“Drawing has always been more than drawing”:
Derrida and disegno

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“…le dessin a toujours été plus que le dessin.”
(Jacques Derrida)

1. Disegno

It would be trite and obvious to say that all I can provide in a short essay is a sketch of the problem (or is it a thematics?) of drawing, from among the abundance of the references to the subject in Jacques Derrida’s writing. Indeed, what I want to sketch is an answer to the, for me at least, simple and puzzling question: Why drawing and not painting? The obvious answer would be that Derrida speaks of drawing rather than painting (or of colour, as we shall see) because in drawing, in the encounter with drawing, there is the experience of the trait, of the differential trace that marks all his work from the ground-breaking essay on différenciation. Derrida proposes the simple fact that any mark is already re-marked: the first mark is already second if it is to be identifiable and to signify. This is the structure of what Derrida calls “the differential inappearance of the trait” (1993: 53). But the trait, as many have pointed out, is also the brushstroke (see Brunette and Wills, 1994). Of course, matters are never by any means so simple with Derrida, and so mine will be perforce an excessively and necessarily sketchy gesture, a drawing out and drawing down.

In Memoirs of the Blind Derrida confesses, “I have always experienced drawing as an infirmity … I still think that I will never know either how to draw or how to look at a drawing” (1993: 37). This, of course, did not stop him looking at drawings and writing about drawing. In a short text of 2005, Le dessin par quatre chemins (The four pathways of drawing), Derrida explores four lines of force around the fact that “the possibility and meaning of drawing remains to be thought” and that, in the phrase I have taken as my title, “drawing has always been more than drawing” (2005a: 4). Those four lines of force which exert a certain attraction (attrait) upon each other are: dessiner, designer, signer, and enseigner. To draw, to designate, to sign and, to keep the assonance going, we might say “to assign” in English (although the French enseigner more literally encompasses both indicating and teaching). From the point of view of the possibility of drawing, and the responsibility of the trait, everything necessarily returns here to a question of the sign. Everything in designing or projecting itself (through its signature) returns towards the same thing: the designatum.
In Italian the word *disegno* refers to a figure, an image traced on a surface through a sign left by a pencil or other means (in other words a drawing), but the word *disegno* also means project or plan. In Italian *disegno* is the noun from *disegnare*. However, in French from the old verb *dessigner* two nouns are possible: *dessein* (with two ‘e’s) and *dessin* (with one) are originally synonyms and also homophones separated by a silent ‘e’, but which come to denote with the Enlightenment the metaphysical and the descriptive. That is, the not simply orthographic, but also semantic, silent ‘e’ marks the gap (écart) between conception and execution, between the intelligible and the sensible. To appropriate a Derridean commonplace, *le dessein* (two ‘e’s) is always already *dessin* (one) and their relationship is co-extensive. As Georges Didi-Huberman has recounted, for Renaissance art theory “*disegno* was a word of the mind as much as a word of the hand. *Disegno*, then, served to constitute art as a field of intellectual knowledge” (2005: 78).

By speaking of *disegno* we have begun to design the subject of *disegno*, paving a pathway (one of Derrida’s chemins) for it. In its claim to discourse on *disegno* (drawing), this paper will be the result of *disegno* (design) that speaks of itself in a reflexive structure, one that does not produce a coincidence with itself but instead forever projects forward the advent of drawing as *disegno*; that is to say, it follows a trace. Drawing as *disegno* is designing itself as drawing. It presents itself from the start as a beginning that is already designed. There can be no metadiscourse on drawing since all work on drawing is also a work of drawing.
2. Allegory

“Not a single day without the line”: nulla dies sine linea is the epigraph on Italian artist Valerio Adami’s letterhead. This is the line that superimposes itself upon the white page. But what is it, this line? Presence and absence; one and multiple; the same as itself and always different. Perhaps, for this very reason it journeys with a single companion, the rubber: that cancels, chases away, renounces, places it under ‘erasure’ (sous rature), allowing it to be different to what it thought it was, to renew itself again each time. The Journey of Drawing was the title of Adami’s exhibition for which Derrida’s essay “+R”, to which I wish to return in a moment, was written. To follow a line, uncover Derrida’s line on drawing, I want to read a drawing by Adami. The drawing I have chosen is a drawing about which Jean-Luc Nancy to complicate matters further, has also published a short reading in book form: À plus d’un titre (2007).

Valerio Adami, Jacques Derrida, allegorical portrait, pencil on paper, January 27, 2004, first exhibited at the Galerie Daniel Templon, Paris in December 2004, barely two months after Derrida’s death, among an exhibition of Adami’s painting, dedicated to Derrida’s memory and titled “Préludes et Après-ludes” (Fig. 1). Let me start with the description I have just furnished, according to Adami: the subtitle “allegorical portrait” was apparently given by Derrida to the drawing (Nancy 2007: 85-6). Derrida, I think, is slipping us a definition of drawing that is at once allegorical and ironical. The reference, of course, is to the two rhetorical figures that Paul de Man judged to be inseparable and irreducible. Derrida writes in Mémoires for Paul de Man:

Paul de Man often stresses the ‘sequential’ and ‘narrative’ structure of allegory. In his eyes, allegory is not simply one form of figurative language among others; it represents one of language’s essential possibilities: the possibility that permits language to say the other and to speak of itself while speaking of something else; the possibility of always saying something other than what it gives to be read, including the scene of reading itself. (1986b: 11)

If one were to recast Adami’s portrait of Derrida in de Manian terms, the portrait is an allegory of drawing and of the attempt to read drawing: that is, to understand the activity of drawing. But, as a reader of de Man will remember, reading as he (de Man) establishes it, whether one is reading Rousseau or Proust (or a drawing) is forever impossible. The act of trying to understand drawing repeats the enigmatic unknowable event (drawing) that is the object of our anxious interpretation.

3. Subjectile

But let me try to recover some ground. Let me really begin with the subjectile: an old technical word meaning what is put under the drawing or painting, the support, that which makes the image or representation possible. In Adami’s drawing we might first wish to say that the subjectile becomes a subject. The point of the pen, one of those old-fashioned fountain pens, grasped tightly by bunched-up fingers, is placed exactly at the edge of the drawing, as if to run over – pour déborder (Nancy 2007: 58) – in this way. This pen nib at the edge, on the edge, raises the question of how to get in to or out of the drawing. The term subjectile marks a certain crossing of borders, as well as an institution of the borders it crosses.
It is Derrida’s reference to the hand – and indeed the very hand we are looking at – that asks us to consider again. The physicality of the primary gesture of the drawing hand here must also be understood as an impulse to touch that which should only be an object of visual perception, to transfer a presence to a deep memory. The drawing is in this sense a “search” rather than a “communication”. Nevertheless, with drawing one is not dealing, according to Derrida, with an experience of blocking vision, but of refining it, through (behind [derrière]) the mirror, and igniting its internal sparks and revelatory breaths. As he has explored at great length, and with great subtlety, in Le Toucher Jean-Luc Nancy (2005b), the privilege of the visible has been constantly sustained and framed by the privilege of touch.

4. Desk and books

The preface to A Taste for the Secret, written with Maurizio Ferraris, is titled “Secrétaire”, a reference to “a writing desk in which papers are locked away”, and a secretary “assistant … sparring partner … interviewer”, and “a catalogue, even an iconography or a portfolio, or more exactly an ichnography [from ichnos “trace”] in which one collects, writes or describes traces, which are, at bottom, secrets” (2001: vii). What secrets? In every drawing, in which there exists the tracing of drawing, there is a movement that is secret, that is separate from and irreducible to daily visibility.

And here we have it, a writing desk and books: six in the first line and three in a second line, one held partially open as if it had just been placed back down in its place in the line and a finger or thumb had been removed from the gap between the pages. What might their titles be? Let us fantasise for a moment that they might be Hegel and Genet: Aesthetics, Faith and Knowledge, Phenomenology of Spirit, Funeral Rites, Our Lady of the Flowers, The Thief’s Journal. The references would be to the building blocks of Derrida’s strange and powerful “bookish” volume Glas (1974), which blends a meticulous commentary on Hegel’s philosophical works, in one column of a vertically divided page, with a more lyrical, fragmented commentary on Jean Genet’s literary writings in a facing column. This juxtaposition, apposition or opposition of the textual columns, and widely diverse writing styles gives rise to provocative semantic and phonemic networks: “phonogrammatic” is Derrida’s adjective. There are also sidebars or baby columns in different typefaces; each column has its own continuity but is not impermeable to oblique interconnections, creating a multi-directional reading. The reading process is further complicated by the presence of a number of what Derrida refers to as “Judas holes”: peepholes through the commented texts that give self-conscious access to autobiographical or signatory effects.

First published a year after Glas in Derrière le Miroir, no. 214, and then reprinted in The Truth in Painting, the essay “+R (par-dessus le marché)” (“+R: (Into the Bargain)”) introduces Adami’s drawing exhibition Le voyage du dessin (The Journey of Drawing). Derrida’s essay functions as part of the exhibition, and undercuts its commercial underpinning, as well as offering the supplementary function of critical commentary. In particular “+R” examines several drawings of Adami, notably two studies for a drawing after Glas and a portrait of Walter Benjamin, described by Derrida as a “hieroglyph of a biography” (1987: 179). Adami’s characteristic fissured picture plane, his composition by erasure, and his use of textual citations in the image become the ground for Derrida’s examination of the
art mark/art market and the economy of the (sur)plus-value of the letter. Adami’s rendering of Derrida’s texts and his handwriting become in turn the captions and illustrations dispersed in Derrida’s subsequent essay. And, finally, Adami’s use of Derridean texts affords Derrida the opportunity to comment on his own transformation into an image.

The first drawing after *Glas* (Fig. 2), appearing to represent a text written on the back of a canvas, effects the figure of chiasmus as a crossing-out by a triple-play manoeuvre of, first, a text partially hidden under a fold at the bottom; second, the X near the middle which could be read as barred; and, finally, the X at the top, a sort of false start cut off by the edge of the paper. *Marges* (*Margins*, the title of Derrida’s essay collection) written and crossed over at the top, occupies the title position but seems to have been folded over from the bottom of the other side of the canvas. The text’s continuation over the folds at the right undoes any notion that the writing preceded the folding. As does the *mise en page* of the drawing, its reduction in size, its place first of all in a sequence which includes its own repetition (in *The Truth in Painting* on pages 153, 167 and the front cover).

The second drawing after *Glas* is titled *ich* (Fig. 3). The German first person pronoun *ich* when transliterated back into the Greek (*iota plus chi*) designates Christ, as traditionally symbolised by a fish-like emblem that provides a Greek acronym for Jesus Christ. Furthermore, for Derrida, as a pseudomorpheme of the abbreviated Greek word *ichtus* (*fish*), the reversed *ich* is *chi* chiasmus (x), the rhetorical figure whose double criss-cross marks this drawing as it did the previous one. In this chiasmatic exchange it would be wrong, though, to think of the fish as drawing and the words as writing. The outlines of the fish loosen and disintegrate and become at their tail an angular scribble, and notice how a capital ‘A’ and a ‘D’ seem to materialise at the right below its tail.

The *Glas* drawing contains several other truncated words, including part of Derrida’s signature and an implied *Je (ich)* in the capital ‘J’ of Jacques, as well as, at the bottom of the page, a relic of Derrida’s first poem published at the age of 17. One of Derrida’s strategies in *Glas* is to show how Genet’s autobiographical writings comment on, and eventually undermine, the very assumptions about the role of the signature which inform definitions of autobiography. He does this through a commentary via those “Judas holes” on the way his own signature, the name that signs *Glas*, operates just as he claims Genet has done. The result is not only a
theoretical critique which questions the assumption that the signature is a mark in the text that points to an extra-textual source of the text, one that he developed around the same time in *Signsponge* (1984), but is a radical displacement of the genre of autobiography that now must include *Glas* as one of its examples.

This still leaves the question of the (double) signature on the drawing. Derrida’s signature or “half signature” is not original but reproduced; here it is a reproduction of a reproduction, the signature is as much Adami’s as it is Derrida’s, since it is reinscribed in Adami’s characteristic hand. If in *Glas* the reader has to generate a meaningful relation between the two juxtaposed texts on Hegel and Genet, in “+R” the viewer moves in a similar way between Adami’s drawing and Derrida’s writing. But, as I have been at pains to insist, the drawings are not illustrations. They function as an accompaniment. In the light of this account of Derrida’s discussion we might ask: what then is drawing, a drawing, as such? Is it possible to distinguish it, if we take the example of “+R”, from hypothetical writing on drawing, on these drawings? Can we distinguish, that is, between writing that speaks about drawing and writing that appears within drawing? When does the drawing begin to become writing and the writing drawing?

5. Landscape and circumflex

Like the portrait convention of placing landscape or landscapes behind the figure, Adami’s drawing has its own background landscape: a pointed hill and a desert of dry, schematic trees. It is noteworthy Adami confirms that for him this is Derrida’s Algeria, a desert of dunes, small hills and trees without leaves (Nancy 2007: 91). Given, as we have seen, the emphasis placed on the graphic effects of diacritical marks in *Glas* it is perhaps significant, therefore, that the strangely pointed hill reminds us of the French accent, the circumflex. It is the same disseminative drift of the circumflex that features in *Glas* in the play between the proper name Genet and the flower *genêt*. It is all, Derrida suggests there, “A question of the circumflex: of a ‘fruitless’ complication of the orthography” (1986a: 230bi 257). But the circumflex is not just a diacritical caprice, or an archaic mark of punctuation, it has the quality of what David Wills calls a “graphic effect” that constitutes, he continues, “perhaps the most explicit example of the figural in Derrida’s writing” (2001: 113). The very inbuilt graphicality of language becomes, as Wills outlines it, “both a cohesive and disruptive force” (114). The circumflex is one of the minimal traces of the way in which, for Derrida, writing is already constituted by the “figuro-pictorial” but for Adami, in turn, how the pictorial is already constituted by the “semantico-syntactic”.

6. Face

We come now to the figure, the portrait face. To all appearances it is a face that doubles, its planes sliding and meeting behind each other, to cover and envelope, reveal and display like Jean-Luc Nancy suggests “like the carapace of a tortoise or a suit of armor that plays against itself and pushes its plates or its scales one upon the other in slippages and progressive rubbings where the disposition of a face in waiting breaks up (*se brouille*)” (2007: 68; my translation). And what of the three eyes that all look to the left, the central one perhaps cyclopean (see Derrida 1993: 87ff)? We register the hint of a certain non-presence in the gaze that looks to us but doesn’t regard us directly in the face, face-to-face. The expression on the
lips: a mocking yet tender smile. A smile that now, inevitably, recalls Derrida’s final words spoken for him by his son Pierre at his graveside: “Smile for me, he [Derrida] says, as I will have smiled for you until the end. Always prefer life and constantly affirm survival... I love you and am smiling at you from wherever I am” (2007: 244). Je vous souris: we hear the assonance but also dissonance between survivre and sourire in what Nancy has baptised as “this surviving portrait that will have become the allegory of his smile” (2007: 38; my translation).

7. Cat

According to David Wills, the essay “+R” represents “the most fertile nexus of relations among framing, animals, and autobiography” in any of Derrida’s writings (2001: 126). As we have seen, a fish hooked and emerging from the water is analysed by Derrida as the figuration of a play or competition of his signatures, signatures that Adami also draws on the surface of the work. In Adami’s portrait of Derrida, on our left protruding from the border, its head completely exposed, is a gazing cat. In terms of formal compositional dynamics, this cat is a case of what in the Renaissance Leonbattista Alberti, giving advice to painters in his Della pittura, called a “spectator figure”. It represents the displaced glance of the picture’s real spectator: it is the spectator’s painted deputy. What we see is not a gaze looking at us but the gaze, our gaze, itself displaced. By it, the cat, it is the act of our seeing that we see. Plausibly posed as a bystander or onlooker to the depicted scene, the cat yet flagrantly represents us – like it, observers of a scene from which, spatially, we are and must remain implacably separate. Often, like a lead-in figure, the spectator figure stands in the wings and gazes into the depicted scene. Like the real spectator, it is separated from the scene it observes by a depicted space it can never cross. The structure of a cat’s eye is a permanent gaze that unblinkingly fixes the instant as if in a moment of eternal attention. It is the cat that considers and guards the secret of that which it sees. The cat without words. We notice the ears of the cat pricked up as if listening for language.

The cat at the edge of the drawing recalls for us the moment, recounted in The Animal That Therefore I Am, when one Paris morning, while naked in his bathroom about to take a shower, Jacques Derrida observes his cat observing him. Observe is not quite the right word here; this “looking” of the cat is more directed, more intentional, and more disturbing because of this. He was, Derrida says, “faced with the cat’s eyes looking at me [qui me regarde] as it were from head to toe, just to see [pour voir], not hesitating to concentrate its vision [sa vue] – in order to see, with a view to seeing – in the direction of my sex” (2008: 373). “Caught naked, in silence, by the gaze [le regard] of an animal” (ibid.: 372) Derrida has difficulty overcoming his embarrassment. Why he asks does he “have trouble repressing a reflex dictated by immodesty”? Why is he disturbed by “the impropriety that comes of finding oneself naked, one’s sex exposed, stark naked before a cat that looks at you without moving”? He gives this old experience, the impropriety that comes “from appearing in truth naked, in front of the insistent gaze of the animal, a benevolent or pitiless gaze, surprised or cognizant”, a new name – animalseance – derived from the French for impropriety (malséance).

In Derrida’s essay where these events are recounted, the malaise of this scene in the bathroom plays out over a crossing of borders between human and animal. “The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins there,” suggests Derrida (397). The nudity in front of the cat is like the nudity in
front of the drawer of the drawing. Adami who gazes to draw his subject has re-
marked that in terms of the dynamics of the drawing he thinks of himself as the
cat (Nancy 2007a: 92). In his turn, the subject is exposed, his shirt front is open,
his face is denuded under the artist’s gaze, indeed the drawing may turn against
him and show him what he is not or what he does not want to believe/see.

8. Table

In the upper left of our drawing there is a table in the sky. Tavola in Italian also
means board or panel (subjectile) for a painting. It is a table that floats in a phan-
tasmatic fashion, its leg somehow fixed into another subjectile, the wall, one of
the two walls we see of the four that must surround the figure. A single leg
supporting the corner of a table suspended in the sky that has upon its table-top
lightly drawn the sign of a cross. Perhaps it is a “drawing table”, the table on
which this drawing was drawn, a table that is then drawn mysteriously sky-
ward? And what if the cross isn’t a symbol, a Christian cross, but rather a mark of
the artist’s process, a sign of the drawing, part of the squaring up, its mapping?
As a sign of position and positioning its longer line may be extended as a mark
for the J. (Je) of J. Derrida, it points us to Jacques, and the cross-line if extended
passes through the forehead of the figure, the portrait of Derrida. So, a sign of
position and positioning. As if the writer’s desk has become this table/is this ta-
ble lifted out, but no books, no hand that draws or writes, a tabula rasa. The cross
is also the cross of erasure (sous rature) and the crossing of chiasmus (x). The cross
on the table is also the ‘+’ (plus) of Derrida’s economical title of economy. A seem-
ingly off-hand incision that becomes a double and doubling signature, of writer
and artist, a marking that through its double-crossings, its marking and market-
ing, signs and binds the two discourses of writer and artist.

9. Signature

So here in this drawing, like those of Glas, we have it, a sort of signature, but not
really, balancing on an inclined line that bisects the top quarter of the composi-
tion diagonally, crossed, divided or fissioned. But this may also be the line and the
trait that the pen, which is gripped so firmly, at the opposing side of the com-
position is drawing. This name like a mountain range at the top of the drawing.
A name like an avalanche that might slip down and be lost in the impossible.
This incline is the counter-band (contre-bande) Derrida makes reference to in Glas
(1986a: 244a). “A band passing from the upper sinister corner of the escutcheon
to the lower dexter corner” (American Heritage Dictionary) (cited in Leavey 1986:
178). But also a surnom that surmounts Adami’s signature at the bottom right
(Adami’s name that shares a ‘da’ with it), next to the date of the drawing (257 days
before Derrida’s death). The portrait can only appear in truth in the disappear-
ance (the surmounting) of the name. But also a nickname of sorts, like the one
that might be carved in a desktop by a naughty schoolboy: Jackie Derrida.

10. Colour

Perhaps the most striking thing about Derrida’s essay on Adami in Glas is the ab-
sence of colour from the drawings discussed and yet the painstaking, if convo-
luted, analysis of colour in this text that draws meticulously upon visual exam-
pies that are just drawings and are colourless. How is it that the graphic is used
to discuss an absent chromatic? Or drawing to talk about painting? This is made even more striking because Derrida chastens us on this very point in *Memoirs of the Blind*: “We are talking here about drawing, not painting” (1993: 44), he admonishes. But to return to “+R”; the text in question. It is no doubt of significance that the first mention of colour in the essay on Adami comes in a passage where Derrida is commenting on his own signature on the edges of the drawing and he remarks that two letters of his name (those two that he shares with Adami) are missing: “The *da* is not there, *hic et nunc*, but it is not lacking. Like colour?” He then defers… “We'll have to see later...” (1987: 159). Colour, then, is a mode of deferring, it is the “unanticipated”. Colour is something we must wait for. On the same page as the passage cited earlier, Derrida writes of all the drawn lines of the Adami drawings, all their *traits* together: “Let drawing = *tr*” (1987: 170). What can he mean by this enigmatic statement? What is the significance of this sublexeme *tr*? Immediately, he lists a number of *tr* words which his translator cleverly catches:

The *treachery of this translation or transcription*, the *transpassing*, the *trance or tragedy of Ich*, the *transpiercings*, *trunks*, *trepannings*, the *tréma* or the *ex-tra* which interest Adami have apparently no linguistic or semantic affinity with what I say I am doing … when I *travail*, *tremble* or become *troubled* while writing. (1987: 171) [my italics]

He continues: “But if *tr* is each time altered, transformed, displaced by what appears to complete it, it keeps a sort of self-sufficiency” (171). This matrix, as Jonathan Tiplady notes, “is singular because it does not simply stand pregnantly vacant, allowing for an event but not already inciting it; instead the matrix *tr* already has within it the events it is supposed to be merely hatching” (2003: 208). Despite their listing and retracing in moments of translation, *travel*, *traction*, *trains*, *traits*, *transactions*, *transfer*, *traversals*, *trailings*, and of course the Italian *ritratti* (portraits), words encountered along the trajectory of *tr* cannot be retrieved in a thematic inventory. The two letters have no identity for themselves, for there is no way to vocalise *tr*, I have to say or spell it to you like that, ‘*tr*’.

I now turn to a passage on the following page. In some way my entire essay so far has been working towards a citation of this unusual passage and to saying a few words about it in conclusion:

The rigor of the divide between *trait* and colour becomes more trenchant, strict, severe and jubilant as we move forward in the [Adami’s] so-called recent period. Because the gush of colour is held back, it mobilizes more violence, potentializes the double energy: first the full encircling ring, the black line, incisive, definitive, then the flood of broad chromatic scales in a wash of colour.

The colour then transforms the program, with a self-assurance all the more transgressive (perceptual consciousness would say “arbitrary”) for leaving the law of the trait intact in its inky light. There is, to be sure, a contract: between the drawing which is no longer an outline or sketch, and the differential apparatus of the colours. (1987: 172)

Derrida’s logic is clear enough. We have here what we might call the “counter-effect of colour”: drawing the black line is an act of aggression against colour and by being that invites colour’s very revenge. Colour most forcefully *is* when it is most rigorously held back and detained. In the context of Derrida’s wider work
we have an example of what Hillis Miller has called Derrida’s “refraining”: “the contradictory ‘with-against’ movement that characterizes Derrida’s work” (2007: 279) he calls it. Formulations where the system in question does not close because it is entrenched, transposable, transgressive, traversed, tremulous, troubled etc. The opposition between the trait and colour is not really an opposition at all; it is a question of supplementarity. Colour supplements the drawn line by filling it out. At the same time colour brings into the open what is the essential of the drawn line. Colour is already there when it is most forcibly held back, when it is a retrait. Adami’s colourless drawings precisely because they so strenuously resist it are already awash with colour.

Of course, in this sketch I have not been able to provide a satisfactory representation of Derrida’s thought on drawing, nor, despite some hypotheses, a satisfactory account of what drew him to drawing. This is, I conclude, because with the question of drawing there can be no “originary” insight, because with Derrida, as Geoff Bennington says, “there is complexity at the origin” and “his thinking turns around the thought that the origin is not simple, and that a non-simple origin has immeasurable consequences for thought” (2007: 231). There has been no colour here, in the images I have shown you, no chromatic in the graphic, but neither a simple chromatic-graphic distinction, and yet what I have been attempting to do is a certain kind of colouring in; the sort of “filling-in” one finds in those books that children use made up of thick black lines (like, of course, Adami’s) which form spaces to be filled up upon a white page. It is a form of touching up which forces us to ask once again with Derrida: “Does one ever get over drawing, is one ever done mourning it?” (1993: 39).

References


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