

3

interstices

SPACES BETWEEN LINES

a journal of architecture and related arts

"'The enchantments of reality' has the air of a paradox. But when the object is perceived by particular [illegible] unique and not merely the member of a family, when it appears independent of any general relation and detached from the sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable in the light of ignorance, then and then only it be a source of enchantment."

(Samuel Beckett *Proust* (New York: [illegible])

interstices

Interstices is an open forum

for the dissemination of architecture and thought.

It is a non-profit publication of the

Department of Architecture, University of Auckland.

This issue is supported by a grant from the visual arts publication programme Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of New Zealand, and by a grant from the Winstone Limited Centenary Education Trust.

All correspondence should be addressed to:

The Editor, Interstices, Department of Architecture, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland New Zealand, e-mail interstices@auckland.ac.nz

ISSN 1170-585X

Published by University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Copyright © 1995

Printed by Monographics Ltd, Auckland, New Zealand

Bromide Production by Master Lithographics

EDITORIALS

A Particular Encounter

Defined by domestic ritual, a house speaks to "houses" of many other times and places; it occupies the enviable condition of simultaneity. The resonance of the individual architectural project holds true within other building typologies as well.

At the same time, individual architects often wish to bring something of their particular selves to the architecture project, to enliven it, to particularize it as we are. Architecture is not necessarily responsive to this particular calling.

Our human dilemma is that while we identify ourselves and our work with the particulars of our individual being, these are always subject to universals. The particular and collective dimensions of living were, of course, fiercely debated in Vienna between Freud and that notorious circle defined by Wittgenstein, Kraus, Schoenberg and Loos—the contest between the determination of an organism and the life of language.

If we boldly make a claim for the individual life, then we can say that while architecture lives many lives, we each live but one particular life; or as Milan Kundera wrote in *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*,

"We can never know what to want, because, living only one life, we can neither compare it with our previous lives nor perfect it in our lives to come."

To the project of architecture, architects must persist in drawing that breathe of life that one discovers in the sketch; to enliven architecture, to particularize it, even when it resists us. Through a tense labor, the individual has the cunning to conceive a near-vital architecture.

Keith Evan Green

Specifications

As art of ordering architecture demands a coherence, a bringing together, a joining, a jointing of specific differences. A construction joint or a room do not have to hold together the way a garden or a city, which is never finished, do but a building at a certain level must be assembled and hold together. The challenge of the particular, however, is the threat that nothing might be able to be said of it or made of it. It poses the limits of language. Can we even say that the particular is an idea, except in so far as it is already brought within an existing system of sense, which is to say, a system of universals? The moment of resistance by something truly specific to any form of generalization, any elevation to the level of unity and of ideas that sustain a unity, is potentially a moment of sublime breakdown to be contemplated and even prolonged with a certain cultivation. This very attempt at editorializing, with its necessary demands for an overview, must acknowledge its own limits in the face of this.

The unique, the singular, the heterogeneous, the new, fall outside the canon, they fall outside sense, raising the dilemma of authentication and authorisation in the guise of other singulars: the individual witness and the signature. But even the 'I' in its declaration of singularity does not turn out to be a stable entity.

At the furthest limits of certainty and the known world chance and unaccountable phenomena demand to be brought into the realm of intelligible systems and institutionalized knowledge. The task of ordering, mapping, and bringing to the level of cultural visibility is an intimate part of the colonial universalization of productive and habitable space that is now so questioned by exposure of internal conflicts. Places, sites, texts, for example, are not simply 'found' but are a product both of the coloniser's expectations, intentions, and interpretations and of dialogue between coloniser and colonised. Thus a diversity may be exposed between and within presumed homogeneous discourses where the smallest

particulars may become the focal point of their intersection.

In effect it is the smooth finish of discursive rationality itself which totalises and enslaves in its refusal to risk the death of meaning in anything that stands outside its empire. Order, classically, was constructed by a systems of substance and accidents, form and matter, part and whole; relationships supported by grammar, metaphysics, power structures. With the break up of such systems has come the need to think otherwise - obliquely and peripherally - to elude the totalising effect of purely rational thought.

Architecture is never simply analytical but necessarily projective. The sort of conjectural thinking that Ginzburg locates in the minute and specific narratives of clues and traces has been related by Marco Frascari to architectural knowledge, itself a way of thinking that cannot be explained through the use of demonstrative reasoning or by the scientific method. If Mies' minute concern with the particularity of the building craft relative to the universals of modernist space, was typified by his "God is in the details," a notion with its own particular micro-history, Frascari reads the detail as site of creation itself. The exercise of detailing here becomes the guiding concept for the discipline of architecture where by invention the elements and jointing are seen as a fertile nexus of all forms of connection in a chiasmus, a tense dialectical crossing, between reason and constructing, between the construction of construal and the construal of construction.

The menace and instability of the particular, is in that it is accidental, it is what simply befalls and denies classification. The risk, so common in our local architecture, is that a work may, in the absence of an idea, fall apart into an assemblage of details or else never rise beyond the banal, that is, the general which is opposed to the particular, for in becoming common property, a commonplace, the particular is transformed into the banal, being the particular we know too well to see. The banal is "the singular in general," that is to say, the inability to maintain the two terms in their difference. Unlike Duchamp's "beauty of indifference" that comes so close to it but instead raises the question of what was not already art, the banal defies the impulse to become symbol, or figure; it belongs to no poetic genus. The challenges are to transform the everday detail into myth, to join and make differences visible while maintaining their fertile particularity.

Ross Jenner

Counting Particulars

"Et n'est-ce pas le fantasme lui-même qui appelle le 'detail,' la scène minuscule, privée, dans laquelle je puisse finalement predre place?..."

(Roland Barthes, *Le Plaisir du texte*)

To film is to particularise.
A film shows everything at the same time on the same surface.
Yet the number of things we chose to distinguish in a film is confusing and variable.
Its completeness never ceases to be there in front of us, a power from afar, but viewing is somehow never a complete act.
We are ever aware of what we miss.
One never *looks at* a film, at least heuristically speaking, we *gaze* which is not the same mode of apprehensision.
To gaze is not to see, not to see at all.
We gaze to see more in the whole, to discover the imperceptible.
Perhaps what we gaze at is really the more we cannot see?
So what can it mean to possess a detailed knowledge of film, a film?
Or to turn that question round, what is the role of detail in film?

To film is to engage the triple operation which marks detail.
The first is to approach or enter into a field, to enter into the particulars.
This is the penetration of an elective epistemology of the intimate which the action of the zoom lens or the rack of focus brings with it.
Descending to particulars.
This intimacy however also conveys with it a perverse violence, and surely it is perverse.
One approaches thus only to cut to something else, or to cut up, to morcelise.
This is the fundamental meaning, the 'part', of particular and it is the etymology of detail, too, in *la taille*, 'to cut from.'
The cutting bench of the film edit.
Finally the particular, in a move no less perverse, designates an operation that is symmetrically opposite to the cut: the assembling together of the pieces of the whole.
As if the cut has only provided for the collection together of all the pieces, was only to provide for the possibility of a summation in the pan of the camera around a room across its objects, or over the faces in a crowd, entranced with diversity.
It is also there in the totalising systematics of combination in film montage.

So a triple and paradoxical operation is in play.
The particular with its three operations - proximity, partage, summation - depends upon an ideal of knowledge and totality.
The whole depends upon the part.
But fixing the particular also allows us to redefine and reconstitute the whole.
The particular is not a fragment.[1]
For the fragment relates to a whole in order to put it in question by posing it as absence or enigma or lost memory.
The fragment is not defined by its position in a compositional chain since, as Barthes has noted, itis "syntagmatically irresponsible."[2]
The fragment can only be explained according to the whole.
In contrast the particular imposes the whole, its legitimatised presence, its hegemony, its recovery.

The great fortune of the particular in the field of interpretation is that it is not simply restricted to its common sense meaning.
The assumption that simply in order to know something one needs discover it in detail, discover its details.
As if the enigmas of the visible have but one solution.
But the particular, as we have seen, is more of an event than an object.
Its presuppositions are certainly more complex and more strategic and in this sense it is a risk for thought.
It is this risk which interpretation must indicate: it can only indicate, not measure, it.
The intractable which constitutes its object.
The object of the particular is not a representation of the visible world but the fragile moment of its defiguration.

Every film ends with a cut but also keeps going.
The reel never stops like the endless list of the *et cetera*.[3]
This *et cetera* is the trope of inexpressibility and incompletion which seems to dominate all discourses of the particular.
For the particular is a discussion that is without end.

Laurence Simmons

[1] See Omar Calabrese, *Neo-Baroque. A Sign of the Times*, trans. Charles Lambert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), in particular Chapter 4 'Detail and Fragment'; and Jacques Derrida, "Les morts de Roland Barthes," *Poetique*, XII 47 (1981): 269-292.
[2] "Le troisième sens: notes de recherches sur quelques photogrammes de S. M. Eizenstejn," *Cahiers du cinema*, 222 (1970): 17.
[3] See Alan Liu, "Local Transcendence: Cultural Criticism, Postmodernism, and the Romanticism of Detail," *Representations* 32 (Fall 1990): 75-113, p.84 ff



JONATHAN LAMB

Coconuts: First Persons Singular and Un-relative Events

"Into our bay one morning sailed a fleet of ships flying the British flag and anchored offshore. The gunwales and rigging were full of sailors carrying pineapples and tortoises and waving scrolls with maxims on them in Latin and English. On the quarter-deck, amid officers in tricorne and wig, Captain Cook fixed the shore with his telescope."
(Italo Calvino, The Cloven Viscount*)*

It is perhaps not necessary to point out that this scene never occurred except in the imagination of a novelist, for rarely in the history of voyages is a potential discoveree likely to be treated to such an elaborate pantomime of authenticity. In the fiction, each exotic thing held up by the sailors is matched and naturalised by an inscription. The particular article - a pineapple, a tortoise - is no sooner displayed than it is fetched within the frame of knowledge and made exemplary of some maxim or truth. The scrolls of Latin and English wisdom redeem the scene from all troublesome strangeness by rendering it legible, and by transforming the enigma of discovery into a recognisable event and a valuable lesson. It meets the condition laid down by Jeremy Bentham for making voyages of discovery run parallel with good instructions: "If it be a matter of importance and of use to us to be made acquainted with *distant* countries, surely it is not a matter of much less importance, nor of much less use to us, to be made better and better acquainted with the chief means of living happily in our own."[1]

If the scrolled plunder from remote places brings the event of Captain Cook's voyages ethically and topographically home to the people on the shore in Calvino's story, it does so by means of a dialectic of the particular and the universal that authorises the equation, on the one hand, between the unspeakably singular thing and an untruth and, on the other, between language and universality. No matter how particular you may mean a thing to be, to speak at all is to exhibit the divine capacity of language of reversing the meaning of what is said in respect of sense-certainty. Should the sailors on the gunwales and the rigging be supposed to be engaged with their pineapples and tortoises in a mime of sense-certainty, pointing at 'absolutely singular entities,' unique sensuous objects pinpointed as 'this' tortoise and 'this' pineapple, then either what is meant cannot be reached by language insofar as they are trying to speak (like Gulliver when he talks of European peculiarities in Houyhnhmland) about an irrational idea, 'something which *is not*'; or they succeed in saying something quite contrary from what they intend: to impersonate Hegel: "When I say, 'a single thing,' I am really saying what it is from a wholly universal point of view, for everything is a single thing; and likewise 'this thing' is anything you like... and I have only uttered the universal all the time."[2] The inscribed scrolls are icons of the power of language to retrieve as significant the most heterogeneous particulars of a voyage of discovery. Without the script you have, from a public point of view, nothing. Speaking of the difficulties encountered by the first chroniclers of the Spanish conquest and settlement of America, Anthony Pagden points out that all particulars falling outside of the canon were simply nonsense: "Nothing could be made intelligible in terms of an alternative non-scriptural authority."[3] Without a scroll, historians of the *Conquista,* such as Oviedo and Las Casas, are condemned to the perpetual repetition of the same vain gesture of specification ("the wild animals, the tigers, lions, serpents and other noxious beings" - Oviedo) with nothing but the first person singular to authenticate it ("Only I can be trusted to know what I write" - Las Casas). (Pagden, pp. 61, 76)

I want to see if the same dialectic that universalises the particular tortoise and pineapple holds in respect of a coconut. On the day that Cook died he was in pursuit of some particular things - tongs, chisels, the lid of a water-cask and the *Discovery*'s cutter - that had gone missing the day before. He took hostage the senior local chief, Kalani'opu'u, usually a successful tactic in obtaining the return of pilfered equipment. While the crowd was assembling that was shortly to disperse the British and to kill Cook, Kalani'opu'u was crouched by the ships' boats, detained by two of his chiefs and his wife, Kaneikapolei, apparently very unwilling to go on board. At this critical juncture a priest chose to offer the dejected chief and the angry captain a coconut. According to an eye-witness, Lt Molesworth

Phillips, it was all a ruse: "An artful Rascal of a Priest was singing and making a ceremonious offering of a Coco Nut to the Captain and Terre'oboo to divert their attention from the Manoeuvres of the surrounding multitude."[4]

Probably the finest account of this translation, and the one that is most faithful to the structure of the dialectic, is that of Marshall Sahlins. According to him the fruit is placed at the site of a conflict of the human and divine, signalling the imminence of a sudden shift of power relations that is typical of the usurpational pattern of Hawaiian cultural history. This crisis by the boats is one of the many radical contingencies that disturb but also renew a culture capable, under the stress of the unforeseen accidents and chances, of improvising a functional revaluation of mythic signifiers and absorbing the interruptive phenomenon - including "this unparalleled Commander" Captain Cook[5] - into its mode of reproduction. If Hegel triumphantly exhibits the paradox of a singular entity that declares the universal, Sahlins is no less delighted by antinomies which proclaim the continuity of interruptions. In the case of Cook's arrival at Kealakekua Bay, "The event was absolutely unique, and it was repeated every year."[6] The scene by the boats for an instant destabilises the triad of 'the god, the man, and the woman' upon which the ritual of the Makahiki is founded; but inscribed on the scroll beneath Sahlins' coconut is this maxim, "*Usurpation itself is the principle of legitimacy.*" (Sahlins, p. 80)

Challenging what he takes to be the Eurocentric and hagiographic assumptions behind Sahlins' theory of conjuncture, Gananath Obeyesekere tries to locate the coconut within the practical rationality of an Hawaiian discourse notable for "contentious and multiple interpretation," one capable of weighing "the actuality of myth and event against the pragmatics of commonsense."[7] He concedes, however, that the pre-European culture of Hawaii is hard to find behind the interpretative crust left behind by explorers, missionaries and structural anthropologists. Indigenous history has been so far corrupted by rival systems of language and belief that all Obeyesekere can reasonably be sure of is that Hawaiians must have known the difference between a god and a man (Lono and Cook), and between the miniature boat in which the god is represented as travelling and Cook's vessel, the *Resolution*. His privileging of an empiricist practice leaves him scant room for manoeuvre, however, when it comes to the coconut. He is refusing Sahlins' dialectic, on the one hand, but, on the other, has insufficient access to cultural data to estimate the ritual value of the priest's gesture and chant. "My own guess is that we will never know why this offering was made jointly to Cook and Kalani'opu'u, and any number of hypotheses are possible and plausible."(Obeyesekere, p. 180) While keeping in reserve the possibility of an explanation, Obeyesekere allows the coconut to float free of scrolls and to claim a particularity independent of a local or universal meaning. Instead of registering the repeatability of a unique event, the coconut remains obstinately a coconut, signing and representing nothing, simply constituting an unimprovable contingency: a bare chance, a sheer whim, an event unconnected with any of the other particulars of that day: the tongs, the chisels, the lid of the water-cask, etc., which erupt into the story of Cook's death with the same weird irrelevance.

Everyone involved in this disjointed episode was agreed upon its unaccountability. It was a "sudden and confused transaction," an "accidental affray," "a chain of events which could no more be foreseen than prevented."[8] There were no scrolls to make these particulars intelligible, and therefore no adequate account or narrative to mitigate what William Dampier calls "the Hazard of all outward Accidents in strange and unknown Seas."[9] "It is very hard to be sure of anything of this sort," observes John Harris of reports from the Southern Ocean.[10] Let us consider what is at stake in the representation of hazards and uncorroborated circumstances. There is the thing itself - the coconut - and the first person singular who saw it; then there is the testimony of the first person and the audience who will receive or reject it. The aim of the narrator is to convey the unprecedented and unexampled impact of the experience; the aim of the audience is to test its credibility and to understand it. These aims are not compatible; for if the experience is probable and intelligible - that is, if it will bear a scroll above it - it is less than novel and will have failed to render the utter particularity of the thing itself; but if it succeeds in conveying the flavour of the encounter with the bare hazard and the loose circumstance, it will cost the narrator the belief of the audience who, while eager to hear of wonders, will accommodate nothing that is not authorised by an antecedent idea. William Wales, astronomer on Cook's second voyage, puts it like this:

> I have always thought the situation of a Traveller singularly hard. If he tells us nothing that is uncommon he must be

> a stupid fellow to have gone so far and brought home so little; and if he does, why - it is hum - aya - a tap of the Chin; - and - He's a Traveller. (MS 315, Smith 138)

The uncommon is not necessarily intrinsically incredible, as is the miraculous or the marvellous; it becomes so only when the degree of connection between one particular and another falls below the level of probability required by circumstantial evidence.[11] Cook found tattooing as troublesome as cannibalism on his first voyage because he could not assign a cause for it. "The manner in which it is done must certainly cause intolerable pain and may the reason why so few are mark'd at all, at least I know no other."(1.279) Like the Maori design admired for its extravagance by Banks, such a phenomenon is self-subsistent, comparable to itself alone, "and I may truly say like nothing but itself."(2.14, 24) As Michel de Certeau observes, "the history of voyages... tolerates or privileges as an 'event' that which makes an exception to the interpretative codes."[12] The result of operating outside these genres and codes is that even the slightest particulars, when lacking connection with other circumstances and ideas, acquire the same implausibility in the reader's eyes as the monstrous; and in insisting upon them, the voyager is reduced to an iterative or tautologous style that always signals what systems theorists call the improbability of a highly personal message. Forsaking all validating norms, and resting on nothing more solid than the affirmations and figures ornamenting the autoptic claim, 'I saw it with my own eyes,' the natural destination of such a message is complaint, the most improbable of all personal communications. Therefore, we are likely to hear complaints against painful contingencies and against their unintelligibility, complaints against the reader who disbelieves what has been equally difficult to experience and to articulate. Pagden notices this tendency in the historians of the *Conquista*. "In Oviedo's text, complaints about the conditions of composition rapidly slide into complaints about the conditions of life ... the narrator fashions himself as a sufferer."(Pagden, p. 66) Ovieda starts quoting Job.(p. 61, n.37)

It is not just the monstrous, then, that the reader resists, but any event which stands beyond the bounds of knowledge. The reader objects also to the prose in which the event is delivered, whose fault is not that it is hyperbolic or extravagant, but that it is circumstantial in a self-evident and circular way, and that it is couched in an idiom which emphasises the singularity of the first person who has endured the hazard. David Hume, in his essay "Of Miracles," mentions "the miraculous accounts of travellers... their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners" in a context of the miracle as an event divorced from general experience, "when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation."[13] A miracle is no more than a chance that cannot be familiarised by previous experience or authority: an impression lacking the antecedent idea that would warrant its telling. It is like the bare print of a single foot that terrifies Robinson Crusoe, and would terrify anyone limited to the exiguous inference which Hume allows to be the only one that can legitimately be drawn from it, namely "that there was some figure adapted to it, by which it was produced."[14] The slightest circumstance of a narrative that does not encourage the mind comfortably to ascent "from the effect to the cause; and descending again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect"(Hume, *Enquiry*, p.144), will be construed as miraculous and monstrous. Sailors' stories are disbelieved because great hazards are bare chances, and "of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object."(Hume, *Enquiry*, p.148) The hagiography of Cook deprecated by Obeyesekere germinates in the unforeseeable chances and uninterpretable particulars of his death, including the coconut which imparts a miraculous flavour to the event in proportion as it divides it from the universal that would assign it a cause, and inscribe it on a scroll. The coconut is the monstrous first step in the insistence upon that absolutely singular entity which (according to Hegel) is the thing which is not, and which must therefore be a lie. It is the irreducible detail for which no place has been assigned in the order of things and in the genres of narrative.

In fact, Hume questions whether it is possible for an entirely singular and unparalleled event to have a place in our consciousness; but Lord Bolingbroke, starting from a position similar to Hume's, argues that there are such things as coconuts in history:

> The events we are witnesses of, in the course of the longest life, appear to us very often original, unprepared, single, and un-relative, if I may use such an expression for want of a better in English ... they appear such very often, are called accidents, and looked on as the effects of chance ... We get over the present difficulty, we improve the momentary

> advantage, as well as we can, and we look no further. Experience can carry us no further; for experience can go a very little way back in discovering causes: and effects are not the objects of experience till they happen.[15]

Aestheticising this historical problem, Diderot compares the loneliness of the imaginative dramatist with the traveller at the edge of the world: "he is sometimes uncertain if the thing that he declares to there is a reality or a chimera, or if it has any existence outside of himself. He is then at the furthest limits of the energy of the nature of man, and at the extremity of the resources of art."(Pagden 165; *Oeuvres Aesthetique* , 213)

If we look at one of Cook's examples of an un-relative event, experienced at the limit, you can see why the experience delights him and why the report troubles him. He is explaining how the wall of ice he met in the Antarctic put an end to his search for the great southern continent, the task set him by the Admiralty in his first two voyages.

> I, whose ambition leads me not only farther than any other man has been before me, but as far as I think it is possible for man to go, was not sorry at meeting with this interruption, as it in some measure relieved us from the dangers and hardships, inseparable with the Navigation of the Southern Polar regions. Since therefore we could not proceed one Inch farther South, no other reason need be assigned for our Tacking and stretching back to the North ... I will not say it was impossible any where to get farther to the South, but the attempting of it would have been a rash and dangerous enterprise and what I believe no man in my situation would have thought of.[16]

The strained egoism of the entry is owing to the straddling of two irreconcilable extremes demanded of the first person at the limit of the known world. On the one side Cook claims a superbian interest in the uniqueness of his experience, which he has scarcely any need to explain or justify because it is unprecedented and unscrollable; on the other, he is aware of a public that will refuse to locate the limit within the purview of the first person singular, and will want to know why it was found there and not further southward. If there is anything that compensates him for the pains of navigating unknown seas it is Cook's strong sense of being the first person in them, the 'I' possessed of a singular view of a marvellous thing. But if it is expressive of the absence of what ought to be there, and for which a place has been assigned in the narrative formed out of his Admiralty instruction and the inventories of naval stores, Cook becomes very anxious indeed.[17] The tongs, chisels and the lid of the water-cask bear comparison in this respect with the Great Southern Continent, insofar as they are items forming the circumstantial whole of an Admiralty document that constitutes Cook's notion of scrolls. A piece of equipment that goes missing, or a continent that fails to be found, makes a breach in the orderly summary of things and events that his public - the Lords of the Admiralty - have prescribed and require of him.

Hence the troubled sublimity of his meeting with the ice. "I, whose ambition leads me... as far as it is possible to go." What ought to have been the self-proclaimed triumph of the 'I' breaks down into an appeal to a third person standard of probability - the hypothesised 'man in my situation' who takes the place of an antecedent idea, and who imports the question of probability into an account of a particular and un-relative event. As soon as the first person makes room for this other possibility, the incontrovertibility of firstness that it commands crumbles, like the ice, into an alternative (the other man, the unseen gap) which transforms the limit into a predictable index of personal shortcoming, a failure of subjective agency the very opposite of what the first person wants to claim. The sublime of exploration is bordered by the guilt which turns overreaching into diffidence, and supererogatory effort into unworthy caution.

This is anomie in the strict sense of the term: a discrepancy between the norms of success and the institutional means provided for its attainment.[18] Cook experiences it whenever he crosses the border that divides specific instruction from improvisation in the face of the hazard. His Letters of Instruction partly explain why, because they try to incorporate bare chances within the intelligible system of written orders. They told him, "But for as much as in an undertaking of this nature several Emergencies may Arise not to be foreseen, and therefore not particularly to be provided for by Instruction before hand, you are in all such Cases, to proceed, as upon advice with your Officers you shall judge most advantageous to the Service on which you are employed."(Beaglehole, 1. cclxxxiii) Here, the independence of the un-relative event is pre-empted by the same paradox that establishes

the standard of taste in eighteenth-century aesthetic theory. Although what will occur will subjectively be absolutely singular, it will nevertheless be reported as if it were obedient to a law, or some a priori concept. However, from the side of the first person singular, the un-relative event corresponds much more closely to the case of the sublime, insofar as the measure of subjective intensity is the presentation of the unpresentable: specifically the impossibility of representing the discovery of the absence of a continent in an accessible and probable manner to the public.

Cook is aware that his is an impossible task of presentation, and in two remarkable entries in the *Endeavour* journal he tries to isolate the difficulty of narrating a limit-event. The first concerns the limit itself, which confusingly manifests itself to the voyager as confirmation that the outermost boundary has been breached, and also as the obstruction to the possibility of further exploration. It combines features of the pure hazard and with the predictable (and therefore removable) impediment. The second tackles probability in respect of the exaggeration in sailors' stories and the difficulty of believing them.

> Such are the Vicissitudes attending this kind of service and must always attend an unknown Navigation: Was it not for the pleasure which naturally results to a Man from being the first discoverer... this service would be insupportable... The world will hardly admit of an excuse for a man leaving a Coast unexplored he has once discover'd, if dangers are his excuse he is then charged with *Timorousness*... if on the other hand he boldly encounters all the dangers and obstacles he meets and is unfortunate enough not to succeed he is then charged with Temerity and want of Conduct.(Beaglehole, p. 380)

Cook's sense of this is not, as Sahlins argues, of prescriptive systems, that nothing is new "even when what happens is unprecedented."(Sahlins, p. xii) He feels keenly the phenomenal uniqueness of his experience as 'first discoverer,' whose sole pleasure resides in being first: the first person singular topographically and grammatically. However, the pleasure of singularity raises the question of the genre of narratives available for probable self-delivery, and of the conflict between first-hand accounts of hazards and the scrolled particulars preferred by the 'world,' represented by that hypothesised man, perfectly obedient to Admiralty orders, who is always prepared for the unprecedented situation and able to slot it into a credible narrative. Cook is so troubled by his intuition of the discreditable nature of reporting the pleasure of being first among the hazards of the limit, that he projects the guilt of story-telling upon his crew:

> For such are the disposition of men in general in these Voyages that they are seldom content with the hardships and dangers which will naturally occur, but they must add others which hardly ever had existence but in their imaginations, by magnifying the most trifling accidents and Circumstances to the greatest hardships, and unsurmou[n]table dangers without the imidiate interposion of Providence, as if the whole Merit of the Voyage consisted in the dangers and hardships they underwent, or that real ones did not happen often enough to give the mind sufficient anxiety; thus posterity are taught to look upon these Voyages as hazardous to the highest degree. (Beaglehole, 1. 461)

Apart from his sense that the combination of the first person singular with the chances of a cruise in an unknown ocean cause the generic boundaries of truth and fiction to dissolve, it is hard to work out quite what Cook wants to say; for it seems that the only extravagance this imagined narrative will commit is to call dangers dangers and hardships hardships, magnifying accidents in the same tautologous fashion that Cook magnifies the first person. "I say 'I', this singular 'I'... the Now is point to, *this* Now. 'Now'." [Hegel, *Phenomenology*, pp. 62-63].

At the barest side of chance is the first person at the limit, absorbed in an un-relative event, who simply proclaims his identity there: here on the boundary of world stand I, and I am I. At the most scrolled and canonical side of probability is a system of prediction based on the third person who demands or exemplifies the universal element within all human testimony - a system that discredits as monstrous all assertion and reports not foreseeable by virtue of *a priori* concepts or of common sense. If any negotiation is to occur between these two extremes, that is to say, if the first person is to acquire probability in the narration of hazards, it will occur by means of a rhetorical adjustment of particulars. For Cook this adjustment wickedly relies upon the magnification of particulars; for the French it was quite the opposite.

They instituted a mode of travel-writing designed to preserve the first-person in a universalised form. In his influential *Histoire des Navigations aux Terres Australes*, Charles de Brosses assured his audience that, "Le navigateur parle presque toujours lui meme a la premier personne." But the voice will have been subtly adjusted, purged of inelegancies, repetitions and arid details such as dates, distances, anchorages, winds, currents and so forth, and be carefully arranged alongside reports from the same region. Although therefore "l'auteur des faits parl[e] lui-meme de sa proper action" he will acquire authority by passing, as it were, insensibly through the universalising mouth of his historian.[19] Prevost goes even further, manufacturing out of several navigations a joint account that will constitute a system of geography as well as a corpus of narratives, aimed to represent "avec autant d'ordre que de plenitude, l'etat present de toutes les Nations."[20] Now it is clear that their priority is to render the singularities of the first person adventurer in a acceptable form precisely by ejecting details and circumstances that are too particular. A concern of equal importance with this of editing and shaping the raw data of the original journal into a universal form is that of not disturbing the reader. By getting rid of "petits details inutiles"(Prevost, p. v), the convenience of the reader is always consulted, who is by means of these abridgements saved from "intolerable ennui" (de Brosses, p. ix).

When Dalrymple, the arch-advocate of a great southern continent, defended the empiricist alternative preferred by the British, he was well aware that unprocessed accounts of singular events are liable to be greeted with intolerance. He confesses that his *Historical Collection of Voyages* (1770-71) "was as disagreeable to me in writing, as it will be to the reader in his perusal: I am not insensible that the *undress* and uncouth sound of a *literal* translation is enough to frighten all readers except for the *very few* who take up a book *merely* for information."(i.1) What Dalrymple is defending, specifically against the reader's interest, is the figure of *autopsy* which, according to Pagden's account of the *Conquesta* historians, preserves both the first person and the multifarious and intricate details that empower its narrative. "It is the appeal to the authority of the eye witness, to the privileged understanding which those present at an event have over all those who have only read or been told about it." And it consists in amplification. The aim of the narrator ought to be, as Jean de Lery puts it, "to leave nothing out, if that is possible." (Pagden, p. 51) Lemuel Gulliver provides a notorious fictional example, partly based on Dampier, whose commitment to observing "the true Nature and State of the Things described" has, he notices, met with public disapproval. "It has been objected against me by some, that my Accounts and Descriptions of Things are dry and jejeune, not filled with variety of pleasant Matter, to divert and gratify the Curious Reader." (*A New Voyage*, 3, ii) Bougainville encountered the incredulity of his translator, J.-R. Forster because, he partly suspected, his "relation detaillee" was too heavily marked by "la vie errante and sauvage que je mene depuis douze ans. Ce n'est ni dans les forets du Canada, ni sur le sein des mers, que l'on se forme a l'art d'ecrire."[21] He is simply a seaman, "c'est a dire un meneur and un imbecille." (1, xi) Even though he defends an unedited account, Dalrymple suspects that without an editorial supplement, no eye-witness testimony will make much sense or be believed: "Perhaps, indeed, no single voyage can give authentic memorials for such a work [i.e. his translation], without filling up by a web of conjecture what is wanting in the original."[22] It is an effort to be faithful to these discontinuities in his original that John Hawkesworth owns of his compilation of voyages (including Cook's first). "It will probably be thought by many Readers, that I have related the nautical events too minutely." But, he adds, "minutely to relate these events was the great object of the work... for it is from little circumstances that the relation of great events derives its power over the mind."[23]

The anticipation of readerly hostility to autopsy is not ill-founded. The *Monthly Review* recommended the account of Cook's second voyage, reassuring readers who expected nothing more than "an authentic, but dry and every returning detail of latitudes and longitudes, and of bearings, distances, and soundings" that they 'will here meet with much expected entertainment."[24] But the *Critical Review* reversed the judgement in respect of Hawkesworth's work. Although the authors have been "particularly explicit in the detail of all such remarks as served to delineate the maritime circumstances," it observed, this punctuality has not "prevented them from mixing their detail with trifling incidents or reflexions foreign to the subject."[25] George Forster, who offered an account of Cook's second voyage upon new principles of philosophical order, disparaged all previous narratives in these terms: "Facts were collected... and yet knowledge was not increased. [The public] received a

confused heap of disjointed limbs, which no art could reunite into a whole; and the rage of hunting after facts soon rendered them incapable of forming and resolving a single proposition."[26] The *Edinburgh Magazine* said of Hawkesworth, "His work abounds with a multitude of frivolous particulars."

Cook's intuition of the dissolving barriers between a report of maritime exploration and a fiction is explicitly addressed by his ventriloquist, Hawkesworth. He compares his minutely detailed redaction of Cook's and Banks's journals to Richardson's Pamela, "the imaginary herione of a novel that is remarkable for the enumeration of particulars in themselves so trifling, that we almost wonder how they could occur to the author's mind."(Hawkesworth, pp. vi-vii) However, these are the particulars which, solely by virtue of their number, will command attention and belief, and exert their power over the reader's mind.

In fact, Hawkesworth revels in all the narrative liberties which have formed the outline of Cook's complaint against the improbability of the tales of his own crew. Clearly he is keen to multiply the circumstances of vicissitudes, "magnifying the most trifling accidents and Circumstances to the greatest hardships." He is eager also to deny the particular interposition of providence, arguing in his preface that it was not owing to God that the wind dropped after the *Endeavour* went aground on coral, but to sheer chance. "Either the subsiding of the wind was a mere natural event or not; if it was a natural event, providence is out of the question, at least we can with no more propriety say that providentially the wind ceased, than that providentially the sun rose in the morning."(Hawkesworth, 1, xxi) Hawkesworth could not have presented hazard in a more monstrous form. Nor was he in the least inclined to justify the violence of unrelative events by reference to larger narratives of imperial or civilising missions. When it came to firearms, a topic on which Lord Morton had expatiated in the most moving terms in Cook's Royal Society instructions, he says quite simply, "When the command to fire has been given, no man can restrain its excess, or prescribe its effect."(Hawkesworth 2, p. 122) It is an observation of peculiar pertinence to the muddle in Kealakekua Bay, where Cook's decision to fire provoked the violent reaction that cost him his life. "Every excess thus produced is also an inevitable evil," cautions Hawkesworth, but it is unavoidable.

And all this Hawkesworth chose to deliver in Cook's own voice, being convinced that, "a narrative in the first person, would, by bringing the Adventurer and the Reader nearer together, without the intervention of a stranger, more strongly excite an interest." He combines particularity with a first person narrative in order to insist on the unrelative, unprovidential and unenlightened nature of limit-events. If Cook thinks the exaggerations of his crew will result in dangers and hardships being reiterated as dangers and hardships, then the only solecism that will have been committed is the elaboration of the tautology that stands as index of the highest degree hazard or miracle of discovery. In effect, Hawkesworth does no more than expand the tautology around the testimony of the first discoverer: the man who, as Dalrymple puts it, has "done that which no one else ever did before, or can do after him."(Dalrymple, 1, p. xvii) His orientation of the stranger's first person to that of the first discoverer's is the presentation of inconceivable event as inconceivable event by means of minute relation, "for it is from little circumstances that the relation of great events derives its power over the mind." And what is the event? That "which no imagination could possibly conceive."(Hawkesworth, 2, p. 207) A coconut without a scroll.

Hawkesworth's plan is quite the opposite of de Brosses' and Prevost's in this respect. Instead of straining and shaping the original account through the universalising mouth of the invisible historian, he is determined to preserve its intractability. "A digest could not have been made of the whole, without invading the right or each navigator to appropriate the relation of what he had seen."(Hawkesworth, p. vi) By virtue of placing events within the pure ether of experience, where causes act as no more than a chimerical ornament to self-evidence, autoptic vividness is sustained in all its absolute discontinuity. In the voice of Cook, Hawkesworth declares, "The principle causes were such as necessarily resulted from our situation and circumstances, in conjunction with the infirmities of human nature."(Hawkesworth 2, p. 182) It is like Hume's explanation for the footprint; namely, that there was some cause adapted to it by whose means it was produced. It is an explanation that leaves the terror of the inexplicable intact. It is to say that events are known by the experience of

them, that dangers are dangers, and that fear is fear. He will not use hindsight to transform the unforeseeable into predictability, or to blunt the edge of Cook's complaint. Like Oviedo before him, Hawkesworth finds in Job the only scripture apt for the work of delivering indistinguishable particulars: "Shall we receive good from the hand of God and shall we not receive evil?"(Hawkesworth 1, p. xix)

Hawkesworth's fidelity to the experience of unrelative events was not an achievement for which Cook was likely to be grateful, since it set in amber exactly those unscrolled moments in his career which he feared would attract charges of disobedience and mendacity. He wanted an 'I' like de Brosses' or like Adam Smith's impartial spectator that would legitimate his account with posterity by means of a narrative consistent with the commonsense of 'men in general.' Nor were Hawkesworth's readers better pleased. They hated his tedious devotion to the particular; they condemned him for his blasphemy and for the lusciousness of the sexual material; they despised his extenuation of violence, and Dalrymple even blamed him for the loss of the Great Southern Continent. For Cook, Hawkesworth was a godsend, embodying as he did all the unacceptable and opprobrious aspects of discovery. Six months after publishing his *Account*, Hawkesworth died of resentment and despair, complaining bitterly at the way he had been treated by the public. Six years before, Cook was to die contingently and unforeseeably in a setting framed by the presence and absence of minute particulars, Hawkesworth fell a victim to the narrative intransigence of the same sort of particularity. It was not worms as done them in (Sahlins is quite right about this), it was coconuts.

[1] Jeremy Bentham, *A Fragment on Government* , ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (University of London: Athlone Press, 1977), p. 393.
[2] G.W.F. Hegel, *'Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 66.
[3] Anthony Pagden, *European Encounters with the New World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 52.
[4] Cited in J.C. Beaglehole, *The Voyage of the Resolution and Discorery*, 2 vols. (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1967), 1. 535-36.
[5] George William Anderson, *A Complete Collection of Voyages Round the World, 1768-80* (London: Alexander Haig, 1784), p. iii.
[6] Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p.108.
[7] Gananath Obeyesekere, *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 170.
[8] The words are those of James Trevenen, Kalaimoku and William Ellis, cited in Gananath Obeyesekere, *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook*, p. 186, 145; and in Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History*, p. 104.
[9] William Dampier, *A New Voyage Round the World* in *A Collection of Voyages*, 4 vols (London: J. and J. Knapton, 1729), 3, iii.
[10] John Harris, *A Complete Collection of Voyages and Travels*, 4 vols (London: T. Woodward et al., 1744), 1, 332.
[11] On the question of circumstantial evidence and its relation to narrative and history in the eighteenth century, see Alexander Welsh, *Strong Representations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. .2-42.
[12] Michel de Certeau, "Travel Narratives of the French to Brazil," *Representations* 33 (Winter, 1991): 223.
[13] David Hume, *Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (London: World's Classics, 1903), pp. 528, 523.
[14] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 144.
[15] Henry St John, Lord Bolingbroke, *Letters on the Study and the Use of History* (London: A. Millar, 1652), p. 34.
[16] *The Voyage of the Resolution and the Adventure*, ed. J.C. Beaglehole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and the Hakluyt Society, 1961), p..322.
[17] Compare Oviedo: "Here he is wounded without a surgeon, sick without a doctor or medicines, hungry without food, thirsty without water, tired without beiong able to sleep, needy with nothing in which to dress himself, and with no shoes for his feet." *Historia de las Indias*, ed. Juan Perez de Tudela Bueso (Madrid, 1959), 2.304; cited in Pagden, *Encounters*, p. 66.
[18] Robert K. Merton's rule, cited in Chrispher Herbert, *Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), p. 69.
[19] Charles de Brosses, *Histoire des Navigations aux Terres Australes*, 2 vols (Paris, 1756), 1.viii-ix.
[20] Antoine-Francois Prevost, *Histoire Generale des Voyages* (Paris, 1746), 1.v.
[21] Louis de Bougainville, *Voyage autour du mond*, 2 vols (Paris: Saillant et Nyon, 1772), 1, pp. .xiv, xxxvii, xxxix.
[22] Alexander Dalrymple, *An Historical Collection of Voyages and Discoveries in the South Pacific Ocean*, 2 vols (London, 1770-71), 1, p. .x-xi.
[23] John Hawkesworth, *An Account of the Voyages and Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere*, 3 vols (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1773), 1, p. vi-vii.
[24] *The Monthly Review; or Literary Journal*, vol. 57 (London: R. Griffiths, 1778), p. 18.
[25] *The Critical Review; or Annals of Literature* (London: A. Hamilton, 1773), p. .242.
[26] George Forster, *A Voyage Round the World*, 2 vols (London: B. White, 1777), 1, p. .xi.



Dans l'ombre de Ledoux
L'espace de transgression

A three-dimensional Mocbius strip folding back on itself

An undemarcated surface merging inside/outside, public/private

Sexually ambiguous, it dissolves discriminatory boundaries



Engraved plates of **Claude Nicholas Ledoux's** *Bath House at Chaux* and the *House for the Agricultural Guards of Maupertuis* an overlapping of an ideal of *public space* with an ideal of *private space*

The form generated from Ledoux's shadows using a prophylactic

The resultant form: a product of distorted surface tensions

A series of parallel cuts permits reproduction of the form

MARK GOULTHORPE

In the shadow of Ledoux
Installation at Le Magasin, Grenoble

Material dissolution went furthest in our development of a sculptural piece for 'le Magasin' in Grenoble named *'In the Shadow of Ledoux'*. Here we literally *poured* the form in plastic, squeezing it as the resin set; the form *clarifying with time*, fading *into* existence. This form was generated, not in a 'positive' sense, but *negatively*, from the imagery of Ledoux in two of his utopian projects (the *'Bath House at Chaux'* and the *'House for the Forest Guards of Maupertuis'*); from the shadow, *in the shadow* - in the graphic margins of his *oeuvre*. It, hangs in the balance between past and future, in a suspension in *time* (poised in the abyss of the present), in a suspension in *space*, a suspension *of* space perhaps.

The exhibition 'Application and Implication' intended to raise the question of the public and private faces of architecture which we felt had changed markedly throughout history, from the strict symbolic codes of feudal or despotic orders, codifying and controlling the *socius*, containing desire to the much more diffuse and ambiguous influences of democratic, capitalistic society.

No longer limiting or restricting energy, they *release* it, opening space to the great flows of modernity; *flows of money, flows of people, flows of desire* . It is a great curving social surface across which everyone is free to circulate, led *by* desire,by all the mechanisms of capitalist attraction. Our question, though, *apropos* Ledoux (*last architect of the King, first architect of the Modern*) (Vidler) was whether we still inhabit Enlightenment space? Whether the fraternal ideals of these utopian projects - one public, the other private - still capture our imagination?

Our collage, merging Ledoux's social and aesthetic radicalism (hugely *transgressive* in its time) subverts the still clear demarcation between inside and outside. It problematizes notions of public and private by projecting one into the other. But such *violation* of Ledouxian precedent, a continuing *transgression*, is not a controlled or measured manoeuvre, for our use of a prophylactic, a condom, as a generative model has resulted in unpredictable and *non*-geometric volumes.

A product of *distorted surface tensions*, the resulting form, is a nebulous and un-demarcated social surface. Curving back on itself (as an almost three-dimensional Moebius strip) it creates an invaginated pocket for which it is impossible to define a transition point from inside to outside, from public to private. No longer an architecture which projects itself out into space through elaborate systems of signification, it is codifying space, controlling space. It is the flow of space which invades the architecture - a turning inside-out of public space; now a mute and implacable surface.

The form sets up a series of oppositional logics which reverberate across time. It is a staged dissolution of demarcated and structured space *and* the merge and fade of public and private in an indeterminate space of social milieu (Ledoux neither really present nor absent). It is a folding back of historical and social issues condensing a form mute yet resonant. It is an irresolute repetition, an altercation.

We built the piece with rings of plywood chosen for their laminated, annular intensity which gives the surface a kinetic energy, an oscillation which desubstantiates in some curious way its objectivity. An eroded monolithic form, worn smooth eccentrically, it reveals itself as sedimented, archaeological: *a memorial of the instant.*

In small steel letters, sanded flush with the surface, we embedded the names of the sponsors into thegrain of each ring, creating a very real social surface - names flowing across its deterritorialized and undemarcated surface. But each one alone, trapped within their own circuit (the independence and isolation of the post-modern *self)* emerged as the antithesis of Ledoux's idealized fraternity, and this, too, is evoked by the generative model of the condom, the perfect quotidian object for problematizing all boundary conditions: public/private, inside/outside, self/non-self, the free and unrestricted body of the present unsheathed in a transparent veil.

In this sense the object is not simply a 'body without organs' (Deleuze and Guattari's slippery, unrestricted social surface) but an *organ without body*, a curiously hermaphrodite modern creature. It is both a tactile promiscuity and a *flotation of sexuality* (Barthes, Baudrillard), ambiguous couplings endlessly fracturing, endlessly reconfiguring duets: a 'poetry of the incomplete . . .'



MARK GOULTHORPE

Reykjavik High Court Iceland

This project is the competition entry for the Supreme Court of Iceland in Reykjavik. It focusses on a 'public' architecture, but one which is still seemingly shrouded in privacy, for the courthouse (the chamber where the law of the land - the foundation-stone of democracy - is established) is in Iceland, certainly one of the most important public institutions, second only, perhaps, to Parliament itself.

Yet, when I went to Iceland (to this most democratic and egalitarian of societies), I was astonished to read the brief which specified (quite literally) that the building be of concrete construction, and divided completely in two with the judiciary entirely separated from the public who I had supposed they were to represent.

This was not to be a courthouse where people are tried (which one might imagine still needs such distinction, such reinforcement of power), but a debating chamber, open to all, where the public might come to witness and comprehend the process by which the law evolves and which gives shape to their liberty.

We might speculate, with Nietzsche, that every advance in society, every heightening of its morality, is marked by an opening of its systems of justice, as it resists, to an ever greater degree, the ethic of *revenge* . The law, and transgressions of the law, come to be seen in this movement increasingly at a *social* rather than an individual level. Notions of 'guilt' (and even punishment) are dissipated into social debate and society reflects upon *itself.*

This, as I see it, is the very *substance* of the supreme court. It is not a place of division and privilege, but of open and just social commentary; the courthouse as a quite public *sanatorium of the conscience.*

Our proposal, then, is a High Court for the 21st Century. It anticipates this continuing desire for refinement, this straining towards an ideal of open justice, and it does so in quite marked opposition to the constraints of the brief.

The building is simple. It is open and transparent in both its organisation and its materials as it looks for an increased openness and clarity, *as justice brought to light.* It is envisaged as an open public forum, a great moot hall filled with filtered natural light within which are placed the various elements of the courthouse.

Discrete scupltural forms float in open space, shrouding the judicial functions within, but clearly open to view. Such conceptual clarity extends even to the separation of judges and public. This is achieved simply and effectively by a series of walkways in space which allow one to glimpse the judges as they circulate such that the public can witness and comprehend the full functioning of the court, *a theatre of justce.*





The courtrooms themselves, the point of union between lawyers, judges and public, continue this ideal of openness. Elevated boxes are flooded with daylight from skylights which pierce up through the plane of the roof. They are calm, neutral spaces, folded combinations of concrete, plaster and wood, stripped of all symbolism or hierarchy. They are simple and elegant (both conceptually and physically), and they impart a dignity and equality to this highest court of the people.

Externally the building is a simple crystalline cube, a translucent and fragile envelope enclosing more solid and elemental forms (perceived as shadowy forms) within. Its glass skin is sheathed with a delicately perforated metallic surface, a filter which plays continuously with the subtle and changing light of Iceland - a solid luminous form, in the dark winter, glowing from within, and in the surreal summer light, an ambiguous and reflective surface.

The courthouse compliments the delicacy and lightness of the adjacent library with a contemporary aesthetic and finesse. The form of the building duplicates that of the existing library. The rhythmic pattern of its metallic skin is generated from the library's geometry and is incised with the abstracted forms of ancient runes (the primordial root of all writing and law).

The two buildings read as twin pavilions of light - one white, the other metallic, set against the dark and powerful form of the art deco theatre behind. Set on a hill overlooking the harbour, the two buildings begin to define a civic presence, the library already destined to house the President's offices.

The courthouse draws inspiration from the generic simplicity and the utilitarian and lightweight construction of contemporary Icelandic architecture. Fragile but pure forms are placed delicately into the savage expanse of the volcanic landscape. They draw from the almost mystical qualities of this strange land: the subtle ambiguity of the northern light, the eerily illumination of the vast Atlantic skies, and the harsh rawness of natural materials - the rough concrete shrouded by a cold and brittle metallic veil.

There were two architects on the jury, and three members of the judiciary, and what, for me, was interesting, was that it was the architects who liked the project and apparently staked their claim on it. The lawyers hated it to the point where they threatened to dissolve the jury.

This was completely the reverse of what I had expected since I had blithely assumed that the lawyers would appreciate this search for a form that mirrored, as it were, this opening of the judicial system which championed the Supreme Court as the haven of democratic law.

This leads me to question our potential to effect change through architecture, to open the way, as it were, to an increasing liberty. It is a question succinctly posed, and effectively answered, I think, by Michel Foucault:

> "Men have dreamed of liberating machines. But there are no machines of freedom, by definition. This is not to say that the exercise of freedom is completely indifferent to spatial distribution, but it can only function when there is a certain *convergence*. . . .
> Where liberty is effectively exercised, one finds . . . that this is not owing to the order of objects, but, (once again), owing to the practice of liberty. . ."

So there may, in fact, always be, a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even break them. But none of these projects can, simply by their nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically:

> "I think it [architecture] can and does produce positive effects when the liberating intentions of the architect coincide with real practice of people in the exercise of their freedom."

In Reykjavik, it became apparent that our liberating intentions simply did *not* coincide with such practice (or at least did not correspond with the *perception* of such practice). It scarcely matters if, in our opinion, that resulted from a certain blindness. The fact of the matter was, that there was not a 'convergence'. That is not to say that we shouldn't have attempted to 'modify some constraints, to loosen or even break them', for I think the aspiration to an increased openness in the judicial system was a good one.

One does not hesitate to have the courage of one's convictions (that, I am afraid, is our inheritance) which means that one must be willing to have one's ideas rejected, in the hope that, if nothing else, they might begin to shift perception.









fig 1 (top left) Ruskin: The Vine Angle; depicting the Drunkeness of Noah, 1869
fig 2 (bottom left) Ruskin: The Vine, Free and in Service
fig 3 (right) Ruskin: Angle of the Façade, St Marks, undated

ROSS JENNER

Masters And Slaves, Ornament And The Particular The Stones Of Venice

"in several cases, the sculptor has shown the undersides of the leaves turned boldly to the light, and has literally carved every rib and vein upon them, in relief; not merely the main ribs which sustain the lobes of the leaf, and actually project in nature, but the irregular and sinuous veins which checquer the membranous tissues between them, and which the sculptor has represented conventionally as relieved like the others, in order to give the vine-leaf its peculiar tassellated effect upon the eye"

(John Ruskin, *The Stones of Venice*, 10 §xxxvii)

"all the leaves and tendrils and fruit that make up a grape vine"

(Jorge Luis Borges, 'Funes the Memorious,' *Labyrinths*)

1.

Le Corbusier revolted "against our enforced servitude to the *abnormal*.." Attention to "type-needs," themselves typified by the filing cabinet were to overcome this: "The objects of utility in our lives" he argued "have freed the slaves of a former age. They are in fact themselves slaves, menials servants. Do you want them as your soul-mates?"[1] Buckminster Fuller's "energy slaves" and Louis Kahn's "served" and "servant" division of spatial function continued the theme. The ancient Telemones, Caryatids and Persian captives, Michelangelo's suffering Captives, his Bound - and Dying Slaves, Serlio's bound and braided Herms and beyond[2], provided classical ornament with a long-standing set of tropes involving burden, binding, entanglement, and enslavement. Such figures would appear to be trophies of triumph and the celebration of lordship. Slaves have but one function: *to serve*, to bear.[3] Emblems of labour, they are adornments. Paradoxically it is the superfluity beyond service, the uselessness, the very freedom from work, which is both the definition and peculiar *work* of ornament.

In Ruskin's architectural thought, so often condescendingly treated as being both naively unhistorical and *merely* concerned with ornament,[4] it was the addition of this single element of the *unnecessary* to the construction which defined architecture itself: a stone motif of binding, a cable moulding.[5] "Ornamentation" he wrote "is the principal part of architecture"[6] If, however, he regarded as inadmissable the representation of human work as such[7], it was by the trait of *work* in the characteristic singularity of its mark that the virtue, or otherwise, of ornament was to be discerned. But work is different from business, from whose premises ornament was to be kept apart.[8]

Consciousness of work was a value in itself.[9] It was a theory of bodily trace and individuation which functionalist thinking, would supercede in the abstraction of a moving trace in space, in ergonomics and in modular standardization, to form an architecture, in Musil's words, *ohne Eigenschaften*, without qualities. Work for Ruskin was the imprint, the index sign of the body, subjugated or emancipated.

What counts in architecture for Ruskin is not composition or structure, volume or breadth, where one can scarcely speak of ornament and detail, but the surface facing, and its interplay with its own depth. In Venice, he finds the first broad characteristic of St. Mark's is that of "incrustation," the use of revetment, or stone "sheeting." What lies behind this "wall-veil", the inner structure is of no concern[10], only "the precious film" (Ruskin, 10.101) exquisitely stained and the spoils and trophies of victory, which are riveted to it[11]. There is nothing behind the curtain. Surface is depth. It has all the depths of a painting, a page: Ruskin no sooner likens stone to paper (his own ground as writer), to its pulping and pressing processes, than out of it emerges a writing, a legend, a history, a politics of stone[12]. The surface[13] is the crucial plane where the formative forces and "the historical language of stones"[14] encounter the workman's hand[15] - and is in turn worked on by weather and illumination[16]. Here nature's work and man's work touch. The value of an ornament or building rests in the the writing, the character, the (im)print it bears of living labour, of human struggle.

Only what is opaque and matt is able to sustain the marks and colours of distinction, the Curtain Wall cannot bear the individual: "you can never have any noble architecture in transparent or lustrous glass or enamel" (Ruskin, 9 appendix 17 and n 15) - Ruskin's grounds for denying any

future to the mode of the shiny tense transparent meniscus, "the bubble", which is Crystal Palace. It is here at Crystal Palace in the wake of the great wave of its planetary expansion and colonization that Europe cedes to the 'other', the strange, the foreign, the extraneous. It appropriates it, reconstructing its identity; it liberates itself from the world.[17] Both Owen Jones and Gottfried Semper visited Crystal Palace. Jones would be the first to introduce Maori tattooing seen there (the word itself borrowed from Tahiti by Captain Cook) into his encyclopaedic *Grammar of Ornament*. Tattooing is at issue in Semper and will still be so in Reigl's *Stilfragen* in 1893[18]. But character and particularity cut two ways: both as mark of individual identity and as denial of it. Fingerprint, handwriting, *modus operandi* all classify criminality. Character in its etymological sense means "branding", as stigma means "tattoo."[19] It would be up to Adolf Loos to establish the conjunction of ornament and particularity with criminality.[20]

2.

Ruskin reads mastery and slavery in the very surface and patterns of material. The direct visual pleasure of Arabic woven or perforated designs, for example, he sees as not only a matter of our absorption in the maze of the texture but it is also "increased and solemnized by some dim feeling of the setting forth by such symbols, of the intricacy and alternative rise and fall, subjection and supremacy of human fortune." (Ruskin, 10.163) In a willfully anti-classical mode he defines what he calls three "orders," which are based on three possible configurations of mastery and servility, and manifested historically in three phases. They underpin the entire thesis of *The Stones*. Ruskin undoubtedly speaks with a view to contemporary politics, but this discourse of mastery and slavery has not been examined on its own terms.

> We have, then, three orders of ornament, classed according to the degrees of correspondence of the executive and conceptive minds. We have servile ornament, in which the executive is absolutely subjected to the inventive, - the ornament of the great Eastern nations, more especially Hamite, and all pre-Christian, yet thoroughly noble in its submissiveness. Then we have the mediaeval system, in which the mind of the inferior workman is recognised, and has full room for action, but guided and ennobled by the ruling mind. This is the truly Christian and only perfect system. Finally, we have ornaments expressing the endeavour to equalise the executive and inventive, - endeavour which is Renaissance and revolutionary, and destructive of all noble architecture. (Ruskin, 9.291)

This is all elaborated in much greater detail in "The Nature of Gothic" and the enormously enlarged treatment of one of its categories, the Grotesque, with which he wrestles with in the third book.

In the **first** phase, characteristic of Assyria and Egypt, on the one hand, and on the other of Greece, where the "master-workman was far advanced in knowledge and power" above the others, nevertheless, "the workman was, in both systems a slave." (Ruskin, 10.189) This is "Servile ornament in which the execution or power of the inferior workman is entirely subjected to the intellect of the higher." (Ruskin, 10.188)

In the **second**, the "constitutional" or "subordinate" phase, the individual value of the soul is recognised, fallenness and powerlessness admitted, imperfection and unworthiness confessed, obedience is now rendered to higher powers. Out of the labour of inferior minds and imperfect fragments a greater whole is created.[21] Constitutional ornament, is where "the executive inferior power is, to a certain point, emancipated and independent, having a will of its own, yet confessing its inferiority and rendering obedience to higher powers." (Ruskin, 10.190)

In the **third**: "revolutionary" or "insubordinate" phase no executive inferiority or imperfection is admitted at all, the workman has become as good as, if not, *the* master, but at the cost of the loss of his own original power which is defeated by abstract learning.[22] Similarly in "pride of science" the artist becomes "encumbered with useless knowledge" (Ruskin, 11.55) and the abstract invention of ideas is regarded as more important than the narration of fact in religious painting. (Ruskin, 10.126) The classical system of ornament is for Ruskin already something mechanistic. (Ruskin, 11 §xc) To seek the mechanical reproducibility of its components simply doubles the enslavement unless imperfection is accepted.

> For since the architect, whom we will suppose capable of doing all in perfection, cannot execute the whole with his own hands, he must either make slaves of his workmen in the old Greek, and present English fashion, and level his work to a slave's capacities, which is to degrade it; or else he must take his workmen as he finds them, and let them show their weaknesses together with their strength, which will involve the Gothic imperfection, but render the whole

work as noble as the intellect of the age can make it.(Ruskin, 10.202)[23]

But the modern English have chosen "to make men tools and the tools of tools." This enslavement of souls to "trivial perfection" is the ultimate slavery,

> a thousand times more bitter and more degrading than that of the scourged African or Helot Greek. Men may be beaten chained, tormented, yoked like cattle, slaughtered like summer flies, and yet remain in one sense and the best sense free. But to smother their souls within them, to blight and hew into rotting pollards the suckling branches of their human intelligence, to make the flesh and skin which, after the worms work on it, is to see God, into leathern thongs to yoke machinery with - this is to be slave-masters indeed. (Ruskin, 10.192-3)

> It is verily this degradation of the operative into a machine, which, more than any other evil of the times, is leading the mass of the nations everywhere into vain, incoherent, destructive struggling for a freedom of which they cannot explain the nature to themselves...It is not that men are ill-fed, but that they have no pleasure in the work by which they make their bread, and therefore look to wealth as the only means of pleasure. (Ruskin, 10.194)

In probably the most well-known[24] part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807, Hegel[25] had presented a dialectic of domination and servitude which is perhaps worth comparing, since, for both Ruskin and Hegel, mastery proves to be a dead-end, and a viable form of subordination alone offers the way to the experience of independence and the formation of individuality in work.

The relation between master and slave arises in Hegel from the struggle for recognition.[26] The master is the actual realization of consciousness for-itself who requires the mediation of another consciousness to achieve independent being and join with the world of things in general. Domination is inherently contradictory: the master is master only because he is recognised by the slave, his autonomy depends on the mediation of another self-consciousness, the slave's. The slave in the encounter between them retreated in the face of death - "the absolute master". He discovers mortality, the non-being of his being, and trembles in every fibre of his being. Everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. Preferring servitude to liberty in death he is the slave less of the master than of life: "That is the yoke from which he has been unable to free himself through struggle and why he has shown himself to be dependent, having his independence in thingness."

Lordship, on the other hand "consists in showing that it is unfettered to determinate existence, that it is not bound at all by the particularity everywhere characteristic of existence as such, and is not tied up with life". The master placed himself above life, willing to lose it for the sake of recognition. The master relates only through the slave to independent being, to life, to things. He can enjoy things, negate them and so affirm himself in immediate self-certainty. He has no concept of the independence of the being of life nor of the resistance of the world to what he wants. But the slave knows only the resistance of life to desire and so cannot deny this world. His desire encounters the resistance of the real, and he is only able to *elaborate* things, to work on them. His lot is servile labour, arranging the world so that the master can negate it by enjoyment and consumption. The slave transforms the world in production, "delayed enjoyment". The slave recognizes himself as slave, and this slave-consciousness in moving from fear and anguish, to service, to labour will form the truth of self-consciousness. Consciousness thus disciplines itself in service of the master and detaches itself from natural existence.

Genuine independence, however, can only be attained when work transforms servitude into mastery, rendering the world of things adequate to desire. The slave shapes himself by shaping things, and so imprints the form of self-consciousness on being. He finds himself in the product of his work. The master attains only a transitory enjoyment, but the slave through work is able to contemplate independent being as well as himself. Consciousness, in the guise of the worker, comes to see its *own* independence in the independent being of the object: "In fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to *him*, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. The shape does not become something other than himself through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape that is his pure being-for-self, which in this externality is seen by him to be the truth." (Hegel, *Phenomenology* p 118)[27]

The inscription of human labour, the values of "life," the idea of creative expressivity is common to both writers and will become central to the problematic of decorative art.[28] Both understand work as a move from slavishness and as a process by which individuation occurs: the particular arises only in work, consciousness only from the particular.

> Work...is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now in the work outside of it acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence.(Hegel, *Phenomenology* p 118)[29]

Where Hegel's concern is the dialectical achievement of universality and self-consciousness[30] Ruskin's is (even to the extent of valorizing a certain savagery, cruelty and ignorance) the achievement of the particular, making it visible:

> Is there, then, nothing to be done by man's art? Have we only to copy; and again copy, for ever, the imagery of the universe? Not so. We have work to do upon it; there is not any one of us so simple, nor so feeble, but he has work to do upon it. But the work is not to improve, but to explain. This infinite universe is unfathomable, inconceivable, in its whole; every human creature must slowly spell out, and long contemplate, such part of it as may be possible for him to reach; then set forth what he has learnt of it for those beneath him extricating it from infinity, as one gathers a violet out of grass; one does not improve either violet or grass in gathering it, but one makes the flower visible. (Ruskin, 9.410 §5)

The categories of "The Nature of Gothic": Savageness, Changefulness, Naturalism, Grotesqueness, Rigidity, and Redundance show work as means and expression of such particularity. Approximately six years later in *The Elements of Drawing* he would be haunted by an extraordinary nightmare:

> We have to show the individual character and liberty of the separate leaves, clouds or rocks. And herein the great masters separate themselves finally from the inferior one... Now although both these expressions of government and individuality are essential to masterly work, the individuality is the more essential, and the more difficult of attainment ... It is a lamentable and unnatural thing to see a number of men subject to no government, actuated by no ruling principle, and associated by no common affection: but it would be more lamentable thing still, were it possible, to see a number of men so oppressed into assimilation as to have no more any individual hope or character, no differences in aim, no dissimilarities of passion, no irregularities of judgement; ... a society in which every soul would be as the syllable of a stammerer instead of the word of a speaker, in which every man would walk as in a frightful dream, seeing specters of himself, in everlasting multiplication, gliding helplessly around him in speechless darkness. Therefore it is that perpetual difference, play and change in groups of form are more essential to them than their being subdued by some great gathering law... (Ruskin *Elements of Drawing* II.133)

3.

For Ruskin ornament is not only site-specific it must know its place: "Every one of its qualities has reference to its place and use: *and it is fitted for its service by what would be faults and deficiencies if it had no especial duty*. Ornament, the servant, is often formal, where sculpture, the master, would have been free; the servant is often silent where the master would have been eloquent; or hurried, where the master would have been serene." (Ruskin, 9.284)[31] To be ornamental is to be subservient:

> As an architect, therefore, you are modestly to measure your capacity of governing ornament. Remember its essence, - its being ornament at all, consists in being governed. Lose your authority over it, let it command you, or lead you, or dictate to you in any wise, and it is an offence, an incumbrance, and a dishonour. (Ruskin, 10.308)

One of the greatest problems of ornament is the dynamic of limitation and excess from which emerges its tendency to proliferate and threaten the stuctural underpinning of what it is meant to embellish. It is a question of restraint, or "submission" (Ruskin, 9 §xxxii) or "subordination" to a greater, simpler and more powerful order or class (Ruskin, p §xxvi). Removal of ornament is not at issue: "Whatever has nothing to do, whatever could go without being missed, is not ornament, it is deformity and encumbrance. Away with it." (Ruskin, 9 §xxxiv) Ruskin's fascinating and characteristic problematic, is that, having made ornament the *touchstone* of architecture, what should be peripheral and backgrounded is given both focal emphasis and all the seriousness of the foreground.[32] His political programme is not at all democratic[33]: it will neither allow nor have any intention of allowing ornament, the servant, to become master, though such margins cannot be transgressed every effort short of this must be made to valorise the servant's work. Viewed in Hegelian terms, is ornament the slave who will become through work a master, or already master, hence otiose, superfluous, and incapable of attending to the particular? The line must be drawn. But where?

> How far this subordination is in different situations to be expressed, or how far it may be surrendered, and ornament the servant, be permitted to have independent will; and by what means the subordination is best to be expressed when it is required, are by far the most difficult questions I have ever tried to work out respecting any branch of art... (Ruskin, 9.285)

Cornice and Capitals of St. Mark's

fig 3 (top) Cornice and Capitals of St Marks
fig 4 (bottom left) Leafage of the Vine Angle
fig 5 (bottom right) The Fig-Tree Angle of the Ducal Palace

The very concepts of centre and hierarchy in ornament are rendered difficult. The human body is excluded from it (being reserved for the "master", sculpture), at the symbolic level of subject matter, its representation must be alongside the quadrupeds(Ruskin, 9.281) as part of Creation. The body in any other guise or (what once probably amounted to the same) the Orders must be banished from a central position, being mere pagan forms of self-celebration. The "proper material of ornament" offered (Ruskin, 9.265-266)[34] is something between a programme for a museum and the outline for an encyclopaedia of natural history. This excess of centre, its very multitudinousness, amounts to a denial of centrality by leaving no room for margins. Nor is there any space between the subjects of ornament found in man's works and God's (Creation) to fit entire areas of iconography: such as the representation of the celestial city, the body of Christ, or the cruciform plan. The motif which Ruskin once described[35] as the "Distinctive test" of Gothic: the trefoil arch hardly approximates it.

The nearest ornament comes to being conceived of as background embellishment is in the discussion of the Romanesque striped wall but such a conception can hardly be said to exist, when every moulding tells a story and is apparently intended to form part of a cross-referenced catalogue of types. Above all the insistent readings in naturalistic terms, despite Ruskin's emphasis on the need to abstract, conspire always to break down any distinction between fine art and decorative art[36] Though ornament implies stylisation and repetition which is the diminishment of individuation for Ruskin it offers the greatest potential for concentration on the particle and the particular. As in Pre-Raphaelite painting every detail is elaborated to its highest pitch of **specificity**. This acute observation of the particular, the author as exegete of the world, leads not only to acceptance and valorisation of heterogeneity, the eclectic character of Venetian ornament (St Marks as shrine "at which to dedicate the splendour of the miscellaneous spoil than the organised expression of any fixed architectural law" (Ruskin, 10.97)), Venice as city of fragments, but also to the insistance that all ornament be treated and placed with reference to the physical circumstances of the spectator[37]rather than any abstract or absolute schema. For Ruskin the decorative arts differ from the other arts not in value but only in that they are site-specific. In fact the portability of the art work may be considered a degradation (Ruskin, 16.320-21).

The tendency to particularisation is most evident at St Marks, all of which Ruskin confesses he would like to draw "stone by stone, to eat it up in my mind, touch by touch" (Ruskin, 10.xxxvi) Here, without any general description of the façade as a whole, without sections, plan, aerial view, perspectives from within or without, he offers only a detail, in fact in illustration (Ruskin, 10.115 (facing)), a fragment of a detail such that our "decision of the respective merits of modern and of Byzantine architecture may be allowed to rest on this fragment of St. Marks alone" (Ruskin, 10.115-117). After some general account of the Doge's Palace, its successive transformations and relations to Venetian history we find "We are at liberty to examine some of the details of the Ducal Palace..." which in fact since every capital is different form the bulk of his treatment of the building. The most notable of these is the "Vine Angle" portraying the drunkenness of Noah, filled with minute description of the "extreme refinement" of the leafage, so delicate that half the stems are now broken, where every carved rib and vein on the undersides of the leaves exposed to light is noted.

The explanation (Garrigan, p 159) of this impulse towards detail and fragment as arising from the need to rebuild in his imagination a world he saw falling into ruins around him is only partially satisfactory. There is a void and "the English School of landscape, culminating in Turner, is in reality nothing else than a healthy effort to fill the void which the destruction of Gothic architecture has left." (Ruskin, 11.225)[38] Perhaps ultimately such fragmentation resists recomposition. Instead detail is valued in and for itself, within an aesthetics and (if the two can be distinguished here) an ethics of particularity.[39]

4.

For both Ruskin and Hegel Gothic architecture is 'centrally' concerned with particularization and the non-finite. For both the question of individuation arises with Christian art[40]. Ruskin notes:

> We have with Christianity recognised the individual value of every soul; and there is no intelligence so feeble but that a single ray may in some sort contribute to the general light. This is the glory of Gothic architecture, that every jot and tittle, every point and niche of it, affords room, fuel, and focus for individual fire.[41]

For Hegel, however, in Romantic art (that is, in his own terminology, art since Christianity) consciousness, free from external obligations reflects on itself, producing a disequilibrium where the representation of exterior phenomena does not go beyond the limits of ordinary and banal reality, and is not afraid of appropriating the real world in all its faults, its insufficiencies, contingent particulars and finished precision. Romantic art no longer aspires to reproduce life in a state of infinite serenity, to exteriorize the soul in incarnating it in a body. It turns its back on this summit of beauty and makes interiority participate in every accident of exterior formation. It carries subjectivity to the extreme and makes prosaic circumstances intervene. Gothic architecture is an "elevation above the finite." It is "precisely where particularisation, diversity, and variety gain the the fullest scope." The whole, however, is not allowed "to fall apart into mere trifles and accidental details." [42] The totality will always remain in control.

> Now since spirituality has withdrawn into itself out of the external world and immediate unity therewith, the sensuous externality of shape is for this reason accepted and represented, as in symbolic art as something inessential and transient; and the same is true of the subjective finite spirit and will, right down to the particularity and caprice of individuality, character, action, etc., of incident, plot, etc. The aspect of external existence is consigned to contingency and abandoned to the adventures devised by an imagination whose caprice can mirror what is present to it, exactly as it is, just as readily as it can jumble the shapes of the external world and distort them grotesquely.(Hegel, *Aesthetics*, II p 685)

Art, unlike philosophy, Hegel saw as no longer capable of surpassing the schism between subjectivity and objective reality, therefore as he notes in the introduction to *Aesthetics* it "is and remains for us from the point of view of its supreme destination, something of the past." In this movement of universal consciousness, the self, the individual consciousness, like the particular, has value only as a moment in a global picture of sense. "The true is the all but the all does not coincide at all with the dimension of the self-conscious subject as such."[43] There is a gap. And before long the discovery that at the centre of the subject there is no subject, only an uninhabited spectral place: "our glassy essence,"[44] become speaking void, in its vitreous clarity guarding an invisible Other.(Bodei, p 217)

Ruskin's emphasis is on the particular, the "passionate admiration" of the inanimate object (Ruskin, 5.322)[45]. The highest art demands truth to nature, that is "showing the specific character of every kind of rock, every class of earth, every form of cloud, every species of herb and flower."[46] It is from here that his naturalism and his demand for "panegyric accuracy" springs, rather than a desire for perfect mimesis *per se*. Imperfection, incompletion, independence, individuation do not await instant dialectical recovery. Finish, both as realization and surface, threatens to efface the particular and consciousness itself.

> Above all demand no refinement of execution where there is no thought, for that is slave's work, unredeemed (Ruskin, 10.199)

The glass bead maker typifies that. (Ruskin, 10.197-8) In fact the fault, the flaw is constitutional and the very means of individuation:

> For as that resulted from a humility, which confessed the imperfection of the workman, so this naturalist portraiture is rendered more faithful by the humility which confesses the imperfection of the subject. (Ruskin, 10.234)
>
> Let them show their weaknesses together with their strength which will involve the Gothic imperfection, but render the whole work as noble as the intellect of the age can make it (Ruskin 10.202)
>
> In the works of man, those which are more perfect in their kind are always inferior to those which are, in their nature, liable to more faults and shortcomings. For the finer the nature, the more flaws it will show through the clearness of it, and it is a law of this universe, that the best things shall be seldomest seen in their best form. (Ruskin, 10.108-90)
>
> And of all things that live there are certain irregularities and deficiencies which are not only signs of life but sources of beauty. No human face is exactly the same in its lines on each side, no leaf in its lobes, no branch in its symmetry. All admit irregularities as they imply change, and to banish imperfection is to destroy expression, to check exertion, to paralyze vitality. All things are literally better lovlier and more beloved for the imperfections which have been divinely appointed, that the law of human life may be Effort, and the law of human judgement, Mercy. (Ruskin, 10.204)

This valorisation of imperfection would the basis of Hopkins' *Pied Beauty* :

> All things counter, original, spare, strange;
> Whatever is fickle, freckeled (who knows how?)
> With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim;





fig 7 (top left) Cornices and Abaci
fig 8 (bottom left) Edge Decoration
fig 9 (right) Cornice Decoration

Ruskin sharply distinguishes this emphasis on the particular from the attitudes of Reynolds, for whom the whole beauty and grandeur of painting consisted in "being able to get above all singular forms, local customs, particularities and details of every kind." (Reynolds quoted in Christ, p. 7) The Earl of Shaftsbury had argued that the painter and poet "hate minuteness and are afraid of singularity, which would make their images or characters appear capricious and fantastical" (Shaftsbury quoted in Christ p. 7) But it is equally distinguished from the "laborious" finish of Dutch naturalism:

> ...and from these larger incidents he (the painter) may proceed into the most minute particulars, and lead the companion imagination to the veins of the leaves and the mosses on the trunk, and the shadows of the dead leaves upon the grass, but always multiplying thoughts, or subjects of thought, never working for the sake of realization...(Ruskin, 11 IV §xxvi)

Already with some of the earliest works of the Gothic revival, Walpole's Strawberry Hill, for example, there is a growing individuation granted to the exterior expression of each element of the house, which, since this differentiation can be related to commodity or purpose, is sometimes called "Picturesque utility." In Victorian architecture this is carried to its fullest extent. The passion for minutiae and detail, in *The Modern Painters*, in its digression, the *Stones of Venice*, and also in Pre-Raphaelite painting is perhaps a desperate attempt to enumerate a disperate world grown resistant to and withdrawn from human control. For Ruskin there are no longer the classic five orders,[47] they are limitless. But if limitless, how to can any order be achieved? The compilation of particulars was the hope of ordering by saturation, a last attempt to find a universal order transcending that world's multitudinousness, its particularity; and to overcome the solipsism that threatens to engulf the particular subjectivity. Hence the lists, tabulations, the profiles, the families of capitals, convex and concave, Byzantine and Norman, etc, as a naturalist might compile. Ruskin praised Butterfield's All Saints in Margaret Street begun 1849 whose constuctional polychromy arises from a profusion of minerals collected, cut and polished into complex patterns, the stones were intended to reveal the glory of their creator's handiwork. The church is presented as sacred museum, while the museum Ruskin inspired at Oxford, where each of the pillars of the colonnades is made from a different stone, was a sort of secular cathedral[48]. In the very moment when everything in nature was stridently proclaimed to reveal God in the detail, there dawned the frightening realisation that it did not, that detail revealed only blind and violent chance.

Darwin's theory displaced typological thought rendering the idea of species an artificial abstraction by denying the immutablity it implied. Instead, since no two individuals are exactly the same and the variations between them are what propels the process of natural change, the variant, the unique, the particular became elevated as the very instrument of evolution. Ruskin, however, would reject the continuity and merging that such a theory implied:

> Species are not innumerable; neither are they now connected by consistent gradation, they touch at certain points only; and even then are connected, when we examine them deeply, in a kind of reticulated way, not in chains, but in checquers; also, however connected, it is but by a touch of the extremites, as it were, and the characteristic form of the species is entirely individual.(Ruskin, 19.359)

Elsewhere chiaroscuro or dappling (Ruskin, 11.25) is opposed to the principle of gradation "for gradation is to colours what curvature is to lines, both expressing the law of gradual change and progress in the human soul itself" (Ruskin, 15.147)[49], gradation being a principle of merging not distinction between things. Ruskin's much younger contemporary, Hopkins, with whom he bears comparison,[50] would define two very similar modes of differentiation in nature[51]: what he called 'diatonism', any difference between part and part which is abrupt, and 'chromatism' any change or difference which is sliding or transitional. He also tended to reject chromaticism as associated with evolutionary development from shapeless slime without any notion of absolute types but simply momentary and accidental coagulations of matter developed without break from the species below, flux and continuity without fixed points.[52]

5.

The sense of self is derived both from particularisation of the exterior world and deeper and deeper interiorization of consciousness. The inward turn of consciousness continues through the nineteenth century where privatization of the psyche is a distinctive element in the stage of self-consciousness

which is modernism.. Here the inward turning, arising from a sense of loss, alienation isolation, is also something of a counterbalance to an extreme outward turning set in train by distancing and objectivising technologies. The human being having no nature that can be simply found must make itself. The 'I' unavoidably separate, particular, takes on a free-floating condition. Baudelaire speaks of *"un kaléidoscope doué de conscience, qui, à chacun de ses mouvements, représente la vie multiple et la grace mouvante de tous les éléments de la vie. C'est un* moi *insatiable du* non-moi..."[53] Ruskin poses the multiple shaft as image of the individual soul:

> The idea of the shaft, remains absolutely single in the Roman and Byzantine mind: but true grouping begins in Christian architecture by the placing of two or more separate shafts side by side, each having its work to do; then three or four , still with separate work; then by such step as those above theoretically pursued, the number of the members increases, while they coagulate into a single mass; and we have finally a shaft apparently composed of thirty, forty fifty, or more distinct members; a shaft which, in the reality of its service, is as much a single shaft as the old Egyptian one; but which differs from the Egyptian in that all its members, how many soever, have each individual work to do, and a separate rib of arch or roof to carry; and thus the great Christian truth of distinct services of the individual soul is typified in the Christian shaft; and the old Egyptian servitude of the multitudes, the servitude inseparable from the children of Ham, is typified also in that ancient shaft of the Egyptians.(Ruskin, 10.VIII §xxv)

But it is perhaps a small step from multiple and particularized shaft to multiple and particularized soul; even within Ruskin's life, if the disintegration of his own mind from 1877 onwards may be considered here.

In his dissection of the nineteenth century subject Bodei notes, "The I becomes all the more rarified and its voice all the more extraneous as it approaches its presumed nucleus... The path of consciousness of oneself through oneself is blocked...The circle of perfect identity of I=I does not close because the Other is already in the I, because, rather, the I is a simple phenomenon of the Other. Behind the evidence of the cogito there is only an echo, which repeats in a timbre not its own I, I, I..."(Bodei, p 217) *"Je est un autre"* Rimbaud would recognise in his Letter to George Izambard dated 13 May 1871. The ineradicable complement to the identity formed from process, from the self-reference which keeps opening itself every time in the search of a higher 'satisfaction', is Alterity. (Bodei, p 219) Self dispossession and self effacement become a strategy, the erasure of the individual, of the author, an emptying, a sort of secular *kenosis*. Rimbaud's programmatic explanation, as Agamben argues, "must be taken literally: the redemption of objects is impossible except by virtue of becoming an object."[54] With Mallarmée both author and thing depicted will vanish. The greyness and loss of brightly distinguished medieval clothing that Ruskin laments will become for Loos the very mask supposed to guarantee identity.

6.

The elevation of the particular meant also a loss of hierarchy and assurance that any personal experience could be generalized. Type as a concept no longer necessarily organized particulars. In early Romanticism the part could stand for the whole, the univeral be perceived in the particular; there was a synthesis of sign and thing. Absence of the general now became a prison or paralysis, conducive to insanity and suicide. Even for Ruskin the preoccupation with detail, such as the German and Flemish Schools showed, was a matter of morbidity. Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* reveals a horror of fragmentation and the merely particular. As governing forces they were the threat of dissolution. The accidental was a danger. For Engels the crowd shattered the relation of the individual to any hierarchical whole:

> And however much one may be aware that this isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking is the fundamental principle, in our society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced, so self-conscious as here in the crowding of the great city. The dissolution into monads of which each one has a seperate principle, into the world of atoms, is here carried out to its utmost extreme.[55]

Coherence is never guaranteed, least of all where the transformation of the crafted object into the mass-produced article manifests the loss of self-possession with respect to things. The coherence of the individual is caught in a process of splitting and pulverization :

> We have much studied and much perfected, of late, the great civilized invention of the division of labour; only we give it a false name. It is not truly speaking the labour that is divided, but the men:- Divided into mere segments of men - broken into small fragments and crumbs of life (Ruskin, 10.196)[56]





fig 10 (top left) Tracery Bars
fig 11 (top right) Plans of Piers
fig 12 (bottom) The Lagoon at night

In the work of the Pre-Raphaelites, as in the way Ruskin reads a building, the fullness of presentation of each detail in its very clarity - its *Naturalism* - creates an unnatural vision, where everything is crowded into focus without peripheral relief. Each detail threatens to fall apart and demand individual explication. But this itself sets to work the *energy* of the particular. Particularity becomes an active principle that reunites subjectivity and world in the vital force of its own identities, creating identification between individual and individuated matter through painstaking accuracy.

Unlike an *a priori* system of ideal forms the particular is no guarantor of meaning; there is always the possibility that the presentation of the fortuitousness and neutrality of phenomena may threaten a barenness or impenetrability. The particular exists outside of any systems of difference or dialectic. Outside of order, relation and meaning. That is its danger. How much unclassifiable difference can be accepted before instability, insanity? "'I' is an unavoidable declaration of independence, of separateness, of particularity"(Ong, p 33) Architecture as the art of ordering, finds itself in an unstable situation when menaced by this particular, it is the accidental, what befalls. "Taken in itself," writes Blanchot of the fragment in relation to aphoristic poetry, "it is true, it appears with its sharp edges and broken character like a block to which nothing seems able to attach. A piece of meteor detached from an unknown sky and impossible to connect with anything that can be known."[57]

Alberti observed that what the philosophers termed *accidents*[58] are such as to be known only by comparison - a relativism which classical thinking surmounted by the insertion of man as the measure and scale of all things. Ruskin knows no such measure or scale, for him structure in terms of completeness, grammatical interrelation and sufficiency of part and whole is irrelevant, "the whole is inconceivable" (Ruskin, 11.II §xxxii.) Classification by typology on the scientific or pattern book model provides hope of stability: Ruskin's compilations and tabulations of minute measurements and profiles, garnered from hours spent daily clambering over Venetian buildings,[59] suggest the reassurance of sufficient enumeration, should there be no end in sight -sheer busyness, the energy of the particular, is its own justification. The Platonic notion of multiplicity or diversity within an implied wholeness, the particular as token of divine abundance is probably Ruskin's commonest recourse. But classification shatters before the wonder of limitlessness: "Infinity of infinities in the sum of possible change" (Ruskin, 9.142)[60]. If the whole is inconceivable, then there is always an inbuilt lack. Putting it another way, it is the lack that is filled by particulars, by ornament.

7.

It is where Ruskin approaches this heart of darkness, the lagoon in its indistinguishable mud and blackness, that it is sensed that the horror, the *horror vacui*, from which stems the excess which is the particular, is an effect of lack, lacuna:

> The scene is often profoundly oppressive, even at this day... but, in order to know what it was once, let the traveler follow in his boat at evening the windings of some unfrequented channel far into the midst of the melancholy plain; let him remove, in his imagination, the brightness of the great city that still extends itself in the distance, and the walls and towers from the islands that are near; and wait until the bright investiture and sweet warmth of the sunset are withdrawn from the waters, and the black desert of their shore lies in its nakedness beneath the night, pathless, comfortless, infirm, lost in the dark languor and fearful silence, except where the salt runlets plash into the tideless pools, or the sea-birds flit from their margins with a questioning cry; and he will be enabled to enter in some sort into the horror of heart with which this solitude was anciently chosen by man for his habitation. (Ruskin, 10.13)

"We must remember" argues Roberto Masiero "that decoration is the response to the *horror vacui*, to the fear of the void, which is by its very nature the horror of solitude, a horror that the decay of communication would start, the thought that between the 'one' and the 'others' there is no longer anything to say."[61] Ornament has always presupposed the manifestation of social identity and a certain repression: "We speak we write, we decorate because something is missing. Social relations are constructed where instinct is inhibited - instinctive desire does not allow repression except in the definition of behavior intended to prevent it, social behavior." (Masiero, p 21) The slave cannot immediately negate in pleasurable consumption, but be can only work upon 'elaborate' (*bearbeiten*) which consists in inhibiting (*hemmen*), in hemming his desire, in delaying the disappearance of the thing. The link between ornament and the unconscious, with subjective phantasy has been explored by Rae Beth Gordon, who argues that "the event - the disruptive event of the unconscious- cannot be



fig 13 Lily Capital of St Mark's (Volume II, Plate IX)

removed from the empty space left by repression. This is why ornament, circumscribing and defining the void, itself situated in the "empty space" of peripheral perception is most apt to figure desire. In the first case (circumscription of the void) ornamental patterns are a symbol of unconscious desire that is characterised by lack."[62] Psychology and the theory of ornament develop together.

8.

The poles of the solitary, utter solitude, solipsism even, and "the world's multitudinousness" are connected by the motif of the maze and labyrinth, the restless linear twining of particular to particular, and subject to particular.

> It is that strange disquietude of the Gothic spirit that is its greatness; that restlessness of the dreaming mind, that wanders hither and thither among the niches, and flickers feverishly around the pinnacles, and frets and fades in labyrinthine knots and shadows along the wall and roof, and yet is not satisfied, nor shall be satisfied. The Greek could stay in his triglyph furrow and be at peace; but the work of the Gothic heart is fretwork still, and it can neither rest in nor from, its labour, but must pass on sleeplessly, until its love of change shall be pacified for ever in the change that must come alike on them that wake and them that sleep. (Ruskin, 10..214)

In the early 1850's the experience of entanglement is untroubled,

> the joy that the human mind has in contemplating any kind of maze or entanglement, so long as it can discern, through its confusion, any guiding clue or connecting plan.(Ruskin, 10.163)

The labyrinth of Venice is provided with white marble threads.(Ruskin, 10.296) It is like a mind and *The Stones of Venice* is a "kind of urban autobiography of consciousness".[63] Later, things will not be not so simple:

> the labyrinth of black walls, the loathsome passages between them, which now fills the valley of the Thames and is called London.(Ruskin, 21.104)

> The labyrinth of life itself, and its interwoven occupation becomes too manifold, and too difficult for me (Ruskin, 22.452)

> One great part of pleasure, depended on an idiosyncrasy which extremely wise people do not share - my love of all sorts of filigree and embroidery, from hoarfrost to the high clouds. The intricacies of virgin silver, of arborescent gold, the weaving of birds-nests, the netting of lace, the basket capitals of Byzantium, and most of all the tabernacle work of the French flamboyent school, possessed from the first, and possesses still, a charm for me of which the force was entirely unbroken for ten years after the first sight of Rouen...(Ruskin, 35.157, n 3)

The conjunction of fragment and entanglement began with Schlegel who affirmed that "Many works of the ancients have become fragments, and many works of the moderns are fragments at their birth." The arabesque reproduces life's endlessly varied profusion (*Fülle*), and its chaos. Schlegel thought that only the fragment could transcend the limit to which every finite work was subject, while the arabesque for him conforms is an endless series of digressions or offshoots -the very form of open-ended self-engendering form that Ruskin calls for. Changefulness, movement and metamorphosis in ornament, often so highly praised is paralleled by unconscious thought process.[64]

Ruskin's text itself moves in such offshoots and digressions, meandering, returning upon itself. Digression becomes a mode of presentation. It is the literary equivalent of ornament, though, as with Ruskin's understanding of ornament in relation to architecture, the apparent evasion often forms the "central" thought. *The Stones of Venice* is itself a digression from *The Modern Painters, The Modern Painters* an "explanation of a footnote" in *The Stones of Venice* (Ruskin, 10. xlvii)[65]. Only in section four of the second book, after skirting the outer islands and after a final diversion into an English cathedral town are we ready for the first sight of St. Marks. But first the passage by way of "a paved alley some seven feet wide" whose very compression crushes the narrative to a string of particles at first mundane (so much so his father feared he was mimicking Dickens), then at last the itemization of the "treasure-heap" in all its(Ruskin, 10.82-3) specifics of mythic symbolism, colour, variagation, entwined organic form. It is a vision devoid of breadth and the mastery attained by panopticism or the comprehension of a totality by plan. Jay Fellows (Fellows, *Ruskin's Maze* p 53) contrasts Ruskin with Newman's synthetic, synoptic, panoramic, centralizing intellect: "I say then, if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend; we must gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method..." [66] He then mounts above it, reconnoitering the neighbourhood. "When he is without either map or prior topographical knowledge, Newman is irritated by complex specificity. He takes no pleasure in exploration. To explore is to be more lost than found. And losing his way in

fallen intricacy Newman loses control of potential synthesis and generalization." (Fellows, *Ruskin's Maze* p 178)

Understanding for Ruskin is like the traveler's, necessarily partial and progressive; he associates the modern taste for travel and the picturesque not only with actual travel but also with a certain restlessness characteristic of the modern temper.[67] His suspicion of composition is of "that false composition which can be taught on principles." (Ruskin, 10.VI §xlii)[68] *The Stones'* own compositional heterogeneity perhaps reflects this even as it tries to teach principles. The first book consists of short history and an immense list of parts; the second, a circuitous arrival at St Marks, a list of Gothic elements, the Doge's palace and other palaces; the third, the Renaissance, the extraordinarily convoluted and difficult distinctions within the grotesque and its recuperation, finally, a self-confessed "rambling" supplement as conclusion.

9.

The Renaissance spirit is suspect for its complete confidence in its own wisdom: its mastery of space by perspective and of detail by the certainty of the orders; both efface the specific and guarantee mechanical reproducibility. The grotesque for Ruskin is a rupture in this rationality, a lacerating intrusion of the sublime, with its necessary distortions, into the world of discursive thought and polished finish. "This most curious and subtle character" is a category deferred till the end from "The Nature of Gothic" concerned with the ludicrous and the fearful: the terror of evil but above all of death (Ruskin, 11.III §lxv)[69].

> the mind under certain phases of excitement, plays with terror, and summons images which, if it were in another temper, would be awful, but of which, either in weariness or in irony, it refrains for the time to acknowledge the true terribleness. And the mode in which the refusal takes place distinguishes the noble from the ignoble grotesque. For the master of the noble grotesque knows the depth of all at which he seems to mock, and would feel it at another time, or feels it in a certain undercurrent of thought even while he jests with it.(Ruskin, 11.III §xl)

Characteristically he digresses in footnote into the necessity of madness, the criticism of system, and the conceit of the "I" in the case of a German philosopher-artist: "but I think that among the first persons, no emphasis is altogether so strong as that on the German *Ich.*" By contrast "the truly great" is he who ""ays his head in the dust and speaks thence -often in broken syllables." (Ruskin, 11.III §lx note)[70]

In effect it is the smooth finish of discursive rationality itself which enslaves, in its refusal as Bataille will say, to risk the death of meaning.

> A fine grotesque is the expression, in a moment, by a series of symbols, thrown together in bold and fearless connection of truths which it would have taken a long time to express in any verbal way, and of which the connection is left for the beholder to work out for himself; the gaps, left or overleaped by the haste of the imagination, forming the grotesque character. (Ruskin, 5.132)

The valorization of this speaking "in broken syllables", of "shattered majesty", of the scattered, the unfinished, the particular not simply in the negative or in terms of nostalgic or picturesque values makes Ruskin (often despite his intentions) the first architectural theorist of particularity, and its negotiation between mastery and servitude.

10.

Virtually a century after *The Stones of Venice*, the Venice School again raised the question of the particular. Saverio Muratori having drawn up an "operant history" whose minutely detailed maps trace Venice down to the level of showing every individual room, presents in the concept of *building type* something which is, nevertheless, thoroughly in keeping with the spirit of Hegelian totalisation[71]. Aldo Rossi's perpetuation of this move of typology towards structuralism, would later be posed in the clearest of oppositional polarities.[72] Only Carlo Scarpa's works in their palimpsest- and mosaic-like assemblage of particulars eluded the trap. Writing on his work Manfredo Tafuri[73] will cite Blanchot on the scattered archipelago of René Char's words. Need one now remark that writing on this archipelago-city Ruskin had already said as much?

The scattered is the lack of a common measure. The Ruskinian particular is menaced from two sides: by meaninglessness - empty, blind chance and by endless susceptibility to exegesis - unrelieved

relevance where apparently negligible details could reveal through detective work profound phenomena of great importance (invisible to contemporary Venetians though right under their noses) but overdetermined, all chance removed, the paranoiac state where *everything* is relevant. Ruskin is programmatically committed to the recollection of Venice brought into omnipresent unity, a world of detail without fragments where the detail will always be able to interpret and reconstitute the overall schema.[74] If St Marks is a "vast illuminated missal" then *The Stones* itself aspires to something of that all-embracing proto-structuralism which is the the nineteenth century project of "The Book" in Mallarmée, in Flaubert and in Viollet-le-Duc, to the aspiration to mastery. But Ruskin is philosophically committed to the unfinished, the fragment, the intrinsic, the particular. And, as the Schoolmen already knew, *individuum est ineffabile*, what is individual cannot be spoken about (Ginzburg, p 171), except, one is tempted to add, "in broken syllables..."

1 Le Corbusier, *The Decorative Art of Today*, trans James I Dunnet, (London: ,The Architectural Press, 1987), pp. 67-79, and p. 8.

2 The continuity of this tradition is argued by George Hersey, *The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989)

3 "The one idea which appears to underlie all human and animal figures used to support architectural members is service. This may be the service of a slave, of a serf, or simply of a servant." Michael Vickers, "Persepolis, Vitruvius and the Erechtheum Caryatids: The Iconography of Medism and Servitude," *Révue Archéologique* 1, (1985): 16

4 John Unrau, for example, provides a list of works critical of Ruskin on these counts and then proceeds further to attempt to measure him against the historical facts of medieval practice and working conditions. John Unrau "Ruskin, the Workman and the Savageness of Gothic," *New Approaches to Ruskin*, Thirteen Essays, ed. Robert Hewson, (London: Boston & Henley, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).

5 "Let us, therefore, at once confine the name to that art which, taking up and admitting, as conditions of its working, the necessities and common uses of the building, impresses on its form certain characters venerable or beautiful, but otherwise unnecessary. Thus I suppose, no one would call the laws architectural which determine the height of a breastwork or the position of a bastion. But if to the stone facing of that bastion be added an unnecessary feature, as a cable moulding, that is architecture." John Ruskin "The Lamp of Sacrifice," *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, (London: J M Dent, 1963) p. 8.

For Loos of course the very absence of ornament, in a certain symmetry to Ruskin, will define architecture in an absence of practical use: "When, crossing a wood, one comes across a tumulus six feet long and three feet wide, raised by shovel in the form of a pyramid, we become serious, and something in us says: That is architecture..." Adolf Loos "Architektur" *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. **Gluck von Franz** (Vienna: Herold 1962) p. 317.

6 "Lectures on Architecture and Painting" The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E.T.Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, (London: George Allen, 1903-12) 12.83,

7 "So, therefore, finally, neither architecture nor any other human work is admissable as an ornament, except in subordination to figure subject." (Ruskin, 9. 262)

"I conclude, then, with the reader's leave, that all ornament is base which takes for its subject human work, that it is utterly base, - painful to every rightly-toned mind, but for a reason palpable enough when we do think of it. For to carve our own work, and set it up for admiration, is a miserable self-complacency, a contentment in our own wretched doings..." (Ruskin, 9.264)

8 "Hence then a general law, of singular importance in the present day, a law of simple common sense, - not to decorate things belonging to purposes of active and occupied life. Wherever you can rest, there decorate; where rest is forbidden, so is beauty. You must not mix ornament with business. any more than you can mix play. Work first, and then rest. Work first then gaze, but do not use golden ploughshares, nor bind ledgers in enamel." (Ruskin,*Seven Lamps* §xix)

9 "Ornament ...has two entirely distinct sources of agreeableness, one that of the abstract beauty of forms, which, for the present, we will suppose to be the same whether they come from the hand or the machine; the other the sense of human labour and care spent upon it. How great this latter influence we may perhaps judge, by considering that there is not a cluster of weeds growing in any cranny of ruin which has not a beauty in all respects nearly as equal and in some immeasurably superior, to that of the most elaborate sculpture of stones [...] and that our interest in the carved work, our sense of its richness, though it is tenfold less rich than the knots of grass beside it, of its delicacy, though it is a thousandfold less delicate...results from our consciousness of it being the work of poor, clumsy, toilsome man" (Ruskin, *Seven Lamps*, pp. 81-2)

The gospel of work is also no doubt to be seen in the light of Carlyle's Past and Present : "All work even cotton-spinning is noble, work is alone noble" Thomas Carlyle *The complete works of Thomas Carlyle* (New York: Cromwell 1902) v. 10, p. 153

10 "§31 Law II. Science of inner structure is to be abandoned." (Ruskin, 10. 99)

11 The practice of gathering precious marbles and slicing them thinly which arose at first out of necessity was, he argues, "prolonged in the pride of the conquering one; and besides the memorials of departed happiness, were elevated the trophies of returning victory. The ship of war brought home more marble in triumph than the merchant vessel in speculation." (Ruskin, 10. 97)

12 Thus of the colours of marble: "There is a history in them. By the manner in which they are arranged in every piece of marble, they record the means by which that marble has been produced, and the successive changes through which it has passed. And in all their veins and zones, and flame-like stainings, or broken and disconnected lines, they write various legends, never untrue, of the former political state of the mountain kingdom to which they belonged, of its infirmities and fortitudes, convulsions and consolidations, from the beginning of time." (Ruskin, 11. 38)

13 As Joseph Rykwert notes it was nature that "Ruskin continually scrutinized for the way in which surface revealed structure, and the structure the process of making...Ruskin was a naturalist: he was of Darwin's generation and intellectual

climate..." Joseph Rykwert *On Adam's House in Paradise*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1981) p. 36.

[14] It is only from this sense of materials in their "peculiar class", and "higher principles of action" that "the languages of Types" will be read. (Ruskin, 11. 41)

[15] "All art which is worth its room in the world...is art which proceeds from an individual mind, working through instruments which assist, but do not supersede, the muscular action of the human hand, upon the materials which most tenderly receive, and most securely retain, the impression of such human labour.

"And the value of every work of art is exactly in the ratio of the quantity of humanity which has been put into it, and legibly expressed upon it for ever..." (Ruskin, 9 appendix 17)

[16] See the celebrated contrast (in Pugin's sense) between the Renaissance and Romanesque Wall-Veil Decoration (Ruskin, plate XIII facing 9. 348)

[17] "European man has become free, master of himself and lord of the world precisely because he has renounced the fear of alterity, contradiction and the unknown, because he has been passing through them practically at their own height, thinking them and joining thus to the complete unification, in a figure, of the universal and of the individual" Georg Wilhelm Friedric *Encykl.opadie der philosophischen in grundrisse* (Berlin: L Heiman 1870) §258Z

[18] Alios Reigl *Stilfragen Grundlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik* (Berlin: R. C. Schmidt and Co 1923) *Problems of style: foundations for a history of ornament* trans Evelyn Kain; (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press c 1992)

[19] C.P. Jones, "Stigma: Tatooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity", *Journal of Roman Studies*. LXXVII, (1987): 139-55. Jones notes that the ancient practice of penal tattooing on slaves and criminals is found as late as 1871 in the British Army where delinquent soldiers were tattooed with the letters D. and B.C. for Deserter and Bad Character.

See also Joseph Rykwert, "Semper's 'Morphology'", Rassegna XII, 41/1 (March 1990): 46-7, n. 40.

[20] ific study of fingerprinting began in 1823. In 1860 in India "imperial officials appropriated the conjectural knowledge of the Bengalese in fingerprinting and turned it against them." Individualization becomes the mode of controlling the indistinguished mass. On the importance of the identification of criminals in the nineteenth century and of the non-transparency of the evidential paradigm see Carlo Ginzburg, *Miti emblemi spie, morfologia e storia*, (Turin: Einaudi, 1986), pp. 158-209.

[21] "this slavery is done away with altogether; Christianity having recognised in small things as well as great the individual value of every soul. But it not only recognises its value, it confesses its imperfection, in only bestowing dignity upon the acknowledgement of unworthiness. That admission of lost power and fallen nature, which the Greek or Ninevite felt to be intensely painful and as far as might be altogether refused, the Christian makes daily and hourly, contemplating the fact of it without fear, as tending, in the end, to God's greater glory...

"And it is, perhaps, the principle admirableness of the Gothic schools of architecture, that they receive the results of the labour of inferior minds; and out of fragments full of imperfection; and betraying that imperfection in every touch, indulgently raise up a stately and unaccusable whole." (Ruskin, 10. 190)

[22] "The third kind of ornament, the Renaissance is that in which the inferior detail becomes principal, the executor of every minor portion being required to exhibit skill and possess knowledge as great as that which is possessed by the master of the design; in the endeavour to endow him with this skill and knowledge, his own original power is overwhelmed, and the whole building becomes a wearisome exhibition of well-educated imbecility." (Ruskin, 10. 189)

[23] On "Savageness" see Patrick Connor, *Savage Ruskin*, (London: MacMillan, 1979) pp. 98-100, and Wendell V., Harris, "The Gothic Structures of Ruskin's Praise of Gothic", *University of Toronto Quarterly*, vol XL, No. 2, (1971): 109-118.

[24] "Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage" *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. trans A.V. Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) p. 111-119

See also:

Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, (New York and London: Basic Books 1969) pp. 40-70.

Georges Bataille, *L'expérience interieure*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1954) *Inner Experience*, trans Anne Leslie (Boldt State: University of New York Press, 1988)

Maurice Blanchot, "Literature and the Right to Death" *The Gaze of Orpheus and Other Essays* trans Lydia Davis (New York: Station Hill 1981)

Jean Paul Sartre *L'être et le néant: essai d'ontonogie phenomenologique* (Paris: Galliman 1949)

Jacques Lacan, "The Symbolic Order", *Freud's Papers on Technique 1953-54*, trans John Forrester (New York: W W Norton 1988) XVIII, pp. 222-23

Jacques Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy", Writing and Difference, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) pp. 251-77

[25] I do not intend to suggest any direct links between Ruskin and Hegel, though see Robert Hewison *John Ruskin: the argument of the eye* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press c1976) pp. 204-204 for speculations on this account, in particular those of R.G . Collingwood and his father.

[26] Jean Hypolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans S. Cheriak and J. Heckman (*Genèse et structure de la Phénomenologie de l'esprit de Hegel*, (Paris: Aubier, 1946)), (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1974) 14, pp. 172-77. My abbreviation of Hegel is derived from Hypolites's summary.

[27] Kojève comments: "The opposition of Particularity and Universality, of Einz*elheit* and *Allgemeinheit*, is fundamental for Hegel" (Kojève, p. 58) and elaborates: "Mastery corresponds to Universality and Slavery to the particular...The human value constituted by work is essentially particular, 'personal.' Bildung, the educative formation of the worker by Work, depends on the concrete conditions in which the work is carried out, conditions that vary in space and are modified in time as a function of this very work. Therefore it is by Work, finally, that the differences beween men are established, that the 'particularities,' the 'personalities,' are formed. And thus it is the working Slave, and not the Master, who becomes conscious of his 'personality' and who imagines 'individualistic' ideologies, in which absolute value is attributed to Particularity, to 'personality'." (Kojève, pp. 59-60)

[28] Yves Michaud, "L'art auquel on ne fait pas attention (à propos de Gombrich)" [review of *The Sense of Order*] *Critique*

XXXVIII No.416, (January 1982): 29.

29 This individuation is expressed by the hand:

"That the hand, however, must represent the in-itself of the individuality in respect of its fate is easy to see from the fact that, next to the organ of speech, it is the hand most of all by which a man manifests and actualizes himself. It is the living artificer of his fortune. We may say of the hand that it is what a man does, for in it, as the active organ of his self fulfilment, he is present as the animating soul; and since he is primarily his own fate, his hand will thus express this in-itself." (Hegel,*Phenomenology* §314, p. 189)

30 For Hegel difference is at once manifested and absorbed in the moment which resolves it. He cannot think difference in terms of diversity only opposition. Difference is made contradiction. [Cf Francoise Collin, *Maurice Blanchot et la question de l'écriture*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1971) p. 202-3.] The other of something is never an other but its other. What differs from difference is identity, which Blanchot parodies thus: "What differs from difference is difference" quoted (Collin, p. 203 n. 2 "For Blanchot a thing does not have an other, nor its other, nor others, but is of the other, art is other. It is not particular, and is not inscribed from hence in the movement of the universal: it is always already anonymous," (Collin, p. 204)

31 Ruskin's emphasis. This paragraph begins: "The especial condition of true ornament, is that it be beautiful in its place, and nowhere else, and that it aid the effect of every portion of the building over which it has influence; that it does not by its richness make other parts bald, or by its delicacy, make other parts coarse." (Ruskin, 9.284)

32 Cf Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubió: "What is decorative is inessential, it is that which appears not as substance but as background, Something which allows a reading, in the style of Walter Benjamin, which is not attentive but distracted and, as such, becomes something that highlights and enriches reality and makes it bearable, without attempting to dominate, to become central, to demand the respect due to the totality." Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubió "Arquitectura Debil", Quaderns 175, (1987): 83-4.

33 "Directly opposed to this ordered, disciplined, well officered, and variously ranked ornament, this type of divine, and therefore of all good human government, is the democratic ornament, in which all is equally influential, and has equal office and authority: that is to say , none of it any office or authority, but a life of continual struggle for independence and notoriety, or of gambling for chance regards. The English perpendicular work is by far the worst of this kind that I know." (Ruskin, 9. 302-303). The military metaphors in relation to ornament are again taken up in 10. 308.

For Ruskin a false idea of liberty had supplanted the old values of loyalty and obedience resulting in the "horror, distress and tumult which oppress foreign nations", the revolutions of 1848.

34 It comprises the following:

(1.) Abstract lines.
(2.) Forms of Earth (Crystals).
(3.) Forms of Water (Waves).
(4.) Forms of Fire (Flames and Rays).
(5.) Forms of Air (Clouds).
(6.) (Organic forms). Shells.
(7.) Fish.
(8.) Reptiles and Insects.
(9.) Vegetation (A). Stems and Trunks.
(10.) Vegetation (B). Foliage.
(11.) Birds.
(12.) Mammalian animals and Man.

35 Ruskin wrote to his father February 1852 that the essence of Gothic lies "in the workman's heart and mind - but its outward distinctive test is the trefoiled arch... I shall show that the Distinctive test of Gothic architecture is so by a mysterious ordainment, being first a type of the Trinity in unity, Secondly of all the beauty of Vegetation upon earth - which was what man was intended to express his love of, even when he built in stone - lastly because it is the perfect expression of the strongest possible way of building an arch." *Ruskin's Letters from Venice 1851-1852*, ed J.L.Bradley, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955) p. 192, see also Jeffrey L. Spear, *Dreams of an English Eden: Ruskin and his tradition in social criticism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) p. 115. Spear notes how Ruskin conducts most of his analyses in triplets.

With specific reference to *The Stones of Venice* one may note: Three books, three "orders", three cities: Tyre, Venice London, three elements: Roman, Lombard, and Arab, three virtues: required of a building: that it act well, speak well, look well, three classes of artistic qualifications, the foxglove in three stages.

36 For Ruskin's opposition to a theory of pure form, such as that of Ralph Wornum, see E.H. Gombrich, *The Sense of Order*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univerisity Press, 1979) p. 38.

37 See Kristen Ottesen Garrigan, "Visions and Verities: Ruskin on Venetian Architecture" *Studies in Ruskin, Essays in Honour of Van Akin Burd*, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1982) p. 159.

38 See Jay Fellows, *The Failing Distance, The Autobiographical Impulse in John Ruskin*, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) pp. 37-8.

39 "Greatness can only be rightly estimated when minuteness is rightly reverenced. Greatness is the aggregation of minuteness; nor can its sublimity be felt truthfully by any mind unaccustomed to the affectionate watching of what is least." (Ruskin, 7.230)

40 "This phenomenology which admittedly describes the diverse figures of human consciousness and knowledge, is nevertheless a clearly phenomenal manifestation of the Absolute - that is, of what Hegel calls in his preface, the 'life of God' or the 'life of the Spirit,' by which he means the life of the trinitarian Spirit that 'endures [death] and maintains itself in it.' In this sense, Hegel's Phenomenology is the speculative version of the Passion (as Bataille, rectifying Kojève, understood perfectly): the Absolute that 'rends' itself in is self-negation is strictly modelled on the kenosis of Christ (Saint Paul, Philippians 2:7; Christ "emptied himself [ekenosen], taking the form of a servant").We might as well say that this death is inseparable from the resurrection. There is in Hegel an incarnation of the Absolute (human manifestation, finite phenomenality), but this

incarnation remains that of the Spirit that 'maintains itself even in death' and thus 'changes nothingness into being,' The fact that man (the 'Son of Man') dies is no problem for Hegel, since this death of the finite man is precisely the motive force behind his infinite 'sublation' (Aufhebung), the condition of the Spirit's finally absolute manifestation as trinitarian identity of Father and Son, of Substance and subject, of the in-itself and the for-itself, of identity and difference: 'That Substance is essentially Subject is expressed in the representation of the Absolute as Spirit -the most sublime Concept and the one which belongs to the modern age and its religion'" Michael Borsch Jackobsen, *Lacan The Absolute Master*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press **199**) pp. 12-13.]

41 9.291 §13

42 Georg Wilheim Friedrich Hegel*Aesthetics: lectures on fine art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975) v. II p. 685. For Hegel's treatment of the particular in relation to Gothic architecture see Naomi Schor, *Reading in Detail Aesthetics and the Feminine*, (New York and London: Methuen, 1987) p. 29.

43 Remo Bodei, *Scomposizioni Forme dell'individuo moderno*, (Turin: Einaudi, 1987) p. 211

"Hegel is interested not so much in the defence of differentiation or the interiority of the individual (which for him still conserved the mark of feudal particularization or of youthful enthusiasm) as much as their connection with reality, in the construction of rational and anonymous ties, which being incarnated in the laws and institutions and becoming second nature -would have had to make a rationality living in the real and drastically diminish the weight of individual arbitrariness, from the monarchy to the last citizen." (Bodei, p. 212-3)

44 William Shakespeare *Measure for Measure* II.iii.ii

45 See also (Fellows, *Failing distance* p38)

46 Carol Christ, "The Finer Optic" The *Aesthetics of Particularity in Victorian Poetry*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975) p. 52.

47 "Five orders! There is not a side chapel in any Gothic cathedral but it has fifty orders, the worst of them better than the best of the Greek ones, and all new; amd a single inventive human soul could create a thousand orders in an hour" (Ruskin, 11. II§xci)

48 See Peter Fuller, "The Geography of Mother Nature" The *Iconography of Landscape*, ed. Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

49 see Alison G Sulloway, *Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Victorian Temper* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972) p. 87.

50 Apart from the more obvious similarities of subject matter and, at times, of technique in their drawings, there is similar valorization and minute observation of the particularities of nature and self. ["Throughout his life Hopkins filled his journals with comments on Ruskin's aesthetic laws, artless pronouncements on the superiority of Gothic architecture above all others, 'as Ruskin says' (*The Journals and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins* , ed Humphry House and Graham Storey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959) p. 13) and admonitions to himself and others to follow Ruskin's advice." (Sulloway, p 41-2)] These themes will be developed and be carried to an extreme pitch. In Hopkins is to be found the striking conjunction of self-denial, self-sacrifice the the wrestling with an inner void or abyss of the self, even as he speaks of the "taste of the self".

"What is man says Job that Thou shouldst contend with him? Yet as in Job, we feel the calling more than the being called - a voice constraining the void. The true contender is man who cries for justice. So Hopkins who strains ears amd eyes to transform the not yet into the now"

like a lighted empty hall

where stands no host at door or hearth

vacant creation's lamps appall ("Nondum")

The more he packs his verse the more we sense his Pascalian horror at that vacancy. 'Verily Thou art a God that hidest Thyself' ." ("Poetry and Justification" Hopkins A Collection of Critical Essays ed by Geoffrey H. Hartman, (Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1966) pp. 6-7.)

J.Hillis Miller ("Creation of Self in Hopkins" *Victorian Subjects*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p. 4) notes "What had seemed so solid (the self) turns out to be merely a 'positive infinitesimal' (*The Notebooks and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (London and New York: Oxford University Press 1937) p. 322). What had seemed so self-subsistent is really very much like the Mallarméan néant; it is 'nothing a zero, in the score or account of existence'"]

Here too a horror vacui ["Hopkins will use word on word, image on image, as if possessed with a poetic kind of horror vacui." ("The Dialectic of Sense-Perception", ed Geoffrey H Hartman *Hopkins: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1966), p117] is set in contention with an inexhaustible resilience, multiplicity, differentiation, and individuation of things:

Each mortal thing does one thing and the same~:

Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;

Selves -goes itself, myself it speaks and spells

Crying What I do is me: for that I came.

Each thing in nature has its own distinctive note or tone, is "arch-espécial". Hopkins related his own notions of individuation in his terms "inscape" and "instress" to the principium individuationis of Duns Scotus in the medieval philosopher's concept of haecceitas, the ultimate individuality of a thing. For Scotus every individual entity is radically different from any other entity. For Plato and Aristotle individual things or men are feeble incarnations of the species. The individual's greater richness of perfection is incontrast to the species and the ultimate perfection of things, it enables them to receive in themselves the act of existence. Multiplication of individuality is seen as a communication of divine goodness and beatitude, see Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus:The Basic Principles of his Philosophy*, trans and ed Bernadine Bonansea, (Washington DC, Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1961) haeccetas for Scotus is the positive ultima realitas entis (Sermons *and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, ed. Christopher Devlin, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959) p 350) Fr Devlin (Hopkins, Sermons, p 293) notes that Hopkins "identifies 'inscape' with 'nature' as distinct from 'pitch', which is identified with haecceitas." Hopkins uses the expression 'pitches of suchness.'

See also Walter J Ong, 'Particularity and Self in Hopkins' Victorian Consciousness' *Hopkins, the Self and God*, (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press,1986) pp. 1-46

Each thing has the energy of being "throughout one with itself" and each is distinctive in pattern. [Hopkins, *Journals* p130.]
"Inscape" refers to "species or individually distinctive beauty of style" ("Letter to Coventry Patmore", Hopkins, *Journals* p 373)
According to Scotus what distinguishes one individual of a species from all other individuals cannot be explained in terms of matter or form or essence or quantity or even by existence, but is simply given with the individual itself, the being's 'thisness', haeccetas [See Frederick Copelston, *A History of Philosophy* (London: Burns Oates Washbourne 1946) vol 2, pp. 234-40.]
My selfbeing, my consciousness and feeling of myself that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnut leaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man. (Hopkins, *Journals* p 123)
Hopkins' notion of "piedness" like rhyme and beauty is a relation between things which are similar without being identical, each thing deriving its peculiar existence, its "inscape" from a unique interlocking or interweaving or coincidence of characteristics, a "chiming" of words that founds difference of sense on identity of sounds: "All beauty may by a metaphor be called rhyme." (Hopkins, *Journals* p 102)
Hopkins' presentation in the colloquial, vernacular, local, the acute detail indicate how he must begin with the individual "for he is confronted at the beginning with a world of unrelated particulars," (J. Hillis, Miller *The Disappearance of God*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975) pp. 276-7) harmony is reached by way of rhyme where "any two things however unlike are in something like." (Hopkins, *Journals* p 123) "For Hopkins Form is eccentric, realist, differential" (Michael Sprinkler, "A Counterpoint of Dissonance" *The Aesthetics and Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) p 24)
"Form does not originate in the imposition of structure on a series of diverse elements, but in the spontaneous generation of similarity out of difference. As Gilles Deleuze puts it, 'seul ce qui se ressemble diffère, seules les différences se ressemblent'. Form does not radiate from a centre but arises spontaneously from the comparison and differentiation of separate and distinctive parts within the whole." (Sprinkler, p25)
"There are indeed two texts in Hopkins, the over thought and the under thought. One text, the overthought is a version... of western metaphysics in its catholic Christian form. in this text the Word governs all words, as it governs natural objects and selves... On the other hand the under thought, if it is followed out is a thought about language itself. It recognises that there is no word for the Word, that all words are metaphors - that is, all are differentiated, differed, deferred. Each leads to something of which it is the displacement in a movement without origin or end, in so far as the play of language emerges as the basic model for the other two realms (nature and the effects of grace within the soul), it subverts both nature and supernature. The individual natural object and the individual self, by the fact of their individuality, are incapable of ever being more than a metaphor of Christ - that is, split off from Christ." (Hillis Miller, "The Linguistic Moment in 'The Wreck of the Deutschland'" *New Criticism and After* ed Thomas Daniel Young, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976) p. 58)
At the deepest centre of selfhood each is altogether alone, what Scotus calls the *ultima solitudo* of man. There is no "us," no resonances between men. For Hopkins the "inscape" of the individualized being moves outwards by its "instress" to be registered by consciousness [Hence his reflections on the term 'sake': "Sake is word I find it convenient to use: I did not know when I did so first that it is common in German in the form of sach. It is the sake of 'for the sake of,' foresake, namesake, keepsake. I mean by it the being a thing has outside itself, as a voice by its echo, a face by its reflection, a body by its shadow, a man by his name, fame or memory and also that in the thing by virtue of which it has this being abroard, and that is something distinctive, marked, specifically or individually speaking as for a voice and echo clearness; for a reflected image light, brightnes; for a shadow-casting body, bulk; for a man genius, great achievements, amiability, and so on." Letter to Bridges 26 May 1879 The Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges (London: Oxford University Press 1935)].
But there is neither a centre from which this happens nor a universal self. In his extraordinarily contorted commentary on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius (Hopkins, *Sermons* p 127), the self cannot be reduced to "a mere centre or point of reference for consciousness or action attributed to it." The concept of a universal self is revealed to be a contradiction in terms: the universal self 'is not really identified with everything else nor with anything else, which was supposed; that is / there is no such universal', as Sprinkler notes: "The despairing conclusion to the text, that there is no such universal partially conceals but cannot entirely avoid the silent but inevitable conclusion of the text's inexorable logic: there is no such self either." (Sprinkler, p 86)

[51] (Hopkins, *Journals* p. 76, 84, 104) See J Hillis Miller, "The Univocal Chiming" Hop*kins: A Collection of Critical Essays*. ed Geoffrey H Hartman, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966) p. 89

[52] Hopkins is opposed to merging, where "all is seared with trade; smeared with toil;/And wears man's smudge" and "self in self" is "steeped and pashed" individuality and pattern are insufficiently distinctive to produce rhyme.

[53] Charles Baudelaire, "Le peintre de la vie moderne", *Critique d'art*, ed. Claude Pichois, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965) p. 449.

[54] Giorgio Agamben, *Stanzas, Word and Phantasm in Western Culture*, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) p. 50.

[55] **Engels** "The Condition of the Working Class in 1844"

[56] A conscious reference to Adam Smith *An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* gen ed R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner ed W. B. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976) vol.1 p. 8, where the pin is used as example of the division of labour.

[57] Maurice Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, trans Susan Hanson, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) p. 308

[58] Leon Battista Alberti, *On Painting and Sculpture*, ed. and trans. Cecil Grayson, (London: Phaidon Press, 1972) p. 53. Cf Svetlana Alpers, *The Art of Describing, Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) pp. 21-2, for a comparison between Dutch and Italian art in terms of the particular.

[59] "to examine not only every one of the older palaces, stone by stone, but every fragment throughout the city which afforded any clue to the formation of its styles" (Ruskin, Preface, 9.10)

[60] See also Tony Tanner, *Venice Desired*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p. 86. The problem of modernism for Ruskin, as it will be for Pound, is how to make it all come together.

[61] Roberto Masiero, "In Praise of Decoration against Superficiality", *Rassegna* XII, 41/1 (March 1990) p. 23.

[62] Rae Beth Gordon, *Ornament Fantasy, and Desire in Nineteenth Century French Literature,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 242.

[63] Jay Fellows, *Ruskin's Maze, Mastery and Madness in his Art,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) p. 205.

[64] "Ornament becomes the privileged location for the expression of desire because it is peripheral. Peripheral perception writes Eherenzweig, 'serves no better purpose than to be repressed from the surface memory image and to feed dream-like hallucinations of which we hardly ever become aware' (*Psychoanalysis,* 173n quoted in Gordon, p 19)...What the mind enjoys in looking at ornamental metamorphoses is not the images per se, but 'the movement of thought which passes from one to the other' (Souriau, *L'Imagination,* p. 60 quoted in Gordon, p 19)."

[65] See Fellows, *Ruskin's Maze,* p xx, and earlier: John Hayman, "Towards the Labyrinth" *New Approaches to Ruskin, Thirteen Essays,* ed. Robert Hewson (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981)

[66] *The Idea of a University Discourse* 6 Section7, quoted Fellows.

[67] Cf Elizabeth K Helsinger "History as Criticism: The Stones of Venice," *Studies in Ruskin: essays in honor of Van Akin Burd* ed Robert Rhodes and Dellvan Janik (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 1982) Helsinger argues that traveling, reading, seeing are nearly synonymous terms for a way of taking in or consuming cultural artifacts. On *The Stones* as travel literature see also her *Ruskin and the Art of the Beholder,* (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982) and Cosgrove, Denis "The Myth and Stones of Venice an Historical Geography of a Symbolic Landscape," *Journal of Historical Geography,* 8.2, (1982), pp. 145-169.

[68] see also Colin Rowe, "Character and Composition; or some Vicissitudes of Architectural Vocabulary in the Nineteenth Century" *Oppositions* 2, (1974).

[69] "The trembling of the human soul in the presence of death ..And from the contemplation of death, and the pangs which follow his footsteps, arise in men's hearts the strange and irresistible superstitions" (Ruskin, 11.III§lxv)

The grotesque which we are examining arises out of that condition of mind which appears to follow naturally upon the contemplation of death.

[70] Cf "..if language is to begin the life that will carry this language must have experienced its nothingness, must have 'trembled in the depths, and everything in it that was fixed and stable must have been shaken'. Language can only begin with the void'" (Blanchot, *Gaze of Orpheus* p. 43). See also Andrzej Warminski, "Dreadful Reading Blanchot on Hegel" *Readings in Interpretation,* (Mineapolis: University of Minesota Press, 1987) pp. 183-91

[71] On the concept of building type he writes:

"Come origine energetica di un processo, agente in ogni senso, quindi insieme costruttivamente e funzionalmente, forma formante, che viveva e mutava rimanendo sempre se stesso, affermando quindi una individualità sua propria, antecedente a qualunque espressione individuale personale, ché anzi ne diveniva la condizione e unica base di legittimità, costituendo dunque la sostanza dell'unità e della pienzza di una tecnica, intesa non come applicazione economistica, ma come attività umana completa, dunque come civiltà." Saverio Muratori "Architettura e Civiltà in crisi," 1963 *Antologia critica degli scritti di Saverio Muratori,*(Florence: Alinea, 1990), p124.

"All' esterno esso costituiva un principio aggregativo altamente caracterizzato nel tessuto edilizio come parte integrante dell'organismo urbano, di cui diveniva condizione, ma anche stimolo qualificante di una ulteriore individualità legittimamente fondata sulla individualità base del tipo edilizio; mentre l'organismo urbano, a sua volta, si apriva a una vita nel tempo secondo una sua ulteriore affirmazione individuale - condizionata e stimolata insieme dai gradi già acquista di individualità - e si identificava nell'ambiente urbano, come unità nella continuità, rimanendo sempre pari a se stesso, a un tempo limite e principio di sviluppo attivo.

"All'interno il tipo edilizio si apriva a un ulteriore e continuo processo di individuazione nella caratterizzazione peculiare dell'edificio singolo, determinato da forze individue - di luogo, di committente e di artefice - agenti e innescate nella loro facoltà individuante dai limiti stessi posti dal tipo edilizio." *Antologia critica degli scritti di Saverio Muratori,* (Florence, Alinea, 1990), p. 100.

[72] On the first page of Rossi's *Architecture of the City* is to be read:

"The contrast between the particular and the universal, between individual and collective, emerges from the city and from its construction, its architecture. This contrast is one of the principal viewpoints from which the city will be studied in this book." Aldo Rossi, *The Architecture of the City,* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press,1985), p. 21.

[73] "One has to make the effort of identifying in the 'explosion' or 'disintegration' a value that is not purely negative. And not privative or simply positive, either. It is as if the alternative and the compulsion to affirm the being when one wishes to deny it were split apart... So the fragmentary poem is not incomplete, but one which opens up a different mode of completion: that mode which comes into play in the form of expectency, of questioning, or of an affirmation irreducible to unity." Manfredo Tafuri, "Carlo Scarpa and Italian Architecture" Carlo *Scarpa The Complete Works,* ed Francesco Dal Co and Giuseppe Mazzariol, (New York: Electa/Rizzoli, 1985), p. 77

"the discontinuous form, according to Blanchot, is the only one that 'weds speech and silence, play and serenity, the need for utterance and ... the uncertainty of wavering, troubled thought.'" (Tafuri, p. 81)

Both quotes are from Blanchot's *Entretien Infini.*

[74] I refer to detail and fragment here in the sense used by Omar Calabrese "Detail and Fragment" Neo-B*aroque A Sign of the Times,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 68-90.

fig 1 (top left) SYNTAX, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, 1990 (Photo: Tom Daniell)
fig 2 (top right) Kirin Plaza, Osaka, 1987 (Photo: Tom Daniell)
fig 3 (bottom) Crystal Monolith, Yokohama, 1992 (Computer graphics: courtesy of Akihiko Endo, Shin Takamatsu Architect & Associates)



INTERVIEW WITH SHIN TAKAMATSU AND TOM DANIELL

Ornament and (anti)Urbanism

TD Your architecture is uncompromisingly individualistic and without apparent precedent. It has been characterised as a response to the overpowering and chaotic nature of the contemporary Japanese city. This is certainly true of a building like Kirin Plaza Osaka, located in the Shinsaibashi district of Osaka, one of the most intense urban environments in all of Japan. Kirin seems excessive in photographs, but in reality it is silent and serene: the eye of the storm. There, it is a perfect response. However, it seems ironic that the majority of your built work to date is located here in Kyoto. This is a very traditional city, in both architecture and custom. How do you regard context in your work?

ST There are two ways to deal with context. One is to harmonise as much as possible, to work with utmost sympathy for history, tradition and the aesthetics of the surrounding buildings. By way of analogy, imagine the city to be a length of *obi*.[1] If you wish to add to or repair the *obi*, you could weave a new pattern into it using a very similar thread and stitch. This would then become indistinguishable from what was existing. The second method would be to inlay a brilliant and complex knot of gold thread into the *obi*, to transform it. This is my method. Kyoto has a profound tranquillity which rapidly assimilates all new intrusions. It is a form of stagnation. The context here is something that must be played with, challenged, fought and transfigured. In creating a new building, it is necessary to also create a new place, to redefine the surroundings.

As long as the making of a building is intended to add value to the city, architecture and urbanism cannot be separated. When I make a building, I am always considering both the immediate context and the deep structure of the city.

TD Kyoto is becoming increasingly modernized; tradition is fading. You have said Kyoto is dying.

ST Entropy increases. All cities must die, and it is exciting to be present at their death. What is important is how a city dies. Unfortunately, Kyoto is dying very badly. On the other hand, Vienna is dying well. The Viennese show wisdom in dealing with their city. Kyoto needs such wisdom right now.

TD Wisdom in what way?

ST We must take account of that which makes a city unique. One thing vital to Kyoto is *shakkei*.[2] *Shakkei* enhances and invigorates every space in the city, and allows spectacles such as the *diamon-ji*.[3] As long as Kyoto does not lose its *shakkei*, it will die well. Unfortunately, projects such as the Kyoto Tower Hotel and the new Kyoto JR Station were designed without thought for this, without an understanding of Kyoto. If the city was analyzed more intelligently, better architecture would result, and Kyoto would die with dignity.

TD Many of your commissions have been from developers and other commercial clients, yet these buildings have very powerful, almost religious, qualities, far in excess of the average tenant building. You once said, in reference to the LINKS building, "To me, a commercial building is like a temple ... commercial space, in an extreme sense, is a space to sublimate and to rescue us from all our wants and cravings."[4] Are such buildings intended to ritualise consumerism? Do you believe contemporary society has substituted materialism for religion?

ST No. Materialism will not bring us closer to the infinite. However, commercial space requires intense realization. If we use language as an analogy, a word does not exist in isolation. The word becomes a sentence, a page, an idiom of its own. If you read a book - Mishima perhaps, or Pynchon - you gain far more than just a collection of words. The words attain a certain synergy. It is the same with architecture. A commercial building must be more than functional. It must be architecture.

In the case of LINKS, that is a building which is intended to be seen from a distant place. A person seeing LINKS has a glimpse of a different world, a different definition of their world. Each viewer



fig 4 (top left) "the garden of abstract forms" Kunibiki Messe, Matsue, Shimane-ken, 1993 (courtesy of Nac sa & Partners)
fig 5 (top right) Okamura Research Centre, Yokohama, 1992 (Computer graphics: courtesy of Akihiko Endo, Shin Takamatsu Architect & Associates)
fig 6 (bottom) Kunibiki Messe, Matsue, Shimane-ken, 1993 (courtesy of Nac sa & Partners)

creates their own definition. I want to create an architecture that enriches and transfigures its surroundings. If architecture is a language, then LINKS is not only a means of communication, but a totally new word in the mind of the perceiver.

TD And the function of consumerism is then irrelevant?

ST If we are to believe Hegel, architecture is building without function.

TD I am interested in the paradigm shift regarding technology that has occurred in your work in recent years. This is perhaps exemplified by the differences between the SYNTAX building in Kyoto and the Crystal Monolith project for Yokohama. SYNTAX is a concrete fortress ornamented with mechanistic details; Crystal Monolith is a floating glass box, its form defined by the LCD video screens on its surface. The references here are to information technology, electronics rather than mechanics.

ST There is indeed a paradigm shift between these projects. Architecture is always changing, and technological developments will guide these changes. Crystal Monolith is a field of serial simulations, manifested as a simple glass box. Electronic and media technology provide an appropriate metaphor for architecture in the public domain. Technology, the machine, is a means by which architecture may be transformed.

TD Why the machine?

ST The machine has two important aspects. Firstly, the machine is a sign, that is, a visual message. Secondly, it is a metaphor: it has an invisible function. The machine *desires* something. It desires transcendence, and this secret function is more important than its appearance. A machine expresses both functional efficiency and the invisible dynamic forces that act within it. My machines are pure energy. They provoke and transform their context.

TD The mechanistic detailing of your early work was generally unrelated to function, yet in Crystal Monolith the ornament has apparently become inseparable from the structure. Similarly, in Kunibiki Messe and the Okamura Research Centre, you are dealing with forms that seem to be simultaneously undecorated yet entirely decorative in and of themselves. The distinction between essential and auxiliary, between the ornament and the ornamented, is no longer clear in any conventional sense.

ST Such a distinction has never existed in my work. Throughout history, ornament has been seen as something added, a question of rationality and efficiency versus beauty and grandeur. I am interested in something in between, beyond questions of utility and decoration. I compose architecture. It is all essential.

TD It is Hegel who suggests architecture is at its most powerful when it is most concerned with appearance, with pure symbolic power. Perhaps Kirin Plaza is a good example. The light towers are ornamental, yet completely integral to the architecture.

ST Yes. Kirin Plaza is a monument without physical form. You have seen Kirin Plaza by night: the building dissolves into darkness, and the floating towers remain. It is architecture composed of light.

TD I have noticed connections between your recent work and certain aspects of traditional Japanese architecture. The early buildings were dense, formally-complete monuments, yet your current work has become more sequential and episodic, freer in its composition. This interest in the time- oriented, experiential possibilities of architecture has obvious links with spaces such as Katsura Riky or Ry an-ji stone garden.

ST Two major factors led to these changes. The first is the issue of scale. The early buildings were very small, and hence designed to be instantly comprehended by those who see them. I wanted people to feel their power and strength in the first glance, to experience a moment of ecstasy when

fig 7 (top) A stone garden designed in the Karesansui (waterless stream) style circa 15th century, Ry an-ji temple, Kyoto (photo: Tom DanielI)
fig 8 (bottom)Kyoto Concert Hall, 1991 (courtesy of Shin Takamatsu Architect & Associates)

they encounter these buildings. However, as I started working at a much larger scale, I had to allow for the time it takes to comprehend vast forms and spaces. Such buildings require the accumulated understanding of their many aspects. I began to question the possibilities of large scale, to experiment with what I might achieve during the time it takes to perceive these buildings.

The second reason is that many of my commissions are now for public buildings rather than tenant buildings, and there is a huge difference in the design process. The programmes for public buildings are complex and varied. Tenant buildings simply require neutral, open space. On the other hand, specific functional requirements become very important for public projects. The complexities of the brief guide the design process.

TD So form follows function?

ST In a sense. While designing Kunibiki Messe, I was focusing on the programme very intensely. The building required a tight hierarchical system. We may design with diagrams showing different programmatic functions connected by line segments. This can then be translated into an arrangement of spaces. I struggled for a long time with this approach, and the results were unsatisfactory. I then shifted my attention from the functions to the line segments themselves.These tend to be all but ignored, and resolved into corridors and alleyways of no architectural power. I wanted to create a new type of line between elements, a new method of division and connection. I intended to create a building in flux, in a fluid equilibrium. I don't mean this as a banal deconstructivist aesthetic, but in an experiential sense. Rather than connecting the elements with lines, I allowed the elements to be swallowed up by the lines. At ground level in Kunibiki Messe, there is a 90-metre long processional space. In the taller section of the building, there is a 24-metre high glazed volume containing a number of floating elements, each with a different function: the "garden of abstract forms." There is a similar play of elements within transparent voids in the Okamura Research Centre and YKK Okayama projects. From the original planning diagrams, line segments without dimension became these enormous spaces.

The elements themselves are held in a delicate balance. If you imagine a bowl of water with several apples floating in it, over time the apples will find a stable equilibrium in relation to each other. Or if you look at the kanji character *kokoru*, the location of the fourth and final stroke is not fixed, but is contained within a zone defined by the preceding three.

The design process for these buildings involves a rigorous examination of the programme, followed by an analysis of time in the abstract. It is each particular system which provides the solution, through rigid adherence to every aspect of the system rather than by capricious transgressions of its rules. A system is always impoverished, but it is a poverty that guarantees richness. The solutions lie within this poverty. The purer the system, the greater the possibilities for discovery.

I am aware that my work right now is moving closer to aspects of traditional Japanese architecture. There is a similar equilibrium involved. For example, at Ry an-ji, if one stone is moved, or a stone is added, that space is significantly altered. Japanese space is always balanced on the edge of change. The system may be relatively flexible, but altering a single element can radically affect the entire structure.

TD If these recent projects are related to the minimalist zen space of Ry an-ji, are buildings such as Kirin Plaza and SYNTAX related to the ornate and hermetic Shinto shrines, for example T sh g gate at Nikk ?

ST Yes.

TD Your buildings have always floated. The recessed podiums and top-heavy compositions of the early buildings create the illusion of weightlessness.

ST I am trying to set architecture free. Architecture is constrained by so many things: function,

budget, building codes, systems, institutions, society, daily life, common sense. But above all, it is constrained by gravity. It is very difficult to free architecture from any of those things, although historically it has perhaps been attempted through religion or technology. To actually free architecture from gravity itself is, of course, totally impossible, so I try to achieve this freedom metaphorically rather than physically. In other words, I want an architecture that plays[5] with gravity. My architecture expresses the hope of one day escaping from gravity. In the early buildings, I wished to suggest a kind of instability, through their heavy appearance and tenuous connections with the ground. Although those buildings wish to float free, they barely levitate.

TD Your work is beginning to achieve that freedom, in projects such as Kunibiki Messe.

ST Perhaps. Those projects are tentative experiments. To simply resist gravity is no longer sufficient; I must escape gravity altogether.

TD Your architecture has always been explicit about its own artificiality, its unequivocal separation from the natural world. Recently, however, I have noticed that the boundaries between architecture and environment are becoming ambiguous. Why the shift from darkness to light, from enclosure to openness, from pure artifice to the inclusion of nature?

ST I have become interested in blurring the division between a building and its surroundings. This is related to the shift to public projects. For public buildings, you must examine their relationship with the city very carefully. Of course, you must deal with the facade, the structure, the space, but you must also deal with the transition between the surroundings and the building interior in a new way. For example, in my design for the Kyoto Concert Hall, the building changes over time[6]. It is a flexible[7] system which interacts with its environment. One section is clad in a three-layer "breathing membrane." On the outer perimeter there is a glass boundary wall, which absorbs the landscape. The glass wall is required for the functioning of the building, although I would rather have nothing at all, no separation between inside and outside. Behind the glass is a layer of infra- red-reflective polycarbonate. Behind this is a system of computer-controlled timber louvres. These louvres filter interior and exterior space, and allow glimpses of the activities within. Thus, the building breathes light. Ultimately, it will breathe in the history of Kyoto.



fig 9 (above) Katsura Riky, the former Imperial Villa, Kyoto, circa 17th century (photo: Tom Daniell)

I wish to alter the relationship between the interior and the exterior in architecture. I wish to mingle these two conditions, to layer space.

TD Japanese architecture has always layered space as you describe.

ST Of course. The traditional Kyoto townhouse is separated from its surroundings by membranes and lattices, by *shoji*[8] screens, marsh-reed blinds and bamboo shutters. The Kyoto Concert Hall project achieves this layering by means of high technology.

I am now searching for new types of spatial relationships, an open and ambiguous architecture. This is the ambition of the series of projects beginning with Kunibiki Messe. As I deal with public buildings, I wish to redefine the public domain. I am trying to eliminate boundaries.

June 1993, Kyoto, Japan.

Translation: Hiroshi Watanabe (Japan) and Hideaki Inoue (New Zealand)

[1]The traditional kimono sash, made from hand-woven silk.
[2]"borrowed scenery," the inclusion of distant views as background in the design of a building or garden. Kyoto is located in a basin, and is surrounded by bush-clad mountains. While the middle distance is ignored, the mountains are acknowledged and included in the composition.
[3] An annual festival in which bonfires are lit on seven mountainsides around downtown Kyoto, in the shape of enormous Kanji characters.
[4] "A Temple", *GA Architect* 9, (1990) pp. 118-119.
[5]"tawamureru", a childlike freedom from cares.
[6] "utsuroi", transient, floating, ever-changing.
[7] "kaihoteki", open, frank, easy, flexible.
[8] sliding rice paper screens.

fig 1 (above) "Take them out of the crate Joe".
fig 2 (below) The dots of a screen, both the mesh holes of a light filter and the indentations of a projection screen.



LAURENCE SIMMONS

"Take them out of the crate Joe": The Surface of Detail in John O'Shea's *Runaway*

"You like things too much."
(Joe Wharewera to David Manning in *Runaway*)

"Only universal issues are thought."
(Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*)

A few preliminaries. This paper is a close, dare I say it, a detailed reading of the New Zealand film *Runaway* made in 1964 by John O'Shea, but I also hope to have something to say about detailism,[1] the theory of particulars and film (fig 1) in general. My title ("Take them out of the crate Joe.") is taken from a seemingly innocuous detail in the film and it is a detail that immediately reveals some important characteristics about details. First of all, they are cumulative: you have naturally added to your store of details on Kiri Te Kanawa in one of her first roles here since 1964, and now conjure up, I suspect, the more sophisticated image of a rolex-toting diva of opera in the park. Secondly, when focussed on in this fashion, details always seem incongruous and operate an effect of distanciation, and this occurs whether they are lifted out of context or out of time. Thirdly, if I can take up the metaphor of Kiri's opening challenge, in my attempt to unpack the crate of this film I have divided my paper up into three parts and these three sections correspond to the three rhetorical moments identified by Alan Liu in his wide-ranging discussion of the detail: detachment, commitment, immanence. Figures that ultimately, he suggests, blur together in a kind of "filmic dissolve" where the overall textual result remains one of "detached immanence."[2] Similarly I would argue, it is the discernment of a distanced, yet also nostalgic and immanental sense of reality within a detail, such as that of the haunting moment of Kiri and her crate of beer, which enables, but also as I shall argue ultimately entraps, my own critical interrogation here today.

Each of the three parts of my discussion also focusses on the contribution of a particular theorist to the processes of this 'rhetoric of detail': in Part 1, I make use of Roland Barthes' *Camera Lucida*; in Part 2, Michel de Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life*; and in Part 3, I discuss the implications of Freud's 1927 paper on "Fetishism." As well, each of these three sections has as its subtitle a phrase uttered by a character in the film *Runaway*. Of course, making an epigraph of these phrases taken from the soundtrack of the film invests a casual detail with a truth-bearing function. And, naturally, here I begin to encounter one predicament of running the risk of detail where, as Naomi Schor has remarked, the danger is that "to write on detail is to become lost in it."(Schor, p. 6)

I

"Let us make a beginning... "

Let me begin as the film that is the object of my study here today begins with the question of 'beginning.' The dots of a screen, both the mesh holes of a light filter and the indentations of a projection screen (fig 2).[3] Also the elemental black and white dots that are the essential, meaningless, smallest possible units of a photograph magnified. Dots that announce the origins of film in the still photograph. Dots that also announce the apparatus of film projection without which the the celluloid origin of the image remains unreadable and intangible. Dots that mysteriously begin to focus or coalesce into the immobile profile of a face and have the immediate effect of signaling the presence of construction, the shaping of representation, the function of filtering, manipulating and objectivising events that is filming.

A voice-off that seems at first distorted and metallic, but then sharpens and focusses like those dots as it repeatedly calls out the name "Diana." First words that are also, as we will discover, the last words of this film. A voice that finds itself literally in the dark. Imprisoned perhaps? A voice whose

identity is unknown. A voice that could even be that of the director giving instructions to an actress. A voice that we spectators are also invited to identify with in its distanciation from the scene. A proper name from the edges of the screen, out of shot, that sets the story going, one that also puts into production the mechanisms of filming, signaling a moment of participation but also of witness after the events. For this is the only occasion that our film will jump proleptically forward. Or would it be more correct to say that the entire film which follows is an analeptic flashback to this sequence of beginning?

What happens when a film speaks to us like this in some way or another about itself from its outset, about its being cinema? When it speaks to us about a film that is being made, is gradually taking shape and is finally shown to us on the screen and where we are present at the effort of assembling a mise-en-scene. Such a film acquires a dual dimension, it takes itself as its own object of discourse and makes a mise-en-scene of its own existence. This can make it somewhat ambiguous, its centre may become elusive, a confession may slide into exhibitionism. The off-screen voice in the pre-credit sequence of *Runaway* introduces and shows the cinematic apparatus in both of its principle aspects - that of production (the director giving instructions) and that of consumption (a spectator commenting on the spectacle).

The woman's eyes shift to look in our direction as her body begins to turn mechanically 90 degrees to face the camera directly. The voice previously heard off-frame declaims the phrase "Let us make a beginning." What does this mean? Let us (these two characters, two lovers in the narrative) start again after all that has happened, make, as they say of lovers who have quarelled or broken off, a new beginning? Or is it let us (the filmmakers) *make* a beginning? For this is surely what they were literally engaged in. Or is it let us (the spectators) begin, or as recent spectator-response theory would more correctly have it 'make a beginning,' construct the moments of our beginning to view? For this is surely what *we* are engaged in?...

As she walks to our left Diana (by now we should have registered her name) is masked momentarily by a black pole and then moves further into off-screen space, paced by a panning camera through an indistinct and uncertain space, perhaps the jumble of a stage set. She turns around again to move aimlessly back through a doorway to centre frame and utters in a formal, almost ritualistic, tone another detail lifted from its context: a phrase taken from one of Desdemona's speeches in Shakespeare's *Othello*: "Our loves and comfort should increase even as our days do grow." (fig 3) Do we (spectators) recognise it as such? Perhaps not, but least we recognise it as cited and performative, functioning as an epigraph.

The opening strategies of enunciation, the beginning, of this film illustrate a conflict between two opposing structures. Let us separate for a moment the two components. The first one is fixed by the 'word': we have already noted how through naming the voice-off implicates the story to be viewed, how it sets the narrative going, and refers possibly to a narrative that has gone. The moment of verbal interpellation has the characters address each other and the film is modelled on a conjugation in the second person. So if we analyse the verbal register we find that the opening shot is a subjective one: this will be the story, yet another story, of two lovers, these events will concern individuals. The second structure is linked to the image: if we analyse the visual register we find that the opening shot (not a textbook establishing shot but one that nevertheless establishes) is turned directly towards the spectator in an attitude of revelation, just as the character portrayed is to turn as if in answer to an interpellation directed by us. The scene is seen by someone in the position of an observer, someone who lends his eyes to the spectator from a position 'out of frame' like that of the spectator. As such it metacinematically exhibits the workings of representation. The film in choosing methods of interpellation and shifting emphasis to the spectator conjugates in the first person: 'I/we are watching a film;' or in the participatory scenario I have outlined: 'We are making a beginning to this film.'

This is the fracture that cuts across the first shots of *Runaway*. Thanks to these opening strategies the 'I' of the film spectator, the s/he of the character and the you of subjectivity are placed together in apparent reciprocal equilibrium. However, this equilibrium will endure only for an

fig 3 (top right) a phrase from one of Desdemona's speeches in Shakespear's *Othello*: "Our loves and comfort should increase even as our days do grow"
fig 4 (top left) the male character we focus on emerges from the water
fig 5 (mid left) squared-off, chunky, white on grey modernist poster lettering that jumps position and increases in size
fig 6 (bottom) potent and recurrent associations between landscape and the male body

instant, the use of the first person will not continue, the moment of self-consciousness and interpellation will remain isolated. There will be a return to subjectivity, to representation folded back on 'you' and a victory of the second person.

Let us study in a little more detail how this victory of the second person is won. The second sequence of this film, its true opening, which contains the titles and credits ostensibly bears no connection with what we have just seen. In the establishing shot (and this time it is a classic establishing shot) the male character we focus on emerges from the water with Rangitoto in the background and the film titles play across his body (fig 4). In no way are we aware at this stage that he belongs to the disembodied voice we have just heard in our pretext. There is a further complication. Every filmtext is framed by its relationship to its introductory titles as the spectator becomes involved in 'a figuring out' of the graphic systems at work.[4] The title as genre points to the empty directionality of a sixties road movie - a 'David and Diana' to our own contemporary *Thelma and Louise*. The title as enigma - Who is the runaway? (The figure of David with the very word emblazoned across his chest would appear to confirm that he is. But he also seems curiously static and immobile here, anything but a runaway...) And running away from what? To where? And how does the title of the film inflect its theme song "Runaway" performed live in the first half of the film? These enigmas will find their solutions in the spectator's work throughout the diegesis and its images. Sometimes the experience of viewing confirms what is suggested in the apparent meaning of the title - David as runaway? Sometimes this will be betrayed: Does he really manage to runaway we ask at the end? Or the sense may be mutually reinforcing when the formal structures of a film and its title reinterpret each other: Does *Runaway* have a runaway narrative? Often the visual design, the stenographic shape of the credits, inflects the composition of the film as a whole: it may have an obvious extensive meaning displayed, for example, in the letter credits which drip blood so common in horror movies. But here with *Runaway* we have squared-off, chunky, white on grey modernist poster lettering that jumps position and increases in size (fig 5). And with its synchronisation to these shifts, the powerful role of Robin Maconie's music on the soundtrack of this film has already begun to be felt in these credits (fig 6). The superscription of title and credits above David's supine body, together with the previous image of Rangitoto - itself a reclined body rising out of the Waitemata - inaugurates potent and recurrent associations between landscape and the male body in this film, the potentiality of the male psyche to lose itself in the landscape.[5]

Let us stop for a moment to take some filmstock. What is the meaning of the small moves that I have revealed up until now? They all disclose the status of what is exhibited: the off-screen commentary, the titles, the character's frozen movement all remark, that is, the existence of film (the medium) within a film. Such detachment names the moment when the perceiver suddenly sees not 'reality' but the simulation Barthes calls 'the reality effect.'[6]

The effect of desublimation achieved by such a self-conscious reflection back to spectator space in this film is further enhanced by the many moments of interruption of movement within the image as opposed to movement of the image. Moments I would name as 'the freeze inside the image' rather than the freeze frame, or 'the image stilled' rather than the still. These are unique instants when cinema appears to be fighting against its very principle if this is defined, as Deleuze would have it, as movement-image.[7] For here the filmic is conceived not in the absolute of movement (Deleuze) but on the contrary, in the still whose dissociation from the dialectic of movement creates a space for an indescribable third meaning wavering between fixity and movement, the *not-quite-sure* of the image. This term 'third meaning' is borrowed from Barthes and initially comes from his encounter with several photograms taken from a film by Eisenstein.[8] For Barthes, opposed to the 'obvious' meaning where signification originates, is the fragmentary, exact and unpredictable 'obtuse' meaning whose aim is to be primarily indifferent to and even contradicts film movement in its *deroulement*. One can only reach obtuse meaning through the image that is brought to a standstill, film against the grain. Barthes is seeking a paradoxical object: a meaning prior to all signification, irreducible to articulated language which is nevertheless its vehicle and to which it is opposed. In *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* he reformulates the notion of 'third meaning' as the photographic *punctum*. In contrast to the *studium* or 'obvious meaning' of the photograph that leans towards its themes, its visible signifieds; the *punctum* designates the irrational, unnameable fragment that Barthes says "rises from

the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me."[9] It is the *punctum* that endows a photograph with the structure of a moving image:

> the cinema has a power which at first glance the Photograph does not have: the screen (as Bazin has remarked) is not a frame but a hideout; the man or woman who emerges from it continues living: a 'blind field' [*champ aveugle*] constantly doubles our partial vision... the *punctum* then, is a kind of subtle off-screen [*hors champ*] - as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see. (Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, pp. 55-57)

The filmic, then, is to be found in the play of trace between an absent and a present and the *punctum* breaks through or pierces the constraints of the assumed discrete system of signification that is photography to engage desire and the viewing subject. It 'punctures' the signifying surface and ruptures the space of representation. These instants where no movement is exhibited inside the image, instants of the image stilled or the body de-animated (fig 7), produce the spectral structure of photography where the image's referent is always called upon to share its space with a reference to death.[10] Unsuprisingly, *temps mort* is the technical term used in French to describe those moments when the camera dwells on a space after the character has left, or where, we could add, the actor has become frozen and immobile as if dead. They are moments where the structural distinction between the still and the moving image no longer holds. For given its insistent temporality cinema does move towards the future but, on the other hand, this is a future foreseen that we know will come to an end within the space of a screening. Within the present space and the present time of film, in other words, we are incessantly reminded of the spectre of the past that is death.

fig 7 These instants where no movement is exhibited . . . instants of the image stilled or the body de-animated

At the juncture of the visible and the invisible, the instant that stills the film gives to space the feeling of time[11] but also bears a relation to the film as whole. It goes way beyond its material inscription, reverting the film back on itself, emphasising that it cannot simply be reduced to the real time of illusion. These instants possess a quality of abstraction and of poignancy that seems to introduce a kind of paralysis, they are the pose but also the pause of film.

II

"The Hokianga is a big place but everything is small there."

1964, the date of release of *Runaway*, is also the date of publication of Pat Hohepa's *A Maori Community in Northland* by the Anthropology Department of Auckland University, a monograph on the 342 inhabitants of the Waima Valley situated on an estuary of the Hokianga Harbour. Originally part of an MA thesis, *A Maori Community in Northland* is one of the first attempts at what today would be classified, following the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, as a 'thick description' of a small Maori

community, and at the time of publication it represented a significant shift in the anthropological study of Maori society. Murray Groves in his foreword recognises the novelty of Hohepa's empirics and praises his study for abandoning;

> the traditional preoccupations of Polynesian anthropology and captur[ing] instead the authentic flavour of Maori life in the Hokianga area today. When it deals with such things as social security payments, the pecking order among siblings, the hui, the people's patois, attitudes to Jehovah's Witnesses, the tangi, debts at the general store, the consumption of beer, and complaints about the Department of Maori Affairs, this monograph deals with rural Maori society as it is, not as it was nor as it might be.[12]

Hohepa's monograph with its persistent piling up of detail is, to use de Certeau's phrase, progressively "encysted in particularity."[13] Let us take as an example the account of the annual cleaning of the Waima cemetery:

> Twenty-nine men and ten women, as well as eight boys and three girls, comprised the labour force on that single day in 1958. The equipment consisted of two tractors drawing mowers, one with a trailer; eight long-handled slashers; one scythe; eight spades; one hayfork; and ten maanuka forked sticks. Twenty six households were represented at the cemetery on that one day... While resting or while working, yarns, jokes, greetings and conversation continued, with people continually shifting from one task to another. Begun at 10 a.m., the work ended at 4 p.m., with an hour-long lunch break at 1.45 p.m. Lunch was also a convivial occasion, almost matching that of most households on Christmas day, for the workers had brought along pork, beef, mutton, peas, potatoes, and cabbage, preserved fruit, trifles, jelly, cake, and soft drinks, as well as tea and milk." (Hohepa, pp. 122-3)

We are immediately struck by the obsessiveness of these *ennumeratio* and the constant employfragmentary nature of the enterprise of listing implies that totalities may be gleaned from the scrutiny of detail, and that structures are somehow to be glimpsed through patterns subtending the contingency or gratuity of everyday events. Fragments are by definition parts of a whole. Working concurrently alongside, but also in some respects against, the narrative of historicism in Hohepa's text we find a non-narrative form of textual organisation in his use of the matrix and genealogy as the aggregate of detail. There is throughout Hohepa's account a literal or visual spreading out of the surface of detail to be seen in the interpolated arrays of particulars in his tables and in his diagrammatic accounts of the linking of the pool of *whaamere* ties. But as Hohepa indicates in his conclusion, the cumulative effect of the listing and mapping of these 'authentic' details of Waima is simply to show that there is cultural persistence in change: "Traditional cultural ways and cultural values persist in a modified way despite profound social and economic changes."(Hohepa, p. 129)

In so concluding Hohepa's study reproduces the structure of metonymy according to which much analysis in the tradition of New Historicism has been conducted. Metonymy is the trope of wholes and parts. It always presumes or posits an organic system, a 'field,' an 'episteme,' a 'culture,' or a 'text.' Only on such a presumption can the familiar strategy of New Historical analysis be justified: a strategy which begins with a close-up, a detail, then tracks back as if cinematically to discover in an increasingly broader sweep the context within which the detail makes sense and which it is shown to emblematise. Meaning is thus offered as a constant linking of the seemingly disparate elements in its view, and theoretically producible or deducible from any one of them.

But not only is the problem one of how to tell the story of Waima, and ground the epistemology of the narrative in the rhetoric of slippages between describing detail and narrating a whole; there is also the problem of the point of view of narration, of who tells the story. Here Hohepa's problem is that he was, as he confesses, both participant and observer:

> The bulk of the field research material was obtained by means of participant-observation: visiting and being visited by individuals and groups, attending and listening to speeches or gossip at ceremonial gatherings, at milking sheds, at the hotels in nearby localities, at the store and post office, at beer parties, etc. I also joined various groups on visits to other communities, on fishing or eeling expeditions, and in Youth Club activities, while during the gala-like days when monthly cream cheques or Social Security benefits were paid out at the local post office, I usually visited the household opposite the post office since it was a favourite meeting place for those people who wished to share a cup of tea, gossip, and their lunch (Hohepa, p. 13).

Hohepa's engagement with his subject is, as Alan Liu suggests of cultural criticism in general, "so close, so bit-mapped, or microbial that the critic appears no further from the cultural object than a



fig 8 (top left) a literal AA 'signing' of our location
fig 9 (top right) they are both filmed inside the car from behind
fig 10 (bottom) the camera is no longer directly associated with car and passengers

fig 11 (top) this point of view . . . appears to float
fig 12 (bottom) the subsequent tracking of the car's passage along the foreshore from what is now a definite non-associative point of view

cybernetic or biological virus from its host at the moment of code exchange."(Liu, p. 78) Yet as the linguist Emile Benveniste demonstrated long ago historiography aims at the exclusion of the existential relationship with language that is implied by the seeming presence of an 'I'.[14] The 'I' of involvement with which Hohepa opens his text becomes by its conclusion the foundation for a position that will authorise itself to speak in the third person in the guise of objectivity. By the prevalent use of the third person and a rhetoric of distanciation Hohepa attempts to transcend the irrelevance of the local and the contingency of discursive scenes through strategies of self-effacement.

Turning to *Runaway* and its depiction of the Hokianga we can uncover similar strategies at work resulting in an identical problematics. Both the anthropological monograph and the film represent small local Maori communities as their object and focus on the particulars of everyday life; both use a third-person 'objective' narrative but nevertheless exhibit the tensions inherent in that discursive mode; both are engaged in overcoming the object status that this third personhood entails. In the one case there is the ambiguity of a community member forced to assume the position of outside observer in order to understand the totalities that may be gleaned from the scrutiny of local detail; in the other we have an outsider, with whom both director and spectator are keen to identify, who wishes in some way to insert himself into the local through participation in the minutiae of its everyday existence.

Whereas Hohepa's 'camera' on Waima opens with the obsessive listing and grid matrix of detail to then pull back to discover the broad sweep, in true film style *Runaway* begins with an establishing long shot that then progressively zooms in on details to become in some way lost among them. But in a similar fashion the problematics of insertion into a local culture and the problems of positionality of both filmmaker and central character are inscribed at the level of *Runaway*'s camera. Let us look at several small moments where this is so. Our introduction to the Hokianga community is accomplished by the use of a number of high camera angles and constant recomposition of the frame together with a slippage and fluidity of point of view. At the opening of the sequence the hitch-hiking David, after a literal AA 'signing' of our location (fig 8), looks down upon the expanse of the harbour and its estuaries - a panorama that will subsequently be repeated and made familiar to us from many different angles. A panning camera position up higher on the cliff then follows the curve of the arrival of Laura Kosovich's white convertible. When David has accepted the lift (fig 9)they are both filmed inside the car from behind and very high up - this unusual viewpoint allows us to accompany them as characters rather than simply assume their point of view and so become them. By clever use of a simple camera tilt the filmmaker can then subtly shift this point of view to the road so that the camera is no longer directly associated with car and passengers (fig 10) at all and it appears to float (fig 11). This multiplication of quasi-objective viewpoints also allows for a smooth transition for the camera eye from the car over the edge of the cliff to the helicopter and the subsequent tracking of the car's passage along the foreshore from what is now a definite non-associative point of view (fig 12).

We further sense this multiplicity during David's first entry into the small community, as he walks past the shops while being observed intensely by its inhabitants: the man and child on the wharf (fig 13), Tana at work on his boat (fig 14), and Isabelle in the boarding house. It is as if they and our camera were waiting for him. This is reinforced by the way in which the camera at specific moments anticipates the action and jumps ahead as if to precede him and wait for his arrival (fig 15), giving us small moments of dead time that have no narrative function.

The narrative in these scenes is episodic rather than linear in its development and instead of incessantly moving forward, consequentially and causatively, *Runaway* oscillates between narrative and absence, the activity and fullness of story and the ordinariness and emptiness of the image. This conscious filming of interstices and inbetweeness as well as the multiplicity of viewpoints is in turn linked to the relationships between characters in *Runaway*. Separated and distanced from each other and disconnected from their context, this is a world where lovers touch each other momentarily, almost mechanically, and then seem to lose touch.

During the scene of the hangi at Joe's mother's house the camera wanders aimlessly picking up



fig 13 (top left) the man and child on the wharf
fig 14 (top right) Tana at work on his boat
fig 15 (bottom left) the camera . . . jumps ahead as if to precede him and wait for his arrival
fig 16 (mid right) the small details of flax food-baskets, beer crates, vegetables in the just-opened hangi
fig 17 (bottom right) the languid directionlessness of most of their lives

on and drifting from one character to another, one event to another, as if each time it might perhaps have caught the real, or the most important, protagonist, focussing on the small details of flax food-baskets, beer crates, vegetables in the just-opened hangi (fig 16). This camera movement emulates both the jerky telegraphic forms of communication with which the characters express themselves and the languid directionlessness of most of their lives (fig 17). The camera by continually wandering towards the apparently secondary and shifting its viewpoint thus refuses moments of audience identification.

So I am arguing that there is a fundamental division and tension in *Runaway* between narrative as a vehicle for meaning and the detail of the image as a means of dissolution of the narrative - the way in which the narrative dissolves into or stops on an image and details become no more than images. *Runaway* depicts a loss of centre and hence of meaning for its central character David Manning and at the same time it decentres itself by structuring within its narrative alternative places and details to focus on, this pluralisation of centres is not simply a matter of theme or of locations in the narrative.

In *The Practice of Everyday Life* Michel de Certeau uncovers the ways in which disciplinary knowledges such as history and anthropology work to conceal the position and the interests of their enunciation. Using film term *mise en scène,* he has paid attention, for example, to the way that historiography stages itself by giving "itself credibility in the name of the reality it is supposed to represent, but this authorised appearance of the 'real' serves precisely to camouflage the practice which infact determines it. Representation thus disguises the praxis that organises it."[15] The problem, de Certeau maintains, is not only to account for knowledge as a product, but also for its production in an epistemic situation. This is a crucial issue for the ethnographic study of cultures and also for the study of popular culture. The rhetoric of ordinary conversation "consists of practices which transform 'speech situations,' verbal productions in which the interlacing of speaking positions weaves an oral fabric without individual owners, creations of a communication that belongs to no one."[16] Rhetoric is the broader term by which de Certeau designates the ruses, the jostling for position, the tropes and turns that characterise all semiotic practice and it is opposed, in de Certeau's conceptual mapping, to the myth of impersonal and disinterested speech, the fantasy of linguistic and scientific propriety that governs scientific and technocratic reason.

The practices of everyday life are coded by the same logic that informs the enunciative moves of rhetoric. In this day-to-day jostling of the texture of local irrelevance de Certeau makes a central distinction between 'strategy' and 'tactics.' Strategy, he says, presupposes the separation of the "subject of will and power" from its environment in order to make possible the imposition of this will. Strategy constructs places as fortifications, and thus as distinctly defined and possessed locations. Tactics, by contrast is a logic of momentary occupation without ownership; its place "belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance."(de Certeau, p. xx and xix) Both Pat Hohepa's monograph and John O'Shea's film strain towards a tactics in their attention to singularity and detail and the errant trajectory of their (camera) eye, but both remain entrapped in strategy as they reconstruct discourses of mediation from that detail. This is not to denigrate their efforts, the point is that as a critical insight, the character Joe Wharewera's comment to David Manning "You like things too much" might equally be voiced about Hohepa's cultural anthropology or John O'Shea's filming.

III

"I'd like to do that, disappear to nothing. Lose myself."

I would like to begin this section by taking up the distinction made by the 19th-century art historian Alois Reigl, today recognised as one of the precursors of the semiotics of the visual arts. This is the differentiation between reading a visual image either *haptically* (by touch, visual touch) or *optically* (according to the pure vectoriality of outlines).[17] Optical apprehension involves the scanning of objects according to their outlines, jumping from one point to another, haptics (from the Greek

haptein: to seize, grasp; and *haptikos*: capable of touching) focusses on surfaces and emphasises the superficies of objects. Filming viewing, I believe, is primarily a haptic or synesthetic operation. In *Runaway* the haptic attention to surface is contextualised and takes on a metatextual fascination, it becomes a subject all of its own. The film narrative as we have seen loops back on itself, simultaneously holding onto something, displacing it and letting it go, but never definitely arriving anywhere. With the vacant and distracted gaze of a passenger staring out of the window of a moving car, the engine humming soporifically, we roll past endless examples of the tourist or pictorial landscape that were much criticised by early reviewers of the film.[18] But the pictorial is not an idea to be proved here, this is not merely a tourist board exploitation of New Zealand scenery, the landscape fails to function as explicative or causal, but rather needs to be felt in its duration. It consists of the subject of the 'subject' dissolved, as figures become easily lost in a landscape or absorbed in a surface.

fig18 (above) the water-skis that skim the surface of the Waitemata

In contrast to those instances of the stilled image, camera movement in *Runaway* is a case of constant glancing, almost like a sketch just touching the surface rather than making an incision or mark, never fixing or taking possession. Like the water-skis that skim the surface of the Waitemata in the opening sequence (fig 18) or those of the aquaplane that touch down on the West Coast lake towards the end, the camera rubs over the reflective surfaces of things themselves. The many water sequences in the film, too, are part of a larger fascination with the functions of water and reflective surfaces: objects in shop windows, passengers' faces in train windows, silhouettes of figures in pools, dead faces shimmering hauntingly in the water (fig 19).

fig 19 (above) dead faces shimmering hauntingly in the water

Reflections that are a shimmering, a losing of the outlines of things, for there is a flattening out of profundity in the seizing hold or shortening of depth in glass or reflective surfaces. Water, too, dissolves, shapes and transforms objects. Water is a false surface, below water there is only more water. Water is a changeable and variable surface that sucks in light and colour, a surface which when pierced swallows things up without a trace, but also brings them floating back to the surface like a corpse, as we are reminded in the sequence where Diana nearly drowns (fig 20) and the unfeeling, immobilised David is unable to help her.

fig 20 (above) the sequence were Diana nearly drowns and the unfeeling, immobilised David is unable to help her

Atmospheric qualities and matters of weather, too, can affect the shape or clarity, can erase or alter a perspective to the point of snow-blindness or whiteout. Unsettling, too, is the constant use of extreme close-up (fig 21) that renders the image indecipherable, where the proximity of objects to the camera, and the camera's almost-rubbing-against-them (fig 22), causes the image to lose all semblance of formal unity so that it blocks itself and becomes non-semantic (fig 23). This is the haptic or tactile camera eye that touches the surface of objects finding pleasure in surface and grain. Where the surface of the object is so close to the eye that the size and detail are no longer in

inverse ratio to its distance from the observer as Albertian perspective demands. Where the slippage between a shoulder blade and a sand dune seems imperceptible (fig 24,25).

This fixation on surface in *Runaway*, often the surface of the body, and on how the displacements of detail determine the emplacements of character, is related closely to the mechanisms of desire and the structure of fetishism that underlies both film projection and film viewing. As Christian Metz notes in his important essay on the subject:

> the way the cinema, with its wandering framings (wandering like the look, like the caress), finds the means to reveal space has something to do with a kind of permanent undressing, a generalised striptease, a less direct but more perfected striptease, since it also makes it possible to dress space again, to remove from view what it has previously shown, to take back as well as to retain.[19]

Fetishism is also involved in the structure of oscillation between acknowledgement and disavowal that occurs in the cinema spectator who simultaneously disavows absence or the *not-there* of the cinematic scene while at the same time acknowledging its presence however illusory. As Metz notes again: "behind any fiction there is always a second fiction: the diegetic events are fictional, that is the first; but everyone pretends to believe that they are true, and that is the second."(Metz, p. 72) And there is also a fetishism of technique, the cinema apparatus is a fetish, a prop that disavows a lack and affirms it while doing so, a partial object that makes the object seem whole. Or there is the film star who in the economy of cinematic desire may become a fetish object for the spectator.

According to Freud's article of 1927 on the subject,[20] the fetishistic fixation arises from the refusal of the male child to acknowledge the abesence of the penis of the female (of

the mother). Confronted with this absence the child refuses (Freud used the term *Verleugnung* [disavowal]) to admit its reality, because to do so would permit a threat of castration against his own penis. This process of *Verleugnung* or disavowal is not as simple as it might first seem, for it contains an essential ambiguity in its operation. The conflict between the perception of reality which urges the child to renounce his phantasm and the counter-desire that urges him to deny his perception means that the child does neither one nor the other, or rather he does both simultaneously. With the help of this mechanism of the unconscious he disavows the evidence of his perception; on the other hand he recognises its reality and through a perverse symptom he assumes the anguish he feels before it. In so far as it is a presence, the fetish object is in fact something concrete and tangible; but in so far as it is the presence of an absence it is, at the same time, immaterial and intangible, because it alludes continuously beyond itself to something that can never really be possessed. As the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has pointed out the process of substitution undertaken is an example of the rhetorical figure of synecdoche: the substitution of part for a whole.[21]

If representation dictates a fracturing of that completeness which the child experienced with the mother, it nevertheless offers a substitute figure in the form of the other of desire. This might be a figure to direct the spacial co-ordination within the frame, one who automatically establishes the balance between distance and identification essential to cinematic suture. We see what he sees (and according to Laura Mulvey this spacial-come-narrative interpreter in classical narrative film is always a 'him').[22] We take pleasure in his pleasure, but his presence marks a principle of order and difference within the frame which allows for our own spacial autonomy from the image. On the other hand, it might be a Lacanian *petit objet a*, a fetish in which loss and lack can be inscribed, and which emphasises the fragmentary nature of cinematic experience:

> is it not obvious that this feature, this partial feature, rightly emphasised in objects, is applicable not because these objects are part of a total object, the body, but because they represent only partially the function that produces them.[23]

In either case suture is undone by the persistence of desire. Figures of viewing assume a bodily emphasis under the desiring gaze, they become corpsical, so associating spectatorship with death and the melancholy of absence (this is literalised in the thriller horror genre where our identification with the victim is confounded in violence and death). The body fragment informed as it is by the mechanics of fetishism, has an uncanny way of defiguring itself, disinvesting itself of the living presence with which the spectator would like to invest it. It becomes a de-animated body, or body-part that we view and is echoed in the detached emotions, undesired mechanical sex and the dead flesh of the hidden corpse which haunt *Runaway*. Here the cinematic whole is constituted in disappearance and the invisible or, rather, the filmic is recognised only in non-meaning and disappearance.

Epilogue

The notion of fetishism is coined at the intersection of discourses (anthropological, economic, psychoanalytical, religious, aesthetic) or, to put it another way, fetishism exhibits the inability of any one discourse to place it or fix it, to turn *it* into an object. Precisely what fetishism calls into question is the status of objects and of the discourse around them. At stake in the fetish we could argue is the status of theory. The fetish, of course, is only a fetish in theory never for the fetishist for whom it remains just another detail and, as Baudrillard has argued in his early essay "Fetishism and Ideology," curiously fetishism tends to resist the very theory that employs it.[24] Mark Wigley following this idea through in his paper "The Architecture of the Fetish"[25] has demonstrated that Freud's original paper on "Fetishism" was itself a fetish or a detour from his real subject, repression. Wigley uncovers a process of the fetishization of fetishism structuring Freud's thought when he notes:

> The concept of the splitting of the ego, which becomes central to the final accounts of psychoanalysis and dominates the late essays, is first articulated in detail in the essay on fetishism and is always explained with examples of fetishism... Just as the fetish is, by definition, an ornament made structural, the ornamental question of the fetish actually organises the theory to which it is added... Freud's capacity like the child's, to produce theory is therefore at least doubly bound to the question of fetishism such that... the theory becomes itself fetishistic (Wigley, pp. 109-110).

Precisely because the fetish is both a negation and a sign of an absence it is not an unrepeatable, unique object, on the contrary, it in turn is capable of substitution and each time this never succeeds in exhausting the nullity of which it is the symbol. In its piling up of detail, like the excess but also incomplete nature of the notetaker's page or the particulars of the lecturer's ramble, the fetish of detail exhibits a laconism, giving a part for a whole in an erotics of suggestion, and in so doing enjoys a topos also current throughout the discourses of particularity: inexpressibility or incompletion. Where does this leave us? Simply with the fact that from the particulars of every story, both that of my object and mine as its theory, one can only pull away and back in a cinematic track... and just as I used the beginning of this film to make my beginning, let me sign my end with its 'THE END.'

[1] As Naomi Schor points out this term, originally synonymous with realism, was first coined by G. H. Lewes in his *Principles of Success in Literature* (Boston, 1981). Naomi Schor, *Reading in Detail. Aesthetics and the Feminine* (New York and London: Methuen, 1987), p. 149, fn 1.

[2] Alan Liu, "Local Transcendence: Cultural Criticism, Postmodernism, and the Romanticism of Detail," *Representations* 32 (1990): 75-113. Liu also suggeststhat these three moments may also be read in terms of "a succession of intellectual-historical moments from the premodern through the modern to the postmodern."

[3] A famous film image of light playing across the mesh of a screen or grid is to be found in one of the early sequences of Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin*.

[4] See Tom Conley, *Film Hieroglyphs. Ruptures in Classical Cinema* (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. x-xiii.

[5] For an examination of the New Zealand tradition of this topos see Wystan Curnow, "Landscape and the Body," *Antic III*, November (1978): 143-163.

[6] Roland Barthes, "The Reality Effect," in his *The Rustle of Language*, trans. Richard Howard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 141-148.

[7] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

[8] Roland Barthes, "The Third Meaning," *Image, Music, Text*, trans. Stephen Heath

(New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), pp. 52-68.
9 Roland Barthes , *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), p. 26.
10 See also the commentary on Barthes by Jacques Derrida, "Les morts de Roland Barthes," in his *Psyché: Inventions de l'autre* (Paris: Galilée, 1987), pp. 273-304.
11 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
12 Murray Groves, "Foreword" to P.W. Hohepa, *A Maori Community in Northland* (Auckland: Auckland University Anthropology Department Bulletin, No. 1, 1964), p. 9.
13 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Rendall (London and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 68.
14 Emile Benveniste, *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).
15 Michel de Certeau, *Heterologies. Discourse on the Other*, translated by Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 203.
16 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Rendall (London and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. xxii.
17 See Claude Gandleman, *Reading Pictures, Viewing Texts* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 1-13.
18 See P,. J. Downey, *"Runaway," Comment*, October-November (1964): 5-7; and "Young Man on the Run," *NZ Listener*, November 6, 1964.
19 Christian Metz, *The Imaginary Signifier. Psychoanalysis and the Cinema*, trans. Celia Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster and Alfred Guzzetti (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) p. 77.
20 Sigmund Freud, "Fetishism (1927)," in *On Sexuality. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works*, The Pelican Freud Library Volume 7, trans. James Strachey and edited Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), pp. 347-357.
21 Giorgio Agamben, "Freud; or, The Absent Object," in his *Stanzas. Word and Phantasm in Western Culture*, trans. Ronald L. Martinez (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 31-35.
22 Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," in her *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 14-26.
23 Jacques Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," in his *Ecrits. A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), p. 315.
24 Jean Baudrillard, "Fetishism and Ideology: The Semiological Reduction," in his *Towards a Political Economy of the Sign*, trans. Charles Levin (St Louis: Telos, 1981), p. 89.
25 Mark Wigley, "Theoretical Slippage: The Architecture of the Fetish," in *Fetish*, Sarah Whiting, Edward Mitchell, Greg Lynn (eds.) (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992), pp. 103-114.

DANIEL NAEGELE

The Readymade: Duchamp's Thing

Marcel Duchamp fully appreciated the twentieth century's proclivity for certainty and classification and this attitude became an essential component of his art. In this he was not unlike Freud or Einstein or, in his immediate artistic milieu of *belle époque* Paris, Stravinsky or Raymond Roussel. Of the playwright Roussel, Duchamp once noted with admiration that "starting with a sentence... he made a word game with kinds of parentheses... His word play had a hidden meaning... It was an obscurity of another order.[1] Roussel had economically undermined the totalizing tendency of word order, throwing all of its accepted significance into question. He did so by employing, not destroying, the 'givens.' Duchamp's strategy would be similar as is evident in his readymades. Duchamp describes the readymades in terms of what they were not. They "weren't works of art...weren't sketches" but rather objects, 'things' "to which no art terms applied."(Cabanne, p. 48) Like Roussel's parentheses which are not words but marks (not unlike letters in their most material sense), Duchamp's things were imbued with the accoutrements of art but were not 'retinal' art. Like bracketing, they are inserted into a highly structured world, and in the most economical manner question expose its fundamental nature.

As strategy the readymade was hardly ready made, rather it came about as the logical next step in Duchamp's seemingly methodical approach to art, an approach in no way unusual or exceptional until February of 1912. At that time, Duchamp sent his recently-completed *Nude Descending the Staircase* to the Paris Independents where, according to him, his "fellow cubists did not like it and asked me to, at least, change the title."[2] He refused and withdrew the painting, but it is significant that the controversy surrounding *Nude Descending the Staircase* had little to do with the inherent qualities of the work. Rather it revolved around not only the painting's title, but also its apparent allegiance to *both* Cubism and Futurism, movements which were regarded at the time as mutually exclusive. The importance of these two extraneous issues - titling and classification - were never forgotten by Duchamp. Together with framing and the notion of museumizing itself they serve as society's means of appropriating art, of controlling its display and therefore its momentum. Collectively, titling, framing, classification, and museumizing form a sort of systematic thinking, an ideology if you will (and one which extended far beyond the jurisdiction of the art world), whose authority and coerciveness Duchamp began to question and ultimately set out to undermine.

In effect, Duchamp's readymades unmasked the 'act' of representation. He would expose the arbitrary nature and illusionistic function of 'retinal' art by presenting an analogous condition, that is, by re-presenting representation, a tactic not new to the visual arts in France. Courbet's *The Painter's Studio, real allegory, summing up a phase of seven years in my artistic life* from 1854-55[3] and any of a number of paintings by Seurat from the 1880's to 1891 might be seen as relevant predecessors to Duchamp's attempt. In *The Circus*, for example, Seurat painted the perimeter of his canvas to resemble a frame. This painted frame suggests that what is being portrayed in paint is a picture of a picture. That is, what we see is a painting of a framed picture, a painting whose proportions neatly coincide with those of the re-presented image, whose boundaries begin where the delineated boundaries of the re-presented end. By painting an illusionistic frame, Seurat appropriates the act of containment. Seizing the boundary between art and reality, he renders the subjective objective, reducing a picture to its material components: paint and canvas. His *pointilliste* technique promotes the materiality of the medium, discreetly dividing the surface of the picture into equal dabs of paint and thus accentuating its physicality (Cabanne, p. 47). While this division exposes the painting's objectivity, it simultaneously elevates its illusionism for its dot rendering insists that the 'picture' be actively constructed by the viewer. By objectifying, Seurat underscored the subjective nature of perception. Picasso's first collage *Still Life with Chair Caning* (1911-12) poses a similar question by replacing the medium of paint with swatches of 'reality' - notably a mariner's rope and a stock oil cloth pre-painted to resemble chair caning. Here again the frame (the mariner's rope) is part of the artist's domain, and as a three-dimensional 'real' object begins to question the status of the apparently two-dimensional painting, confusing classification by situating itself somewhere between painting



and sculpture.

Duchamp protracted this question at first unwittingly beginning in 1913. When he "put a bicycle wheel on a stool, the fork down, there was no idea of a 'readymade,' or anything else. It was just a distraction. I didn't have any special reason to do it, or any intention of showing it, or describing anything."(Cabanne, p. 47) In 1914, Duchamp chose his first Readymade, *Bottlerack*. "I just bought it, at the bazaar of the town hall. The idea of an inscription came as I was doing it. There was an inscription on the bottle rack which I forget." There was no move to introduce the piece to the art world at this time. "When I moved from the rue Saint-Hippolyte to leave for the United States," Duchamp continues, "my sister and sister-in-law took everything out, threw it in the garbage, and said no more about it. It was in 1915, especially, in the United States, that I did other objects with inscriptions, like the snow shovel, on which I wrote something in English. The word 'readymade' thrust itself on me then."(de Harnoncourt and McShine, p. 275) Not until 1917, when Duchamp purchased a urinal from 'Mott Works' company in New York, signed it 'R. Mutt,' titled it *Fountain* and submitted it to the Independents exhibition to be hung on the wall rotated and upside down, did he confront the artistic establishment with his things.

Duchamp saw the readymade as an attempt to "reduce the idea of aesthetic consideration to the choice of the mind, not to the ability or cleverness of the hand which I objected to in many paintings of my generation."(de Harnoncourt and McShine, p. 275) He very carefully selected these objects. "I had to beware of its 'look.' It's very difficult to choose an object, because, at the end of fifteen days, you begin to like it or to hate it. You have to approach something with an indifference, as if you had no aesthetic emotion. The choice of readymades is always based on visual indifference and, at the same time, on the total absence of good or bad taste."(Cabanne, p. 48) For Duchamp, taste is merely a habit, the "repetition of something already accepted" and he maintained that mechanical drawing enabled him to avoid taste since it lies "outside all pictorial convention." He insisted that the 'functionalism' of the object "was already obliterated by the fact that I took it out of the earth and onto the planet of aesthetics."(Cabanne, p. 276) Finally, regarding the short sentences which he occasionally inscribed on the readymades, they were not intended to describe the object "like a title" but instead, Duchamp says, "meant to carry the mind of the spectator towards other regions more verbal."[4]

Duchamp did several variations on the readymade theme, but proliferation was necessarily prohibited by his own prescription for the objects: visual indifference and an absence of taste, that is "the repetition of something already accepted." That Duchamp later found it desirable to "expose the basic antinomy between art and readymades" by introducing a "Reciprocal Readymade" which would turn classic art into everyday objects ("use a Rembrandt as an ironing board"), suggests that his attempt to situate his work outside the boundaries of the art world was something which needed to be renewed regularly, that perhaps the museumizing tendency was more totalizing, or more accommodating, than he had initially thought. Or simply that his things, when considered as such, might have had an unanticipated appeal, might possess merit in themselves, not as anti-art.

Certainly, recent art theory and criticism view the readymade not so much as an object but as a gesture or as a moment in the history of art. Octavio Paz deems the readymades *'an-artistic,'* something in between art and anti-art, something "indifferent, existing in the void." He notes that "their interest is not plastic but critical or philosophical" and judges them "beyond beauty and ugliness... not creations, but signs, questioning or negating the act of creation." For him, the readymade "does not postulate a new value" rather it is "criticism in action;" it exudes "nonsignificance."

Here we might ask how Paz can assign nonsignificance to that which he previously designated as sign. He concedes that "form projects meaning" and consequently "nothing is more difficult than to find an object that is really neutral." Yet clearly, we must add, the readymades have form, often very pleasing form, and are anything but neutral. Presumably Paz would counter that Duchamp *neutralized* these things and that he did so by placing them in an art museum, by treating them as if they were, figuratively speaking, 'framed.' "Detached from its original context," Paz proceeds, "the

Readymade suddenly loses all significance and is converted into an object existing in a vacuum, into a thing without any embellishment." But the museum is not a vacuum, we might argue, in fact it serves as the missing frame which insists that we consider objects within its confines as worthy of contemplation. Furthermore, titles, inscriptions, pedestals and spotlighting would certainly seem to embellish the readymade. And Paz again concedes that the "really neutral" quality lasts "only for a moment" after which they succumb to an "invisible transformation and become objects for contemplation, study, or irritation."[5]

Peter Bürger, too, finds Duchamp's readymades "not works of art but manifestations."[6] Readymades serve as exemplars in Bürger's 'theory of the avant-garde' which convincingly argues that avant-garde art sought to overthrow bourgeois art by interrogating the purpose or function of art, its production and its reception. Like Paz, Bürger believes that "the meaning" of the readymade cannot be inferred from its "form-content totality." Rather meaning can be ascertained "only from the contrast between mass-produced object on the one hand, and signature and art exhibit on the other." He sees the readymade as a provocation that relies "on what it turns against: here, it is the idea that the individual is the subject of artistic creation."

Both Paz and Bürger, perhaps in following the artist's cues, would seem to deny the 'thingness' of Duchamp's things, yet both would agree that his objects - bicycle wheel, bottlerack, urinal, comb, snow shovel, etc. - were carefully selected. Presumably both would recognize that these readymades share certain (decidedly non-pictorial?) characteristics, qualities which when considered collectively might even constitute if not an aesthetic, an 'obscurity of another order.' Diagrammatic, even mathematical, the "form-content totality" of these things certainly might be regarded as a three-dimensional formation of the mechanical drawing Duchamp employed in his attempt to avoid taste-making.

All of this is to say that lost in Paz's claim that the readymade "does not postulate a new value" and in Bürger's assurance that readymades are mere "manifestations" is the distinctive 'thingness' of these things as a positive characteristic worthy of contemplation in itself. 'Thingness' is a quality Martin Heidegger investigates in his *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, broaching the topic by contrasting the characteristics of modern science with those of ancient or medieval science. He dismisses the factual, experimental, measuring qualities of modern science in favor of a more fundamental feature which he claims "rules and determines the basic movement of science itself." This characteristic is science's "manner of working with the things and the metaphysical projection of the thingness of the things." Heidegger deems this manner *mathematical* and proceeds to analyze its formation. The Greek expression *ta mathemata* means "what can be learned and thus, at the same time, what can be taught." It is identified and understood in connection with its several determinations one of which is *ta pragmata*, that is, "things insofar as we have to do with them at all, whether we work on them, use them, transform them, or only look at and examine them." Heidegger goes on to note that the numerical is something mathematical and not vice versa. This is so because the mathematical is "that about' things which we really already know. Therefore we do not get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us."[7]

When we recognize in things something which we already have, this recognition is "genuine learning" and thus the numerical is something learnable for no thing or things in themselves exude threeness, for example, but "we can count three things only if we already know 'three'." Heidegger concludes that "the most difficult learning is to come to know actually and to the very foundations what we already know. Such learning... demands dwelling continually on what appears to be nearest to us, for instance, on the question of what a thing is. We steadfastly ask the same question - which in terms of utility is obviously useless - of what a thing is, what tools are, what man is, what a work of art is, what the state and the world are."(Heidegger, p. 252) In a truly philosophical approach to science, Heidegger notes, scientists seek to "create new ways of posing questions and, above all, hold out in the questionable."(Heidegger, p. 248)

Heidegger's philosophy offers another way of viewing Duchamp's project. Duchamp, it could be said, captures the basic movement of *art* itself by focusing on its "manner of working with the

things and the metaphysical projection of the thingness of things." This leads to something more than merely critical. In illuminating fundamental issues of art - naming, perception, measuring - he questioned the nature of knowledge. While the readymade may serve to dismantle, it also offers its 'thingness' for contemplation. In rendering visible museumization, the thingness of things becomes obvious. When Heidegger concludes that the *mathematical* is "this fundamental position we take toward things,... the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of things," it is this position, this presupposition that Duchamp 'holds out as questionable.' Duchamp's questioning transcends the issue of museumization as it confronted him beginning in 1912. His investigation was ontological, in the deepest sense of the word philosophical.

In concluding it must be noted that Duchamps strategy of re-presenting representation extended far beyond the individual object. Although he subscribed to a philosophy of indifference, abhorred routine, and feared the habitual as taste-making, like no other artist Marcel Duchamp promoted the cumulative nature of his work. Time and again he collected his works together, re-presenting them as miniatures in, for example,*The Large Glass* or the *Box in a Valise*. For Walter Arensburg, Duchamp collected himself, amassing what has been called the largest single collection of an artist's work to be displayed anywhere, bringing together nearly all his major works. As a pre-condition for donating the collection to a museum in the early Fifties, Duchamp and Arensburg required that the museum guarantee exhibition of the work for not less than twenty-five years. Only the Philadelphia Museum of Art was interested in these terms and Philadelphia is where the *oeuvre* is housed today, displayed almost exactly as Duchamp himself specified. By collecting and classifying, he countered the twentieth century penchant for collection and classification.

[1] Pierre Cabanne, *Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp*, trans. Ron Padgett (London: Da Capo, 1979), p. 41.
[2] Quoted in *Marcel Duchamp*, eds. Anne d'Harnoncourt and Kynaston McShine (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1973), p. 258.
[3] See Michael Fried, "Representing Representation: On the Central Group in Courbet's *Studio*," in *Allegory and Representation*, ed. Stephen J. Greenblatt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
[4] Marcel Duchamp, "Apropos of 'Readymades'," in *The Writings of Marcel Duchamp*, edited by Michel Sanouillet and Elmer Peterson (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988), p. 141. This passage is taken from a talk delivered by Duchamp at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, Oct. 19, 1961.
[5] Octavio Paz, *Marcel Duchamp: Appearance Stripped Bare*, trans. Rachel Phillips and Donald Gardner (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), p. 22-24.
[6] Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 52. Translation based on the second edition of *Theorie der Avantgarde* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, 1980). The illustrative text which supports this claim includes a photograph which more closely conforms to a standard definition of art than does (or did) Duchamp's thing, Stieglitz's photograph of Duchamp's *Fountain*. The image is saturated with gender iconography, both male and female. It was placed by Duchamp in the *The Blind Man* - itself a Duchampian enterprise in the form of an art journal (which represented the art world tendency towards representation in its critical literal?).
[7] Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 247-255. This selection, here entitled "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics" appears in Heidegger's *What Is a Thing?* trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch from the original *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1962), pp. 50-83.

ARCHITECTUS: BOWES CLIFFORD THOMSON LTD

House at Kelvin Road, Auckland 1991-1995




PROJECT TEAM:
Malcolm Bowes
Patrick Clifford
Mahendrah Daji
James Penton
Tim Mien
Rod Sellars
Michael Thomson
MODEL:
Jeremy Wells
PHOTOGRAPHY:
Paul McCreadie
Lynn Logan



NORTH

EAST

SOUTH

WEST



fig 1 (top) The Ananda Temple and the Himalayas
fig 2 (bottom) S. Marco, Venice

JOHN DICKSON

Chomolungma and the Beekeeper S. Marco, Venice and the Ananda Temple, Pagan: Two Architectural Views of the Himalayas.

"The bee comes home and leaves on each word traces of honey the word never had before."
(Janet Frame, New Zealand Concert Programme, 1993)

An Overview:

In the 11th century, from Byzantium to China, there was undoubtedly a corpus of shared culture. Thus, although S. Marco at Venice and the Ananda Temple at Pagan, Burma differ because of their particulars of place and style they are in many ways typologically similar. This paper is nevertheless concerned with their particular aspects. When I began to understand the façades of medieval churches in Italy such as S. Marco as trompe-l'oeil architectural landscape reliefs, I early realised the relevance of the contemporary Ananda Temple which is known to attempt a comparable programme of landscape reference with, perhaps, more three-dimensional relief and naturalism than in its western counterpart.[1] An understanding of the Himalayas as the particular referential preoccupation of these two buildings - as the landscape *par excellence* - is coincident with appreciation of their geographic symmetry about the range of the world's highest mountains - in the sense of a near view, and distant view. Having set up, as it were, this Badminton Court, Sir Edmund Hillary is inevitably implicated, and His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales also, by means of his connection with the country seat of Badminton in Gloucestershire, if for no other reason.[2]

The Thematic Programme of Medieval Church Façades in Italy:

The thematic scope of many medieval church façades is undoubtedly the grand narrative of creation: incarnation, rebirth and final judgement in cosmological glory. These façades are each a dramatic *scaenae frons*. There is opportunity for embellishment of transcendental themes in the upper registers, and an axial fixation on universals throughout. In the medieval era all this is likely taken for granted as reflexive rather than self conscious, implying a continuity and ease with antiquity. That which is conscious by our standards is the medieval fascination with particulars. Pope Gregory counsels Augustine toward understanding that there are so many ways to reach the ultimate grand design - it is a matter for individual conscience.[3]

This creation scenario is achieved by means of an architectural framework of details of such intensity that I doubt whether contemporary observers are much bothered by the compositional scheme of these medieval public buildings. When attention is drawn to the overall composition it tends to be seen dialectically, an entire field of view contrasting with detail. To the medieval mind the tapestry of God's creation encompasses everything, but the details are the way the scheme is comprehended. The inter-relations of composition and detail are understood to be organized hierarchically according to God's plan. Of immediate concern and interest is that the medieval world spills life in its details; details which are prolific and assume participation in the celebration of fertility, including death, in all its particulars.

The medieval use of the antique *scaenae frons* is not as a background to human action, as it was to become in the Renaissance, but rather as imbued with life, and hence imbued with action. The bi-lateral symmetry of church façades is itself a demonstration of fertility in action, a scheme of which Palladio is very much aware.[4]

If often embarrassed by such particulars, contemporary observers may prefer to ponder these façades as a tension between the grand scheme's architectural outline and the details which enliven it.

Such is a slippage of the kind noted by Mark Wigley whereby surface ornament can appear to be shockingly, distractingly, incidental, irrelevant and ephemeral in comparison to the building's overwhelming structural and spatial majesty.[5] And yet this detail can be seen to be the embodiment of the building's profundity, or as in the case of these medieval churches, their pro-fecundity.

Any impression of consistency of medieval layout and detail is averted when one looks at the buildings themselves - at the particular nuances certain grammatical details can acquire. Part of the fascination of S. Marco is that many such nuances in other churches are implied in its own design, although long since displaced by later embellishments, as if S. Marco is a much painted, overpainted face, yet the face itself is there. In this sense, the Himalayas can be felt to be present as the true face once the trompe-l'oeil technique and landscape subject of the façade is understood.

A Himalayan connection:

This paper makes an absurd or at least hazardous assertion: that the Himalayas, Sanskrit for 'The Seat of Snows,' should have anything in particular to do with S. Marco; that S. Marco should refer to a 2500 kilometre crescent of mountains stretched across Central Asia, with 14 peaks over 8000 metres. Around each of the terminal mountains flows a great river, the Indus in the west and the Tsangpo, later Brahmaputra, in the east, eventually joining the Ganges whose headwaters lie in the western Himalayas. The mutual source for the two great rivers and hub of the whole system, to the Hindu and Buddhist mind, is Mount Kailas (6192 m) north of the western tip of Nepal, and on the Tibetan plateau to the north.[6]

The particularity of my assertion is the stumbling block. A vague, general, reference of S. Marco's façade to a nostalgic Olympus (which one?), and to a Christian high-level hereafter, with plenty of gold stars on blue, would perhaps be acceptable. Tenzing who first reached the summit of Everest with Hillary remarks of the summit: "the sun was shining, and the sky was the deepest blue I have ever seen."[7] Perhaps even more acceptable still would be general reference to 'iced cakes,' just as Wilfred Noyce, a member of the famous 1953 British Everest expedition, resorts to when evoking the ice fall of the Khumbu glacier beneath Everest. He writes "Then, standing on a cake-slice block, you look up," and earlier of Nuptse, "And above, against the sky, a narrow strip of snow clings precariously like the icing on a cut cake" having indicated "the essential rock is pale, creamy granite."[8]

The primary, textual, evidence for my hazardous assertion is S. Marco itself, together with several other churches in Italy. The Himalayas must become the subject because no other mountains match the pretension of S. Marco's reference. S. Marco's façade is a narrative painting very grand indeed.

It is necessary at the outset to contend with the doubt concerning the Himalayas that they were not known by medieval patrons, architects, builders and craftspeople, or by those 6th-century AD Byzantines who contrived their model. Yet the prominent Himalayas can scarcely be missed. Ever since Alexander the Great scrambled down their western flanks, in the Hindu Kush and Karakorams, to the Indus plain and to Ocean, or wherever he thought he was, the Himalayas have been intimately known in the West.[9] Presumably Alexander's imagination traversed their length instantly in contrast to Peter Hillary and Graeme Dingle's emotionally fraught, first-ever traverse from Sikkim to Pakistan.[10] And Asian people have been plodding along them to the north, through them at crucial passes, around them, and up into them since remotest antiquity with a great deal of east-west communication, as did Marco Polo in the 13th century when he caught a first hand description of Pagan in Burma from his Mongolian hosts (or perhaps he went there himself). The twin gold and silver towers with tinkling bells, respected by Kubilai Khan, most captured his imagination.[11]

The Gloucestershire Cotswolds and a Himalayan Connection:

Before I discuss details of the textual evidence, I wish first to arouse some emotional sympathy for the paper's central proposition. Let us begin at Tetbury in the Cotswolds, at least with a view of it as seen from His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales's front doorstep at Highgrove, his Gloucestershire estate. Charles Clover remarks that Prince Charles stood here with a megaphone in order to supervise the positioning of young trees for posterity.[12] The church at Tetbury with its steeple marking the axial view can illuminate our concern with details and particulars. In his gazetteer of the Cotswolds Michael Hall quotes a wall monument to the left of the south entrance of Tetbury Church. This, he suggests, is a rather famous inscription:

> In a vault underneath
> lie several of the Saunderses
> late of this parish: particulars
> the last Day will disclose. Amen.[13]

One cannot avoid associating Prince Charles strolling through the poppy and tulip meadows at Highgrove, carefully contrived with the help of Miriam Rothschild, with Genghis Khan, or Tamerlane, or indeed Marco Polo's Kubilai Khan (Clover, p. 39). Such was the experience of Lord Curzon who in 1905 as Viceroy of India suggested to the Royal Geographic Society that they join with the Alpine Club and reconnoiter Everest. Everest had been named after Sir George Everest, who retired as Surveyor General of India in 1843, when its height was first calculated by the Survey of India in 1852.[14] Central Asia and the Himalayas are thus in the air, even in Gloucestershire.

Chomolungma; Wind, Birds, Land and the Goddess:

My curious connection would not surprise Dr Schubert of Leipzig, a Tibetan scholar who is quoted by Marcel Kurz, in his account of the 1952 Swiss Everest expedition preceding the 1953 British expedition to explain the Tibetan name for Everest, *Jomolunma*, the Queen/Goddess Lunma; *Lunma* meaning air, ether, and wind in particular (Kurz, p. 18). Wind at Highgrove was a feature until Prince Charles planted yew hedges. Robert Graves (1955) suggests that the prehistoric matriarchal world understood conception to be induced by the wind.[15]

At Doughton near Tetbury in the Cotswolds, Highgrove is located, together with the Prince of Wales's sister's and cousin's homes, at the headwaters of the river Thames and Avon. The Cotswolds are a limestone wall. This is ancient stone country, with stone villages, including Chipping Campden, and Bibury which William Morris thought the most beautiful village in England.[16] These villages lie in the folds of the land. Here, at this wall of stone, the Prince of Wales has come to rest, not unlike Captain James Cook, at his wall of ice, unable to go further, as discussed by Jonathan Lamb in this volume. The Prince of Wales writes:

> I have put my heart and soul into Highgrove... The garden at Highgrove really does spring from my heart, and strange as it may seem to some, creating it has been rather like a form of worship... In farming, as in gardening, I happen to believe that if you treat the land with love and respect (in particular, respect for the idea that it has an almost living soul, bound up in the mysterious everlasting cycles of nature) then it will repay you in kind.

He speaks further of how he came to hold this view:

> I felt a strong attachment to the soil of those places I loved best - Balmoral, in Scotland, and Sandringham, in Norfolk. As far as I was concerned, every tree, every hedgerow, every wet place, every mountain and river had a special, almost sacred, character of its own. (Clover p. 10, 25)

According to Marcel Kurz, the British agent to Tibet, Sir Charles Bell, gave, as the Tibetan name for Everest, *Kang Chamolung*, Snow of the Country of the Birds. Dr Schubert connects this name with *ChamaLun*, The Hen-bird Lun (Kurz, p. 18) Tenzing relates how his mother at Solo Kumbu, Nepal, had told him as a child that this name meant *The Mountain So High No Bird Can Fly Over It* . Tenzing

confirms the accepted meaning of *Goddess, Mother of the Wind and Goddess, Mother of the World* (Ullman, p. 38).

In 1921, the Tibetan passport given to the English by the Dalai Lama gave the name *Chomolungma* translated as *Goddess-Mother of the Land* (Kurz, p. 18). Thus the Goddess of the Wind and Land is also Bird of the Wind, just as the plume of wind-driven powder-snow, constantly at the summit of Everest, can be seen as the form of a white sacred bird. The fluttering prayer flags of Nepal, Bhutan, and Tibet have a similar effect.

Tenzing, in his autobiography, shows a personal and emotional, identification with this imagery when describing the moment of reaching the summit of the world:

> It was such a sight as I had never seen before and would never see again - wild, wonderful, and terrible... At that great moment for which I had waited all my life my mountain did not seem to me a lifeless thing of rock and ice, but warm and friendly and living. She was a mother hen, and the other mountains were chicks under her wings (Ullman, p. 270).

A feminine identity for the highest summit of the Himalayas is accorded also by Wilfred Noyce in his self-confessed literary account of the 1953 British Everest expedition:

> That queen of created masses... If there is any personification of Everest at all imaginable, it is for me in the impersonality of Swineburne's 'Proserpine'. 'Pale, beyond porch and portal,/Crowned with calm leaves, she stands.' (Noyce, p. 186, 191)

Interestingly it is Noyce who gives the particular words that Hillary refers to in his own account as "in rough New Zealand slang I shouted out the good news." Noyce writes "'Do you know what Ed said when I met him first?' George asked, squatting over the cookery. He said, 'Well, we knocked the bastard off.'" (Noyce, p. 187)

Perhaps the connection of Gloucestershire with Himalayan Buddhist Goddess-worship is rather stretched despite the imagery of wind, and villages folded into the landscape. If the Prince of Wales has styled himself nostalgically, and subliminally as a latter day Genghis Khan, who could measure the length of his territory by the 2500 kilometers of the Himalayas and still find his estate the greater, including Pagan, but not quite Venice (for it is Marco Polo who has stretched our imaginations that far, as S. Marco presumably had stretched his own) nevertheless, for His Royal Highness a detail suffices to stir his own imagination. He writes:

> Despite the valiant efforts of far-sighted non-governmental organisations in parts of the world like Ladakh (a Tibetan Buddhist enclave in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir) small, local systems of farming which, as a matter of principle, sacrifice immediate gains for the sake of long-term sustainability, are dying out because of an official bias towards large-scale systems and the replacement of local control by centralized bureaucracies.[17]

The 1953 Ascent of Chomolungma and the Goddess: A Red and Blue Pencil, Red Scarf, and Honey; Tenzing and the Beekeeper:

For those who consider this paper is setting up too many lateral connections too quickly it may help to understand that a lattice is the model for its structure; the framework of details is to be seen. And it is these particulars with which the paper is concerned.

The Himalayas are, of course, steeped in Aryan, Hindu and Buddhist mythology and cosmology, and are the realm of India's Gods and Goddesses. Their mountain peaks and river sources are the particular sites of pilgrimage temples, in northern India and Nepal from Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh in the west to Arunachal Pradesh in the east. Here devotees of the God Shiva, and Goddess Shakti (Kali), and God Vishnu cults find satisfaction.[18] The mountain gorges, foothills, valleys and pastures are their playground, as for the Krishna cult.[19] All this is implicit in the view from the hot plains further south even if the mountains themselves cannot be seen. The whole landscape is venerated in the details of Indian life. This mind's eye view, from the Ganges river valley

to the highlands of Tibet, is a cultural landscape *par excellence*. And as the world's grandest is inevitably the subject of the façade of S. Marco.

This landscape's cultural details are likewise absorbed by the Islamic Moghul dynasty descending from Timur's Central Asian Empire of Uzbekistan, Persia and Afghanistan to North India. I have cited elsewhere in connection with Shakespeare's *Sonnets* such a detail found in the Taj Mahal at Agra.[20] Here the cenotaph of Shah Jahan has a marble pen-case carved upon it (a convention for the male partner) and the cenotaph of his consort Mumtaz Mahal is smoothed across the top; as the tablet of the world, upon which creation is written.[21]

This cosmologically charged detail, of the marble ornamentation of the Taj Mahal, is helpful for understanding the significance of Tenzing's crucial account of the fifteen minutes he, and Sir Edmund Hillary (and perhaps a third person) spent on the summit of Chomolungma, "near" as he puts it, the Goddess herself; that day of destiny in 1953, three days before Queen Elizabeth II was crowned in an abbey on the banks of the river Thames, draining from the Cotswold limestone escarpment, where her future son, thirty or so years later, was to find his home; and to place his design upon the earth, much as is depicted in the floral arabesques of the Taj Mahal. For it too expresses nostalgia for the Central Asian steppes.[22] Tenzing relates how that:

> my younger daughter, Nima, gave me a red-and-blue stub of pencil which she had been using at school, and which I promised also to put in the 'right place,' if God willed it and was good to me. (And later) At six-thirty, when we crawled from the tent, it was still clear and windless... Round my axe were still the four flags, tightly wrapped. And in the pocket of my jacket was a small red-and-blue pencil.

And later still he tells:

> From my pocket I took the package of sweets I had been carrying. I took the little red-and-blue pencil that my daughter, Nima, had given me. And, scraping a hollow in the snow, I laid them there. Seeing what I was doing, Hillary handed me a small cloth cat, black and with white eyes, that Hunt had given him as a mascot, and I put this beside them. In his story of our climb Hillary says it was a crucifix that Hunt gave him, and that he left on top; but if this was so I did not see it. He gave me only the cloth cat. All I laid in the snow was the cat, the pencil, and the sweets. 'At Home' I thought, 'we offer sweets to those who are near and dear to us. Everest has always been dear to me, and now it is near too.' As I covered up the offerings I said a silent prayer. And I gave my thanks. (Ullman, p. 229, 262 and 271)

Hillary does not mention the pencil. Perhaps he didn't notice it, just as Tenzing apparently didn't notice John Hunt's crucifix which is crucial to Hillary's grand narrative interpretation of two religious philosophies, Christian and Buddhist, appropriating, through symbol, the world's highest peak. Hillary writes "Strange companions, no doubt, but symbolic at least of the spiritual strength and peace that all peoples have gained from the mountains."[23]

Tenzing did see the cloth black cat with white eyes that he understood Hunt had given Hillary as a mascot to place on the summit. Could this cat possibly be, or contain, the crucifix? Hillary does not mention the cat in any of his several published accounts of that day. But the pencil is, to the Asian mind, surely crucial. This tiny stub of a pencil, belonging to a young girl, and taken to this hitherto *tabula rasa* by her father, in a feat of extraordinary endurance and skill, in its own bizarre particularity, particularises a whole cultural landscape, and makes Chomolungma, Goddess of the Wind, and the other Himalayan peaks, such as Annapurna (8078 m), Blessed Goddess, Goddesses indeed.

Once having heard of Tenzing and his daughter Nima's action who could ever look upon the beautiful surface of Mumtaz Mahal's cenotaph, and the pencil case upon that of Shah Jahan, without recalling this particular, that the stub of a pencil had been brought to the Goddess? Yet a lattice permits other thoughts as Wilfred Noyce indicates: "Contemplate that photograph of Tenzing standing with the flags on the summit; and think back to Thondup peeling potatoes at Base." (Noyce, p. 88)[24]

Perhaps if Hillary did notice the pencil he did not think it was significant. He clearly

understood the significance of Tenzing's offering in general: "a small gift to the Gods of Chomolungma which all devout Buddhists (as Tenzing is) believe to inhabit the summit of this mountain." Hillary is particular about what food was offered by Tenzing "some biscuits, a piece of chocolate, and a few sweets," (Hillary, p. 241). It is easy for him to connect with sweets. He is appropriately obsessed with sugar. This he enjoys in all its forms "with relish."

The finding of two pots of Swiss honey abandoned by the 1952 Swiss expedition on the South Col is a special delight as he relates:

> Sugar was our main standby, and each of us ate nearly a pound of it a day. The honey was a rather unexpected delicacy, as we hadn't carried any up with us. But on the Col we had found two pots left by the Swiss the previous autumn, and the contents were still in excellent condition. (Hillary, p. 193)

Wilfred Noyce shares in the delight of the discovery of the honey on the Col somewhat wistfully:

> Some expert concocting had been going on; I remember lemon with plenty of sugar, far the most refreshing drink high up, soup and fragments of food. For me it was raisins, a little chocolate, and best of all, the scraping of a pot of Swiss honey found here. That honey I could have eaten in large quantity; I wished I had put sugary honey on my luxury list. (Noyce, p. 192)

Thus these two pots of honey are the elixir of the given - a gift from, or for, the Goddess herself. Wunderlich (1972) has linked honey from Crete, in the form of candied fruit and wine (mead), with the ambrosia and nectar offered in vast quantities to the Gods of Egypt and Olympus. This honey was used not only to preserve fruit, but also for embalming the dead.[25] For Hillary, sugar is at the core of his action. It powers him, he needs it, he is propelled by it. It is his secret, as in his careful husbandry of a tin of apricots:

> Then, because I heartily disliked the majority of the assault ration which had already been carried on ahead, I added to my load some food that I was sure I would like - two packets of dates, two tins of sardines, a half-used carton of honey, a few small packets of lemon crystals and, most precious of all, a tin of apricots in syrup. I had carried the majority of this food up from Camp IV, and had kept it carefully concealed from the ravenous eyes of my companions. My cloth bag was almost bursting at the seams under this load, and although cold reason told me that most of this food wasn't really essential, I couldn't summon up the courage to part with any of it.

And then later at the camp near the summit the night before the final assault:

> Out came all our delicacies - we had sardines on biscuits, fresh dates, and pint after pint of hot lemon drink crammed with sugar. As a special treat I produced my tin of apricots and Tenzing opened it with his tin opener. He tipped it upside down but instead of delicious fruit and tasty juice flowing out, all that emerged was a solid block of ice. However a short dose of treatment in a saucepan over the primus soon made it highly edible, and we ate it slowly, lingering over the flavour. (Hillary, pp. 203-4, and p. 218)

Hillary and honey is one of the easiest connections made in this paper. It forms the substance of the second sentence in his 1955 account of the 1953 ascent of Everest: "My father's rapidly expanding bee business had occupied all my holidays, and I'd learned to do a full-size job before I entered my teens." His first sentence is memorable: "I was sixteen before I ever saw a mountain." (Hillary, p. 15)

Bee-keeping as a family interest is a sizeable entry in the Index of Hillary's later autobiography. First as his father's hobby, and then as Hillary's own livelihood: "Gradually I became more and more involved in bee-keeping - largely, I suppose, because I felt more at home there." In his youth his father's hives were spread around South Auckland's dairy farms, and he received "a daily ration of a dozen, or a hundred beestings."[26] That a beekeeper who was sixteen before he ever saw a mountain should with a devotee of the Buddhist earth-Goddess lately grown up under her wings, be the first to climb to her summit, is a particular of considerable interest.

The Temple of Artemis and Church of St John at Ephesus, and the Church of the Holy Apostles at Constantinople: Architectural Twins for the Goddess:

In this paper I have dwelt upon Gloucestershire partly to evoke imagery concerning prehistoric earth-Goddess worship. Yet the connection of this site with Himalayan Goddess worship is rather stretched. Perhaps a walk with Colin Thubron in the Levant would serve to strengthen the lattice of details concerning fertility and connect these distant places. In describing his walking in Lebanon Thubron speaks of Astarte, the ancient Semite earth-Goddess of the region, and of her various names for different peoples living elsewhere. Her "veins and sinews" Thubron writes "were the fields and vines of men."[27]

In Asia Minor the name of the fertility Goddess for the Greeks was Artemis, and before them Cybele. At Ephesus, a particular connection of the bee and the earth-Goddess is explicit. The pre-Greek name of the site *Apasus* means a bee. Bees are depicted on the coinage of Ephesus and on the image of Artemis as part of her iconographic schema. Her belt is decorated with them.[28] Her great temple was one on the Seven Wonders of the ancient world, and organized, it is said, like a beehive, with a priestly college of *essenes* (*essen* = queen bee).[29] Mary, the Mother of Jesus, seems to have succeeded Artemis by moving to live at Ephesus with the apostle John.

The early great Temple of Artemis was destroyed by fire on the night of Alexander the Great's birth, because, it is said, Artemis was away attending Alexander's mother that night. Alexander, like Hillary, was later called to Central Asia and the Himalayas, to Maracanda Timur's future capital of Samarkand, and thence to the Indus, via the Hindu Kush.

The Christian Church of St. John, built over John's grave, supplanted the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus, standing below this church. Artemis and her temple were never liked by John. His Church was rebuilt in the 6th century in the reign of Justinian on the model of the newly built Church of the Holy Apostles on the fourth hill at Constantinople, the site of Constantine the Great's mausoleum.[30] This Church, in ruins at the time of Mehmet II's conquest of Constantinople in 1453 was in due course supplanted by Mehmet's own Mosque and Külliye, in turn rebuilt after the disastrous earthquake in the 18th century.[31]

Now it is known that S. Marco in Venice is also modelled closely on the Church of the Holy Apostles and its likeness at Ephesus. S. Marco's interior follows especially the iconographic schema of the mid-Byzantine remodelling of the Church of the Holy Apostles.[32]

Robert Graves (1955) in his introduction to *The Greek Myths* relates the Great Goddess with the matriarch tending the hearth in a cave or hut - ancient Europe's first social centres. He writes:

> The goddess's white aniconic image, perhaps her most widespread emblem... may originally have represented the raised white mount of tightly-packed ash, enclosing live charcoal, which is the easiest means of preserving fire without smoke. Later, it became pictorially identified with the lime-whitened mound under which the harvest corn-doll was hidden, to be removed sprouting in the spring; and with the mound of sea-shells, or quartz, or white marble, underneath which dead Kings were buried. (Graves, p. 13)

When standing in the Piazza S. Marco and viewing the church, if Graves is followed, we are at least looking at a likeness of one of those prehistoric ash heaps; a heap of whitish marble, like the Temple of Artemis had been, "rising to the clouds," and covering the charcoal-fire of the hearth and spring doll, with even appropriation of the sacred horses. But few in a Christian era are interested in that kind of prehistoric reading. Least of all St. John, who, nevertheless, must have been acutely conscious of its significance, and this consciousness presumably fuelled his hatred of it. But in appropriating the sacredness of the site of the Temple of Artemis, he opted for Tenzing's "nearness" to the Goddess, even in death. Nor, presumably, would the North American millionaire, to whom St. John appeared in a dream, and who has financed the reconstruction of the Church of St. John at Ephesus, be pleased with such a reading of S. Marco, the twin replication to his Church at Ephesus, of

the Church of Constantinople.[33]

Three on the Summit; Tenzing, Hillary, and Lambert:

Graves refers to the twinning of lovers, the summer and winter husbands of the Goddess. (Graves, p. 14) Can we think of these two grave patriarchal churches, of St. John and St. Mark, as two such lovers of Chomolungma? Or if they are one, together, as the Church of the Holy Apostles their common source, then that church and the Ananda at Pagan are the two. Yet Graves speaks of the Goddess's tendency to form three, as a token of divinity, as in the three stages of a woman's life; the maiden, nymph, and crone. (Graves, p. 14) Perhaps for this reason Tenzing's remark that there was another on the summit of Everest with him and Hillary is significant.

It seems that when climbing with the Swiss climber Lambert, and nearly reaching the summit of Everest in 1952, Tenzing had grown to admire and love him, so that he wore Lambert's red scarf on the 1953 climb to the summit:

> And closest of all was one figure, one companion - Lambert. He was so near, so real to me, that he did not seem to be in my thoughts at all, but actually standing there beside me. Any moment now I would turn and see his big bear face grinning at me. I would hear his voice saying, "Ça va bien, Tenzing! Ça va bien!" Well at least his red scarf was there. I pulled it more tightly round my throat. "When I get back home," I told myself, "I will send it to him." And I did.

Earlier Tenzing had explained how he came by the scarf:

> And, most important of all, the red scarf round my neck was Raymond Lambert's. At the end of the autumn expedition he had given it to me and smiled and said, 'Here, perhaps you can use it sometime.' And ever since I had known exactly what that use must be. (Ullman, p. 272 and p. 261)

Perhaps even Robert Graves would blanch at the suggestion that Chomolungma is the greatest ash cone of all, with countless hearth fires under her, and with the vast Himalayan landscape of fertility beneath her, giving the greatest scope for the spring doll. Is the façade of S. Marco, now, too flamboyant for such a reading? Having lost the gravity of her Byzantine marbles? Perhaps the adjacent Doge's Palace, as a heap of blanched white and buff shells is the better candidate for a prehistoric reading.

Conclusion:

What lessons are there in the Ananda and S. Marco for a country that owns a beehive as its seat of government, and that bears the likeness of a beekeeper, the intimate of Chomolungma, on one of its banknotes, together with the likeness of its Queen crowned, it seemed, on that very day Chomolungma called three to her summit?[34] What lessons for a country caught between the panic of remoteness adrift in a Pacific's vacuii, and the intoxication of a Pacific which is nothing but details?

When faced with writing a brief foreword to John Hunt's vast accumulation of data concerning the 1953 British expedition to Everest, His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh in exasperation refers three times to its detail and manages to conclude "In spite of, rather than because of all these details I am still left with a sense of profound admiration."[35]

Whether because of the details of S. Marco, or without them at the Ananda, or by simply going to the Himalayas oneself, one can indeed appreciate the "spiritual strength and peace" of these mountains, as Hillary, who should know, bears witness. And perhaps, at the same time we grasp some of the intoxicating implications of this world's fertility, as has the Beekeeper, who, as if describing the façade of S. Marco, has the final word:

> we descended into the lower Barun valley, and we came into a paradise of flowers. We waded along in acres of blazing red dwarf rhododendrons. The monsoon rain had transformed the landscape, and myriads of tiny blossoms of every colour were bursting through the arid soil. The air was thick and strong, and we breathed it deeply into our starved

lungs. But we were now in a world of rain - hundreds of waterfalls drifted gracefully down the mighty rock bluffs of our valleys, and the heavy clouds would only split for a moment to reveal some startling summit before closing in again with torrential rain. But I enjoyed every moment of it, for it was the most beautiful valley I had ever seen. And when, several days later, we climbed up out of the valley, I knew I wasn't likely to forget its soaring peaks or its rugged beauty. And I knew that, given half a chance, I'd come back again to see its flowers and sparkling streams and to accept the challenge of its unconquered mountains. (Hillary, pp. 119-121)

Particulars:

1. Concerning the Trompe-l'oeil Scheme of S. Marco:

This paper has so far been hazardously concerned with particulars which bring S. Marco and the Himalayas into conjunction. Let us now consider the details of S. Marco's façade. For it is these which hold one's attention.

As a depiction of landscape the two tiers are clear enough in overall massing - an upper and lower register - clearer in its earlier 11th-century, more brutal, Byzantine form, now embellished with Gothic details and mid-13th century wooden domes. Thus foothills, and white peaks, are two distinct realms. The Byzantine reading, derived from the iconography of the interior, of earth and heaven, is the familiar grand cosmic narrative which blurs and overrides all detail and focuses attention on the liturgy enacted within as symbolic drama, giving earthly events, including the incarnation, ultimate significance in relation to the heavenly concerns depicted above.[36]

fig 3 The Trompe-l'oeil scheme of S. Marco, Venice

The Byzantine mind can be considered to have entered the *scaenae frons* literally and to have shifted the dramatic action into it. Somewhat impressed by this sublime interiority, the Italian mind, nevertheless, seems to stay outside and maintain the stance of remoteness, or at least to maintain both options. There is thus, to the Italian mind, a scene still to be observed from outside, and the façade fulfils this option. Heaven, for the Byzantine, may be capable of entry but it is difficult to see. Byzantine writers are very obscure about it in this sense, although it is very clear, nevertheless, what it is like to be in it, especially acoustically. The façade of S. Marco is not in any sense obscure. And with other medieval Italian churches it shares a Mediterranean descriptive language developed, it would seem, from Egypt. With this technical possibility it sets up a detailed architectural description of the world's greatest landscape.

The lower register, as a whole, would appear to be in particular the ancient Egyptian hieroglyph for sky, just as that employed in any Greek temple, or any table or chair.[37] This analysis may strike one as somewhat Platonic. But all these artefacts are, in a particular sense, in their form, Neo-Egyptian. Everything above this horizontal register is deemed to be of the sky, just as in the early Egyptian sense, food offerings placed on a table, or a King sitting on the only chair, are considered sacred. This terrace at S. Marco is supported with free standing supports at each end, just as the hieroglyph for sky - a horizontal band - requires nibs at each end to hold the sky up. This observation may at first not seem to be a question of detail, but this particular happens to be rather big - the Himalayas are, after all, huge, and anything above 7-8,000 metres high is way up in a realm of white and blue. The Greek horses from Constantinople (1204) are positioned exactly here, and presumably make a reference to Plato's Charioteer in *Phaedrus* - virtue arcing up to where the gods are all day, just as all the Byzantine vaults do.[38]

At this point the scope of the landscape can be anticipated, and an architectural language makes the details possible. If, in one's mind's eye, one stands on the Indian plain of the Ganges, or on that of the Indus, as Alexander did, and looks north, one can see the whole works, just as when standing in the Piazza S. Marco. We are facing in the right direction. From below there are at first the rectangular division into grids, of fields and villages, towns and magnificent palaces; then the higher contoured pastoral landscape, and upland settlements, forests and valleys, encompassing in the foothills, estates, mansions, and belvederes; then the big stuff - temples and places of pilgrimage - and the abodes and pavilions of the Gods, just as on Hindu temples such as the 7th-century rock temples at Mamalla Puram. It's all in S. Marco's façade, even if lots of the simple details are missing or elsewhere.

sky (trompe-l'oeil S. Marco)

flat alluvial land (earth)



hill-country



sun rising over mountain

ripple of water (water)

channel filled with water (water-grids)

irrigation canal



irrigation

garden pool

'castle', 'mansion', 'temple', 'estate'

village with cross-roads

Egyptian Hieroglyphs from: Sir Alan Gardiner Egyptian Grammar (Oxford: Griffiths Institute Ashmolean Museum 1927 3rd edition 1982)

2. Concerning the Earth:

fig 4 earth

For the ancient Egyptians two parallel horizontal lines joined together at each end sufficed as the hieroglyph for earth; indicating ground, sand, and firm low lying terrain. This is a common masonry motif in medieval building, achieved with contrasting layers of stone. In seaports such as Genoa, Pisa, and Messina, where ground would surely be appreciated, such buildings are found. Also, in central hill towns, such as Siena, and Orvieto, where firm ground is celebrated midst a sea of hills, and their cathedrals appear like the ark grounded on Mount Ararat. There are many of these striped masonry buildings in Syria and Cairo, a technique called *ablaq* (piebald) by the Arabs. These buildings, in stating firm ground, are architectural icons for stability, and cathedrals especially, symbolically, guarantee this grounding together with the campanile, a pole of stability. For ancient Egypt, a primeval mound is the first ground to appear midst a watery chaos, and this notion is repeated in the story of Noah's ark for Christians. All these buildings refer to cosmic events as well as to practical sense. A layered pattern is indicative of rock building - of sediment and strata - and thus suggestive of the action of water, making the beginning itself, a form of renewal, to be differentiated from a homogeneous mass of stone, sometimes employed in the lower part of a wall, as at the Duomo, Pisa (begun 1063) and San Paolo a Ripa d'Arno (11th-12th century) also at Pisa.

Random mixing of contrasting stones produces a mottled effect, as at the church of San Nicola (dating from 1100) at Pisa. Often seen in pavements, this technique threatens allusion to stable earth; and its more active potential hints of dappled things - growing plants, and creature life, as in Gerard Manley Hopkins's poem 'Pied Beauty': "Glory be to God for dappled things - / for skies of couple-colour as a brinded cow;/For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim;/Fresh-firecoal chestnut-falls; finches wings;/Landscape plotted and pieced - fold, fallow, and plough;"[39]

The Egyptian hieroglyph for hilly terrain places a horizontal wavy line over a straight one. This effect can readily be observed in the blind arcading of the Baptistery at Florence and the 11th and 12th century church of San Paolo a Ripa d'Arno and the Duomo both at Pisa. Their upthrusting arcs pressure horizontal strata and induce aggressive rhythms. Their violent under-pinnings - the column shafts - indicate downrushes, eroded tracts - gullies and ravines - cutting through upland and lowland stratas. Or conversely, these dynamic cleavages, are upward in effect, short circuits to the terraces of upland regions, and to space beyond.

These several techniques distort wall surface, with intimations of perspectives, of regional landscapes. In the foreground low, sand and silt; in the mid-distance and background, ranges of hills. These hills provide a rhythmic framework for accommodating churned up, and overlaid, lowland stratas, which can incorporate random fragments from the past's buildings, and sculptures. The Duomo at Pisa has walls rich in scattered fragments of inscriptions, and sculpture-reliefs, set into the overall design.

Associated with arcading, the rossette motif often suggests as well as flowers, a free interpretation of the solar disc. The Egyptian hieroglyph depicting a circle between two hills indicates the rising sun over hills, and has, for the Nile valley, specific reference to the sun in the south, crossing, from the eastern hills, over the river, to the western hills. This arrangement is often the subject of a medieval cathedral front, with a split gable accommodating a window, as for the cathedral at Orvieto and the church of San Miniato al Monte (begun 1018, with 12th century façade) at Florence. This marks a termination of the earth motif and evokes the region of the sky and heavens.

The façade of S. Marco, at Venice, shows, in its central arch, a narrow strip of blue space, with stars, between a powerful, upthrusting, hemispherical arch, over the central doorway, gathering into itself, supporting ripples from each side, and functioning, as a great, rising, eastern solar disc, between mountains; and above this arch, a pointed ogive, etched against the sky, as a flaming mandorla. This suggests the male and female principles, in conjunction; the male within the female symbolizing generation, of creation in all its richness and diversity.

3. Concerning Water:

Traditionally, the surface configurations of marbles, with soft wavy patterns, have been used as icons, for water, and for the sea. Appreciated in the Byzantine world, in their work-horse marble, the grey and white wavy Marmara marble from Proconnesus which can be seen as columns in the churches of S. Apollinare Nuovo (490),



fig 5 (top left) water
fig 6 (top right) watergrids
fig 7 (bottom) watergrids

and S. Apollinare in Classe (534-539), at Ravenna. The Proconnesian columns at S. Apollinare in Classe are particularly richly veined. S. Marco draws freely on Byzantine tradition and incorporates marble panels, and fragments, looted from Constantinople; from Anicia Juliana's great 6th century church of S.Polyeuktos (524-527). Inside, in places, its wall surfaces are laid out like huge drop-tapestries of watered silk. Undulating, handsawn surfaces, and polish, enhance allusion to water.

There is an intimate connection between textiles and water. The action of weaving, often with water-reeds and rushes, as in Egyptian, and Maori, crafts, is particularly evocative of water and wind patterns. The Egyptian hieroglyph for rippling water is a horizontal zigzag line, sometimes in blocks, and this is readily achieved in weaving. This zigzag motif is known also as the chevron, goat horns, herring bone and dog's tooth motif, in Romanesque, Norman, and Crusader buildings; in Europe, and the Near East, particularly in arches over doorways. It is carved around some of the vast squat columns of Durham cathedral (begun 1093).

The Byzantine world, in inheriting Mesopotamian pessimism - foreknowledge of a doomed world, to be destroyed by flood and holocaust - never freed itself from a sense of insecurity expressed by swirling waters depicted, over, and around, stone piers and walls. The columns of Durham cathedral are a blunter, less effete, reference to the flood, than soft wavy marble patterns of seductive doom, and in their volumetric vigor, hearty to encounter in one's frantic passage to the sanctuary. In bright colours, painted on the slender columns of the cathedral of Notre-Dame-la-Grande at Poitiers, they are, of course, jolly references to water, and festivals, like the maypole dance, which in forming the diaper pattern, seen both at Poitiers and Durham, suggest a world of growth, and fertility, beyond our immediate attention. In Mesopotamian tradition the heavens are separate from the earth, with water between, whereas in Greek tradition, the earth rises up into the heavens, continuously, as a Mount Olympus where the gods dwell, and who on occasions have to retreat further up.[40]

Italian architecture embodies both conceptions. The natural patterns of stone, and marble, are exploited for references to them - to mountain or flood - singly, for rare specimens, and others in large compositions, their patterns reversed, quartered, and repeated, often suggesting other life-forms looming out of the flux of creation. Here is both a fecund matrix for life, as well as an over-whelming force destructive of life. Both the beginning, and end of life, is represented in one instant.

4. Concerning Water Grids:

In Venice, rising tides literally invade the huge piazza and enter the cathedral, submerging the intricate pattern of canals, of which the city is composed. In many Italian cities, rivers are dramatically contained by buildings, as at Pisa, and Florence, both cities on the river Arno; and Rome, on the Tiber. At Venice, the pattern of water channels is unsurpassed, canals large and small, have their banks studded with architectural jewels representing flowers. Control of water in channels, is a legacy from the ancient river civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, where knowledge of geometry, and hydraulic engineering, accompanied economic, and cultural, prosperity.

The rectangular grid patterns of vast irrigation, and flood-control, projects, together with the simple profile of ditch and embankment ridges, are, I believe, the inspiration for the equivalent designs on walls, and pavements; in stone, marble revetments, and inlays. They speak of human control of the watery chaos. The Egyptian hieroglyph for water canals is a rectilinear pattern made of four lines; two spaced lines with cross lines between and blocks of this pattern for irrigation projects much as brick, and concrete block walls appear to the eye. This functioning pattern is seen more literally in tiled roofs, for which channels alternate with ridges, feeding into long channels as gutters.

Complementing the orthogonal framework of these lines are the enclosed, framed, fields of space. Cathedrals such as the Duomo in Florence are entirely clad in these regulating lines, with an infinite number of small fields. They are a dramatic representation of a stable, ordered, well-watered estate, rising up in the midst of a sea of ochre, river-mud-coloured buildings. Each wall is an orthogonal picture-view, extending into the distance. These channels are the source of growth and fertility. The upper register of the Duomo at Florence features rows of upright rectangular enclosures. A rectangular enclosure is the Egyptian hieroglyph for castle, mansion, temple and tomb. These, on the Duomo, presumably depict heavenly mansions. Water, and hence life, is particularly implied, by the use of green stone for the channels on the Duomo of Florence. In Constantinople, at Hagia Sophia, large areas of green marble have been thought of as meadows, and green bands of marble in the pavement as rivers.[41]

In ancient Egypt, embankments along water channels form paths, especially during the inundation of all the fields. The hieroglyph for village, is a crossing of paths, at right angles within a circle. A grid pattern indicates larger settlement just as it indicates larger irrigation schemes, with many crossings. Focus on a central crossing, of two axial streets (decumanus and cardo, ew/ns), within a walled enclosure, was for Romans, both military

camp, and city. These forms continue, not least in Europe, and North America, as both practical, and symbolic, utilities, in architecture, and in urban design. (This iconography is prominent in the work of contemporary American architect Peter Eisenman) The Duomo of Florence is a vision of the heavenly city expressed in these terms. In the Cotswolds ancient boundary ditches between estates survive with earth piled high on each side.[42] HRH the Prince of Wales has, on his Highgrove farm, reinstated the stone walls and hedgerows with their accompanying strips of wild flowers, to provide a habitat for wild creatures and insects, and to thus promote bird life. (Clover, pp. 34-35)

In citing the embankments alongside water channels, we have thus accounted for a preoccupation in classical times, with framing; with borders, fillets, and mouldings in architectural design. In a natural sense, with the concave lap, and wave, forms, along the edges of water channels and larger bodies of water; and in a contrived sense, with qualification of the convex humps of earth, along these channels. These two basic forms, of rut and ridge, together with the straight, flat surface, form the vocabulary of moulding design. There are also the various patterns of water-flow within the channels - vortices, helices, spirals, meanders, and wind-scuffed surface waves, and ripples - these contribute to the repertoire of antique and medieval, design and are featured variously on the columns at Durham cathedral. It was Michelangelo's and John Ruskin's genius to recognize in the convex, concave and straight the three Orders of architecture on which I have elaborated elsewhere.[43]

The Badia Fiesolana at Fiesole (a 12th century marble façade reset in a 15th-century stone front), near Florence, and the 12th century façade of San Miniato al Monte also at Florence, are stunning examples of the scenario we have described. The former depicts rippling water above an irrigated landscape. These rectilinear layouts depict, also, watered gardens, (the hieroglyph for pond is a narrow rectangle) and one can feel the presence of ancient near-eastern gardens, set in the desert, in medieval and renaissance designs. In these contexts, geometrical rosette designs, take, in the imagination, the form of garden pavilions, and belvederes, associated in their style with solar discs, and floral motifs, and refer to Near-Eastern, and Persian, garden designs. These pavilions enjoy proximity with water. A dramatic example of such a pavilion is Longhena's rotunda of S. Maria della Salute (founded 1630) near the entrance to the grand canal at Venice.

The façade of San Miniato al Monte, at Florence, (begun 1018 with 12th century façade) integrates all these themes into a three dimensional world picture, of foreground well-watered plains, studded with large walled cities, bounded by hills, from which rivers run down to the plains; and there are smaller upland fields in the valleys, with gardens, and pleasure pavilions, scattered amongst them; then high plateaux, tall mountains, deep narrow valleys with steep-sided little fields on their slopes, and the golden sun trapped between mountain peaks; then high above in the heavens, the celestial paradise, with its mansions, gardens, and parks, far above the waters above the terrestrial firmament.

This view is a combination of plan and elevation projections, much as ancient Egyptians drew on the walls of their tombs. If one imagines, in one's mind's eye, a foreshortened, single view, of northern India with its countless villages, and the cities of Agra, and Delhi, and their walled forts, on the rivers of the Ganges plain, in the foreground; and the foothills and Himalayas in the distance, with garden valleys such as Kashmir, and its incomparable pavilions, also in the view, then one will have grasped the scope, and intent, of these medieval designs.

5. Concerning Growth, the Arabesque, and Creature Life:

fig 8 concerning growth, the arabesque . . .

With such a framework in place, organic growth is an irrepressible outcome, causing the severity of stone to twitch, pulsate, and burst with fecund profusion. Following the discipline of the water courses, embellishing its watered fields, nourished by these, rooted in stone, growth pops, pokes, thrusts, cantilevers outward and upward, twisting, twining, grappling, forming antique spirals, volutes, helices and arabesques, these unsurpassed in Islamic design; proliferating in a vast repertoire of creatures, many grotesque, as in Romanesque designs, culminating with Gothic ebullience and restraint. The portals of Messina cathedral (S. Maria), the Baptistery of Siena cathedral and Cathedral front, (from 1284), depict such fantastic worlds. Nodules, buds, stem and leaf forms, flowers; creeping, crawling, and fluttering creatures of all kinds, in both realistic detail, and free creation of the imagination are entwined. Older, antique canons are continually enlivened. S. Marco's late Gothic ogee arches and crocketed pinnacles refer to life-forms.

The façades of the Doge's Palace (south side 1309-1404, west side 1424-1442), at Venice restrain details to

the edges, along filleted channels, and the overall mass has the breathtaking delicacy of calcite forms, of sea-shells, and fine boned creatures; bleached white skeletons, of coral, and birds. Large planes between these borders, are paved with mottled, beige-marble, zigzag, and diaper patterns, evoking the patterns of sea shells like those I have picked up from the sand at the Lido, and there are identical ones, here, on Auckland's North Shore beaches. Adam and Eve are set upon the corner-stone, entwined with the tree forms of paradise. The Ca'd'Oro (House of Gold) (1422-1440) shares this delicate reference, with marble revetments, fillets, and organic ornament, at a smaller scale.

Although this delicate ornament, like plant growth itself, can be rooted out, skimmed off, broken off, or "knocked off" as Ed Hillary might say, or dried, beaten back or downtrodden, it is nevertheless integral with the architecture of earth and water, and no more superficial than that which it depicts. And with the season it remains a distilled elixir - honey, wine, fragrances, unguents, stored and stacked in jars, in silos, granaries and storehouses. The elaborate storage systems of Minoan Palaces on Crete would seem to have much to do with Goddess worship and honey, in particular, for which Crete was prized by the Turks. (Wunderlich, p. 282)

The acoustic dimensions of these buildings are modified by the extrusion of these living forms. Sound is dispersed by the carving; rustlings, twitterings play upon the ears, and it is hard to distinguish between the subtle interplay of light and shade, and sound itself.

Huge column bases, and squatting creatures, of stone, seem to emit lowing, and moaning, sounds. We are confronted with, and surrounded by, a personalized architecture. Rubbing oneself against these creatures is exactly what Italian people, especially children, do, and childhood sentimentality of the Noah's ark story - as captured by George Orwell in the opening scene to his novel *Animal Farm*, when all the animals assemble in the barn, and the orphaned ducklings are accommodated on the straw, within the huge, bent, foreleg of Clover, the gentle-hearted draughthorse - this sentiment is the subject, and we fit into the architecture, in just this way.[44] Fertility is the exuberant antique-medieval theme - procreation and increase, abundance coupled with decay, travail, mortality, and death; all, are its themes.

6. Concerning Centered Stem and Bi-lateral Symmetry Composition for Fertility Themes:


fig 9 bi-lateral symmetry

Depiction of organic and biological growth tends to encourage a central stem and bi-lateral symmetry as in the façade of S. Marco. This is a traditional fertility design continuing with more recent Beaux Arts compositions via Palladio and the great spatial compositions of the Baroque palaces, such as Versailles, which celebrate wealth and prosperity.[45] Many of Palladio's Venetian villas for the rural aristocracy spring directly from the rural canal systems we have described. This central stem and bi-lateral composition is also much used in Ottoman design, particularly 16th-18th century naturalistic floral designs, and these, with ogival lattices, inspire textiles, particularly damasks used as wall coverings, of both Italian and Ottoman manufacture.[46] William Morris seems to have studied these designs, presumably in museums and insitu in old houses, and recreated their patterns, beginning with simple trellis and grid patterns such as his 'rambling briar rose' design, then leading to elaborate symmetrical ogival patterns.[47]

The arrangement of people in group photographs of the 19th and 20th centuries often employs this form of centered bi-lateral symmetry, with undertones of fertility, as in the photographs of the office staff of the New Zealand architectural practice of Gummer and Ford.[48] Such photographs are, in effect, symmetrical vine rinceaux designs often centering on a pointed ogive made by entwining central stems, as in 16th-century Ottoman tile prunus designs, and latterly in William Morris's wall paper, textile, and tile designs. The lattice, ogival net, and rectilinear grid are both the structure, i.e. the setting out lines for such designs, as well as the substance of the design's detail. Simple field designs emphasize the enclosure of each compartment containing an isolated rosette, flower, bird, animal or some such emblem, depending on the degree of abstraction of the design. In more complex designs the arabesque links the various compartments with the theme of the repetitive cycle of seed, maturity (stem, bud, flowers, ripening), death and renewal.

William Morris's briar rose design (1864) shows hesitation in grasping that the trellis grid and the curvilinear rose plant are effectively one and the same. This ambivalence, of a geometrical grid combined with figurative motifs within each compartment, is found in Early Christian 5th-6th Century floor mosaics at Antioch and Jerusalem. There is also in this period commitment either to an austere geometrical grid or to a full vine rinceaux layout as depicted on the 4th-5th century wooden doors of the Copt Church of St. Barbara at Old Cairo, and the 6th-century mosaic floor of the funerary chapel outside the Damascus Gate at Jerusalem, with its

profusion of birds. Italian medieval church façades likewise differ and fluctuate in intention. Whether iconoclast or not these various approaches seem to address an agreed subject of fertility. In our own time it would seem to require an historically trained mind to appreciate the 'protestant' iconoclast celebration of fertility and economic prosperity depicted in the modern and post-modern Western architectural preoccupation with structural and ornamental geometrical grids. In their architectural austerity these designs imply missing figurative details.

Depiction of the Goddess at the centre of the symmetrical vine rinceaux, as at Hadrian's 2nd century Temple at Ephesus, is of course unambiguous, unlike the apparently concealed equivalent seated figures in Ottoman tile and glass window designs, as in the tiled panels of the 16th-century Türbe of Sehzade Mehmet at Istanbul.

The windows of the early 18th-century library of Sultan Ahmet III at the Topkapi palace show within the graceful outline of a seated figure a pen-case and cartouche, with writing, adjacent a white tablet with a pointed ogive. A full, complementing gender-set is thus depicted.

Nostalgia for the ancient Anatolian Goddess is surely intended on a 6th-century Byzantine silver bowl with its arabesques outlining swelling breasts and thighs.[49] The Western use of the ribbon-bow at Christmas, and for birthdays and weddings, with its characteristic voluptuous loops seems to indicate a frank depiction of the Goddess in a frontal position of sexual presentation, to which William Morris was inevitably led, as his so-called 'peacock and dragon' design for woven wool of 1878 indicates.

The juxtaposition of the death/rebirth of Christ at the centre of rinceaux designs, as at the 12th Century apse Mosaic of S. Clement at Rome, demonstrates Medieval acceptance of the integrity of these designs from antiquity. That the medieval church façade, whether Iconoclast in technique or not, should choose to depict a posture of sexual presentation, with its larger scale implications for regional fertility, is undoubtedly an aspect of the continuing popularity of these buildings.

We have cited the façade of S. Marco as a trompe-l'oeil architectural relief, and as more literally, a *skene* from the theatre, much as is painted on many walls in the houses of Pompeii. Here is a huge, landscape mural, in more aggressive relief than those elsewhere, accentuating the walled ramparts of the cities on the plain, and the vigor of the hills, calmed by the upland, sky-plateau, with distant mountains beyond. The foreground, like a pierced screen in theatre scenery, has wonderful things perched on it, and gives glimpses, of still more wonderful cities, gardens, landscapes, and events, beyond.

The excitement generated by this amazing building, relieved, and magnified, by the large piazza in front, is comparable to the frenzied depictions of supernatural beings, and events, in Tibetan Buddhist design, and the landscape references of the Ananda Temple (1091) at Pagan, Burma, a building contemporary with the basilica of S. Marco (first completed 1094).

7. Concerning the Ananda Temple:

fig 10 The Ananda Temple, Himalayas

The site of Pagan in central Burma on the River Irrawaddy abounds in the particulars we have discussed. Its grids are lusciously articulated by hundreds of whitewashed brick 'ash heaps' covering beautiful gilded spring dolls - many huge, set in top-lit caves. The connection of the Ananda Temple and the Himalayas is secure in legend and history. (Klein, p. 218)

The *Glass Palace Chronicle* relates that in the reign of King Kyanzittha (*1084-1112*) eight monks visited Pagan saying that they were from the legendary Nandamula Cave-temple in the Himalayas. This mythical landscape was conjured up for the King, during repeated visits by the monks on rainy days, through meditation. And thus, seeing this landscape before his eyes - a vision of coolness and serenity on a hot, dusty, or muddy, plain - the King was overwhelmed and had the vision built in brick.

Surmounted by a 'beehive' crown - a golden stupa following the Hindu *Sikhara* tower form - with five diminishing walkway terraces for circumambulation on the roof, the Temple bears witness to measured Buddhist harmony, with the stupa replicated at the Temple's four corners.

On the roof terraces glazed terracotta panels illustrate the *Jataka*. Following the overall form of a Greek cross in plan, four halls of meditation and learning, each with the same sixteen Buddha images, mediate between

their entrance and each of the four chambers containing the four 9.5 metre teak Buddhas of this world-cycle. Gautama the latest, is facing west. These chambers are connected by corridors for circumambulation, containing reliefs of the life of Bodhisattva from birth to enlightenment.

The Temple contains also, statues of King Kyanzittha and the monk Shin Arahan who had crowned him, and who had died in 1115, aged 81 years, having served four Kings. As a young monk, Shin Arahan had moved from the Mon capital of Thaton in the south to live in a cave near Pagan. A devotee of the Hinayanan, Thervada School, with its emphasis on the individual path, he had attracted the attention of King Anawrahta, who longed for some release from the tantric excesses of the Mahayana Northern School.

After Anawrahta's conquest of Thaton in 1057, Mon architectural influence was brought to bear on Pagan, leading to the Ananda Temple. Its name is also linked to that of the favourite disciple, and cousin of Buddha; and to Nalanda, the Buddhist university in Buddha's home Bihar province of Bengal. This monastery, now in ruins, was sacked by Muslims in the 12th century, and refugees from it made their way to Pagan. Some connect the name with the concept of the 'endless' (Sanskrit *Ananta*).

Too far off to be seen, the actual Himalayas nevertheless complement the hot, dusty plain of Pagan, as the Ananda Temple bears witness. In the same sense the ancient river civilizations of India, Egypt and China, can be understood to require the mountains which fed their rivers not just in a practical sense but as a spiritual homeland. They are incomplete without them. And their remoteness has perhaps driven Egypt, in panic, to an excessive obsession with 'ash-white' heaps of limestone over their spring dolls; a configuration which surely must make even Chomolungma blush, that most impressive of all white Himalayan Queens.

And perhaps such a remoteness has caused Venice to heap detail upon detail with an unrestraint that has recently both fascinated and repelled Robin Evans.[50] Cannot the façade of S. Marco bring Hillary's "daily ration of a hundred beestings" to mind? And is not the outcome much as in a radio adaptation of Henry Fielding's novel *The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews* when Beau Didapper, at Booby Hall, and about to kiss Fanny exclaims "Ods bobs those lips! you'd swear a bee'd stung'm."[51]

8. Concerning Landscapes of Madness; Khumbu Icefall and Anzac Cove:

In the Ananda Temple the excesses of Tibetan tantric Buddhism - a too-closeness to the Himalayas? - have been calmed by the influence of the Southern Hinayana school of Buddhism from the Mons, a Khymer people in the south of Burma, and have produced a simple, graceful likeness of the Himalayas. Here is a calm view of a bewildering world of detail; an effect which, it seems, only mountains of the scale of the Himalayas can produce. Yet these mountains also increase the intensity of detail - for there are frightful landscapes of madness within their folds, such as the icefall of the Khumbu glacier with its daily changing contours of danger and death, intimately charted and lived with by mountain climbers; just as the Dardanelles and Flanders landscapes of madness of the First World War were intimate territories of intense detail for those who knew them.

fig 11 The Green House, Glenfield 1975-79, Claude Megson and mountaineer

At Anzac Cove, from Hell Spit through the narrow Shrapnel and Monash Gullies, between two ridges, their land features peopled with soldiers' names - McLagan, Plugge, Russell, Walker; Bolton, Johnston, MacLaurin, Steele, Courtney, Quinn, Pope - like those of the Apostles in S. Marco; to Bloody Angle, The Nek, and Baby 700 was the territorial limit for most of the Australians and New Zealanders. And the terminus for many. Higher above, on a German and Turk occupied register, lay The Apex, The Pinnacle, and the 200 metre summit of Chunuk Bair, with beyond the impossibly remote heights of the over 300 metre Sari Bair Ridge commanding the Aegean and the Dardanelles 2 kilometres apart. Here, in this gully, as for Maui between the thighs of Hine-nui-te-po, the Goddess of Death, the Anzacs were crushed. Yet, it seems, both for the Anzacs and the defending Turks, a new national identity was born of the place.[52]

The Khumbu Icefall's details, like those of Anzac Cove, are the subject for a paper in itself. Hillary is the one, of course, who gives a detailed map of the 1953 route through the Icefall, indicating its hazards; Mike's Horror, Hillary's Horror, Hell Fire Alley, Atom Bomb Area, Ghastly Crevasse, Nutcracker, Hunt's Gulley, and so on.(Hillary, 1955, p.138) All these places were subject to unexpected, or feared, change of contour. This is the world of Bunyan, Dante, and Mike Linzey. First with Eric Shipton in the 1951 reconnaissance of Everest, when the icefall proved insurmountable, and then in 1953, following the Swiss the year before, Hillary became intimately acquainted with the glacier's seasonal details, and unlike Captain Cook, he forged through his wall of

ice to encounter the formidable ice walls of Lhotse and Chomolungma. Tom Stobart, the 1953 Everest film-man, writes in his autobiography: "Every mountaineer knows that a mountain is made up of a lot of detail and each one must be overcome separately."[53]

These intricate landscapes, like Dimitris Pikionis's Route up Philopappou Hill at Athens, do not have the pretension of the nomenclatures of Philosophy and Science.[54] But are such detailed histories to be excluded from History? And are their details different in kind from those declared as the universal narrative? Is not the detailed nomenclature of Science as crazed as that of Anzac Cove? And what if the Goddess Hine-nui-te-po should turn in her sleep?

The fields of Flanders, once like the Prince of Wales's wild-flower, red-poppied meadows, and latterly becoming the horror vacuii of sludge - human, animal, and mineral - with a middle life of rut and ridge, are, with the North African battlefields, depicted on the flanks of the War Memorial Museum at Auckland.[55] In this architectural guise, as a frieze of carved stone panels and inscriptions, similar in arrangement to the Ananda Temple, they evoke the distant calm prospect of a landscape of madness transcended; as if a way has been found through the details. Yet what spring dolls lie concealed under this ash-heap of Portland limestone to set in motion again a frenzy of renewed detail and madness, and desperate digging of trenches?

1 Wilhelm Klein gives a short account, based on the *Glass Palace Chronicle*, of Kyanzittha's request for a replica of the legendary Nandamula Himalayan cave temple to be built at Pagan, in the *Insight Guide Burma* (Hong Kong: Apa Productions, 1984), p. 218.
2 Badminton, a game with nets and shuttlecocks, was supposedly first played in the hall of the Duke of Beaufort's country seat of Badminton, in 1863. The Somerset family and their estate are particularly associated with fox hunting, and also a summer drink - a mixture of claret, soda, and sugar. The significance of the connection of sugar will be appreciated below. See Gervase Jackson - Stops, "Badminton, Gloucestershire - I, The Seat of the Duke of Beaufort" in *Country Life*, April 9, 1987 pp. 128-133. Also Sibylla Jane Flower, *Debrett's The Stately Homes of Britain* (London: Webb and Bower Limited, and Debretts, 1982), pp. 134-144.
3 Stephanie Hollis in *Anglo Saxon Women and the Church* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1992), 'Pope Gregory's Replies to Augustine,' pp. 15-27.
4 The Villa Barbaro, Maser, Treviso, with its axis perhaps conceptually continued to the Villa Emo, Fanzolo di Vedelago, Treviso, on the plain below, are outstanding examples. Peter Lauritzen *Villas of the Veneto* (London: Pavilion Books, 1987), pp. 114-133, and Michelangelo Muraro, *Venetian Villas, The History and Culture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1986), pp. 210-255.
5 Mark Wigley, "Theoretical Slippage: The Architecture of the Fetish" in *Fetish, The Princeton Architectural Journal*, Volume 4, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992), pp. 88-129.
6 Kerry Moran and Russell Johnson, *Kailas, On Pilgrimage to the Sacred Mountain of Tibet* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1989).
7 James Ramsey Ullman, *Man of Everest, The Autobiography of Tenzing* (London: George G. Harrap, 1955), p. 269.
8 Wilfred Noyce, *South Col* (London: Heinemann and Reprint Society, 1955), p. 87 and p. 74.
9 Robin Lane Fox, *The Search for Alexander* (London: Allen Lane, 1980).
10 Graeme Dingle and Peter Hillary, *First Across the Roof of the World. The First-Ever Traverse of the Himalayas - 5,000 Kilometres from Sikkim to Pakistan* (Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1982).
11 *The Travels of Marco Polo*, trans. Ronald Latham (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), pp. 159-160.
12 HRH The Prince of Wales and Charles Clover, *Highgrove Portrait of an Estate* (London: Chapmans,1993), pp. 60-61 and p. 65.
13 Michael Hall and Ernest Frankl, *Stratford-Upon-Avon and the Cotswolds* (Newton Abbot: Pevensey Heritage Guides, 1993), p. 106.
14 Marcel Kurz (ed.), *The Mountain World 1953*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), p. 17-18.
15 Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*, Vol. 1, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. 14.
16 Richard Cavendish, *Visions of Cotswolds* (Basingstoke: The Automobile Association, 1990), pp. 8-10.
17 Clover, p. 32. The Prince of Wales is not alone in noting a connection of his Gloucestershire lifestyle with a Himalayan Territory. Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales likewise makes such a connection, but in person, and this is recorded on the cover of *Vogue* (May 1993). A four year old incarnation of the Hindu Goddess Durga is located in Nepal, writes Georgina Howell. Princess Diana visiting Nepal for five days is also said to be a living Goddess putting the British royalty in touch with reality. It is a beguiling story and the link between the two Goddesses is far fetched, but emotionally credible, (pp. 266-273, 332 and 334. Coverplate by Tim Graham/Sygma.)
18 Mian Goverdhan Singh, *Art and Architecture of Himachal Pradesh* (Dehli: B.R. Publishing Co., 1983).
19 W.G. Archer, *Indian Painting in the Punjab Hills* and *Kangra Painting* (London, 1952).
20 John Dickson, "Stone and Shakespeare's Sonnets" in *Interstices. A Journal of Architecture and Related Arts*, vol. 2, Michael Linzey and Ross Jenner (eds.), Department of Architecture, University of Auckland, Auckland, pp. 135-157, note 39, p157.
21 W.E. Begley and Z.A. Desai, *Taj Mahal The Illumined Tomb, An Anthology of Seventeenth-Century Mughal and European Documentary Sources*, The Aga Khan Programme for Islamic Architecture, Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989), p. 101.
22 John D. Hoag, *Islamic Architecture*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), Chapter XVIII 'The Architecture of the Moghul Empire,' pp. 176-188.
23 Edmund Hillary, *High Adventure* (Melbourne: Readers Book Club, 1955), p. 241.
24 Curiously, James Morris, *The Times* correspondent for the 1953 Everest British expedition, now Jan Morris, and who tended to give a masculine identity to Everest, associates the mountain with a pencil case. He writes "...the great cirque of mountains that blocked the Khumbu Valley. It was very symmetrical, this great horse-shoe of peaks, and with the glacier valley itself

running down in a wide strip to the south, the whole formation reminded me strongly of those oblong strips of wood, with rounded ends, that used to slide into the tops of children's pencil boxes." Jan Morris, *Coronation Everest*, (London: Boxtree, 1993), p. 87.

25 H.G. Wunderlich, *The Secret of Crete*, trans. Richard Winston, (London: Souvenir Press, 1975), pp. 282-283.

26 Edmund Hillary, *Nothing Venture, Nothing Win* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975), pp. 25-26.

27 Colin Thubron, *The Hills of Adonis. A Journey in Lebanon* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 15.

28 David Attenborough, *The First Eden. The Mediterranean World and Man* (London: William Collins and Sons, 1987), p. 106.

29 *Insight Guides. Turkey*, ed. Thomas Goltz (Hongkong: Apa, 1989), pp. 169-170; and *Turkey. A Phaidon Cultural Guide*, ed. Mariaane Mehling (Oxford: Phaidon, 1989), p. 181.

30 Clive Foss, *Ephesus after Antiquity: A Late Antique, Byzantine and Turkish City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. .89.

31 Godfrey Goodwin, *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press; and London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), pp. 123-131.

32 *Sir Banister Fletcher's A History of Architecture, Nineteenth Edition*, ed. John Musgrove (London: Butterworths, 1987), p. 293 and 295; and Cyril Mango, *The Art of the Byzantine Empire 312-1453, Sources and Documents* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972),''The Decoration of the Church of the Holy Apostles,' pp. 199-201.

33 Clive Foss and Paul Magdalino, *Rome and Byzantium* (Oxford: Elsevier - Phaidon, 1977), p. 76.

34 Peter Shaw and Robin Morrison, *New Zealand Architecture From Polynesian Beginnings to 1990* (Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991), p. 175.

35 John Hunt, *The Ascent of Everest* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), p. vii.

36 K. McVey, "The Domed Church as Microcosm: Literary Roots of an Architectural Symbol" in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers 37*, 1983; and Andrew Palmer and Lyn Rodley, "The Inauguration Anthem of Hagia Sophia in Edessa: A New Edition and Translation with Historical and Architectural Notes and a Comparison With a Contemporary Constantinopolitan Kontakion," in *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 12*, 1988, pp. 117-167.

37 Sir Alan Gardiner, *Egyptian Grammar, Being an Introduction to the Study of Hieroglyphs Third Edition, Revised* (Oxford: Griffith Institute Ashmolean Museum, 1982).

38 Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).

39 *Gerard Manley Hopkins*, ed. W.H. Gardner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954).

40 Aristophanes, *Peace*, trans. Alan H. Sommerstein (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985).

41 *Procopius Volume VII Buildings* (London: William Heinemann, 1971), p. 27; and G.P. Majeska, "Notes on the Archeology of St Sophia at Constantinople: The Green Marble Bands on the Floor," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, vol. 32, 1978, pp. 299-308.

42 W.G. Hoskins in *The Making of the English Landscape* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), p. 56, gives an example of such a sunken lane in East Devon.

43 J.D. Dickson, *The Mastery of Space Part 1: Space, Shape, Movement and their Social Implications*. Study Paper No. 66 (Auckland: University of Auckland, School of Architecture, 1982).

44 George Orwell, *Animal Farm. A Fairy Story* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1945/1988), p. 10.

45 Michelangelo Muraro, *Venetian Villas: The History and Culture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1986).

46 Esin Atil, *The Age of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent* (New York: National Gallery of Art, Washington, Harry N. Abrams, 1987), 'Textiles and Furnishings', pp. 207-223.

47 Norah C. Gillow, *William Morris, Designs and Patterns* (London: Bracken Books, 1988); and Peggy Vance, *William Morris Wallpapers* (London: Bracken Books, 1989).

48 Bruce Petry, *The Public Architecture of Gummer and Ford*, 2 volumes, Master Thesis, University of Auckland, 1992. The photographs cited here are unfortunately not included in the thesis.

49 Alice Bank, *Byzantine Art in the Collections of the Soviet Museums* (Leningrad: Aurora, 1985); 'Dish with the scene of Athena deciding the quarrel of Ajax and Odysseus, 6th century' plates 60 and 61.

50 Robin Evans, "Eyes It Took Time to See" in *Violence and Space, Assemblage 20*, ed. Mark Wigley (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 36-37.

51 Henry Fielding, *The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews and his friend Mr Abraham Adams* (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1910).

52 Peter Liddle, *Men of Gallipoli. The Dardanelles and Gallipoli Experience. August 1914 to January 1916* (London: Allen Lane, 1976); and Br. General C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, *History of the Great War - Military Operations Gallipoli. Volume II May 1915 to the Evacuation* (London and Nashville: The Imperial War Museum and The Battery Press, 1932).

53 Tom Stobart, *Adventurer's Eye. The Autobiography of Everest Film-man* (London: Odhams, 1958), p. 225.

54 *Demetres Pikiones, Architect 1887-1968, A Sentimental Topography*, Pamela Johnston ed. (London: Architectural Association, 1989).

55 The Sculptural frieze by Richard Gross (1882-1964) is discussed in Robin Woodward, *Public Sculptures in Auckland. 1895-1971*, 2 volumes, Thesis, University of Auckland, 1972.



. . . a log lies silent
Once a tree,
frozen, gentle, quietly sleeping,
peaceful and harmless.
A detail.
A detail of architecture?
A detail amongst the grandeur of the site,
lost, forgotten, a memory, protected.
A hidden detail (that no one sees),
undisturbed, waiting.
Waiting to be found; discovered.
. . . Architecture to be disclosed,
discussed, and realised.
. . . To look beneath the skin,
to unravel, unearth, realise,
the potential, a secret
Nature, the rhythms of time,
texture, colour, form, structure.
To witness a thousand years,
before people.
I ask is this history, is this ancient times?
. . . To reflect to stop, to rest, to pause.
I am a visitor, greetings.

The track . . . extends through the site, weaves through the bracken (natural), meets and touches the hut (architecture), and continues its "journey".

The "visitor" acts in the same way. The visitor's arrival is passive: to pass by, maybe, a place to rest, a place to pause, to catch one's breath.

Architecture (hut) is also revealed as a "moment in time"; to pause, to escape from the grandeur and shelter amongst "a minute part of the whole".

. . . this is a point, a moment, where architecture and the visitor(track), relate and meet, and share a mutual dialogue - (both are in the act of pausing). Both the visitor and hut leave the ground - to retreat.

The relationship amongst site, visitor and architecture is "understood".





REWI THOMPSON

Carter Holt Harvey Environmental Award Registered Architect First Place 1994

photography Lynn Logan









REWI THOMPSON

Wishart House Hokianga

photography Lynn Logan



fig 1 (above) Mr Charles Davy, Surveyor [23 December 1843], Taranaki Museum

GISELLE BYRNES

Between the Lines: Expressing the Particular in the Discourse of Surveying

"There is something exhilarating in daily coming on new country, and descrying new objects of interest."
(John Turnbull Thomson, Chief Surveyor of Otago, 1857)

Introduction

"The first impression of a place," wrote the surveyor Edwin Brookes of his arrival in Taranaki in 1874, "[is] generally the most lasting, and on my first glimpse of New Plymouth I formed an opinion that I never modified afterwards."[1] To the nineteenth-century European settler - or unsettler - land that lay uncultivated was unproductive. British emigrants expected that the transformation of the New Zealand landscape would 'civilise' what appeared to be a wild and unlettered land. This part of the new world was to be a 'Britain of the South''; an antipodean outpost of empire that replicated, then reproduced the values, attitudes and aspirations of the old. The task of the colonial surveyor, as Mary Louise Pratt has observed of the colonial explorer, "was to incorporate a particular reality into a series of interlocking information orders - aesthetic, geographical, mineralogical, botanical, agricultural, economic, ecological, ethnographical and so on... In scanning prospects in the spatial sense... [the explorers'] eye knows itself to be looking at the prospects in a temporal sense - as possibilities for the future, resources to be developed, landscapes to be peopled, or re-peopled by Europeans."[2] Within the matrix of colonialism, surveying was the active universalization of a habitable and productive space; in providing capitalism with new geopolitical territory, surveying was implicated in a dialectic of technological innovation and representation.[3] "It was not by discovering novelties," Paul Carter has argued, "but by ordering them, rendering them conceptually and culturally visible, that the great work of colonization went ahead. In a sense, it was the process of surveying itself that constituted the decisive discovery, rather than the fruits of exploration. It was the method of giving objects great and small a place in the world, the picturesque logic of connection and constrast, that ensured they could never be lost again or overlooked."[4]

This paper will focus on the discourse of surveying as a site where the tension between the universal and the particular was played out in a specifically colonial context. This tension was manifest in the fissure between objectivity and subjectivity; between subjective experience and the need to structure that experience in terms of absolutes, to transform it into a productive space. It is suggested here that the act of land surveying was a mimetic act which expressed both particularity and universality. Surveying was (and is) predicated on the specific and the accurate; lines, boundaries and discrete measurements dictate the need to quantify, categorise and control. As Brad Patterson has recently argued, "'spatial goals'... translated into landscape form, constitute the cutting edge at which actual cadastral engraving commences, for it is at this point that the precise layouts of farm boundaries, paddocks, fences, roads, villages and townships are determined."[5] Surveying the land, however, involved more than attention to detail in effecting a physical transformation of cultural space. The inscription and description of landscape also demanded participation in universalising conventions; reading the land invoked conventions of the panoptic and the picturesque, while the strategies of naming and mapping were employed in writing the land. Moreover, it is suggested here that these tensions were embodied in the generic persona of the surveyor, whose subjectivity was a site of constant negotiation between particularity and the universal conventions which gave such detail meaning. (fig 1)

1. Universalising Colonial Space

As a master narrative of crisis, postcolonial discourse itself has a propensity to universalize; to subsume difference rather than celebrate it, tending toward a transcendent theorizer which is assumed to be outside time, space and power relations. It has also been questioned why the homogenization of postmodern de-centring theories should emerge at a time when various minortity groups are asserting their claims to political and cultural identity.[6] Critical enquiry, as a latter-day visitation to the past, often risks re-inscribing the very colonial discourses it seeks to deconstruct. As the objects of the historian's enquiry, colonial texts are again privileged; they are once more accorded the space (and the audience) they sought in their initial production. Colonial discourse analysis then, "walks a thin line between the reconfirmation of and the flight from the known," and the study of colonial discourse has largely been a study of this tension.[7] The problem facing critics, as Robert Young points out, is "whether... to locate evidence of historical examples of resistance, as is often assumed, or whether the analysis of colonial discourse can itself make political interventions in terms of current understanding and analysis."[8] An analysis of colonial discourses must, therefore, address the strategies and tactics by which these discourses claimed, and were accorded legitimacy at a specific moment; but must seek to do so without repeating those same moments.

As an alternative critical strategy, the 'place' or 'text' may be defined as both a product of the expectations previously held by the observer - the travellers' interpretation or appreciation of place was often what they expected to find - and of the dialogue between coloniser and colonised. This kind of methodology replaces the apparant uniformity of colonialism with the recognition of a diversity of discourses, where the distribution of power is more interactive than passive. The surveyor's response to the 'new' environment was then, fashioned as much by his interaction with local Maori as it was determined by his own cultural pre-conditioning. This is not dissimilar to Bernard Smith's argument where [in imagining the Pacific], "Europeans imagined from a reality that they had to come to terms with, not a fancy or a fantasy that might eventually disappear."[9] As Carter has also proposed, the place did not precede the traveller; it was the offspring of his intention.(Carter, p. 349) These introductory comments are significant here because the shortcomings of the discursive system they describe are evident in surveying narratives and the accompanying maps; texts which appear to be homogenous controlling devices, but are themselves split both between and within differential discourses.

"The particular," Theodor Adorno argued in *Negative Dialectics*, "would not be definable without the universal that identifies it, according to current logic; but neither is it identical to the universal."[10] Particularity and universality, while different, are interdependent. Adorno, however, maintained that "[t]he concept of the particular is always its negation at the same time; it cuts short what the particular is and what nonetheless cannot be directly named, and it replaces this with identity. This negative, wrong, and yet simultaneously necessary moment is the stage of dialectics."(Adorno, p. 173) Hegel made it clear that the negation of space was to be found in the point; that the difference of space is "the *negation* of space itself, because this is immediate *differenceless* self-externality, the *point*."[11] As Derrida has argued, the Western philosophical tradition rests on hierarchical binary oppositions which include unity / diversity, identity / difference and universality / specificity. These terms are interdependent, with the primacy of the first derivative from the second.[12] Or, as Elizabeth Gross has argued, "the primary or dominant term derives its privilege from a curtailment or suppression of its opposite."[13] This is not dissimilar to the French critic Lucien Goldmann's use of the term 'totality'; "the idea that the phenomenon can be comprehended only by first inserting it on the broader structure of which it is a part and in which it has a function."[14] Space thus accomodates a constant dialectic between the universal and the particular, and this particularity is dependent on exposing internal conflicts, contradictory logic, or totalization that requires supplemention.

Surveying is a spatial activity: spatiality is a concept which allows subjectivity to be understood as as a social representation. For the historian Michel de Certeau, "space is a practiced place"[15]; while, for Foucault, "space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any form of power."[16] The space of the colony, with its semblance of homogeneity, included a multiplicity of fragmented spaces. "Colonial space," as J. K. Noyes has recently argued,

"is not a universal space, but a space which has been produced. As such, it can be grasped as a historically specific organization of multiplicities into an apparent unity. The capitalist production of space relies upon the conjunction and collation of various diverse spaces... In short, capitalism not only produces a space in which it may perpetuate itself, but one in which subjectivity has meaning."(Noyes, p. 98) Deleuze and Guattari have also exposed how, within the capitalist system, colonization continually produces spaces, creating space out of a multiplicity of abstract qualities.[17] The codification of colonial space also universalised that space; while facilitating movement through the coordination and control of activities, it simultaneously removed the particular meaning of space and time from much of ordinary experience.

Surveyors often searched for boundless and empty spaces. The Nelson surveyors Thomas Brunner and Samuel Stephens had both looked for the 'great plains' of the southern west coast on separate occasions.[18] Cass, Torlesse and later Baker were among those who sought the plains of promise in Canterbury. Empty space is an already inscribed space, where paradoxically, "the things to be contained are not present."(Sack, p. 33) The attempt to visualise space in the absence of boundaries is also a fundamental component of colonizing vision. As Homi Bhabha has argued, "at the center of the originary myth of colonialist power... is the demand that the space it occupies be unbounded, its reality coincident with the emergence of an imperialist narrative and history, its discoures nondialogic, its enunciation unitary, unmarked by the trace of difference.[19] When the space of the Other is generalised and universalised, it begins to lose meaning.

Within this colonial and mimetic space, however, slippages occured. These slippages between the ideal and the real find a parallel in the ambivalent identity of the colonial, which, as Homi Bhabha has suggested, is characteristic of colonial discourse in general.[20] The intended plans for survey often could not be simply translated from script to soil. Indeed, the implementation of the plan was exercised tactically, surveyors frequently having to negotiate with an unsympathetic landscape and less than co-operative Maori. Maori opposition to surveying and surveyors was not uncommon. As early as July 1843, the Resident Agent in New Plymouth, Wicksteed, wrote to Colonel Wakefield:

> I have had some trouble with Maori ... at the Waitara. A number of men belonging to Kapiti appeared lately among the Waitara people, and in conjunction with a chief, who lives some miles up the river, stopped a party of surveying men who were cutting a line preparatory to making a road. They were not armed and used no violence, but sat down in the road to the number of about 188, including men women and children, and quietly declared that they would not allow the white men to occupy any land at the Waitara. When the assistant surveyor and some of the white settlers attempted to reason with them they said "You are all Wicksteed's slaves, and we will not listen to you." As soon as I heard of this occurrence I withdrew all the Company's men from the Waitara, wishing at present to avoid collision with the natives.[21]

Under the instructions of Wi Kingi te Rangitake women had pulled up the survey pegs at Waitara in February 1860, and on the surveys south of the Waingongoro river in 1866-67.[22] Edwin Brookes wrote of Te Whiti "forcibly turning off the ground the staff of surveyors then engaged upon the this work and carting all their equipment off the plains."(Brookes, p. 37) In Taranaki, the surveyor W. H. Skinner "... did about 2 1/2 miles when to my surprise I found the pegs had been pulled out by the Hauhaus and I was obliged to search for the places again in order to continue my levelling, which impeded us very much & I was unable to complete my work this evening."[23] While laying out military settlements in Taranaki in 1865-66, Percy Smith often had to work under the protection of covering parties.[24] (fig 2)

2. The Colonial Surveyor and Personal Particularity

The task of the nineteenth-century surveyor was to define spaces of objectivity and subjectivity; to negotiate the specific and the general in the fragmented and hierarchically organized space within which he moved. If, as Hegel suggested, the negation of space is to be found in the point, then the subjectivity of the surveyor was located at this site. As Noyes suggests, the narrative of the traveller is the site of this tension: "[t]his is because the conflicting tendency of subjective



fig 2 (top) Francis Edward Nairn, Mr Mantell at Moeraki [1848], E333/84, Alexander Turnbull Library
fig 3 (bottom) Stephenson Percy Smith, FB37, Department of Survey and Land Information, Hamilton. This sketch from Smith's field book clearly illustrates how triangles informed the surveyor's vision of the land.

experience toward self-fulfillment in looking on the one hand, and self-preservation in writing on the other hand is also a conflict between the need to structure ambient space in absolute terms, as homogeneous and borderless, and to render it knowable through the production of discrete spaces within well defined boundaries."(Noyes, p. 166)

It is suggested here that the surveyor - to universalise the persona - read the land and formulated the landscape, from an in-between place. This space between may be seen as a mimetic one, which Michael Taussig has recently argued for as "a space permeated by the colonial tension of mimesis and alterity, in which it is far from easy to say who is the imitator and who is the imitated, which is copy and which is original."[25] This was a contestatory site that demanded constant negotiation and compromise, and was, in Michel de Certeau's terms, a 'tactical' terrain. de Certeau defines a 'strategy' as "the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an 'environment'... . It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exterior... can be managed."(de Certeau, pp. 36-7). On the other hand, a 'tactic' is, for de Certeau, "a calculus which cannot count on a 'proper' (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a border-line distinguishing the other as a visible totality ... [it is] a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus... it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organised by the law of a foreign power."(de Certeau, p. 37) This was a fluid space which shifted according to discursive context and content. Surveyors were travellers who brought their cultural baggage to bear on the environment they encountered. Their expectations in tact, they saw what they wanted to see in the new place. But their reading of it was modified by what they did not expect to find; a place and a people that were both exotic and familiar. The need to universalise was therefore predicated on the need to control. (fig 3)

Surveyors had an eye for the particular and often engaged in a fascination with detail. While surveying the Nelson hinterland, the surveyor Samuel Stephens paused to notice:

> In the open parts of the country we had passed through, the ground was covered with a shrub, which I believe I have before described and called the satin plant, from the resemblance the under part of the leaf, when the skin or epidermis is removed from it, bears to that substance. Its colour is a very delicate straw or lemon colour, and from its being very elastic, properly speaking it may be said to resemble soft kid leather in its texture. I have little doubt ultimately, this substance may be applied to some profitable purpose in manufactures. The plant bears a very handsome blossom about the size of a crown piece, of a white colour with a yellow eye, something like the chrysanthiumum in form. The rain abating a little towards the evening, I sallied forth to take a view of the lake and surrounding country, which, although viewing it under very disadvantageous circumstances, was exceedingly interesting and beautiful. (Stephens, MS Papers 2698-1A)

Despite such frequent diversions, the surveyor had to conform to convention and the master narrative of the discourse, when confronted with the task of submitting a report or furnishing a map and translating his work into a medium for further dissemination. There was a constant tension between the joy of looking for its own sake, and the need to commit this gaze to print. This was, however, a productive tension. As the critic Edward Said has noted, "knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is a 'fact' which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it."[26] Indeed, the eye acts as an instrument of mediation between the universal and the particular. But the eye does not merely gather information; it processes it to be subsumed within a larger epistemological scheme. Said explores the primacy of individual agency in his work *Orientalism* (1978), where he proposes close textual readings "to reveal the dialectic between individual text or writer and the complex collective formation to which his [sic] work is a contribution."(Said, p. 24) However, Said's opposition of particular and universal, individual consciousness versus totalization, and the unresolved contradiction in his critique of historicism and the political effects of its Eurocentric universalism, is, as Young suggests, "where the rejection of totalizing systems for particularism appeared to risk substituting a total fragmentation for total synthesis."(Young, p. 135)

To universalise then, is to raise to a level of abstration where difference is negated and where power is exercised strategically. Conversely, to particularise is to recognise difference, and so to negotiate power in a tactical mode. Universalising employed the use of stereotype and category; to recognise the particular is to render the object visible. Moreover, in the transition from general to specific (and universal to particular) there occurs a shift in power. For example, when the surveyor Thomas Brunner ceases to see his Maori guide as a generic "native attendant" and comes to appreciate Kehu as an individual, the power relationship between the two alters; Brunner can only navigate a route down the West Coast of the South Island with Kehu's assistance and constant negotiation.[27]

The colonial surveyor's image of the landscape was determined as much by the universal (capitalist) demand for land as it was controlled by the sights of his particular 'cultural theodolite.' The surveyor saw his task as preparing the path for orderly colonization. He was the means of transforming the dynamic space of travelling into the fixed and passive space of settlement, viewing the country he passed through as if with the eyes of the future.(Carter, p. 20) Bernard Smith has already shown how Europeans in a 'new land' imposed their cultural expectations on the environment, and remodelled the landscape accordingly.[28] Surveyors were instructed "to locate objects of cultural signficance: rivers, mountains, meadows, plains of promise... They were expected to arrest the country, to concentrate it into reversible roads which would summarize its content; they were expected to translate its extension into objects of commerce."(Carter, p. 56) "There is no doubt," wrote Felton Mathew to Hobson of his exploration of the Waikato region in the 1840s, [that] "it must become the great granary of the colony."[29] In 1841 the chief sureyor of the New Plymouth settlement, F. A. Carrington described New Zealand as "the Great Granary from its possessing such an immense extent of Land fit for Agriculture..."[30] "The valleys are particularly rich," wrote the Taranaki surveyor Thomas Kingwell Skinner in 1872, "and this is the best land you can find."(Skinner, p. 29)

Although their allegiance to the universal agenda of the colonial project cannot be underestimated, colonial surveyors were also inspired by the particulars of personal motivation. The desire to join the vanguard of exploratory expeditions into the new wilderness was a temptation few adventurous young colonists could resist. In his field book, the surveyor Charles Douglas wrote of:

> the impulse which drove the bravest and best of Old Rome to face death and danger on the banks of the Danube or the Sandy Desart [sic] of Afraca [sic] and Asia impells the Briton to do likewise and plant his flag all over the World indifferent as to whether the danger to be faced is from prowling Savage, Feversmitten Jungles or Artic Snows... The impulse drove me out into the World, but the desire to then settle must have been omitted in my moral character, as here I am crouched under a few yards of calico with the rain pouring and the wind and the Thunder crashing down the Gorges of the mountains, a homeless, friendless Vagabond, with a past that has little to show of work done, and a future equally dreary, still I have never regretted adopting the life I am leading and can see that even if I and thousands more besides me fail in the life they are leading and die miserably the impulse which impells them to the search for knowledge about the unknown is for the benefit of mankind, and cheaply bought at any price.[31]

Douglas' admission further illustrates how personality was itself a particular constructed in the process of travelling. As Paul Carter has observed, "the personality of travellers is not something there from the beginning, a quotient of inheritance and environment: it is an identity consciously constructed through travelling (Carter, p. 100). In *The Road to Botany Bay*, Carter argues that the diary was an intentional, self-referential and active transformation of space, in that the diarist used language to create both the space and the occasion in which to write.[32]

3. Reading Particulars

Reading, as the act of viewing with a conditioned eye, was central to the creation of colonial space, for reading articulated the unknown in terms of the known, and incorporated the

preconceived spatial goals of transformation into the particular and immediate line of vision. Visual impressions played a primary role in the aquisition and management of colonial space "It is remarkable," wrote the Taranaki surveyor Edwin Brookes in the 1870s, "how attached a surveyor becomes to his theodolite. So it was with myself. My little star gazer, as I used to call it, went through the whole campaign with me. So jealous was I of it that it was never entrusted to other hands but once."(Brookes, p. 2) Reading integrated the viewer into the scene, willed him/her into the frame, to occupy and become a part of the space, fixing it in time and place. The nineteenth-century observer, like the twentieth-century historian, re-invented this space *every time it was observed*. Fixed in texts, captured on the page, map or canvas, landscape, like history, was and is created at specific moments.

Surveyors read landscape with reference to the panoptic and the picturesque. The panoptic was both particular and universal; both subjective and conventional. Constructed from the first person, the 'I'/eye, the panoptic perspective was, as Pratt has suggested, "unheroic, unparticularized, without ego, interest, or desire of its own... able to do nothing but gaze from a periphery of its own creation, like the self-effaced, non-interventionist eye that scans the Other's body."(Pratt, p. 143) The panoptic, as universal, positions the viewer in the centre of the world. de Certeau refers to the "division of space [which] makes possible a panoptic practice proceeding from a place whence the eye can transform foreign forces into objects that can be observed and measured, and thus control and 'include' them within its scope of vision;" while the elevated vantage point, "[allowed one] to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god."(de Certeau, p. 36 and p. 94) The panoptic perspective was an established motif in surveying discourse. In his *Outlines of a System of Surveying, for Geographical and Military Purposes* (1827), Sir Thomas Mitchell, as Surveyor-General of New South Wales, wrote that "the consequent necessity [of] clearing summit stations for the theodolites, were great impediments; but I made the most of each station when it had been cleared, by taking an exact panoramic view with the theodolite of the nameless features it commanded."[33]

But the panoptic was also a personal - subjective - particular. At Ahuriri in 1852, the surveyor John Rochfort noted: "This is a fine plain, and standing in the centre you see a clear horizon all round, such as you would at sea.".[34] In March 1861, while exploring the grazing prospects of the Mackenzie Plains, John Baker finally reached Lake Pukaki: "Here," Baker confided to his diary, "I obtained my first view of the magnificent Mt. Cook range of the Southern Alps, with Mount Cook itself in the centre dominating over the surrounding snow giants."[35] The panorama was often the reward for physical perseverance; it was the aesthetic satisfaction obtained from an ascent to a panoptic view; the mind satisfied the body as place became picture. "How often have I sat," wrote Samuel Butler of Canterbury in 1872, "on the mountain-side and watched the waving downs, with the two white specks of huts in the distance, and the little square of garden behind them; the paddock with a patch of bright green oats above the huts, and the yards and wool-sheds down on the flat below; all seen as through the wrong end of a telescope, so clear and brilliant was the air, or as upon a colossal model or map spread out beneath me."[36]

Similarly, the picturesque was a universalising convention, but one constructed from the perspective of personal subjectivity. In the latter years of the eighteenth century, landscape and natural scenery had come to be judged with increasing reference to picturesque standards (Smith, p. 149). In 1794 Uvedale Price defined the picturesque as an aesthetic category, distinct from the sublime and the beautiful, marked by roughess, variation and irregularity; Payne Knight, however, in his *Analytical Enquiry into the Principles of Taste* (1805), claimed it to be nothing less then "the true visible appearance of things."(Smith, p. 150) Price's definition became the accepted version, and the term was soon expanded to include the exotic, as indigenous flora and fauna were ascribed various picturesque qualities (Smith, p. 150). The link between scientific representation and art had been made by Cook. "The Admiralty," he wrote, "shewed no less attention to science in general, by engaging Mr William Hodges, a Landscape Painter, to embark in this voyage, in order to make drawings and paintings of such places in the countries we should touch at, as might be proper to give a more perfect idea thereof, than could be formed from written description only."[37] Surveyors aimed to provide 'a more perfect idea' of the terrain they encountered, but their pictoral representations were informed by the artistic fashions of the day as much as they were by attempts

at accuracy. The picturesque, then, universalised the particular: "[the picturesque] allowed not only the contraction of future time but also... the bringing near of distant objects, the magnification of the minute, the God-like survey of the great. The picturesque assembled time and space, presenting society as a community of objects."(Carter, p. 244)

While surveying in Taranaki, the surveyor Edwin Brookes paused to observe a picturesque scene:

> Mount Egmont... an enchanting study for an artist, and may be considered as one of the chief sights of Taranaki... Another striking scene is when it is covered low down with snow, the reflection of the sun's rays upon it, mostly toward sunset, change the usual dazzling whiteness to one of the richest tints of light pink, a scene at once so striking that one is chained to the spot as by a magician's wand. This reflection seldom occurs, and even when seen it would be difficult for an artist to imitate either in oil or water-colours, as at best it would be far from the reality... (Brookes, pp. 57-60)

The picturesque was also a personal moment of reflection, a punctuation in the mode of travel. Picturesqueness was a spatial figure of speech which lent itself to description. The picturesque also enabled the eye to explore: "[p]icturesque prospects were one that allowed the eye to wander from object to object: they had their mental counterparts in complex ideas that sparked off trains of thought. Picturesque views might give rise to all kinds of pleasant ideas, but the primary pleasure they gave resided in their picturesqueness itself - in the fact that their structure of casually interlinked and constrasting forms enticed the eye (and the mind) to wander. They were places where the lie of the imagination was made visible."(Carter, pp. 231-240) On commencing a survey of the inland Nelson region, Samuel Stephens wrote "Before leaving I took another hasty view of the lake and adjoining scenery, and also a rough sketch of its now really picturesque character. The view was completely alpine - the back mountain ranges being all completely cased in one continuous sheet of white, the trees and shrubs in the fore ground on the borders of the lake having their boughs incrusted by the snowy mosses and reflecting their graceful images in the still and glassy lake, really formed a most beautiful and striking picture, which was still more enhanced by its novelty, as we had met with no snow since we left England - excepting at a great distance. The scene was rendered still more peculiar, from the intense stillness, and absence of all appearance of animated nature - no sign of waterfowl floating on the lake, or note from the feathered inhabitants of the wood. The sun shining out in full splendour shortly afterwards, added a richness to the wintry picture."(Stephens, Journal, p. 16)

4. Writing Particulars

In the writing of landscape, naming and mapping were strategies of the survey that were universalising conventions dependent on particularity. In the European colonisation of New Zealand, naming the land was an attempt to legitimise ownership and the authority of the society that produced those names. The inscription of colonial space is most obvious where 'little Englands' have been replicated on New Zealand soil. The name 'New Plymouth' is a case in point. As if the language itself could impart something of the old world onto the 'new,' British place names were transported wholesale to the colony; for instance, see Stratford, Inglewood, Carlyle, Raleigh, Eltham, Midhurst and Egmont in Taranaki alone. The map of New Zealand also reads like an inventory of British history; Wellington, Auckland, Nelson, Hastings are a few such examples. Indeed, European New Zealanders seem to have defined their environment in terms of legends of arrival, conquest and permanence. For the early European colonists, place names were the most tangible (and perhaps easily transportable) memoir of 'Home' that they could transplant in the colony. In contrast to the colonial society which is created, England and English society simply *is*. Indeed, as Ross Gibson suggests, "English society... appears to have grown out of the soil rather than planted itself there... East Anglia is not just arable land: it is also Constable country... Cornwall connotes Celtic prehistory... Hampshire evokes maritime myth and history; the Midlands are about industrialization and transport: and so on in a national semiosis that is limitied only littorally."[38]

The process of selecting names exhibited a further tension between generic naming and descriptive or particularised nomenclature. As Carter has shown, in Australia '"Cook's names were

neither meaningless nor arbitrary: they did have a genealogy, but it was a genealogy of particulars, a horizontal disposition to mark things were they occured locally, rather than to organize them hierarchically or thematically."(Carter, p. 8) This stood in contrast to Banks' systematic Linnaean naming, which was based on a epistemology at once universalised and removed from the immediate object (Carter, pp. 20-21). New Zealand place names exhibit a similar tension. In New Zealand, urban topography and street names tended to memorialise founding figures. New Plymouth for instance, has street names which read like the minutes of a meeting of the New Zealand and Plymouth Companies. Geographical features were largely descriptive or commemorative. On his survey of the lake district of Otago in 1861-2, James McKerrow named Fog Peak, Black Peak, Smooth Peak and Treble Cone on a descriptive basis; the Humboldt Range, Mt Edward, Mt Tyndall and Mt Austed paid homage to eminent European scientists; Mt Walter, Mt Cecil and the Thomson Mountains memorialised local dignatories; while the mountains Ben Nevis, Ben More and Ben Lomond signalled McKerrow's own remembrance of his Scottish home.[39] The combination of names, drawn both from the metropolitan and local cultures, reflects the ambivalent identity of the colonial, caught between two worlds.[40]

In much the same way, mapping the landscape was a universalising strategy of surveying which relied on the production of particulars. "Individual experience becomes meaningful in colonization only where it can be incorporated into a written system of territories."[41] Surveyors participated in cartographic discourse through the medium of the map. "To lay down a useful map," Fitzroy and Raper had considered in the *Royal Geographical Journal*, "is an easier task than usually supposed, if correct principles be adopted and carefully followed in practice. A field-book... should always be at hand, in which every particular relating to the direction travelled... the distances, times, angles, bearings, and observations, should be noted on the spot and as they occur..."[42] Indeed, mapping determines the way landscape has been conceived; quite literally, the land may be seen as an 'unfolded map.'[43] Like tables and diagrams maps are also taxonomic ways of ordering categories of contrast and opposition: source vs. variant, center vs. periphery, pure vs. mixed variant, displaying criteria of quality vs. those of quantity.[44]

Surveyors had to operate tactically and with particularity; they had to function with short-term manoeuvres. They utilised Maori geographical information as and when they required it, and assumed a tactic mobility which enabled them to "accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer[ed] themselves at any given moment."(de Certeau, p. 37) In doing this, the surveyor entered the space of the Other, and the distribution of power became more tentative and fluid. The implications of this are significant, for it means that the surveyor, as coloniser, was not simply exercising by a one-way distribution of power, but had to constantly negotiate and compromise power relations in transit.

European explorers and surveyors in New Zealand were reliant upon Maori guides for their particular geographical knowledge and their ability to construct 'mental maps,' often transcribed on non-permanent media for the instruction of other Maoris. Between 1769 and 1859 such maps were constructed by Maori for European explorers from Cook, Colenso and Nicholas, through to Mantell, Thomson, Hochstetter and von Haast. Carter has noted how in Australia the European was more often led than he was the leader (Carter, p. 340). Yet for their reliance on native navigation, they often attempted to erase this dependence, or at least their acknowlegement of it, and so tansformed the knowledge of the native guide into a universalized form of knowledge. As Barbara Belyea has commented of European explorers in North America: "the explorers wanted this knowledge not as it came structured in Amerindian ways of seeing and experiencing, but broken down into data which they could fit into their own geographical scheme."[45] Belyea goes on to argue that "the work of cartographic historians repeats in significant ways that of the surveyor-explorers... Although they claim to recognize that Amerindian cartographic conventions are valid and separate, their definition of 'map' remains culture-specific, Eurocentric. The standards by which they judge Amerindian maps are not universal and essential, but - inevitably - conventional and particular (Belyea, p. 275). Alternatively, as Deleuze and Guattari have suggested, this kind of nomandic knowledge is also representative of an alternative kind of power to the centralised imperialist discourses of the West.[46]

Conclusion

In constructing colonial space and creating a new cultural landscape, colonial surveyors were constantly mediating between particularity and the need to express this detail in a universalized context. It has been suggested here that the task of the surveyor was to negotiate subjective experience and then structure this experience in terms of absolutes, to provide it with productive meaning. In nineteenth-century New Zealand, the act of surveying - as a discourse of settlement and dispossession, of reading and writing landscape - was the product of this tension. As a discourse ostensibly predicated on universals, colonial surveying was as much dependent on particularity; indeed, as Emerson once remarked, "the Universal does not attract us until housed as an individual."

1 Edwin Stanley Brookes, *Frontier Life: Taranaki, New Zealand* (Auckland, 1892), p. 5.
2 Mary Louise Pratt, "Scratches on the Face of the Country: or, What Mr Barrow Saw in the Land of the Bushmen," in *"Race," Writing and Difference*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jnr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.125.
3 Robert Sack, *Human Territoriality its Theory and History* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 87.
4 Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History* (London: Faber 1987), p.128.
5 Brad Patterson, *Reading Between the Lines*, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Geography (Victoria University: Wellington, 1984), pp. 4-5.
6 Sneja Gunew, "Postmodern Tensions: Reading for (Multi)Cultural Difference," *Meanjin* 49, 1 (1990): 22.
7 J. K. Noyes, *Colonial Space: Spatiality in the Discourse of German South West Africa 1884-1914* (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood, 1992), p. 285. It can be argued that not to attend to the deconstruction of colonial discourses is to accord them the legitimacy sought in their initial production.
8 Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (New York, 1990), p.145.
9 Bernard Smith, *Imagining the Pacific In the Wake of the Cook Voyages* (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1992), p. ix.
10 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), p.173.
11 A. V. Miller, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 28-29.
12 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
13 Elizabeth Gross, "Derrida, Irigaray, and Deconstruction," *Left-Right, Intervention*, 20 (1986): 73. See Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); and John M. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
14 Lucien Goldmann, *Cultural Creation in Modern Society*, trans. Bart Grahl (St. Louis: Telos, 1976), p.112. For further discussion see Norman Simms, *The Humming Tree: A Study in the History of Mentalities* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), pp..59-87.
15 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.117.
16 Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge and Power," *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. .252. See also Michel Foucault, "Questions of Geography," *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester, 1980); Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', *Diacritics* 16 (1986).
17 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Land (New York: Viking, 1975), p. 287.
18 See John Pascoe (ed.), *The Great Journey: An Expedition to Explore the Interior of the Middle Island, New Zealand, 1846-8* (Christchurch, 1952); see also Thomas Brunner, *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* (1850), Vol XX: 344-378: Samuel Stephens, Journal, MS Papers 2698-1A, Alexander Turnbull Library.
19 Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken as Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817," in *"Race," Writing and Difference*, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jnr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 176.
20 Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse', *October 28*, Spring 1984: 125-131.
21 Resident Agent, New Plymouth to Colonel Wakefield, 31 July 1843, cited in B. Wells, *The History of Taranaki* (New Plymouth, 1878), p. 97.
22 J. Rutherford, *Sir George Grey K. C. B., 1812-1898: A Study in Colonial Government* (London, 1961), p. 449 and 551.
23 W. H. Skinner,"Diary, " MS020/1, Taranaki Museum. See also Skinner's comments on "Native Unrest in Central Taranaki" in *Reminisences of a Taranaki Surveyor* (New Plymouth, 1946), pp. 48-49.
24 S. P. Smith, *Reminiscences*, TS, Auckland Institute and Museum, p. 42.
25 Taussig further suggests that "mimesis as fact and epistemic moment can be understood as redolent with the trace of that *space between*, a colonial space par excellence, a windswept Fuegian space where mankind bottoms out into fairy-tale metamorphoses with children and animals, so mimesis becomes an enactment not merely *of* an original but *by* an 'original'." Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 78-9. See also Norman Simms, *Points of Contact: A Study of the Interplay and Intersection of Traditional and Non-Traditional Literatures, Cultures, and Mentalities* (New York, 1991).
26 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge, 1978), p.32.
27 John Pascoe (ed.), *The Great Journey* and Thomas Brunner, *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* vol. XX(1850): 344-378.
28 Bernard Smith, *European Vision and the South Pacific*, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Harper and Row, 1985).
29 Felton Mathew, NZ Mss 78-79, Papers 1846-48, Auckland Public Library.
30 F. A. Carrington to the Secretary of the New Zealand Company, 22 September 1841, MS00/1 A96, Taranaki Museum.
31 Charles Douglas, Diary, MS Papers 0090:1, ATL, ts, p.4.
32 For further discussion of Carter's argument see Andrew Hassam, "'As I Write': Narrative Occasions and the Quest for Self-Presence in the Travel Diary," *ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature*, 21, 4, October 1990: 33-47.

[33] Sir Thomas L. Mitchell, *Three Expeditions into the Interior of Eastern Australia,* (London, 1838-39) II, pp. .318-19, cited in Smith, *European Vision,* p. 214.
[34] John Rochfort, *Adventures of a Surveyor in New Zealand* (London, 1853), p. 30.
[35] J. H. Baker, Diary 1857-97, 5 vols, Ms, ATL.
[36] Samuel Butler, *Erewhon; or, Over the Range* (Golden Press: Auckland, 1973), p. 20.
[37] J. Cook, *A Voyage towards the South Pole, and Round the World* (London, 1777) 2 vols, i, p.xxxiii, cited in Smith, *European Vision,* p.43.
[38] Ross Gibson, *South of the West: Postcolonisalism and the Narrative Construction of Australia* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1992), p. 65-66.
[39] The streets Vivian, St Aubyn, Hine, Buller, Devon, Leach, Lemon, Pendarves, Gilbert, Eliot and Cutfield Road memorialise the Directors of the Plymouth Company; Young Street, Currie Street, Wakefield Street, Fillis Street, Molesworth Street, Courtnay Street and Woollcombe Terrace the Directors of the New Zealand Company; Queen, Bell and Hobson streets honour public figures; Standish, Barrett and King streets salute those of local repute; and Liardet Street, Octavius Place and, of course, Carrington Road, the surveyors. Murray Moorhead, *Tales of Old North Taranaki* (New Plymouth, 1991).
[40] Sir Thomas MacKenzie, MS Papers 3922-1, ATL.
[41] See Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," pp. 125-131.
[42] Noyes, *Colonial Space,* p. 87. Or, as Deleuze and Guattari have suggested, as soon as [individual experience] is inserted into a system of writing, any unmediated visibility of the world is subsumed in a 'kind of blindness.' Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* p. 205.
[43] H. Raper and R. Fitzroy, *Royal Geographical Journal,* vol 24.
[44] Elizabeth Ferrier, "Mapping Power and Contemporary Cultural Theory," *antithesis,* 4,1, (1990): 41.
[45] Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 55.
[46] See P. L. Barton, "Maori Geographical Knowledge and Mapping: A Synopsis," *Turnbull Library Record,* 13, 1, May 1980: 5-25.
[47] Barbara Belyea, 'Amerindian Maps: The Explorer as Translator', *Journal of Historical Geography,* 18, 3 (1992): 267-277.
[48] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Nomadology The War Machine* , trans. Brian Massumi (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986).

KEITH EVAN GREEN

Student Design Work

Citadel - A Precise Anomaly



Conceived by the studio, an architectural advertisement for public display and reaction.

Over a five week term, students were asked to design an alternative to Auckland's *Visitor Information Centre* on its current downtown site adjacent to Auckland Town Hall on Aotea Square.

> *What is a "visitor's center "? What is "Auckland"? How can a building help to define a place ? How can one account for the vital transformations in the other ?*

At the outset of the Italian Renaissance, Leon Battista Alberti encountered similar complications when describing the citadel. He explained that while the citadel was initially "a place of piety and religion," it soon became "one of cruelty and excess." For Alberti, the citadel was an anomaly, a place which was "neither inside nor outside the town" - one defined alternatively as a "pinnacle of the whole world or lock of the city." "In short," he wrote, "a citadel should be conceived and built like a small town." Following from the complications presented by Alberti's suggestion, members of the studio were asked to reflect upon the *situation* of both "Auckland" and it's "Visitor's Centre".

For this studio, I proposed a particular "tactic" which might serve as an economical vehicle for pondering the particulars of the architectural situation, to discourage the abstruse and long-winded diatribes sometimes invented or appropriated, without discrimination, by students of architecture. Members of the studio were thus asked to conceive their "visitors center" and "citadel" following from an *oxymoron*, a written figure consisting of just two words set in a tense relationship which might represent their unique vision of the city of Auckland.

In this way, "Auckland" and "Visitor's Centre" were defined in the projects shown here as a "fragmented collective" and a "responsible deception". While arriving at their figurative representations of the City, students wondered whether "Auckland" might be mythical or real, whether "Auckland" is a past, present and/or future, and how "Auckland" might feel, taste, and smell.

At the outset of the studio, each member of the studio conceived his or her own oxymoron and presented this along with five graphic images that demonstrated it. Thereafter, members of the studio worked to develop a precise, *anomalous* architecture following from their oxymoronic conception of "Auckland" and "Visitor's Centre". The discovery of this *anomalous* citadel was represented with the *utmost precision* in drawings.









RESPONSIBLE DECEPTION
Nick Melrose, Fifth Year Student

The Visitor's Centre can never fully define the vitality of Auckland as a systematic, static phenomenon. At best, the Centre acknowledges this difficulty and proposes to *responsibly deceive* the visitor. As in the city itself, the visitor to the Centre is required to navigate his or her way through an ever-changing landscape of images, offered as electronic information by instruments which themselves define the interior space of this public place.

While the historical centers of Europe might be described as a collective form, Auckland's is relatively fragmented. But the city, as an ever-transforming situation, inherently has something of both the fragmented and the collective.

FRAGMENTED COLLECTIVE
Melinda Trask, Third Year Student

Auckland and it's Visitor's Centre is here described as a *fragmented collective*. Visitors enter the Centre through an oscillating passageway that brings them to a cylindrical volume, a "pin". Here, across a reception desk, the visitor meets a worker who can obtain the desired printed information about the City. This information is retrieved from the walls of the cubic volume, essentially composed of leaflets. The elevator tower is accessible only to the worker, who can descend to an underground level to retrieve additional leaflets, or ascend to survey the situation of the City. After the encounter with the worker, the visitor exits through a linear passage and returns to Auckland, somehow changed.




e l e v a t i o n
1:50

SZCZEPAN JAN URBANOWICZ & MARK PANCKHURST

Competiton Entry: "The Laugh"

THE END'S Second Annual Design Competition: THE LAUGH received some 350 submittals which were judged by the following prominent architects: Arthur Erickson, Thom Mayne, Eric Owen Moss and Wolf D. Prix. The judges awarded three winning entries and named seven honorable mentions. These winning and selected entries were on public exhibit in the City of Los Angeles from 31 October 1994 - 21 November 1994.

Included in the category of HONORABLE MENTIONS were two graduates from the Department of Architecture at the University of Auckland: Szczepan Jan Urbanowicz and Mark Panckhurst.

On Two Kinds of Laughter

There they stood, Devil and angel, face to face, mouth open, both making more or less the same sound but each expressing himself in a unique timbre - absolute opposities. And seeing the laughing angel, the Devil laughed all the harder, all the louder, all the more openly, because the laughing angel was infinitely laughable.

Laughable laughter is cataclysmic. And even so, the angels have gained something by it. They have tricked us all with their semantic hoax. Their imitation laughter and its original (the Devil's) have the same name. People nowadays do not even realise that one and the same kinds of laughter, and we lack the words to distinguish them.

from Milan Kundera *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*

The Site

The structure is locates in a vacant lot in Queen Street, central Auckland, New Zealand.

Queen Street is in the Centre of Auckland's Central Business District and the site was vacated by the demolition of the His Majesty's Theatre in 1987 to make way for an office block that never eventuated.

The Shrine

Every physical relic of the site has been removed. Visually it is an empty site. But it is a site still imbued with meaning. The shrine is the recollection of laughter. It is the theatre retained in the mind. The intention of the project is to create an architectural intervention that brings these memories into physical tangibility.

The Temple

It is intended that a screen plays movies, television, music, shows to a small audience contained within a skeletal egg-like theatre.

The temple seeks to make comprehensible the loss of His Majesty's Theatre by setting up a reciprocal relationship between temple and the passer-by.

The purpose of this temple is the recollection of laughter.


plan
elevation
section
elevation
1250
QUEEN STREET

Lighting casts the audience's shadows onton the large translucent shells that are suspended from the theatre. The images of the theatre's screen/audience relationship in motion catapult this private heterotopia into the public realm.

The first celebration - the celebration of a theatre's portrayal of life - is put on its own stage and hence the relationship between the audience and the screen. The audience's suspension of disbelief is made public. That which is the essence of what theatre "is" is affirmed publicly.

The total structure seeks to take a step back and celebrate the position of laughter and theatre *within* life. The former heterotopia of the theatre bursts into the street, its participants are at the same time viewers and the viewed. The theatre pivots between being the camera and the screen.

Szczepan Jan Urbanowicz
& Mark David Panckhurst



NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

In keeping with the aim that *Interstices* be an open forum for the discussion and dissemination of architecture and architectural thinking, the editors welcome unsolicited contributions. Such contributions may be in response to work published in *Interstices* or may be altogether new material. All work, however, is subject to editorial review and external refereeing.

PROCEDURE

Manuscripts may be submitted either on computer disk or on paper. Manuscripts submitted on computer disk should be sent on a $3^1/_2$ inch disk, formatted for either *Apple Macintosh* or *IBM* machines. Preferred software is *Microsoft Word*. Otherwise send work as *Text only (ASCII) file*. One printed copy is to be inclued with the disk.

Manuscripts submitted on paper should be sent in duplicate and must be letter quality (either typed or laser printed as dot matrix copy can not be accepted), single sided, double spaced with 50mm left margin and on consecutively numbered A4 leaves. All notes are to be similarly presented on a separate sheet.

In all matters of style, including notes, bibligraphical details etc., contributors are advised to refer to *The Chicago Manual of Style* (13th edition, revised and expanded in 1982) and are also asked to review recent copies of *Interstices*. Contributors are further requested to avoid long footnotes.

Writers are invited to suggest images to serve as illustrations for their texts. Send copies of suggested images with the manuscript. Final acceptance of all illustrations is dependent upon editorial approval and upon receipt of images of suitable quality. Responsibility for obtaining these images rests with the contributor. *Contributors must obtain all necessary approval to quote extracts and reproduce images*. Photographs should by high resolution black and white prints or slides. Drawings should be in black ink on art quality white paper. The photographs must not be written upon. Captions (including acknowledgements should also be sent).

PROJECTS

In addition to and separate from manuscripts the editors welcome the opportunity to publish architectural projects. As with manuscripts all projects will be subject to review by the editors and the external referees. Final acceptance of projects will be dependent upon the receipt of suitable camera-ready artwork. Photographs and slides should be a high resolution black and white quality. Drawings should be in black ink on art quality white paper, preferably on a vertical format similar to that of the journal. Drawings may otherwise be presented as high contrast reproduction: photocopies are unsuitable. The photographs must not be written upon. A list of images and all captions, legends, necessary acknowledgements etc. to appear in the publication should be provided separately, typed on A4 paper. Identification of images should be on labels attached to photo-versos. Do not write on photographs in any way.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRIBUTORS

With the exception of gallerys, all proof-reading is the responsibility of contributors. Accepted manuscripts, therefore, will be returned to contributors for them to review.

Contributors must obtain all necessary approval to quote extracts and reproduce images. Copies of the documentation showing proof of permission must be submitted with the proofed manuscript.

Contributors must inform the editors if the manuscript/project has been submitted for publication elsewhere and if so whether it has been accepted or not. *Interstices* will not ordinarily publish work which has been accepted for publication elsewhere. However the editors do welcome translations and will consider extracts from forthcoming books.

Copyright is held by the publishers until publication. Thereafter the privileges of copyright revert to the contributor.

Work for publication including manuscripts, projects, letters and books for review should be addressed to:

The Editors, *Interstices*
c/-The Department of Architecture
University of Auckland
Private Bag
Auckland
New Zealand

ORDERS AND BACK ISSUES

Notification will be posted to all previous subscribers and interested parties. Please make cheques payable to the *University of Auckland* (for *Interstices*); Individual rate $30.00 NZ per issue, Institution rate $40.00 NZ per issue.

Back issues are available of *Interstices* 2 ($ 30.00 NZ per issue); *Interstices* 1 is out of print.

Please add $6.00 NZ per issue for shipping and handling to all *Interstices* orders.

Interstices 1

Contents

Interstices 2

Contents