INTERSTICES 06

Contents

Introduction

A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul, Ross Jenner, and Albert Refiti

In February 2004, a series of lectures was announced jointly by the School of Architecture, University of Auckland, and the School of Art and Design, Auckland University of Technology, to re-initiate the critical work carried out between 1989 and 2000 in the *Under Construction* lecture series and the resulting *Interstices* publication. In the past, writers and presenters such as the 2005 Pritzker winner Tom Mayne (USA), Mark Wigley (USA), Francesco Venezia and Renato Rizzi (Italy), and Mark Goulthorpe (France, now teaching at MIT) were involved with *Interstices*, contributing to contemporary local and international debates. The fact that both the lecture series, with its lively and collegial discussions, and the publication then lay fallow for some years was felt as a sad gap by many in the architectural and arts community in New Zealand.

It was Albert Refiti's entrepreneurial spirit that brought about discussions of a joint venture between the two schools and institutions. Ross Jenner and Laurence Simmons—old *Interstices* activists—were thus joined by Albert Refiti, Tina Engels-Schwarzpaul, and Mark Jackson to forge a theme that would attract interest and participation from a wide range of academics and practitioners of architecture and related arts, in and beyond the two schools and institutions.

Thus, last year's lectures and the current *Interstices* issue *Animal/Impulse* set their sights on what is perhaps a central problematic for contemporary culture and theory. *Animal/Impulse* raises a series of questions regarding the idea of the human/animal divide in Western thought. What are the formations/formulations that discipline the body and impulses from outside? How are the natural forces, that are but fortuitous bundles, controlled and striated in the animal/person/body? How do they, in turn, contribute to the construction of meaning? These are philosophical and ethical questions that go to the root not just of what we think but of who we are. In response, contributors to *Animal/Impulse* explore a set of coordinates for the representation of these issues in and through contemporary architecture and related arts.

Our aim was, from the beginning, to open *Interstices'* reach beyond the local ground, on which it had begun and developed, and to address a readership beyond—both within New Zealand, and further afield. It was encouraging to see how many architects and academics of high standing in other countries were willing to join the editorial board to support and guide the publication through the next issues. A few, such as Nigel Ryan, have been involved with *Interstices* already at the very beginning. With Peter Wood, we were able to welcome a colleague from the University of Victoria at our lecture series, who later also submitted his paper for publication. Regarding *Interstices 6: Animal/Impulse*, we are very proud to count Marco Frascari (Ottawa), Deane Simpson (Zürich), and Anthony Hoete (London and Beirut) amongst the contributors. For the current lecture series, *Genius/Genealogy*, we have the pleasure to welcome Andrew Benjamin from the University of Sydney and Jonathan Lamb from Vanderbilt University.

As in the past, *Interstices* is committed to providing an interface between theory and practice, and writing and drawing, in recognition of different ways of theorizing architecture and the related arts. The issues are composed of a strictly thematic, double-blind refereed part and a lighter and more diverse non-refereed part, which more loosely addresses the theme of an issue through reviews of exhibitions or books and reports on project work in New Zealand and overseas. Thus, *Interstices* brings together local and international contributors and juxtaposes locally conducted art and design practices, and research and scholarship, with those from outside New Zealand.

It is intended that *Interstices* will be published at least once a year, with guest editors at other institutions in New Zealand and Australia to bring a greater variety to the journal. We also look forward to the institutional sponsorship and involvement of the Schools of Architecture and Design at Victoria University of Wellington and Unitec Institute of Technology. The journal will remain a forum for the dissemination of research and debate on architectural and art practices. It will continue as a critical platform for the review and discussion of current projects in New Zealand and overseas. The annual lecture series will become, yet again, the point of contact between practitioners and academics to develop a critical culture focused on contemporary practice. As in 1989, *Interstices* is not intended

> to reaffirm existing normative standards and canons, nor to rest comfortably in the supposed self-sufficiency of the building object, regional identity, composition, nature, function … but to explore the interstices, the gaps and fractures within an institution that appears solid, secure and fixed.

Interstices is about "the spaces between idea and thing where perfect correspondence is never quite found, demanding a realm of endless negotiation and interpretation that we see as productive" ("Introduction", *Interstices 1*).

In the current issue, *Animal/Impulse*, Mark Jackson opens this realm with "Impulsive Openness: Boredom and Bio-politics". In a close reading of aspects of Martin Heidegger's 1929-30 lectures *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, and Giorgio Agamben's *The Open: Man and Animal*, the latter's notion of 'bare life' is traced in his reading of Heidegger. For a concern

with animality, 'bare life' is an indication of the substantial political conflicts of modernity clustering around animality and humanity.

In "Heidegger and the Herringbone Cowshed", Laurence Simmons similarly explores the question of animality in the theoretical context of Heidegger's, Derrida's and Agamben's writings. He also engages with a local instance of technological innovation: Ron Sharp's 1952 change of his twelve bail walk-through milking shed to what became known worldwide as the herringbone cowshed. Simmons suggests that while it is urgent to think the animal beyond mechanical paradigms, it is equally important to investigate the blurring lines between human, animal, and machine.

From a very different perspective, Sarah Treadwell and Paul Veart investigate in the animation *Beyond* the blurring of lines between animal and architectural movement, which give rise to an unexpected animal/architectural drawing: "Animation, the cat and escaping drawing" traces the porosity between the categories of animal/human/drawing/architecture. The theoretical reference here is Hélène Cixous' "Without End, no, State of Drawingness, no, rather: The Executioner's taking off", where drawing is somehow always beyond her strength but nevertheless looks back at itself.

Such interest in animal cunning is shared by Peter Wood, who explores the human animal's environmental responsiveness and non-intellectual aspects of aesthetics and architecture. In his paper "Architecture = Building + Value: Exploring the Social Purpose of Architecture" he addresses atavistic factors operating through art in the evolution of human relationships. With the help of such a change in perspective, the oppositions between building and architecture, body and intellect, become unsettled and open up for re-inspection.

"Woven Flesh", too, is concerned with the space-between of human bodies, animals and ancestors. Albert Refiti engages two motifs: one of the impulse in Albert Wendt's works, and the other of the animal in John Pule's. The two motifs are read against the thematic *animal/impulse* in an attempt to open up discussion of an architecture of the body in Polynesia. If the body is the dwelling of the ancestors, then the impulse is its long-time resident and the animal its temporary lodger.

Dispersed and difficult to control, impulses are also historically contingent. In "Frontiers of Shame and Repulsion", A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul explores connections between the efficiently circulating sewers of suburban developments and the exhibition of a 'dunny' at the 2004 Sydney Biennale. While not immediately obvious, aspects of the 'civilising process' demonstrate an increasing distance between human bodies and their excrements. This moulding of affects is necessary for both sewers and art work to function.

The peculiarly moulded affects of Italian Futurism and Rationalism lend themselves to an architecture leaning towards transcendence. There would appear to be little hope of finding in it forms of lightness that seek freedom *within* earthly matter. But, as Ross Jenner shows in "What Goes Up Must Come Down", they can indeed be found in a suspension, caused by the engagement with the contradictions of the regime, in the works of Persico and Albini. A different concept of lightness emerges, a lightness of 'thinking otherwise'.

In the non-refereed part of *Interstices 6*, an interesting mixture of speculation, review, translation and reporting rounds off the theme. Marco Frascari's "Gee Wiz" is a speculative account of the cosmopoietic dimensions of architectural criticism buried deep inside the closet of architectural culture. At present, Frascari maintains, most architectural judgment works by a refusal of the power of recognition that properly belongs to animal experience and, being uncritically open to memory-less scientific or artistic fashions, forgets the links between the arts of building, living and thinking well. This paper is an antidote.

While Frascari uses cheese as metaphor, Deane Simpson employs that of misfits to counteract certain tendencies of the last 75 years of urban planning, which often failed due to an excess of will and intention. Simpson discusses collaborative projects in Detroit and Copenhagen where the strong will of 'master' planning was suspended in favour of experiments with open and auto-reactive systems. These 'instinctive systems' challenge the genetic identity of particular urban 'species' through the generation of urban mutations.

During the production of this issue, Anthony Hoete, 1990 graduate of the Auckland School of Architecture, came to New Zealand on a visit from his permanent base in London to visit family—but also to begin a commission for the design of a house. In an interview with A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul, Albert Refiti and Ross Jenner, he reflected on his 1995 design for his father's house on Motiti Island and its relationships with his own, highly mobile life in architectural designing and teaching.

The interview is followed by two reviews of the *Fale Pasifika* at The University of Auckland by Semisi Potauaine and Jeremy Treadwell. Potauaine discusses Tongan architecture around the theme of "The Tectonic of the *Fale*", and Treadwell recounts, in "Chains of Negotiations: Navigating between Modernity and Tradition", the complex processes and dilemmas involved in the design and construction of the *Fale Pasifika*. Subsequently, John Walsh and Peter Bartlett explain their views of the exhibition *Models for Living: 1905–2005: A survey of 100 years of New Zealand residential architecture* held at the Auckland War Memorial Museum, 8 April–19 June 2005.

Maria O'Connor provides a tantalising review of one of the key texts informing this issue, Giorgio Agamben's book *The Open: Man and Animal*. Rather than (or over and beyond) explicating the text, or giving a relatively fixed account, O'Connor appeals to those readers who will benefit from Agamben's ethico-political stance in relation to their own projects, through an active and personal engagement with the text.

Finally, a translation of Félix Guattari's "L'énonciation architecturale" by Tim Adams, "Architectural Enunciation", shows how the French psychotherapist and activist applied his considerable conceptual apparatus to the problem of architecture. This was a subject dear to his heart, about which he often wrote. It is strange that this important work has been so long overlooked, especially given the attention paid by architectural theorists to the work of his collaborator, Gilles Deleuze. This translation goes some way to address this oversight.

Impulsive Openness:

Boredom and Bio-politics

Mark Jackson

Introduction

In a book remarkable for the brevity in which its prose develops considerable complexity, Giorgio Agamben interrogates animal being. *The Open: Man and Animal* has at its core Agamben's reading of Martin Heidegger's 1929-30 lecture course, published as *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. As Agamben notes, the contents of this lecture course do not necessarily hold what one might have expected from the title. About a third of the publication concerns a discussion of 'boredom' as a fundamental attunement of being-in-the-world; another third is concerned with a determination of the essence of animality in the disclosure that 'animal is poor in world'. The remaining third is concerned with the world forming of world as the disclosure of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Agamben approaches the Heidegger text for how Heidegger is able in a non-contradictory way to speak of 'the open' with respect to both animal and human being while yet designating a fundamental abyss between the essence of animal and the essence of human being.

And Agamben inflects his engagement with Heidegger concerning the fundamental condition for defining 'life' in terms of a notion of the biopolitical. In an earlier book, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Agamben takes up Michel Foucault's engagements with governmentality and modernity in terms of the governance of 'bare life' of populations, or the biopolitics of living beings. In *The Open* Agamben further articulates the difficult notion of 'bare life' and brings an engagement with biopower into the orbit of Heideggerian thinking. In this paper I want to assay these aspects of Agamben's argument in *The Open*, firstly in relation to Heidegger's own account of animality; secondly, in terms of the proximity of Dasein to animality in the fundamental attunement of Dasein in 'boredom'; and, thirdly, in terms of how Agamben reads Heidegger's concerns as fundamentally political. Perhaps, though, I should start with Heidegger's 'animal'.

A Break with Humanism

In his 1923 lecture course, published as *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Heidegger develops his notion of Dasein in fundamental distinction to the two predominant concepts of 'man', as 'the theological concept of man' and as 'animal rationale'. 'Man' has been that being that falls between a creation in the image of God and a 'living being [animal] which has discourse', which is to say between the divine and the inhuman. Heidegger's 'Dasein' is nothing human in either sense:

> In choosing a term to designate this region of being and appropriately demarcate it, we have avoided the expression 'human Dasein,' 'human being,' and will continue to do so. In all of its traditional categorical forms, the concept of man fundamentally obstructs what we are supposed to bring into view as facticity. The question 'What is man?' blocks its own view of what it is really after with an object foreign to it. (Heidegger, 1999: 21)

I am mentioning this notion of the 'being-there' of Dasein in its 'being there for a while' in order to emphasise Heidegger's break both with humanism as an ego-centrism of the human and with any evolutionism implicit in a notion of 'rational animal'. In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger aims at an understanding of the fundamental attunement of Dasein to its being in the world, to its being with beings, its world-forming. Dasein's being is its openness to Being, to the being of beings as a whole as those beings disclosed to it. Heidegger wants to come to some understanding of 'world' in the sense that 'man is world-forming'. He undertakes this by initially inquiring into animal being and its relation to world, which is to say in relation to animal being's relation to beings as a whole. He commences with a comparison of stone-being, animal-being and world-forming. Hence, the stone is 'worldless' in the sense that the stone has no access to beings. While the stone is a being, it has no access to beings and equally is not deprived of being. It is worldless: "The *worldlessness* of a being can now be defined as its having no access to those beings (as beings) amongst which this particular being with this specific manner of being is" (Heidegger, 1995: 197).

Hence, 'world' infers the accessibility of beings to beings. With respect to an animal, things are more complicated than for the stone. An animal, Heidegger suggests, is 'poor in world'. It both has and does not have world, which means it both does and does not as a being have access to beings. What does he mean? When Heidegger discusses world-formation and Dasein's relation to beings, he means that beings are disclosed in their present at handness for Dasein; that is, beings are disclosed in their being, in that they are as such. Animal being never has access to the present at handness of beings, to the beingness of beings. Beings are never disclosed to animal being in its dealing with its 'world' of things. Heidegger goes into some detail in describing the relation of animal being to its 'world' and in so doing arrives at what he terms the essence of animality as 'captivation':

> Of course, this driven behaviour does *not* relate itself, and as captivated activity cannot relate itself, *to what is present at hand as such*.

What is present at hand as such means what is present at hand in its *being* present at hand, as a *being*. … *The animal as such does not stand within a manifestation of beings. Neither its so-called environment nor the animal itself are manifest as beings.* (248)

Accessibility to Being

Before addressing in any detail Heidegger's account of animal being's relation to beings, I want to emphasise what is at stake in Heidegger's questioning. When Heidegger initially enquires about stone, animal and man with respect to world, he arrived at the worldlessness of stone, the world-forming of man and the ambiguity of the animal which is in one sense closer to the stone as worldless and in another closer to man with world. But the decisive question is from what viewpoint can such a comparison be disclosed? Who questions? And what does the questioning question? Heidegger suggests: "The *substantive* problem with which we are concerned is precisely that of *accessibility itself,* the question concerning the potential access that man and animal characteristically have to other beings" (Heidegger, 1995: 201). But who questions? Human-being questions. Hence, "*Can we transpose ourselves into an animal at all*?" (201) Transposition does not mean transferring ourselves into the interior of another being, becoming that other being; nor does it mean going along with that other being *as if* we were that other being; nor does it mean having empathy for that other being as a feeling our way into that being. Rather, it firstly means understanding the being that we are as a being that has access to other beings and secondly, going along with the animal "in a way in which it sees and hears, the way in which it seizes its prey or evades its predators" (204).

That is to say, we understand that the animal in its dealings with its 'world' has access to beings, and in our going along with the animal we recognize that the 'sphere' of its 'world' offers the possibility of transposition. With the stone, matters are different. While the stone is a being, its being offers no possibility in our going along with it for our transposition to its sphere of being: "It is impossible because the stone as such does not admit of this possibility at all, offers no sphere intrinsically belonging to its being such that we could transpose ourselves into the stone" (204). There is a third question: can we transpose ourselves into another human being? Heidegger suggests this question seems to be the same question posed regarding animal being. We can go along with human beings in the possibility of transposing ourselves into the access they are with respect to the sphere of their world. But there is a fundamental difference. With human beings, it is no longer an intrinsic *possibility* that we may transpose our being into the being of other human beings. Rather, human being as Dasein is this transposition of existence into other human beings: "For it is part of the essential constitution of human Dasein that it intrinsically means being with others, that the factically existing human being always already and necessarily moves factically in a particular way of being with …, i.e., a particular way of going along with" (206). In his analysis of accessibility of being to beings through the question of the giving of access itself, Heidegger arrives at a fundamental distinction between animal and Dasein.

Organ, Organism and Life

In breaking with the doxa of thinking of an 'organ' as an instrument in a mechanistic thinking of organism, Heidegger suggests that the essence of 'organ' is 'capacity' or 'capability' understood as an "instinctual self-driving towards its wherefore" (Heidegger, 1995: 228-9). Are our organs, such as our eyes, equipment we see with, instruments of vision in a complex assemblage of instruments or pieces of equipment we call an organism? Equipment is in the service of something. It is produced to accomplish a task. Its essence is serviceability as reliability or readiness. Instruments are ready for a task. A pen is ready for writing, or (the same thing) not ready if it needs ink, or the ink won't flow. A pen has no capacity for writing, in the sense than an eye has a capacity for seeing. Yet, organs in themselves have no capacity except as relations to an organism as capacities, that is to say, the organ is in possession of a capacity, is given a capacity. The readiness of equipment is determined and prescriptive, and in this sense we would not say a piece of equipment is capable of such and such. Capability is self-regulative, as Heidegger suggests: "It drives itself towards it own capability for …" (228). Such capability, constitutive of living organisms, is instinctually driven: "Capacity is to be found where there is drive" (228). Drive infers capacity, and capacity infers the possibility of training for regular behaviour:

> These driving forces [*Antriebe*], which arise from the instinctual capacity in each case, do not as such merely occasion vital movements—like nutrition and propulsion—but rather as *drives* they always permeate and drive on the whole movement in advance. That is why they are never simply mechanical, even if they can be isolated in this way, i.e., by ignoring the instinctual structure of drives in which the specific potentiality for being and thus the manner of being belonging to these drives is embedded. In principle there is no mathematical expression for this instinctual structure of drives, and it is one which is incapable in principle of being mathematised. (229)

Heidegger thus defines the constitutive moment of the being of animal as 'being capable', which means being organized in the sense of being a self-producing, self-regulating, self-renewing and self-preserving being. By 'self' he is not anthropologising animality, in the sense of a self-conscious or reflective organizing. Rather, he means that such producing, regulating, renewing and preserving is the proper to the itself of animal being, what is closest to its being. That is to say, in its towardness, its potentiality for being, its movement in advance and anticipatory instinctual response, it does not leave itself behind. This, for Heidegger, would be constitutive of what we have named, and are primarily concerned with, as *'animal impulse'*. And, as we will come to recognize in registering Agamben's concern with Heidegger's animality, animal impulse has the most complex complicity with Dasein's openness to being.

I mentioned earlier that Heidegger suggests the essence of animality is 'captivation'. What does he mean by that, and what would be the relation

of 'captivation' to capability or capacity? Capability is the potentiality of the animal to be, which means its proper producing, regulating, renewing and preserving what is closest to itself in its being. In its being in the world it acts instinctually in its behaving in the world in its proper being, in being what is closest to it, its 'world' of other beings recognized as prey, nourishment, shelter, sexual partners and so on. Capability is capability for behaviour. And here Heidegger makes a further distinction between animal and 'man'. Animals behave in the sense that they act according to a driving performing, an instinctual drivenness; humans 'comport' as doing or acting: "The *specific manner* in which man *is* we shall call *comportment* and the *specific manner* in which the animal *is* we shall call *behaviour*. They are fundamentally different from one another" (237).

How, then, is animal behaviour to be characterized? Unlike the stone or the piece of equipment that have no access to beings, no drive or capability, the animal is open to beings in its 'world'. Its being is this openness to beings, its behaviour. Again, it is crucial to emphasise that we do not in some manner define animal being and then ask what does this being do in a world of things, just as we do not ask the question 'what is man' and then ask what 'man' does in a world of things. Rather, the disclosure of being is the disclosure of the being open of beings to their being in a 'world'. If Heidegger is emphatic on the distinction between animal-behaviour and human-comportment, he is equally emphatic on distinguishing between animal-environment and human world. World and environment come to designate different entities from the point of view of the disclosure of being. Heidegger will define the inner possibility of behaviour, as the openness of animal being to beings, which is to say to its environment, as 'captivation'. As the inner possibility of behaviour, 'captivation' refers not to a kind of enduring fixation an animal might have with its environment, a kind of seizure or mood that it cannot get over. Rather, it refers to the animal's absorption with itself, its remaining with itself, the specific manner whereby in its towardness, it does not leave itself behind. Captivation does not accompany behaviour; it is the possibility of behaviour.

How does the animal maintain the proper of itself in its towardness, its relatedness to beings, where this 'towardness' is also a moving-away-from in the traversing of an environment? As instinctual drivenness, the animal is 'given over' to beings: "It is *not* an apprehending of something as something, something present at hand. There is no apprehending, but only *behaving* here, a driven activity which we must grasp in this way because the apprehending of something as something is *withheld* from the animal" (247). This possibility of apprehension as such is 'not given at all'. In this sense, the animal is 'taken by things'. Hence, this access of animal being to beings as a relatedness to things, as an openness to beings, is at the same time a withholding of the being of beings, a closeness to being, to that something is as such. The open as a revealing of beings to animal being is at the same time a concealing of the beingness of beings. Strictly speaking, as a withholding of being, the open of animal being to things is neither openness to being nor closure to being. The question of revealing and concealing never arrives.

The Openness of Animal Being

But how do we yet understand this 'open' of the openness of animal being to beings? As mentioned earlier, in discussing organ, organism and drives, drives are not a mechanistic assemblage; the organ is given a capacity by an organism considered as the driven towardness of instinctual drives: "Instinctual drivenness, as being driven from one drive to another, holds and drives the animal within a *ring* which it cannot escape and within which something is open for the animal" (249). So, on the one hand, the animal cannot apprehend beings as such and on the other hand animal relatedness to things, to environment, is circumscribed by the interrelatedness of instinctual drives constitutive of an organism as a capacity or capability of self-preservation. How to yet speak here of an openness?

Heidegger suggests that the negative manner of considering the 'withholding' of the apprehension of being for animal being may be considered otherwise. He rather emphasises that the animal in its relatedness to beings possesses an "eliminative character" which he will come to define as a "rejecting [of] things from [the] itself [of the animal]" constitutive of the animal's self absorption (252). Eliminative behaviour is the putting to one side, the obviating, of the present at hand, the as such of a being. In this sense, behaviour is a relatedness of a 'not-attending-to' that is yet still open in the sense that an animal in some manner announces itself as affected by things it relates to. Hence an animal is understood as a kind of encirclement of instinctual drives as a "totality of its self-absorbed capability" constitutive of behaviour as relatedness to other things (253). Behaviour is fundamentally eliminative as the non-attending to things as such. Yet the animal announces its capacity to be affected by its environment, and as capacity is the towardness of its preserving in the open of its relatedness. But as capacity, as capability, it is the containment, as inhibition, of its instinctual drives that require disinhibition:

> Capability for … and thus behaviour itself is open for such occasions, for stimuli, for that which initiates, i.e., disinhibits the capability for … in such and such a way in each case. That which the animal's behaviour relates to is such that this behaviour is open to it. This other is taken up into the openness of the animal in a manner that we shall describe as *disinhibition*. Since capability for … thoroughly governs the animal's specific manner of being, a being such as the animal, when it comes into relation with something else, can only come upon the sort of entity that '*affects*' or initiates the capability in some way. Nothing else can penetrate the ring around the animal. (254)

Environment in this sense is the relatedness of behaviour to the disinhibitors that are capable of *affecting*, which is to say that are relatable at all. In such relatedness, the disinhibitors withdraw. Heidegger suggests this is their manner of showing themselves, as that which withdraws and eludes. And it is in this respect that behaviour is eliminative as the not-attending-to. The withdrawal and elusiveness, as the not apprehending of the disin-

hibitors, coincides with the non-apprehension of the presence at hand. In this, Heidegger suggests, there is no permanence as such, nor any change as such, which is to say, no temporality or historicity as such.

The Poverty of World

It is not that the animal is trapped in the encirclement of its ring of inhibitors. Rather, this encirclement is precisely the opening to a sphere of disinhibition. And in this sense, animal being cannot be defined, say as 'captivation', and then be shown how it relates to an environment. Its being as captivation is essentially its being related to the separation-reparation of inhibitor-disinhibitor. An animal's being is its self-surrounding with a disinhibiting ring. Its absorption is not with itself in its interiority but with the ring of interrelated instinctual drives in their opening. This discussion of animal being commenced with Heidegger's notion that 'animal is poor in world' while 'man is world forming', and further, that Heidegger wanted to develop a better sense of how animal being is both a having and a not having of world. We may now get a sense of what he might mean. 'Poverty', Heidegger suggests, is intrinsically related to having. One is not poor in something if that something is simply not within one's horizon of disclosure. To be 'poor' already supposes a sense of not having what can be had. Hence, 'poverty' is a 'having' that at the same time constitutes a not-having.

At the same time Heidegger's guiding question concerning 'accessibility' of beings to beings, of animal being and human being to beings, which for Dasein is 'world-forming' in that Dasein can disclose beings as such in their being, must be borne in mind. Both animal being and human being access beings. Animal being accesses beings as behaviour, whose twin fundamental moments of relatedness are the withholding of being in 'elimination' as behaviour's fundamental mode, and the withdrawing of the disinhibitors in the openness of animal being to its environment. It is in this sense that animal is poor in world, though Heidegger emphasises that a valuative understanding of 'poverty' or 'richness' in world is totally misleading. Equally, Dasein's world is meager in comparison to life:

> This does not mean that life represents something inferior or some kind of lower level in comparison with human Dasein. On the contrary, life is a domain which possesses a wealth of openness with which the human world may have nothing to compare. (255)

Dasein's World of Boredom: Agamben's Reading

I suggested at the beginning of this paper that my interest was in assaying Agamben's *The Open: Man and Animal*. Has this interest been put to one side, and perhaps even eliminated, in a particular captivation with the text of Heidegger? Rather, what has been discussed so far is a preliminary engagement with aspects of Agamben's text, a recounting of salient aspects of his recounting of Heidegger's engagement with animality. I now want to turn to Agamben's concerns more directly, but in doing so, necessarily return to Heidegger's *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, and in particular his engagement with 'boredom' as the fundamental attunement of Dasein

to its being in the world. In what I have said so far about Heidegger's understanding of the poverty of world for animals, there is still something that does not quite make sense. If the animal is fundamentally deprived of access to the apprehension of being, can this be spoken of as deprivation at all? The animal is not open to being but nor is it closed to being. Its 'other' is neither being nor non-being. So in what way does a question of having or not-having emerge at all? That is, if Heidegger wants to make a fundamental distinction between world and environment precisely in terms of the being-disclosed of entities, why say the animal is poor in world at all, as 'world' is never a disclosable entity in the first place?

However, we may begin to see what is at stake for Heidegger, not so much in ascertaining the understanding of disclosure or unconcealment, constitutive of world, but rather in beginning to develop an understanding of concealment or undisclosure or non-revealing. If we speak of a poverty of world, it is precisely in being able to disclose concealment as concealment. And this is where Agamben's reading is addressed. Agamben suggests:

> The ontological status of the animal environment can at this point be defined: it is open but not disconcealed, literally openable. For the animal, beings are open but not accessible; that is to say, they are open in an inaccessibility and an opacity—that is, in some way, in a non-relation. This *openness without disconcealment* distinguishes the animal's poverty in world from the world-forming which characterizes man. The animal is not simply without world, for insofar as it is open in captivation, it must—unlike the stone, which is worldless—do without world, lack it; it can, that is, be defined in its being by a poverty and a lack. (Agamben, 2004: 55)

This 'lack' is fundamental to the animal as captivation, self-absorbing in the emptiness of its behaviour as eliminative, in the emptiness that is its inhibiting capacity. Thus a question of the open for Heidegger oscillates between animal and man, as that between a concealing and a revealing, or an essentiality as concealment and an essentiality as revealing. The 'open' or a questioning of the 'open' brings animal and man into closest proximity in the same moment as it constitutes an abyss separating them. Their proximity is that abyss. Agamben suggests:

> Animal captivation and the openness of the world thus seem related to one another as are negative and positive theology, and their relationship is as ambiguous as the one which simultaneously opposes and binds in a secret complicity the dark night of the mystic and the clarity of rational knowledge. (59)

Agamben's argument develops along these lines: that Heidegger's labour or meditation on *aletheia* and *lethe*, on the pre-Socratic *unconcealment* of being and *concealment* of being are precisely set to work in their depth in his engagement with the animal's poverty of world. In particular, Heidegger dwells here on the mystery of concealment itself, what brings it about, what accomplishes or gives concealment. Agamben's thesis is that Heidegger is

here meditating on the profound nature of Dasein *as* animal being, as that withdrawing, saving and preserving of the being of Dasein in Dasein's revealing of the concealing of what gives being. In this Dasein reveals bare life as its ownmost concealed proximity to being. Heidegger's own engagement in revealing this proximity is through his development of the fundamental attunement of Dasein to its being in the world as 'profound boredom'. Hence the preceding of Heidegger's discussion of animality in the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* with some one hundred pages on 'boredom'.

Boredom's Indifference to Beings

Briefly, Heidegger works through three stages of 'boredom' to arrive at 'profound boredom'. What is uncanny is that the terms he used to describe Dasein's relation to being in these stages will quite closely coincide with his description of the animal's relatedness to its environment, that Dasein's boredom and the open of animal being are coincident or proximal if at the same time abyssal. The three 'forms' of boredom are structured around two moments defining the essence of boredom. The first is 'being left empty' or 'abandonment in emptiness': "Leaving empty as refusal indeed presupposes something *at hand*, but what is at hand must precisely be something *particular* and something *expected* in a particular situation, so that we *can come to be left empty by something*, in the sense of *becoming bored by …*" (Heidegger, 1995: 104). He contrasts this 'being left empty' with things by an account of being 'satisfied' with things in our dealings with them, in our immersion with them. Heidegger will in fact use terms identical to those he will come to use in defining an animal's captivation: "Being occupied gives our dealings with things a certain manifoldness, direction, fullness. But not only that: we are also *taken* by things, if not altogether *lost* in them, and often even *captivated* by them" (101). Hence in being occupied, Dasein may be taken, captivated, or left empty.

In boredom, the totality of Dasein's disclosed world shows beings in their 'indifference', in the emptiness of possibility for action. This disclosure is a disclosure of beings that refuse themselves. Agamben suggests:

> Dasein can be riveted to beings that refuse themselves in their totality because it is constitutively 'delivered up' to its own 'proper being,' factically 'thrown' and 'lost' in the world of its concern. But, precisely for this reason, boredom brings to light the unexpected proximity of Dasein and the animal. *In becoming bored, Dasein is delivered over to something that refuses itself, exactly as the animal, in its captivation, is exposed in something unrevealed.* (Agamben, 2004: 65)

Hence both man and animal are here open to a closedness, given over to what remains concealed. The second moment of boredom develops from the first. If the indifference of Dasein's world of things lights up as the emptiness of possibility for action, for concernful underwayness in Dasein's projection that is its being-in-the-world, this emptiness, from the point of view of possibility, capacity or capability, is a 'being-held-in-suspense' which alerts Dasein to what it could have done, its possibilities, possibili-

ties as such, delivered precisely as the withholding of possibility, as the withholding of the disclosure of beings, the "*telling announcement of possibilities left unexploited*" (Heidegger, 1995: 141). Being-held-in-suspense, in the revealing of the inactivity of Dasein with respect to the totality of its being, is the alerting to Dasein of its potentiality as such for being, of the "possibilitisation proper to Dasein" (66). The revealing of Dasein as possibility or potentiality for being is precisely a revealing of an utmost concealing, of a potential-not-to, of a holding in suspense of Dasein's disclosed world of things. As Agamben suggests:

> Thus, the proximity, and at the same time the distance, between profound boredom and animal captivation finally come to light. … The animal environment is constituted in such a way that something like pure possibility can never become manifest within it. Profound boredom then appears as the metaphysical operator in which the passage from poverty in world to world, from animal environment to human world, is realized; at issue here is nothing less than anthropogenesis, the becoming Dasein of living man. (68)

What is revealed as Dasein's openness to being is nothing other than an openness to the animal's disinhibitor ring, to the concealedness of this ring, its withdrawal in animal being. This is an openness to the closedness, the concealed of life's own open: "Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation. This awakening of the living being to its own being captivated, this anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human" (70).

Animal Impulse and the Biopolitics of Bare Life

I suggested earlier that Agamben moves these concerns with Heidegger's disclosure of man and animal towards his own concerns with the question of the biopolitical. In a book that might be described as bleak and uncompromising, Agamben introduces the notion of 'bare life' as the political substance of modernity. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* takes up Foucault's analysis of biopower as modernity's invention of an exercise of power in its operations on the corporeal reality of populations as the management of the (bare) animal life of humans. This may be thought of in terms of the circular movement of the twin terms: the total humanisation of the animal and the total animalisation of the human. As a summary to his analyses, Agamben suggests:

> (i) The original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion).
> (ii) The fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life as originary political element and as the threshold of articulation between nature and culture, *zoe* and *bios*.
> (iii) Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West.

The first of these calls into question every theory of the contractual origin of state power and, along with it, every attempt to ground political communities in something like a 'belonging', whether it be founded on popular, national, religious, or any other identity. The second thesis implies that Western politics is a biopolitics from the very beginning, and that every attempt to found political liberties in the rights of the citizen is, therefore, in vain. The third thesis, finally, throws a sinister light on the models by which social sciences, sociology, urban studies, and architecture today are trying to conceive and organize the public space of the world's cities without any clear awareness that at their very centre lies the same bare life (even if it has been transformed and rendered apparently more human) that defined the biopolitics of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century (Agamben, 1998: 181-182).

With his later publication, *The Open*, Agamben brings these theses into the arena of Heideggerian thinking, and in doing so seems to offer two proposals where *Homo Sacer* seemed to deliver a singular message. Indeed, the bleakness of *Homo Sacer* is precisely the fundamental figuring of the biopolitical as a totalitarianism abetted precisely by appeals to the contractual relations of human rights. One cannot say that, for Agamben, Heideggerian thinking alleviates anything; but it does, at a crucial juncture, suggest another path of thinking. For Heidegger, the *polis* is fundamentally that place of questioning the question of unconcealment and concealment, which is to say the political paradigm for Heidegger revolves about this pole, this turning of the question of the question of revealing and concealing. Agamben gives to Heidegger's *lethe*, concealment, the proper name, animal, and to unconcealment, *aletheia*, the disclosure that is Dasein. Hence, with respect to Agamben's theses concerning the biopolitical, the ban as abandonment, state of exception or zone of exclusion marks precisely the having-not-having of world that is constitutive of bare life, or the animal life of humanity, just as bare life, *lethe*, concealment is the original political substance as that constitutive of the unconcealing of the pure possibility of Dasein itself as pure potentiality for the letting be of its own concealed being. And what of the two scenarios suggested by Agamben? After having suggested that the decisive political conflict today is that between the animality and the humanity of man, he goes on to say:

At this point two scenarios are possible from Heidegger's perspective: (a) posthistorical man no longer preserves his own animality as undisclosable, but rather seeks to take it on and govern it by means of technology; (b) man, the shepherd of being, appropriates his own concealedness, his own animality, which neither remains hidden nor is made an object of mastery, but is thought as such as pure abandonment. (Agamben, 2004: 80)

While the first of these options constitutes the accounting for modernity in *Homo Sacer*, in terms of technologies of power productive of the global ordering of life, the second no less abandons the fragile vulnerability of bare life as political substance, in the sense that bare life is constitutive of the political as such. Our recourse, then, is not the abandonment of *zoe* for a renewal of *bios*, abandoning the *lethe* of animal being for the *humanitas* of culture building. Indeed, even Heidegger suggests the post-history of this

recourse. Rather, our recourse (but who is this 'our' in Agamben's context of the totalitarianism constitutive of 'community'?) is a certain suspension of the question, which is itself already the question of suspension itself: holding open the openness of possibility as such to the revelation that there is being as such. Agamben addresses this doubling of suspension directly, as perhaps the horizon of a politics that has always been the stakes of the political as such:

> In so far as the animal knows neither beings nor nonbeings, neither open nor closed, it is outside of being; it is outside in an exteriority more external than any open, and inside in an intimacy more internal than any closedness. To let the animal be would then mean to let it be outside of being. The zone of nonknowledge—or of a-knowledge—that is at issue here is beyond both knowing and not knowing, beyond both disconcealing and concealing, beyond both being and the nothing. But what is thus left to be outside of being is not thereby negated or taken away; it is not, for this reason, inexistent. It is an existing, real thing that has gone beyond the difference between being and beings. (91-92)

The politics of bare life would then amount to the recognition of the emptiness, the 'hiatus' that separates, within the human, man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness. This would constitute for Agamben the positive figure of the zone of exception, or bare life, that would recognize in the *impulse* neither the singular element of a fundamental behavioral training nor the sub-species signature of life itself, but rather the trace of an outside of being that would at the same time be the withdrawn giving of the concealed as such.

References

Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life* (D. Heller-Roazen, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1995.)

Agamben, G. (2004). *The open: Man and animal* (K. Attell, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Original work published 2002.)

Heidegger, M. (1999). *Ontology—the hermeneutics of facticity* (J. van Buren, Trans.). Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. (Original work published 1988.)

Heidegger, M. (1995). *The fundamental concepts of metaphysics* (W. McNeill & N. Walker, Trans.). Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. (Original work published 1983.)

Heidegger and the Herringbone Cowshed
Laurence Simmons

Figure 1: Herringbone Cowshed (Diagram showing 'angle-parking')

…and already the knowing animals are aware that we are not really at home in our interpreted world.
　　—Rainer Maria Rilke, "Duino Elegies"

…technology is the mastery not of nature but mastery of the relation between nature and humanity.
　　—Walter Benjamin, "One-Way Street"

To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will therefore mean no longer to seek new—more effective and more authentic—articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that—within man—separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness.
　　—Giorgio Agamben, *The Open*

I

My paper is dedicated to Ron Sharp, who died last year. Ron Sharp was a Waikato dairy farmer who in 1952 changed his 12 bail walk-through milking shed to a design of his own, now known worldwide as the herringbone cowshed. Sharp's design was a direct result of a knee problem, and designed to resolve the recurrent difficulty of having to stoop while milking. One estimate had a person milking for a season stooping 2,400 times for each cow—that is, 240,000 times for a 100-cow herd.

As with all good ideas, the basics of the herringbone shed were simple. It included a pit for the milker to stand in down the middle of the shed and raised platforms for the cows, which were 'angle-parked' with their udders within easy reach and at a convenient height for the milker [Figure 1]. The angle-parking idea came to Roy after observing cars angle-parked in Victoria Street, Hamilton's main thoroughfare. Cows in the herringbone shed could be milked in batches, rather than being let in one at a time. As each batch finished milking it was released to walk out the other end of the shed. The Sharp cowshed could handle up to 90 cows an hour, compared with 30 in the traditional milking set-up. It was also calculated that the Sharp system saved the milker around 225 kilometres of walking each dairy season. Initially the herringbone design won little support from the dairy industry, but by 1964, ten years after its invention, there were thousands of herringbone cowsheds around the world, including India and the Soviet Union [Figure 2]. The herringbone cowshed was later acclaimed by many as the greatest innovation in the dairy industry since the invention of the milking machine. By all accounts Roy was a modest man who had no secondary education, having left school after primary school to help on the family farm during the Depression of the 1930s. He never applied for a patent for his design, and never made any money from it.

II

I am going to revisit, rework, and re-worry the bone of Giorgio Agamben's careful re-reading in his book *The Open* of Martin Heidegger's attempt to distinguish animal life from human life. I want to explore the question of the animal, within the context of Heidegger's critical retrieval and transformation of the philosophical foundations of our technological conception of the world, and through Jacques Derrida's and Giorgio Agamben's re-reading of Heidegger's 'empty interval' between man and animal. To the extent that modernity formulates an understanding of the animal in terms of the mechanical paradigm this will involve me, among other things, in a shift from hand-milking [Figure 3] to the herringbone cowshed. Although it has been increasingly urgent to think the animal beyond the mechanical paradigm, I want to suggest that it may be equally crucial to venture an investigation of the mechanical component in the human: to explore, that is, the necessities and automatisms at the physical as well as psychological level; to investigate the blurring of the lines between human, animal and machine; and to open up questions of prosthetic subjectivity. Or, to follow Derrida, I intend to explore how "my guiding threads lace together in this knot: the *question*, the *animal*, *technology*" (1987: 57).

An exploration of this knot may be necessary and crucial if we wish to stop the 'anthropological machine' of Western thought that operates by

creating an absolute difference between man and animal: a difference that, on the one hand, elevates the human above the animal and its environment and, on the other, places animality outside of what Heidegger described as the human's 'openness' to the world. Heidegger's foundational stance in thinking the question of the animal is a fundamental, and a fundamentally correct, one. It is radically non-anthropocentric in that it attempts to understand the animal's relation to world on the animal's own terms rather than from the perspective of the human. It is this 'biocentrism', in contrast to anthropocentrism, that has led subsequent commentators to use Heidegger's thought to justify a radical ecological critique of technological modernity and to see him as a forerunner of radical environmentalism. Deep ecologists, who represent one branch of the radical ecology movement, have used Heidegger to argue that nature, and the animal, has an intrinsic value apart from its usefulness to human beings, and that all life forms should be allowed to flourish and fulfill their evolutionary destinies (see Naess, 1989 and Zimmerman, 1993). Nevertheless, it is clear that Heidegger cannot avoid falling back on oppositional distinctions between animal and human, and is thus unable to overcome the anthropocentrism of the metaphysical tradition; he is unable to speak of 'the open' with respect to animal and human in a non-contradictory way. What inhibits him from achieving this overcoming, but also offers him the possibility of overcoming, I shall argue, is his reliance on a certain notion of technology.

III

I will proceed according to four axes, each of which lead—separately and in tandem—to my conclusion on the relation between the technical and the animal. Each axis or 'question' starts from a modality of 'the animal', as it is explored by Heidegger, but I also follow through a critique of Heidegger's position using the ideas and responses of Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben and Bernard Stiegler.

Figure 3: Heidegger hand milking (photocollage)

The question of language

Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective environ-ments but are never placed freely into the clearing of being which alone is 'world,' they lack language. But in being denied language, they are not thereby suspended worldlessly in their environment. Still, in this word 'environment' converges all that is puzzling about living creatures. (Heidegger, 1998: 248)

Heidegger argues that animals lack a specific relation to language be-cause they lack 'world'. By world Heidegger does not simply mean nature or environment, but intends the capability for standing in what he elsewhere calls 'the clearing of being', where being comes into presence and leaves. Plants and animals do not exist outside of themselves in the clearing of be-ing; rather, they live enclosed within their surrounding environments. This means simply that plants and animals cannot access beings beyond them-selves in the way that human beings with language and world are able to do. The human body, on this account, is what belongs to the realm of the animal, and the human capacity for language and reason are specific marks of the human beyond the animal. Heidegger here takes the Cartesian (but also Aristotelian in its origin) definition of the human as *animal rationale* (that which sets the human apart as the single and sole living creature with the capacity for language), and he insists that this capacity for language *cannot* be seen as arising from the human's animal nature. Language is not just one among a number of things added on to the essence of the human; "[r]ather", says Heidegger, "language is the house of being in which the hu-man being exists by dwelling" (1998: 254). As this passage suggests—and Derrida notes it clearly (Derrida, 1989: 48)—Heidegger's questioning of the metaphysical definition of the human as *animal rationale* simply displac-es one form of humanism *in the name of another, more exacting humanism*. Heidegger opens up the question of the animal to existence, he shifts the question to a different register, but ultimately he offers nothing by way of critique of the traditional oppositional line drawn between human beings and animals; and so he closes the question down again. It is also important that for Heidegger this line of division—of language—bears an essential relation to death.

The question of death

> Mortals are they who can experience death as death. The animal cannot do so. But the animal cannot speak either. The essential relation between language and death flashes up before us, but remains still unthought. (Heidegger, 1971b: 107)

It is only the human that is capable of dying in the sense of complete, irreducible, untold loss taking place in/with the death of an individual. And it is given to humans to relate to their own death as that which uniquely individuates each of them. By contrast, the animal lacks memory; lacks the ability to repeat. In its absolute singularity, in its 'losing itself at every moment', it lacks presence and a substantive, continuing stability. Heidegger writes elsewhere: "To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies. The animal perishes. It has death neither ahead of itself nor behind it" (1971a: 178).

Thus Heidegger distinguishes between the 'biological-ontological' death of animals and plants—deaths measured in 'longevity, propagation and growth'—and the ontological death of Dasein. While denying the relation between death, language and the animal, Heidegger does not explicitly explore how the relation between death and language separates the human from the animal. Derrida writes:

> Against or without Heidegger, one could point to a thousand signs that show that animals also die. Although the innumerable structural differences that separate one 'species' from another should make us vigilant about any discourse on animality and bestiality in general, one can say that animals have a very significant relation to death, to murder and to war (hence, to borders), to mourning and to hospitality, and so forth, even if they have neither a relation to death nor to the 'name' of death as such, nor, by the same token, to the other as such. (1993: 75-6)

Derrida's point is neither does "man as Dasein" have a relationship to "death as such, but only to perishing" (76). Thus the paradox of Heidegger's position is that since the animal is purely resolved into the species, its death ends up being a matter of that which may be repeated without loss. Because of this, the animal (the labour of metabolic survival and reproduction of life that the animal names) is 'undying'—it indicates life's seamless continuum.

The question of poverty

> Man is not merely a *part of the world* but is also master and servant of the world in the sense of '*having*' world. Man has world. But then what about the other beings which, like man, are also part of the world: the animals and plants, the material things like the stone, for example? Are they merely parts of the world, as distinct from man who in addition *has* world? Or does the animal too have world, and if so, in what way? In the same way as man, or in some

other way? And how would we grasp this otherness? And what about the stone? However crudely, certain distinctions immediately manifest themselves here. We can formulate these distinctions in the following three theses: [1.] the stone (material object) is *worldless* [*weltlos*]; [2.] the animal is *poor in world* [*weltarm*]; [3.] man is *world-forming* [*weltbildend*]. (Heidegger, 1995: 177)

The stone is described as '*weltlos*' or 'without world, worldless'. The stone has no experience, no world: one cannot even say of a stone, employing some form of anthropomorphism, that it is indifferent to Being. Human beings are characterized as '*weltbildend*' (translated as 'world-forming' or 'world-picturing'). The human has access to entities and so 'has a world', and this access is the openness that is characteristic of Dasein. We see the objects in the world as they are. For Heidegger this capacity of a human being to grasp something as something is not due to the human possession of language, the fact that it can name things. In fact, in the radical nature of Heidegger's ontology it is the reverse: human beings have the facility of language because of the kind of Being-in-the-world they are—that is, open to entities. In *Being and Time* he writes:

> We do not so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is 'present-at-hand', rather when something within-the-world is encountered *as such* the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world. (1987: 150)

Animals are '*weltarm*', 'poor in world'. Again, that they 'lack language' does not explain why animals are deprived in this context. In contrast to the stone, the animal is not absolutely without access to entities, and in this sense it can be said to have a world. However, in comparison to human beings, the animal is impoverished: its mode of having a world is in the form of not having a world as such. Heidegger's statement concerning the world-poverty of animals is meant to indicate a simultaneous having and not-having of the world, the assumption being that human beings are not simply part of the world but also in some sense have world. In the 1929/30 lectures Heidegger explains this relationship in terms of how the biological drives that characterize the animal organism are 'disinhibited' by external factors, how a circle is put around them: "the animal, when it comes into a relation with something else, can only come upon the sort of entity that '*affects*' or initiates capability in some way. Nothing else can ever penetrate the ring around the animal" (1995: 254).

In his book *Of Spirit* (1989) Derrida has three related objections to Heidegger's account. First of all, he says, Heidegger assumes 'animality' is one thing, that there is "one homogeneous type of entity which is called animality in general" (1989: 57). Heidegger does not speak, or seem to think of, the domesticated animal when he writes (his examples are lizards, bees, moths, worms, amoebas, and so on). That is, he passes over the possibility that a different animal—say, one I live with or alongside—might be in different respects 'another like myself'.

Derrida's second objection is that Heidegger's thesis is circular. How can the essence of animality be determined by a process of exclusion if

one does not have an essential knowledge of what constitutes inclusion in the category animal? "The logical contradiction between the two propositions (the animal does and does not have a world) would mean simply that we have not yet sufficiently elucidated the concept of world" (1989: 51). Heidegger's account of the animal placed somewhere between the stone and man, Derrida claims, has simply left no category of existence *for* the animal.

Derrida's third objection is that the concept of privation or poverty that informs Heidegger's account of animal existence "cannot avoid a certain anthropocentric or even humanist teleology" (1989: 55). That, even though Heidegger wishes to avoid it, "the words 'poverty' and 'privation' imply hierarchy and evaluation" (56). The problem lies with the term 'poor': the animal is 'poor in world' is not to be understood in terms of hierarchical value; the animal is 'poor' does not mean to say in comparison that the human is 'rich' in having world. According to Heidegger, the animal is poor in the world on its own terms, poor in the sense of being deprived.

The question of the hand

The [human] hand is a peculiar thing. In the common view, the hand is part of our bodily organism. But the hand's essence can never be determined or explained, by its being an organ which can grasp. Apes, for example, have organs that can grasp, but they have no hand. The hand is infinitely different from all grasping organs—paws, claws or fangs—different by an abyss of essence. (Heidegger, 1968: 16)

The sentence at the centre of this quotation is, Derrida says, "Heidegger's most significant, symptomatic, and seriously dogmatic"; it is one, he continues, that risks "compromising the whole force and necessity of the discourse" (Derrida, 1986: 173). "Apes, for example, have organs that can grasp, but they have no hand." This statement, Derrida claims, presupposes a sort of empirical knowledge whose evidence is never shown. Heidegger takes no account of zoological knowledge, and its recent rapid expansion, that is to be included under the word animal, or animality. We read here the inscription of an absolute oppositional limit between a human withdrawn from biologistic determination and an animality enclosed with organico-biologic programmes. As Derrida notes wryly, what Heidegger says of the ape without hand is a clear indication that he has not studied the apes in the Black Forest (174). The result of this discussion of the system of limits within which the human hand takes on sense and value is that the very name of the human, his or her *Geschlecht* ('species being')[1] a becomes problematic itself. The human hand, then, is a thing apart, not as a separable organ but because it is dissimilar from other prehensile organs (paws, claws, talons). The abyss that is reinstated between the human hand and the ape's 'paw' is that of speech and thought. "Only a being who can speak, that is, think", Heidegger writes, "can have the hand and can be handy in achieving works of handicraft" (Heidegger, 1968: 16). Thus for Heidegger the human hand has a complex relation to thought and all work of the hand is rooted in thinking. Derrida continues his critique:

1. This word, with its shifting meanings of 'race', 'species', 'genus', 'gender', 'stock', is the title phrase of a series of essays by Derrida on Heidegger: "*Geschlecht:* Sexual difference, Ontological difference" (1983); "*Geschlecht II:* Heidegger's hand" (1986); and "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht* IV)" (1992).

If there is a thought of the hand or hand of thought, as Heidegger gives us to think, it is not of the order of conceptual grasping. Rather this thought of the hand belongs to the essence of the gift, of a giving that would give, if this is possible, without taking hold of anything. If the hand is also, no one can deny this, an organ for gripping (*Greiforgan*), that is not its essence, is not the hand's essence in the human being. (Derrida, 1987: 172-3)

We might say that here that Heidegger's treatment of the animal 'shows his hand'. For Heidegger, the figure of the hand is determined not by a biological or utilitarian function—"does not let itself be determined as a bodily organ of gripping" (173)—but rather can serve as a figure for thought. The essential centre of this meditation opens onto what Derrida describes as "the hand's double vocation". The word vocation describes the way that the hand holds on to speaking and at the same time shows, points out, gives itself as the extended hand. Heidegger writes:

But the work of the hand is richer than we commonly imagine. The hand does not only grasp and catch, or push and pull. The hand reaches and extends, receives and welcomes—and not just things: the hand extends itself, and receives its own welcome in the hand of the other. The hand holds (*hält*). The hand carries (*trägt*). (Heidegger, 1968: 16, translation modified)

The nerve of the Heideggerian argument, as Derrida points out, seems reducible to the opposition of giving and taking: the human hand "*gives and gives itself, gives* and *is given*", like thinking or what gives itself to be thought, whereas the organ (let's call it that) of the ape as a simple animal can "only *take hold of, grasp, lay hands on the thing*", in that it does not have to deal with the thing as such (1987: 175, Derrida's italics). Can the hand change hands? Is it given or taken? What does it mean to be handed over from human to animal? Then again, as Derrida has repeatedly shown in a clutch of diverse texts, "the distinction between *giving* and *taking*" (176) is never one we may be assured of.[2] Furthermore, the hand for Heidegger, as will be clear from the few quotations I have provided, is a singular thing; that is, Heidegger always thinks the hand in the singular—"as if man did not have two hands but, this monster, one single hand" (182), notes Derrida. The human that speaks and the human that writes uses one hand. The human of the typewriter (today we would say of the computer), and technics in general, uses two hands, as does, let me add, the human who milks the cow. So this is why, Derrida writes, "[t]he hand cannot be spoken about without speaking of technics" (169).

The question of technics

However, reading Heidegger on technology immediately invokes a technical problem, the question of translation. With Heidegger, Samuel Weber has written, "what is lost in translation, often without a trace, is a certain practice of language, in which colloquial, idiomatic phrases play a decisive role" (Weber, 1996: 55). The translation of Heidegger's famous

2. See, for example, *The gift of death* (1995) and *Given time I. Counterfeit money* (1992).

paper "The Question Concerning Technology" (*Die Frage nach der Technik*, 1953) confronts us with the problem of translation, the problem of conceptual rendition. First of all, the English translation of 'technology' for '*Technik*' loses this trace of the colloquial. It is, as Weber says, both "too narrow" in excluding the meanings of craft and skill and, at the same time, "too theoretical in suggesting that the knowledge involved is a form of applied science" (60). I shall follow Weber and use the term 'technics' which is less theoretical in English but also, unfortunately, less habitual, than 'technology'.

A second problem arises with the word 'concerning' in the standard title, "The Question Concerning Technology"; this word again is odd because '*nach*' in German carries the primary meanings of 'towards' and 'after'. Let me quote Weber again: "both meanings will play a significant role in Heidegger's train of thought as it moves towards the question of technics, but only by going (and coming) after it in a certain way" (61). Even the word 'question' ('*Frage*') in Heidegger's title designates something "very different from a mere striving after and answer, in the sense of cognition or information" (62). Rather, it involves a movement of opening oneself up to something else which is worthy of being questioned.[3] Weber proposes that the equivocal title be translated as "Questing after Technics".

In "Questing after Technics" Heidegger's position contests the classically mechanistic understanding of technology. For Heidegger, Western metaphysics has not led to human 'progress', but instead to a technological instrumentalism in which everything—including humankind—stands revealed as raw material for the goal of greater power and security. In contrast, the dynamic sense of technics is ongoing and moves away from the idea of a pure and simple self-identity of technology. This is not in itself technical. Again, to quote Weber: "Heidegger leads his readers in a quest after something that is not simply equivalent to technology, although it is that without which technology would not be" (63). The thinking of technology depends upon philosophical speculation, a presentation of philosophy's constitutive inability to think *technē*, but a speculation that transforms philosophy in the process. The approach to the question, the questing, of technics allows the relation between the technical and the human to appear through past failures to think it.

For Heidegger this speculation starts from the distinction between a traditional and a modern technics. His example of traditional technics is drawn from the sphere of pre-industrial agriculture where nature is worked or tilled ('*bestellt*'). But in the era of industrialization, he argues, nature is no longer worked and cultivated (*bestellt*), it is *gestellt*, literally, placed, 'set up' or 'emplaced'. Technics now has the sense of placing nature on order—a sort of extracting. *Gestell*, we must also remember, comes from '*Stall*', once meaning 'place, position', but now, of course, as it is in English, 'a stable or cowshed'.[4] The notion of 'emplacement' (again I am following Weber in using this 'English' word for *Gestell*, in contrast to the standard English translation and subsequent commentary, where it is rendered as 'enframing') assembles the various ways in which everything, animals and human beings included, is set in place.[5] But as emplacement the questing, the on-going of technics has an ambivalent character: the questing brings to a halt, it sets in place; and yet this placement is a constant 're-placing', it is a dynamic process that opens up. It is in his 1926 essay "Why Poets?"

3. See Derrida (1989) for a discussion of "questions opened by Heidegger and open with regard to Heidegger … to the question of the question, to the apparently absolute and long unquestioned privilege of the *Fragen*" (7, 9).

4. Note also the interplay of these terms in Heidegger's 'Why Poets?': "But that which is set up [das Gestellte]—where is it set up [gestellt], and by what? Nature is brought before man by human re-presentation [Vor-stellen]. Man sets up the world as the entirety of objectiveness before himself and himself before the world. Man delivers [stellt zu] the world unto himself and produces [stellt her] Nature for himself. We must think of this production [Herstellen] in its wide and diverse essence. Man tills [bestellt] Nature when it does not satisfy his representation" (2002: 215).

5. Taking up another hint of Heidegger, Weber (1996) also offers the translation of 'skeleton' to encompass the corporeal implications of Gestell.

that Heidegger, following Rilke, reverses his position on animal, being and world and concedes the existence of a community of living beings, "the integral entirety of beings". Heidegger writes in this essay:

> The absolute self-assertion of the deliberate production of the world … is a process that comes out of the hidden essence of technology. Only in the modern era does this begin to develop as a destiny of the truth of beings in their entirety … (Heidegger, 2002: 217)

This is not simply a restatement of the commonplace that we live in a world articulated through increasingly sophisticated technological supports, which, in turn, bring with them a radical transformation of the site of humanity in the world. Nor is it purely a case of a split between the position of an affirmation of the technicization of the world, or simply, in contrast, an affirmation of the human against these very processes of technicization. My argument will be that thinking through the relation between the human and the animal, as begun by Heidegger, will allow us to think through the relation between the human and the technical, in a way that thinks technology without opposing thought to technics. Or, to put this otherwise, my gamble is that it is the question of technics that allows us, *will* allow us, to think the relation between the human and the animal through all the past failures to think it. That will allow us to "take a hint", as Heidegger says, "from the phenomena of advancing technology, a hint in the direction of those regions from where, perhaps, an originary, constructive overcoming of the technical could come" (2002: 217).

At times Heidegger's treatment of the animal, as I have noted, verges on a Cartesianism (what Derrida calls "the Cartesian tradition of the animal-machine that exists without language and without the ability to respond" [2003: 121]): a position which treats animals as little more than machines. This is most clear in a now notorious passage from an unpublished lecture of 1949, where Heidegger adverted to the Holocaust. Interestingly, the title of this piece was "*Das Gestell*", and it was part of the lecture series upon which "The Question Concerning Technology" was to be based:

> Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of nations, the same as the manufacture of atom bombs. ("*Das Gestell*", 1949 lecture cited in Rockmore, 1992: 241)

This comment is perplexing. What was Heidegger thinking when he compared modern methods of farming with the Holocaust? Is this remark a work of deep thought or an obscene comparison? Does it display a shocking insensitivity to the mass murder of the death camps? Which is greater: the scandal of Heidegger's post-war silence on the Shoah or the scandal of this off-hand comment, this sort of throwaway discourse?

On the one hand, Roy Sharp's herringbone cowshed functions as an illustration of Heidegger's statement: it employs a technological means to make efficient a mechanical output. Indeed, the phenomenon of modern mechanized agriculture is so momentous for Heidegger that it is comparable to historical events such as the Russian blockade of Berlin and the American

deployment of the atom bomb over Japan.[6] This race for efficiency—in gas chambers or milking sheds ("in essence the same")—reduces being to raw material. But in its way the herringbone cowshed also suggests that the operative distinction is not between human being and animal, as Heidegger ended up maintaining, but between the lived body and the objectified body, as his analogy to the death camps forces us to consider.[7] As Heidegger had already noted in "The Question Concerning Technology", "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (Heidegger, 1977: 44). Something deeper is going on in the mechanization of agriculture than first meets the eye. For, *on the other hand*, as Heidegger was to fleetingly argue, the *technē* of Sharp's cowshed is not addressed at making or producing certain things, but at the unlocking of being as such.

IV

I want to turn now briefly, before returning to this question of 'the unlocking of being', to the work of someone who has tackled the broader immediate cultural and political stakes of this undersubscribed debate on the technical object, Bernard Stiegler. Technics, as Stiegler points out, is the unthought, repressed by philosophy as an object of thought. He writes: "the meaning of modern technics is ambiguous in Heidegger's work. It appears simultaneously as the ultimate obstacle to and as the ultimate possibility of thought" (Stiegler, 1998: 7). My exploration of Stiegler will also return us for a moment to the question of the hand (of the ape). A central section of Stiegler's first volume on *Technics and Time* consists of a discussion of the writings of the French paleontologist André Leroi-Gourhan and his empirical analysis of the process of hominization based upon the evolution of the prosthesis—something not itself living—by which the human is nonetheless defined as a living being. Stiegler elaborates how this account of the origin of man (in terms of the stone implement or tool) refuses to confront, despite having the terms to do so, originary technicity. In his book *Gesture and Speech* (1993), Leroi-Gourhan grants the prehominid (*Australopithecus*) the possibility of speech, but refuses it the possibility of anticipation (memory and foresight), the symbolic, and the thought of death. Leroi-Gourhan thereby maintains that the technics of the prehominid is still of a zoological type. Hence its language is nothing more than the articulation of an animal cry, a language constituted by signals rather than the general and abstract economy of signs. In other words, the prehominid has none of the (later) human qualities (anticipation, language, the symbolic). It is here that Stiegler mobilizes Derrida to argue that any possibility of speech already rests on a movement of idealization without which there would be no language in the first place, and that this idealization rests in turn on the possibility of anticipation. Stiegler writes: "It is in the aporia of the origin of language that the chasm deepens: what will have come first, language for the foundation of society, or society for a decision on language?" (Stiegler, 1998: 127) As a result, the passage from the prehominid to the hominid, which Leroi-Gourhan wishes to sustain, cannot have a simple origin. Rather this passage, and remember we are precisely here at the moment of trying to think the passage from animal to human, demands to be thought in terms of its impossibility, in terms of the aporia of origin. Furthermore, for Leroi-Gourhan's hypothesis what marks the transition is the technical

intelligence in the use of a stone implement, but at the same time what lies beyond the animal is language, a symbolic transcendence of the technical. In his inability to think through the aporia of origin, Leroi-Gourhan's analysis is thus beset by a *non sequitur*. Technical intelligence ends up by being animal and yet it does not mark the specificity of the human.

By refusing the abyss of essence between *logos* and *technē*, Stiegler is both working within the Heideggerian problematic and overturning it. This realignment with the constitutive role of technics has radical consequences for all of Heidegger's themes, methods and articulations. It should not be forgotten that Heidegger's concern was to understand the animal in its otherness, and to let that otherness be. This understanding was to be achieved, he thought, through an imaginative transposition of the human into the animal. In this self-transposition "the other being is precisely supposed to remain *what* it is and *how* it is. Transposing oneself into this being means … being able to go along with the other being while remaining *other* with respect to it" (Heidegger, 1995: 202). "It is not", says Derrida, "that the animal has a lesser relationship, a more limited access to entities, it has an *other* relationship" (1989: 49). The idea of an "*other*" relationship provides a crucial insight into the possibility of an animal world. Derrida moves the question from one of its existence (does the animal have a world?) to that of the relationship by which humanity might discover the animal world (how can one speak of or comprehend an animal world?). In Derrida's critique of Heidegger, the poverty of animal being presupposes, nonetheless, some mode of having, even as it drifts towards 'not-having'. "The animal is deprived of a world because it *can* have a world", says Derrida (1989: 50). Accordingly, animals are neither reticent inhabitants of the human world, nor are they, like stones, impassive to the environment of entities. Rather, the animal inhabits, even if in a negative manner, a world that is at the same time not a world. It is at this point, declares Agamben, that the ontological status of the animal environment can be defined:

> It is *offen* (open) but not *offenbar* (disconcealed; *lit*. openable). For the animal, beings are open but not accessible; that is to say, they are open in an inaccessibility and an opacity—that is, in some way, in a non-relation. This *openness without disconcealment* distinguishes the animal's poverty in the world from the world-forming which characterizes man. (Agamben, 2004: 55)

V

Giorgio Agamben concludes that from Heidegger's perspective on the 'anthropological machine' of Western thought two scenarios are possible:

> (*a*) posthistorical man no longer preserves his own animality as undisclosable, but rather seeks to take it on and govern it by means of technology; (*b*) man, the shepherd of being, appropriates his own concealedness, his own animality, which neither remains hidden nor is made an object of mastery, but is thought as such, as pure abandonment. (Agamben, 2004: 80)

How are we to understand these projections? And for us they still *are* projections. I will conclude here by trying to get all of my cows out of the Black Forest back into their cowshed. Heidegger's strategy is not simply one of refusal of technology, nor the nostalgia involved in the return to an agrarian condition, but of a new relation of cohabitation and thereby a reconfiguration of humanity itself in relation to being as a whole. For what is most characteristic of 'emplacement' or 'enframing' (*Gestell*), the transformation of the world into a totalized network of resources, is that it is not merely something humans do to an environment, or do with machines but, first and foremost, it is a demand, a requirement they place upon themselves, their transformation into the human resources necessary for total mobilization. This is how the question raised by technics, we might say, points beyond mere technology.

It is in order to describe the face of this 'beyond', and the nature of its 'suspension' of the interval between human and animal, that Agamben turns to two examples to illustrate these two scenarios. First of all, a letter of Walter Benjamin which introduces the enigmatic concept of the 'saved night'.[8] This Agamben elaborates as follows:

> The 'saved night' is the name of this nature that has been given back to itself … The salvation that is at issue here does not concern something that has been lost and must be found again, something that has been forgotten and must be remembered; it concerns, rather, the lost and the forgotten as such—that is, something unsavable. The saved night is a relationship with something unsavable … For modern man the proper place of this relationship is technology [*la tecnica*]. But not, to be sure, a technology conceived, as it commonly is, as man's mastery of nature … The anthropological machine no longer articulates nature and man in order to produce the human through the suspension and capture of the inhuman. The machine is, so to speak, stopped; it is 'at a standstill,' and in the reciprocal suspension of the two terms, something for which we perhaps have no name and which is neither animal nor man settles in between nature and humanity and holds itself in the mastered relation, in the saved night. (82-83)

Agamben's second example is a late work by Titian known as *Nymph and Shepherd* (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, 1570-75) [Figure 4]. There are two figures in the foreground in a dark country landscape. The shep-

8. It is worth noting that Agamben's term 'bare life' ("life that may be killed but not sacrificed" [1998]) also has its origin in Walter Benjamin's work "Critique of Violence", where the term used by Benjamin—bloßes Leben (1996c: 33)—signifies 'bare life', 'naked life', 'uncovered life' or, as in the Edward Jephcott translation of the piece, "mere life". Rodney Livingstone in the same volume translates Benjamin's *Die gerettete Nacht* as "the redeemed night".

Figure 4: Titian, Nymph and Shepherd (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches m, 1570-75)

herd ('the shepherd of being') facing us has just taken the flute in his hands from his lips. The nymph, naked and viewed from behind, lies stretched next to him on a leopard skin, a traditional symbol of wantonness. She has turned her face towards us and with her left hand lightly caresses her other arm. In the distance is a tree that has been struck by lightning and is now half-bare and half-green. An animal (a goat, according to some commentators) rears up to nibble at the tree's leaves. What are we to make of the exhausted sensuality and subdued melancholy of this landscape? It points, Agamben conjectures, to the existence of a space beyond both the figure of the human and the animal, in which neither openness nor concealedness are constitutive of being. It is an image not limited by the contest between human and animal; an image that allows the animal to exist outside the sphere of being; an image that "let[s] the animal be *outside of being*" (91). Agamben writes:

> Sensual pleasure and love—as the half-bloomed tree bears witness—do not prefigure only death and sin. To be sure, in their fulfillment the lovers learn something of each other that they should not have known—they have lost their mystery—and yet have not become any less impenetrable. But in this mutual disenchantment from their secret, they enter, just as in Benjamin's aphorism, a new and more blessed life, one that is neither animal nor human. It is not nature that is reached in their fulfillment, but rather (as symbolized by the animal that rears up …) a higher stage beyond both nature and knowledge, beyond concealment and disconcealment … In their fulfillment, the lovers who have lost their mystery contemplate a human nature rendered perfectly inoperative—the inactivity and *desoeuvrement* of the human and of the animal as the supreme and unsavable figure of life. (87)

Titian's lovers present an image of being in a state of suspension. The lesson that Agamben draws from Heidegger here is one of 'letting be'. He conjectures the existence of a space beyond both the figure of the human and the animal, and within this state being is not driven towards the revelation of being, there is only a 'lost mystery' and a suspension of the desire to look further behind the façade of just being (2004: 87). This same movement allows the human to reconfigure its relationship with the animal within itself. As Agamben observes, if humanity defines itself by its capacity to disconnect itself from its animal connection to its disinhibitors, then it should also possess the capacity to allow the animal to exist outside of the sphere of being, to "let the animal be" (Agamben, 2004: 91). Among the many things at stake here, I have tried to suggest, lies the break with instrumentality at the heart of technics: the instrumentality that holds technics is a means to an end. What Heidegger wants is a conception of technics that is extroverted in a relation of indebtedness to and responsibility toward another. Roy Sharp's herringbone cowshed may mechanize milking but it also opens up the animal as a place of spacing, the spacing of body with natural world, of human body to animal body, of animal with animal. It opens up the possibility of thinking the body as a place of clearing.

We understand such things about animals quite instinctively: we gain entry to their bodily space, whenever animals are treated like objects, when

cows are treated with hormones which grossly increase their productivity of milk but cause them great pain, when they are herded into stalls barely large enough to hold them, when they are mercilessly slaughtered (despite a lifetime of service as milk producers) for their hides. We understand this best, and quite instantly, when we cause animals pain. As deep ecologists have argued in the wake of Heidegger, for humanity to realize its genuine potential, and thus to be authentic, human beings must let animals be what they are instead of treating them merely as resources for human ends. This is the realm of posthuman biopolitics, where to allow the animal to exist outside of being is precisely to remove it from the inquiry of human sujectivity, and thus call an end to the continued determination of life that characterizes the conflict between human and animal.

References

Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life* (D. Heller-Roazen, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Agamben, G. (2003). *Stato di eccezione*. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.

Agamben, G. (2004). *The open: Man and animal* (K. Attell, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Benjamin, W. (1996a). Letter to Florens Christian Rang (December 9, 1923; R. Livingstone, Trans.). In M. Bullock & M.W. Jennings (Eds.), *Selected writings: Vol. 1, 1913-1926*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 389.

Benjamin, W. (1996b). One-way street (E. Jephcott, Trans.). In M. Bullock & M.W. Jennings (Eds.), *Selected writings: Vol. 1, 1913-1926*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Benjamin, W. (1996c). Critique of violence (E. Jephcott, Trans.). In M. Bullock & M.W. Jennings (Eds.), *Selected writings: Vol. 1, 1913-1926*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Derrida, J. (1987). Geschlecht II, Heidegger's hand. In J. Sallis (Ed.), *Deconstruction and philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Derrida, J. (1989). *Of spirit: Heidegger and the question* (G. Bennington & R. Bowlby, Trans.). Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Derrida, J. (1992). *Given time: I. Counterfeit money* (P. Kamuf, Trans.). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Derrida, J. (1993). *Aporias: Dying—awaiting (one another at) the 'limits of truth'* (T. Dutoit, Trans.). Stanford. Stanford University Press.

Derrida, J. (1995). *The gift of death* (D. Wills, Trans.). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Derrida, J. (2003). And say the animal responded (D. Wills, Trans.). In C. Wolfe (Ed.), *Zoontologies: The question of the animal*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1968). *What is called thinking?* (F.D. Wieck & J. Glenn Gray, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row.

Heidegger, M. (1987). *Being and time* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Heidegger, M. (1971a). *Poetry, language, thought* (A. Hofstader, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row.

Heidegger, M. (1971b). *On the way to language* (P.D. Hertz, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row.

Heidegger, M. (1977). *"The question concerning technology" and other essays* (W. Lovitt, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row.

Heiddeger, M. (1995). *The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: World, finitude, solitude* (W. McNeill & N. Walker, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Heidegger, M. (1998). Letter on Humanism. In W. McNeill (Ed.), *Pathmarks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heidegger, M. (2002). Why Poets? In J. Young & K. Haynes (Eds. and Trans.), *Off the beaten track*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 200-241.

Leroi-Gourhan, A. (1993). *Gesture and speech* (A. Bostock Berger, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Naess, A. with D. Rothenberg. (1989). *Ecology, community and lifestyle*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rockmore, T. (1992). *On Heidegger's Nazism and philosophy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stiegler, B. (1998). *Technics and time, 1: The fault of Epimetheus* (R. Beardsworth & G. Collins, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Weber, S. (1996). Upsetting the setup: Remarks on Heidegger's "Questing after technics". In A. Cholodenko (Ed.), *Mass mediauras: Form, technics, media*. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 55-75.

Zimmerman, M. (1993). Rethinking the Heidegger-deep ecology relationship. *Environmental Ethics*, 15: 195-224.

Animation, the Cat, and Escaping Drawing

Sarah Treadwell and Paul Veart

In her essay "Without End, no, State of Drawingness, no, rather: The Executioner's taking off", Hélène Cixous has an explicit and unusual account of drawing:

> *The drawing is without a stop.* I mean to say the true drawing, the living one—because there are dead ones, drawn-deads. Look and you shall see. Barely traced—the true drawing escapes. Rends the limit. Snorts. Like the world, which is only a perennial movement, the drawing goes along, befuddled and staggering, with a natural drunkenness. (Cixous, 1998c: 21)

Cixous raises the possibility that not only might human beings be rent with a shifting animal/human divide, but that drawings too might slip across categorical boundaries that regularly shape knowledge of life and its effects. Drawings, already meshed and riven in terms of technique and content, might also be quickened with the active involvement of time and spatial sequence. In her depiction of drawing Cixous imagines drunken, disruptive movement that is variably paced and unpredictable. Drawing that eludes finish and that seeks passing truth through encounters with error is what interests Cixous; drawings on the run with erratic speed.

For Cixous, Blythe and Sellers suggest, the "practice of working on what moves, on what escapes" is something that "can only be done poetically" (Blythe & Sellers, 2004: 92). Poetic work means allowing for a certain degree of freedom in interpretation—looking for potential for things (words, phrases, drawings) to mean more than their first appearance suggests. In this vein this paper sets a short animation, *Beyond*[1] by Koji Morimoto, alongside the poetic practice of Cixous. Her words are arranged in terms of a perceived correspondence through proximity, as found in the alongside-ness of children's play (an implicit theme of the animation). The adjacency is imagined as a spatial and interpretative potential with animal connections—heightened senses and peripheral vision.

Beyond is one of a compilation of nine animated films titled *The Animatrix*, a joint Japanese-American production that is part of the Wachowski brothers' multi-media approach to the world of the Matrix. The protagonist of *Beyond* is a young woman called Yoko who lives alone with her cat, Yuki, in a small apartment in urban Kichijoji, Japan. Yoko seems to be a typical anime orphan; she searches for a lost cat that is her main source of emotional expression (and the only creature that seems aware of the Matrix). Following some children to an abandoned site with a haunted house, she finds her cat (and herself, in bliss) through an instability in the world. She and the children are eventually evicted from the site, which is then sealed and remade as a parking lot.

1. Released in the same year as *The Matrix: Reloaded*, the second part of the Matrix trilogy, *The Animatrix* was released direct to video/DVD (after a brief cinema release). The nine animations have seven different directors, mostly from the Japanese animation industry. The animation *Beyond* is directed by Koji Morimoto.

Drawing contours

Not all animations constitute 'escaping texts' despite the literal, constructed movement in the drawing. Some animators draw cartoon contours as closures, and never escape them. Cixous wants to draw that which is invisible to the naked eye and impossible to draw, "the quick of life" (Blythe & Sellers, 2004: 25). She sees traces of the quick of life in a rounded appearance that necessarily conceals the lack of pity and the brilliance of horror in drawing.

The animation operating in *Beyond* sets up categories of life through conditions of drawing: categories that, however, leak and reverse. Certain things in the depicted city are drawn without contour and with attention to variations in surface condition, creating a reassuringly stable background—Cixous' rounded appearance. But while the drawing of the city tends to the realistic surface, with its technical assurance and consistency, it also becomes mere backdrop when set against an animated condition.

Things in the (insecure) animal category are drawn with a linear contour and flat colouration and include Yoko, a young girl/woman; Yuki the cat/girl; and a raven, a dove, and a dog. If cartoon drawing is reserved for the animated as a category of the living, then it also spreads into categories that are close to or touch the living: the cat's feeding bowl and Yoko's bed are drawn with pronounced contour. Contour drawing extends the corporeal, even as it fashions it with a line that is removed from depictions of reality, a line that proclaims most clearly its constructed nature.

The film is structured by a line, a linear narrative, which, however, returns. The story starts with a city scene; depressed looking people march across an intersection. A curious melody plays, a refrain, signalling a marking of territory and imminent change. The sound is plaintive and reminiscent of childhood, haunting and repetitive.[2] Another road intersection follows, with the same song, but this time it is empty. The refrain hangs as a faint echo in the air. A crow or raven flies into the intersection; in its blackness, and with its melancholic cry, it intimates doubt or tragedy. The cat, Yuki, strolling into the intersection, scares the bird away.

Cixous uses an image of something breathing under the pen that writes and draws: a beak/pen that sings, eats, pecks and is both a weapon and an instrument. A bird that can be scared away in the combat that is her image of drawing (Cixous, 1998c: 21).

Cats and shadows

Purposefully walking across the square the escaping cat, Yuki, wears a bell (suppression of feral hunting) and is well fed. It also has what could be the mark of a human footprint patterning its body (as a human might wear leopard fur, so the cat's coat is decorated). Yuki, strolling along a wall, purrs until, behind the wall, it sees its own impossibly large shadow projected onto a building. The disconcerting suggestion of a gigantic cat is caused by familiar techniques of architectural drawing—manipulations of scale, skiagraphy and controlling projections.

Cats in the eighteenth century were positioned as moral monsters in that they, like children, represented the asocial. As James Steintrager points out, "cats are the spectre of society's dissolution" (Steintrager, 2004: 37). The curiosity of Yuki the cat leads Yoko to a place that is outside society and

2. The tune is the Japanese folksong "Tohryanse", which contains a metaphor not dissimilar to that of *The Matrix*. This is the concept of the chosen one, such as Neo and Yoko, who have the potential to discover the 'real world'.

in which play rather than law is operative. The curious cat remains potentially the cruel hunter in that it scares the crow and later hunts the white dove associated with transformative pleasure and excess.

In the story "Shared at Dawn" Cixous writes of finding a dead bird caught in a trellis in her house, only to discover that it was still alive and sought by her cat. Instinctively she released the bird to the despair of her cat, who sought the bird in the house long after its departure to the other side of the city. Cixous regretted her action:

> I've betrayed my counterpart, my betrothed, my little bride with the boundless heart; oh my god if that bird comes back I will give it to her I swear—yes it is better that I swear, surer that way, yes, if it came back, I too would play with its lukewarm little body, I'd give it sharp little blows with my paw and I'd slit its throat cheerfully. (Cixous, 1998a: 179)

Cixous momentarily lets the cat in herself surface as she deals with the bird. Invoking the law she swears to sanction her own cat-like desires. Cixous sees relationships between animals and humans in metaphorical, dream-like terms:

> Animals are important for me because I can't imagine human beings other than as animals in transition … I need the instinctiveness and the wildness in a human being. So when I meet people in reality, or in dreams, there's always a kind of animal awake in the person. (Quoted in Blythe & Sellers, 2004: 64)

Drawings, too, are part of the instinctive wildness of the animal, but they are socially conditioned and claimed as combatative. Cixous writes: "… every drawing (is) combat(s) itself. Drawing is the emblem of all our hidden, intestine combats" (Cixous, 1998c: 28). In *Beyond* appetites, senses and instincts are represented, constructed and unknowable.

Yoko, in her apartment, talks on the phone and simultaneously gets food ready for her cat. Yoko is ambiguously child and adult: she lives alone and is responsible for her cat; its physical necessities are a proof of life. Yoko herself is drawn with her body rotating across and around the bed as she chats and looks for her cat simultaneously. Her movements are sinuous and unselfconscious; cat-like, she seems to lack bones.

From her carefully rendered apartment Yoko hears, unnaturally acutely, the sound of her cat's bell in the city into which she descends. The spatial nature of sound is aligned to filmic technique; there is a sudden blackness signalling the erasure of the visual world in the speed of movement. A heightened sense of animal hearing momentarily predominates. Cixous writes with her senses: "by apprehension, with noncomprehension, the night vibrates, I see it with my ears …" (Cixous, 1998c: 29)

After enquiring as to the whereabouts of her cat from neighbours, Yoko is told by a boy that her cat is at a haunted house. Yoko and the children stand on a chain mesh fence and look across the city to the distant site of the house that is marked by a rainbow.

Dogs, butterflies and the haunted house

The film then cuts to the city, where a woman attempts to control a leashed dog as it slavers and barks at the approach of a menacing looking truck. The dog is wild with fear and the woman who holds him seems anxious. Dogs, once wolves, are nervously presumed to be domesticated. In *Beyond* the leashed dog intimates imminent alteration; it barks at that which will eventually destroy paradise. To draw is not to be domesticated, according to Cixous: like the frantic dog that senses destruction, so too painters might draw because "drawing is the right to tumult, to frenzy" (Cixous, 1998c: 29).

Yoko walks towards the barricaded haunted house. It is not a singular house but, rather, a conglomeration of variable structures. She enters the decaying interior that opens into a courtyard and sees a can floating just above the ground. Around it golden butterflies play. Even while the tin floats above the ground it is still subject to gravity that holds it aloft while the butterflies move lightly in three dimensions and, in their animation, actively resist gravity. [3]

For Cixous the relationship between ground and foot, a relationship of gravity, is uncertain: she cannot find firm footing: "Graze the paper with the soul's foot, and immediately the foot slips" (Cixous, 1998c: 29). She writes of an agitation that reigns in drawing—drawing as essay, as trial; the butterflies in *Beyond* point to the provisional nature of the tin's suspension, and the certainty of its fall.

The haunted house in the animation is internally labyrinthine: rather than being a discrete object, it is riven with internal openings. The house has at its (multiple) heart a leak; rain falls in from a broken roof. Mark Cousins has written of the horror that a leaking roof provokes with its undermining of house/body security (Cousins, 1992-3: 37).[4] But the internal cascade in *Beyond* has the opposite effect: gleaming trajectories of water make small bell-like noises and cast prismatic light as a halo; the leak is portrayed as wondrous. For Cixous, far from being damaging, the leak that shimmers, the error in construction, is to be sought: "… to what extent we can't do without the silvery burst of error, which is the sign, [like a rainbow] all those who go by pen don't cease to marvel at this in a similar way, from century to century" (Cixous, 1998c: 22).

Feral processes flourish in the haunted house in *Beyond*. Yoko discovers a dog ravenously eating, and as it eats colour surges through its body. The drawing contours of the dog that indicate both animation and the fabricated aspect of the creature will be obliterated by a colour that becomes coded as evidence of life: food malevolently flushes the body with blackness. The linear drawing that signals drawing-as-animated, and drawing coded as not real, in this scene, becomes invested with drives, with temperament. The dog stares at Yoko, who backs away. Its eyes are red, filled with the blood that will later leak from Yoko.

Hélène Cixous' story "Stigmata, or Job the dog" (1998b) is sited in Algeria after her father died, between the abject misery of an Arab quarter and a French neighbourhood. The dog Fips that she "loved by force, according to the laws of captivity" (Cixous, 1998b: 190) is driven mad by stone-throwing attacks on the house that occurred after the loss of her father's protection.

3. The ubiquitous tin can re-appears at the end of the film when it is kicked by the clean-up agents, when it cuts Yoko's finger and she bleeds and, in the end, when it is claimed by gravity. The tin projects back to the viewer evidence of everydayness even in the marginal world

4. Thanks to Rachel Carley for bringing this to my attention.

We put the dog on a leash and tied the leash to a wire and the wire to an iron posts so he would not kill, we ourselves chained up our own incarceration, we ourselves put my father's heir in irons. (Cixous, 1998b: 190)

The situation worsens with the child Cixous being bitten and the dog eventually dying. Cixous writes:

I should have spoken to him, I should have, if I had been able to understand him but I thought him perhaps incapable of understanding for I was not then capable of understanding the profound animal humanity... . (Cixous, 1998b: 190)

In her story Cixous suggests that time was the problem: time, disjunctions and anachronisms; there was no time. The starving dog that wolfs down some undesirable food (drawn but barely there) seems to be making up for lost time, in its desperation evidence of some sort of failure in sustenance. Cixous writes, "What remains of a sheet of paper becomes a field of battle on which we, writing, drawing, have killed each other ourselves. A flagstone of paper under which a carnage effaces itself" (Cixous, 1998c: 28).

Animated house, surface and ground

While the dog flushes with blackness the sound of crackling electricity indicates an anomaly in the house. A broken light bulb completes itself momentarily and the filament glows. As the electrical pulse fades the light dims and the broken bulb reappears. Electricity, as a form of nerve-signal, pulses intermittently through the body of the house, the same electrical current that Cixous finds between the viewer and drawings that seek the living of life (Cixous, 1998c: 26).

Yoko goes into a dark corridor and, hearing a noise behind her, turns and sees the walls of the corridor delaminate. The pieces of wall (paper) hit her like bats. The unnerving effect extends to the floor on which Yoko sits. Both Yoko and the pieces of wall are made with the same drawing processes; they share the space of house and screen. The screen itself seems to digitally break down and pixilate as the papers sweep along. The sharp speed of the disintegrating walls is confirmation of Cixous' suggestion that "acceleration is one of the tricks of intimidation" (quoted in Bray, 2004: 144).

Conventional haunted house movies rely on a readily acceptable belief that spaces are emotionally charged by events that might be explained by a projection of memories and feelings. But in *Beyond*, rather than being simply alive or subject to projection, the house is undoing, shredding. Walls as rendered background (familiar, rounded) have become delineated, sharp pieces of drawing that move as a "death passing" (Cixous, 1998c: 27).

Ground that, in the dark corridor, was unstable with earthquake effects is, in the next sequence, doubled; an old pavement marked with an arrow is repeated and rotated. On this surface Yoko picks up and cuddles Yuki, who unexpectedly growls like a very large tiger. On the doubled ground the cat plays with Yoko's detached shadow and a small girl, who may be Yoko herself at another time, plays alongside. Shadows may be dark death marks that cannot be illuminated but here carry the human/inhuman interface

lightly, playfully. An interface that outlaws categorical purity for Cixous who leaves "nothing of … pre-classifications intact" (Cixous & Calle-Gruber, 1997: 151).

Feathers, birds and bliss

Children in the haunted house play with gravity, making and unmaking a glass bottle. They dive towards the ground and stop, poised above it as the tracking camera plunges with them. Despite the apparent lack of impact a nose bleeds. Yoko joins the children, as does a white dove. A feather hypnotically rotates before Yoko: she holds it briefly. At the same moment the cat chases the dove, which flies up in front of Yoko. Time suddenly slows down and the bird is pictured as it laboriously climbs into the air. Whiteness descends and touches Yoko, who falls sideways. Slowly and gently she lands, blissful pleasure evident; the viewer shares her spatial alignment.

In the story "Writing Blind", Cixous writes:

> We all like to be to touch—to be touched. … It is with emotion and nostalgia that I touch the soft and ferocious touch of my cat [*mon chat ma chatte*], the cat whose cat I am, and between us no appropriation only moments of grace, without guarantee, without security without a glance thrown towards the following moment. This is jouissance. All now. (Cixous, 1998d: 142)

For Cixous drawing is not necessarily a visual act: "The drawing wants to draw what is invisible to the naked eye" (Cixous, 1998c: 24). Rather than proposing drawing as simply haptic it seems that, like the touch of cat's fur on the back of the legs, drawing is an internal blind exploration—a moment of sympathetic felicity. Cixous draws in darkness and sees what is drawn in the light of day, but the white fog in *Beyond* is a palpable light that touches but doesn't reveal.

Yoko knocks gently on the earth: "Is anyone home?" To knock on the earth is to be a stranger who imagines the possibilities of homeliness. To be shut out, to live for the moment, is, however, pleasurable. "All now", Yoko smiles. Jouissance is often figured as a sort of speed, an "ecstatic flash of new meaning" (Bray, 2004: 144). But for Cixous speed is the antithesis of non-dominative thinking; Yoko falls slowly into pleasure. Speed returns in the film with the arrival of an extermination truck.

In horror movies, bliss (especially sexual pleasure) is often followed by death, but in this case it induces play. Yoko and the children, in the vertical space of the courtyard, joyfully explore time and gentle gravity. Yoko falls in slow motion towards the earth and a small boy catches her by the heel: "light as a feather". Girl becomes woman, cat, bird, feather in a stream of shifty alteration.

It is at this point of pure play, a condition outside economies of production or definition through use-value, that an external observation obtrudes. The ground, on which Yoko lay in bliss, looks up at the scene with a low angle fish eye. Yuki peers into the hole, and a rat leaps out. The stream of rats that then leave the area are a warning: the ship is sinking; floating is no longer an option.

Following the sound of her disappearing cat's bell, Yoko finds Yuki scratching at a red door. Holding the cat, Yoko looks into the space beyond the door: there is only blackness. Cixous describes drawing as a seeking in the dark—a never finished searching that is not directly answered but which provokes other 'secrets' to emerge. Sounds circulate in the blackness before Yoko, repetitions of her conversations, complicating linear time, activating ideas of surveillance.

Reconfiguration: white, blue and red

At this point Yoko and Yuki are caught in the spotlight of a torch wielded by a gas masked rubber clad figure barely discernible as human. "You don't belong here", he says, and drags her away. The city is invoked at this point—the crowded everyday life of a small street (where she presumably does belong), in opposition to the dark nothingness and white bliss of the house.

The forces of law, paternal prohibition, prevail with the children and Yoko being dragged out of the compound. Orders are given to seal off the area and this is achieved with pumped out whiteness. Is this the same whiteness that was associated with bliss, an act of obliteration casting bliss as the loss of self-definition in a merging that is also a forgetting?

The computer screen registers the effects of the house and site as a rendering anomaly and then records a 'reconfiguration' of the location. This is followed by a shot of blue sky which is also a blue screen with its tendencies to isolate and re-imagine context.

The haunted house has become a parking lot behind a mesh fence. The children, bored and sullen, try to activate the site but to no avail. Bottles smash and gravity works as usual. They depart sadly. Yoko standing at the perimeter of the remade site finds the tin can and picks it up—she too tests gravity and time. The can falls. Blood trickles from the cut it has made in Yoko's finger. It slowly winds down her hand and drips onto the stabilised facsimile of ground.

Cixous describes the search for that which it is desired to draw—"the quick of life"—as a series of approximations, something small and precise like a speck of blood, a nail, a needle—small sharp probes which damage. The quick of life, existing both prior and post vision as an apprehension or awareness, can only be approached cautiously, because with its visibility it will vanish.

Blood, the quick of life, which might stand as a proof of the body as an irreducible limit, a mark of biological origin, is problematised in this context. Yoko's body (that drips blood) refers to the computer-programmed bodies in the film *The Matrix*. In *Beyond* Yoko's body is a cartoon body, referring to a filmic body which represents a computer programmed body, and is physically drawn by hand from photographs of a young woman posed to anticipate the construction of the cartoon Yoko.

Yoko's fallen blood might also be a sign of a wounding. For Cixous the wound "is a strange thing: either I die, or a kind of work takes place … It is here that I sense things taking place. The wound is also an alteration. … I like the scar, the story" (Cixous & Calle-Gruber, 1997: 16). In *Beyond* the wound, like stigmata, is a sign of both separation and repair. The story ends with a return to the beginning, a scene of city life in which depressed looking people march across an intersection.

Filmmaker Morimoto was permitted to make an animation about everyday effects of the Matrix provided that the characters did not discover it. In *Beyond*, Yoko and the children do not even seek the reasons for the strange anomalies in their world; the cat Yuki who, being animal, was not hooked up to the Matrix (the law), but was part of the programme, was able to know about its presence. The cat as a systemic anomaly that didn't necessarily work to maintain the system could perceive and enjoy its representational effects: Yuki passed between systems.

Cixous refers to passwords (words that make passage between systems) as "magic *animots*", "animal-words", and registers a crossing between categories. The drawings that constitute the animation *Beyond* might be like Cixous' *animots*. They are of the everyday, fashioned by familiar techniques of animation, but in their representational complexity, in their unreliable categorization of life and the gravitational play that they both enact and picture, they seem to be drawings that cross the eyelid into the openness of the animal.

Wondering about people who seek finish, which she associates with the clean and the proper, Cixous poses a portrayal of truth in drawing that is characterised by a "panting and unstable allure"; drawing that looks to the drawing yet to be made; drawing that sees itself from a distance even as it is emerging.

Perhaps architectural animation needs to acquire such engaged distance, such animal allure, by losing the didactic and linear techniques which proposes architecture as self-evident, needing no telling, no bringing into the world. It might imagine instead a story like *Beyond*—a movie designed, shaped with responsive narratives—a hybrid design, part animal, that is a spatial making that casts genre, categories and orders into doubt. The director of *Beyond*, Koji Morimoto, certainly knew about categorical and temporal leakage: in a discussion on the making of the animation, he started by recounting a story from his childhood when he saw, on the surfaces of his home, the wood-grain move.

References

Bray, A. (2004). *Hélène Cixous: Writing and sexual difference*. Hampshire & N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan.

Blyth, I., & Sellers, S. (2004). *Hélène Cixous: Live theory*. New York & London: Continuum.

Cixous, H. (1998a). Shared at dawn. In *Stigmata: Escaping texts*. London: Routledge.

Cixous, H. (1998b). Stigmata, or Job the dog. In *Stigmata: Escaping texts*. London: Routledge.

Cixous, H. (1998c). Without end, no, state of drawingness, no, rather: The executioner's taking off. *In Stigmata: Escaping texts*. London: Routledge.

Cixous, H. (1998d). Writing blind: Conversations with the donkey (E. Prenowitz, Trans.). In *Stigmata: Escaping texts*. London: Routledge.

Cixous, H. & Calle-Gruber, M. (1997). *Rootprints: Memory and life writing*. London and N.Y.: Routledge.

Cousins, M. (1992-3). The First House. *Arch-Text*, vol. 1 (winter) 37.

Steintrager, J.A. (2004). *Cruel delight: Enlightenment culture and the inhuman*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Architecture = Building + Value:

Exploring the Social Purpose of Architecture

Peter Wood

Architecture and value

I wish to begin with a contrived formula: Architecture = Building + Value. That is to say that the practice of architecture is concerned with adding value to an accepted state known as 'building'. This is a simplistic but surprisingly difficult principle to disprove. It is immediately apparent that buildings, through a utilitarian distinction from sculpture, monuments, or follies and the like, have a value to us, but this value is inevitably defined within a narrow spectrum of functional servitude to human occupancy. Crudely, buildings provide security against unpredictable external factors, and they facilitate and ritualise human existence. At the level of survival, these pragmatic criteria serve firstly to protect occupants and resources from predators and adverse climatic conditions. Only after accomplishing this do they perform a secondary role, organizing controlled and centralised spheres within which ceremonies such as food preparation and consumption can accentuate social groupings and, therefore, also social and cultural developments. Both of these services can, however, in principle and practice, be more than adequately provided for without evoking disciplinary architecture (as vast areas of urban and suburban development testify). The addition I am referring to is a value over and above the survival of a corporeal frame and genetic code: one that instead celebrates being as more than simply a biological creature (or perhaps that should read a simple biological creature). This is alluded to wherever discussion of disciplinary architecture refers to the elevation of a condition sometimes described as the human spirit. This aspect of architectural value encapsulates what is widely thought of as the art of architecture, and as a state surplus to mere biological existence. However, I will not be suggesting that additional value is a worth removed from biological imperatives. Rather, I wish to show that those qualities of human activity that appear to transcend mere animalistic behaviour—and which therefore celebrate human life as removed from just biologically encoded actions—may in fact be pre-disposed tendencies that serve basic and instinctive drives for survival: animal impulses.

Architectural Elaboration

Determining an evolution-based distinction between building and architecture begins by acknowledging the presence of art practices throughout all human society, culture, and history. As evolutionary biologist Ellen Dissanayake (1992) has observed, the universality of what we have come to call art practices can only be accounted for biologically if it satisfies an intrinsic and fundamental human need. Throughout Western history, art has been regarded as a supplement to survival—as a non-essential overloading of resources and time that adds nothing practical to a species' reproductive success. Simplistic opposition to evolutionary arguments often emphasizes art practices, since they appear to contradict basic Darwinist principles with their emphasis on biological survival rather than cultural development (Aiken, 1998). The common problem in readings of this kind is their interpretation of evolution in narrow, pragmatist terms of natural selection. They do not take into consideration the significance of emotional, social, cultural, or ritualistic criteria that are just as intrinsically a part of successful human development.

Geoffrey Miller (2001) offers an example of how an aesthetic sensibility might serve evolutionary interests. He argues that the examples we use in our efforts to distinguish ourselves from the animal kingdom are often striking for the parallels they draw with natural phenomena.[1] He contends that creative and aesthetic displays are 'indicators' for reproductive choice. The importance of indicators lies in their ability to single out individuals, and help them succeed, by demonstrating their advanced intellectual ability. Human achievement throughout history was significantly linked to a creative imagination that helped advance technological fields through invention. Architecture is no exception. In evolutionary terms, the development of tools was a creative step, and may have involved aesthetic principles to identify materials most suitable to pragmatic tasks.[2] In this, artists or architects were able, by making objects 'special', to demonstrate their particular ability—and thereby a particular superiority and desirability.[3]

Miller's assertions owe much to Dissanayake. Where his argument is limited in scope by his interest in reproductive choice, however, Dissanayake makes a greater claim for the significance of 'making special'. She emphasizes that this is the core defining feature of all art practice, and it "casts a new light on previously troublesome questions about the nature, origin, purpose, and value of art, and its place in human life" (Dissanayake, 1992: 52). 'Making special' is an example of added value. While a decorated paddle may be neither more nor less efficient at moving through water, it does offer a stronger commentary on the person who carries it, and the society that produced it. In this case, value consists in a contribution exceeding the purely utilitarian or pragmatic and, consequently, becomes quantifiable as an addition to the pre-existing state. Architecture, too, can be distinguished as a value based addition to a base condition called 'building'. It is this that architects have historically termed the 'art of building', but the usefulness of this phrase is questionable in a period when value judgments are dominated by fiscal concerns.[4] Generally, the role of architecture in society can be seen as a 'making special' of buildings so that, at an urban scale, architecture signals the desirability of a city by demonstrating its

1. For example, see the discussion on the Australian bowerbird by Alphonso Lingus (2000).

2. One reason why architects have retained prominence in contemporary professional circles, despite relatively lower financial rewards, may be the way in which they are able to display their creative strengths, and therefore their suitability as stronger reproductive partners.

3. "Making things special can be done in many ways: using special materials, special forms, special decorations, special sizes, special colors, or special styles. … From an evolutionary point of view, the fundamental challenge facing artists is to demonstrate their fitness by making something that lower-fitness competitors could not make, thus proving themselves more socially and sexually attractive." (Miller, 2001: 281-2)

4. Current developments in architecture that seek to reduce the energy requirements in buildings are an example of 'making special' insomuch as the increase in energy performance has a tangible worth. This I see as a function of the act of building and quite apart from an art of architecture. It is arguable that any building which fails to exploit the full range of its utilitarian and serviceable requirements is, really, something less than a complete act of building (rather than a poor architectural performance).

commitment to human advancement and progress. Such advances, how-ever, remain firmly within a technocratic paradigm.

The key to 'making special' that I am interested in here is the achieve-ment of a heightened emotional experience, rather than physical accom-modation. That we should desire such a state may well be a consequence of the evolution of our genetic makeup, and in times of risk it is essential to our short-term survival and our long-term existence (Dissanayake, 1992: 61). Thus it is the foundation of our animalistic relationship to the world around us. At some point during our evolutionary path, we "deliberately set out to make things special or extra-ordinary, perhaps for the purpose of influencing the outcome of important events that were perceived as uncer-tain and troubling, requiring action beyond simple fight or flight, approach or avoidance" (Dissanayake, 1992: 51). 'Making special' is a biologically en-dowed need. We quite naturally exaggerate, pattern, and otherwise alter our movements or voices or words to indicate that what we are doing is set apart from ordinary states (60-1). It is to be expected that those activi-ties most concerned with human existence also display the greatest degree of ritualised 'special-ness'. Objects and activities associated with impor-tant life events are inevitably given additional value: birth, puberty, mar-riage, death, hunting, warfare, and healing. These are not only perennial concerns for societies that live close to the edge of survival (Dissanayake, 1992: 34): they are also apparent in contemporary Western societies. Grant Hildebrand (1991) has made a compelling case for such 'life values' in the houses of Frank Lloyd Wright, and I would like to further his argument by contending that the threshold of distinction between architecture and building occurs at the point of divergence between two different notions of survival. Building is concerned with the survival of the immediate and singular body. Architecture, by contrast, identifies with the body as a col-lective, community, and especially as a congregation.

In evolutionary terms, 'special-ness' seeks to account for the way in which humans attach complex aesthetic values to essential behavioural pat-terns that support continued existence. The art of architecture is no more exempt from these traits than any other art practice. Studies of human evo-lutionary practices often suffer from an emphasis of individual fitness over social fitness. Since adding aesthetic to utilitarian value appears to offer no immediate advantages to a singular entity, whole areas of human art practice are, within such framework, dismissed as archaic, atavistic, and, ultimately, primitive. However, they can also be read in evolutionary terms as crucial markers of fitness.[5] Dissanayake (1988) observes that there is no such thing as fitness in the abstract. It is by definition a response to envi-ronmental parameters and, while also concerned with reproduction, not limited to overtly practical or utilitarian aspects. In modernist architectural discourse, such markers of fitness were suppressed because of their atavis-tic implications.

Modernism and Evolution

The history of architecture, as written, with its theory of utilitarian origins from the hut and tumulus, and further developments in that way—the adjustment of forms to the conditions of local cir-

5. "To the unsentimental gaze of an evolutionary biologist look-ing for 'selective value,' elabo-rating is truly perplexing. What ends could it possibly accom-plish? The other human capaci-ties described here—mutuality, belonging, making meaning, and developing manual-mental com-petency—all clearly contrib-ute to survival. But elaborating would appear to interfere with fitness, certainly not enhance it." (Dissanayake, 2000: 134)

cumstance; the clay of Mesopotamia, the granite of Egypt, and the marble of Greece—is rather the history of building: of 'architecture' it may be, in the sense we so often use the word, but not the Architecture which is the synthesis of the fine arts, the commune of all the crafts. (Lethaby, 1974: 1)

So begins William Lethaby in *Architecture, Mysticism and Myth*. Where, he asks, does the distinction between building and architecture lie? This is not a moot question but neither is it a categorical one. Lethaby's prejudice is immediately evident where he identifies the distinction between building and architecture as being like the difference between pigment and painting: building is a vehicle for architecture in a linear system that prevents architecture from ever being a vehicle for building. In his terms, buildings realise the 'manifestation and transmission' of architecture and emphasise the appeal of architecture to the intellect. This opposition between the intellectual efficacy of architecture and the corporeal expediencies of the building underlies almost all discourse on the nature of architecture in the modernist period.[6]

We expect architecture to engage with our lives beyond our animalistic tendencies and requirements because we see ourselves as existing in a higher domain than the animal world. All other forms of physical occupancy are, at best, mere buildings. A basic hierarchy of human edifices reflects this: shelter to structure to building and, finally, to architecture. This model is also an evolutionary one: shelter is the plane of the primitive, architecture that of the civilised, and between the two a linear progressive path upwards is emphasised. This is apparent in an architectural discourse that has privileged the primitive hut as the genesis for all architectural developments. For Vitruvius, it was the discovery of fire that led to centralised assembly and, consequently the need for new accommodations. "The men of old," he writes, "were born like the wild beasts, in woods, caves, and groves, and lived on savage fare" (Vitruvius, 1960: 38). Following Vitruvius, the classicist Laugier described the erection of the primitive hut as a direct response to the failings of the cave and the forest floor to adequately service the human desire for comfort—a state beyond survival.[7] In the contemporary writing of Joseph Rykwert, finally, a fully developed theological framework to account for the primitive hut is presented. He writes:

> Whether in ritual, myth or architectural speculation, the primitive hut has appeared as a paradigm of building: as a standard by which other buildings must in some way be judged, since it is from such flimsy beginnings that they spring. These huts were always situated in an idealized past. (Rykwert, 1972: 190)

'Idealized' is a euphemism for Eden. The hut may indeed be primitive but the purpose it serves is of the highest order. To distort Michel Foucault's argument on architecture and institutionalisation, we can hardly speak of God until we can point to a tangible place in which God dwells: worship and architecture become concurrent events. The primitive hut is a useful metaphor for theology, from whose perspective keeping its origins clear of pagan practices is important.

6. I will in this essay refer to writers who are not so simplistic in their structuring of architecture upon intellectual grounds, but I also hope to show that these arguments are often equally awkward in their accounts, and not without their own versions of a polemical stance.

7. "Some fallen branches in the forest are the right material for his purpose; he chooses four of the strongest, raises them upright and arranges them in a square; across their top he lays four other branches; on these he hoists from two sides yet another row of branches which, inclining towards each other, meet at their highest point. He then covers this kind of roof with leaves so closely packed that neither sun nor rain can penetrate. Thus, man is housed." (Laugier, 1977: 12)

Adolf Loos and Primitivism

Adolf Loos' polemical writings are the clearest (but by no means the only) example of a modernist rhetoric that defines human progress as a movement away from an atavistic state. Loos finds evidence of the risk of regression in the ornamentation practices of 'primitive' peoples. In the course of his argument, Loos claims that it is degenerate for a civilised person to dabble in ornamentation, but perfectly permissible for a Papuan to do so because the child-like ignorance of primitivism prevents him from acting immorally. He writes: "… the evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of ornamentation from objects of everyday use" (Loos, 1998: 167).

His stance needs to be understood within a general context of positivist Darwinism. In particular, Loos was influenced by the Italian proto-criminologist Cesare Lombroso, who had a strong Social Darwinist orientation. Central to Lombroso's position on criminal development was the premise that some men are closer to their primitive ancestors than others, which led him to develop a scientific methodology in order to identify, through physiological data, individuals capable of aberrant social behaviour. Abnormally sized hands, bad dentition, and a pre-disposition to express oneself pictorially—especially through tattoos—are all identified by Lombroso as atavistic traits found in those predisposed to a life of crime. His position is surprisingly non-judgmental: in contemporary society, criminals are modern primitive beings who cannot control their regressive biological tendencies, such as laziness and weak-consciousness. The criminal is "a relic of a vanished race" (Lombroso-Ferrero, 1911: 135). In his interpretation of Lombroso's work Loos highlighted a relationship between primitivism and ornament, especially criminality and tattooing, while avoiding the complexities of pictographic meaning in tattooing that Lombroso found so interesting.[8] The result was a simplistic and ethnocentric argument in which Loos attacked ornament as a degenerate expression of production threatening modern life with its atavistic tendencies. He wrote in 1908 that "modern man finds a face more beautiful without tattoos than with, even if the tattoos are by Michelangelo himself. And he feels just the same about bedside tables" (Loos, 1998: 165).[9] For Loos, tattoos are emblematic of an atavistic corruption affecting modern life. Anything exceeding the clarity of immediate functioning represents a dangerous deterioration of cultural progress (Cacciari, 1993: 104).

It is important to emphasize that Loos' argument depends upon evolutionary principles, even as it constructs a notion of spatiality aligned with the tenets of Christian faith (Ewen, 1988).[10] Loos' position reflects a much wider conflict between positivistic science and the prevailing European theological belief systems of the period: for the Jesuit Laugier, the primitive hut already would have represented a metaphorical dilemma. Within a theological model of creationism, the primitive hut is cast as a place of worship—the first House of God.

The primitive hut is a pivotal moment in the development of modernist principles of utility and function, but these doctrines were in conflict with popular ideologies of the period, and held in a tension similar to that between scientific rationalism and Christian theology of the Enlightenment period. It was due to the prevailing influence of this friction that ornamental additions to buildings were seen as serving no purpose other than to identify atavistic (read pagan) tendencies.

8. "One of the strangest characteristics of criminals is the tendency to express their ideas pictorially. While in prison, Troppmann painted the scene of his misdeed, for the purpose of showing that it had been committed by others. We have already mentioned the rude illustrations engraved by the murderer Cavaglia on his pitcher, representing his crime, imprisonment, and suicide. Books, crockery, guns, all the utensils criminals have in constant use, serve as a canvas on which to portray their exploits. From pictogram it is but an easy step to hieroglyphics like those used by ancient peoples. The hieroglyphics of criminals are closely allied to their slang, of which in fact they are only a pictorial representation, and, although largely inspired by the necessity for secrecy, show, in addition, evident atavistic tendencies." (Lombroso, 1911: 43)

9. Massimo Cacciari, on what he calls Loos' anti-ornament 'ethic', writes: "The concept of ornament in Loos hence goes well beyond the facade—it boils down to a concern for the ends of construction, production, and communication. For Loos, as for all the other 'great Viennese masters of language,' ornament is every word that goes beyond the conditions of its meaning, beyond the formal laws of its grammar and syntax, beyond the limits of its function." (Cacciari, 1993: 104)

10. In Loos' most notorious diatribe on ornament, it is possible to exchange the term 'Papuan' with 'pagan' and leave the intention, and syntax, completely intact.

Burke, art, and the Gothic cathedral

At this point I would like to turn to a basic definition of 'art' within evolutionary arguments to explore the theme of the 'art of architecture'. All art, states Nancy Aiken, turns on a biological response to ethnological releasers (Aiken, 1998). A 'releaser' is another type of environmental trigger that, quite literally, releases an emotional and, therefore, a behavioural response. As noted before, the most powerful of these releases are those linked to our survival reflexes, and especially the fight/flight/freeze responses. 'Art', by this definition, can be found in any cultural artefact or event that is able to activate a range of our primary reflexes, but outside of the parameters of actual physical risk. 'Art' is an activator of behavioural patterns so deeply seated in our biological makeup that they should be considered innate to the human condition and not environmentally or culturally acquired. These are generally traits concerned with survival and reproduction, but one response released by art, which Aiken finds with frequency in the built world, is the quality known as 'awe'. Monumental building—in Aiken's words, the "very huge"—is awe-inspiring because it initiates an emotional release of 'magnitude'.[11]

This is by no means a new or even recent observation. Writing in 1757, Edmund Burke identified awe as a division of the sublime, and he, too, found it in buildings of great magnitude. Burke's writing on the sublime, often invoked in contemporary architectural discourse, is of note here for its divergence from conventional architectural treatises of its period. The degree of divergence is evident in his definition of the sublime:

> Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling. (Burke, 1958: 39)

Burke is describing sublimity within a range of behavioural responses that humans are genetically predisposed towards and, while he gives attention to examples of the sublime taken from the Bible, there is an immediate disparity between his proto-evolutionist observations and the prevailing creationist orthodoxy of the time. It may be for this reason that Burke never draws a direct parallel between sublimity and Gothic architecture. As Boulton had observed before, Gothic architecture displays all the qualities necessary to activate sublimity: magnitude, apparent disorder, expressions of immense energy, the gloom of the interior, and in particular the profusion of detail and suggestions of infinity through ornamental traceries (Burke, 1958: 76). The creation of artificial infinity arises, said Burke, from the uniform succession of great parts. Systematically repeating a single sound is one example, as predictable repetition creates an expectation that then organizes a frame of reference for unpredictable change, however subtle. The optical reverberations caused by a uniform colonnade moving through perspectival space is another, but it pales in comparison to the profusion of succession and uniformity that can be provided for in ornamental detailing. For Burke, ornament is the site of infinity in architecture. As our eyes fail in their ability to comprehend the movement and variability found in a complex ornamental system, an illusion of infinity is achieved, and with it

11. "Another possible releaser used in art, but which I found little about in the literature, is monumentality. Something very huge, such as the Sears Tower, the Egyptian pyramids, the Easter Island faces, and the Sistine ceiling, is awe inspiring." (Aiken, 1998: 137)

a reflection on our own insignificance is evoked. Repetition is the simplest articulation of additional value. Whereas one curlicue is unintelligible, an ordered series proves deliberation, control, and emphasis, even as it disappears into the abstract infinity of the composition (Dissanayake, 1992: 84).

It is tempting to read 'infinity' as 'eternity' but this would miss the pagan threat at work in ornament. 'Eternity' can be thought of as a certainty of faith that exists beyond the temporality of mortal existence. We can arrive at eternity. Infinity is the converse. Infinity does not include 'ourselves' but marks out instead a concept of 'self' as nonexistent. This is why it is such a powerful releaser of sublime effect, and also why it challenges architectural thought. Where Burke says "it appears very clearly to me, that the human figure never supplied the architect with any of his ideas" (Burke, 1958: 100), he is dismissing anthropomorphism as a standard of theologised aesthetic beauty. He replaces it with emotive psychology, which treats human existence as a responsive animal behaviour.

Creationism versus Evolution

The processes of evolutionary selection take hundreds of generations. Despite its fervent conviction, modernist ideology cannot undo genetically encoded behaviour or preferences. What works best for human development is not decided by zealots and evangelical movements but is determined, to paraphrase Donald Symons (1992), in the crucible of evolutional time. I believe it is this same crucible where we can begin to fully separate architecture from building. It has been observed that the central evolutionary problem is not survival *per se*, "but design for survival" (Williams in Symons, 1992: 111). What distinguishes the human animal from all others is what Symons calls our "special problem-solving machinery." However, what we denote today as the 'modern' period of architectural development took place within societies with strong Christian ideals that held creationism central to human endeavour. In this context, all profane tendencies would be viewed at least with suspicion, at worst as blasphemy. While there may have been a Newtonian death of God in the sciences, the arts, and especially architecture, continued to uphold Christian values.

The builders of the great Gothic cathedrals still saw no paradox in emotionally manipulating a devout brethren with genetically determined releasers, and thereby demonstrated an architectural commitment to encouraging faith with fear. The breakdown in this successfully co-dependent relationship takes place when Pugin identifies the 'true principles of Christian architecture'. He provides his two rules for design: firstly, that there should be no features about a building which are not necessary for convenience, construction, or propriety; secondly, that all ornament should consist of enrichment of the essential construction of the building (Pugin, 1853: 2-3). In this way, he locates the primary condition of value in the action of building. This is, in its essence, the origin of Loos' anti-ornament fervour. But where Loos condemns ornament outright as an expression of latent primitive tendencies, for Pugin the true purpose of denouncing ornament is a profoundly pious declaration of the faith which architecture must serve. He writes:

The finest temple of the Greeks is constructed on the same principle as a large wooden cabin. As illustrations of history they are extremely valuable; but as for their being held up as the standard of architectural excellence, and the types from which our present buildings are to be formed, it is a monstrous absurdity, which has originated in the blind admiration of modern times for every thing Pagan, to the prejudice and overthrow of Christian art and propriety. (Pugin, 1853: 3)

Both Pugin and Loos refuse the significance of ornament as an additional value to the value of building, and both condemn its use, although to differing degrees. The vital difference here is the debt of service. Loos holds ornament accountable as representative of architecture in decline, and its removal constitutes for him the cultural progress of buildings into a new age. By contrast, Pugin's rejection of ornament is formed inside his Christian beliefs. For Pugin, ornament in building means the ornament of pagan antiquity and to use it in a Christian context is not just atavistic, but heretical. It should be remembered that while ornament is only one expression of atavistic added value, it is the one that has dominated contemporary thought. I suggest that the reason for this dominance is the deep, unresolved conflict between creationism and evolution that the ornamental makes apparent to the external world. Other forms of additional value, such as sublimity, are emotional releasers that act inwardly and thus are less confrontational to absolute belief systems.

"When you boil it all down," says Dissanayake, "the social purpose of art [is] the creation of mutuality, the passage from feeling into shared meaning" (2000: 204). As a species, human beings across all cultures universally display the same set of needs. We need to belong to a social group, we need to find and make meaning, and we need to elaborate these meanings as a way to express their vital importance.[12] Congregational worship is a profound union of these needs as people are brought together by a common belief system, with rituals and iconography that is specifically designed to provide meaning. Architecture is the perfect tool for organizing, focusing, and delivering these rituals. Elaborating on ceremonial meaning—which is to say, providing additional value—is what architecture does well. Architecture is an enhancement of where the everyday is transformed into the sublime.[13]

But visible atavism—be it in the form of classical ornament, repetition, or archaic architectural elements such as the gable—is not merely a reference to other times. It simultaneously denounces contemporary societies who do not have the moral, ethical, or spiritual standards that are being evoked. Unfortunately, the absolute nature of the opposition between creationism and evolution has constructed an impenetrable wall that prevents shared thought over added value. This is not to say that architects do not consciously manipulate physiological or psychological responses to the environments they design—they do—but these qualities are not thought of as 'added' in a manner that conveys architectural integrity. Until we acknowledge animal impulses in our architectural practices, uncertainty over the difference between architecture and building will remain.

12. "My thesis begins with the assumption that it is in the inborn capacity and need for (i) mutuality between mother and infant (the prototype for intimacy or love) that four other essential human capacities and psychological imperatives are enfolded or embedded and gradually, in their time, emerge. Mother-infant mutuality contains and influences the capacities for (2) belonging to (and acceptance by) a social group, (3) finding and making meaning, (4) acquiring a sense of competence through handling and making, and (5) elaborating these meanings and competencies as a way of expressing or acknowledging their vital importance." (Dissanayake, 2000: 8)

13. "Enhancement of space is achieved additionally when, within humanly shaped or elaborated space, the normal everyday arrangement of people in that space is itself altered for ceremonial purpose. Women and men may be spatially separated; performers or initiates may occupy a stage or arena apart from onlookers; some people may be excluded from the proceedings altogether. Dances usually require that individuals form rows, circles, or other regular configurations in space." (Dissanayake, 1992: 113)

References

Aiken, N. E. (1998). *The biological origins of art*. London: Praeger.

Burke, E. (1958). *A philosophical inquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.

Cacciari, M. (1993). *Architecture and nihilism: On the philosophy of modern architecture* (S. Sartarelli, Trans.). New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Dissanayake, E. (1988). *What is art for?* Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.

Dissanayake, E. (1992). *Homo aestheticus: Where art comes from and why*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.

Dissanayake, E. (2000). *Art and intimacy: How the arts began*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.

Ewen, S. (1988). *All consuming images: The politics of style in contemporary style*. New York: Basic Books.

Hildebrand, G. (1991). *The Wright space: Pattern and meaning in Frank Lloyd Wright's houses*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Laugier, M.-A. (1977). *An essay on architecture* (W. &. A. Herrmann, Trans.). Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls, Inc.

Lethaby, W. R. (1974-1891). *Architecture, mysticism, and myth*. London: The Architectural Press Ltd.

Lingus, A. (2000). Quadrille. *Performance Research, 5* (2), 1-10

Lombroso-Ferrero, G. (1911). *Criminal man according to the classification of Cesare Lombroso* (1972 ed.). Monclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith.

Loos, A. (1998). *Ornament and crime: Selected essays* (M. Mitchell, Trans.). Riverside, California: Ariadne Press.

Miller, G. (2001). *The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature*. London: Random House.

Pugin, A. W. (1853). *The true principles of pointed architecture or Christian architecture*. London: Henry G. Bohn.

Rykwert, J. (1972). *On Adam's house in Paradise: The idea of the primitive hut in architectural history*. New York: The Museum of Modern Art.

Symons, D. (1992). On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human Behaviour. In J. H. Barkow & L. Cosmodes & J. Tooby (Eds.), *The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture* (137-159). New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vitruvius (1960). *The ten books of architecture* (M. H. Morgan, Trans.). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Woven Flesh

Albert L Refiti

Openings

A very fine line is woven between the human and the animal (Agamben, 2004), an impossibly thin separation and boundary whose appearance remains concealed to the animal and whose truth-in-total remains dead to man. The animal is blind to the true nature of world and captivated by it; man is world-forming, but hard of hearing to the world that opens towards him. Sight opens the surface of the world to us but will not penetrate the soul—to apprehend ourselves in our totality is to hear it spoken in the open.

This paper then pleads to the quality that allows man to hear the truth-in-total-that-remains-dead-to-man. In paraphrasing Heidegger, to listen to the poetic call and allow the animal a lodging in our being—and in letting the animal be—we are opened twice: to unfold space for the animal is to be folded or opened sideways in a divided symmetry of hospitality and time.

Woven Flesh, the title of this paper, is borrowed from a short passage in the Samoan poet Albert Wendt's poem "Inside Us The Dead" (Wendt, 1976):

> Inside me the dead
> woven into my flesh like the music
> of bone flutes [1]

When Albert Wendt speaks of "inside me the dead"—of the dead or unconscious woven through us, within our bodies—two things are brought together to the surface: the life-less interior and the living exterior. The po-

[1]. The first section of the poem is located at the end of this paper.

etic image suggests that the body is fleshed, stuffed, woven and filled out with the life-less. The poem says that this thing, "the dead" inside us, is like "sweet-honeyed tamarind pods" ready to "burst in tomorrow's sun", or like "plankton fossils in coral alive at full moon". It is at the point of bursting, in readiness pulsing, pulsing … to overcome. The poet's voice is directed inward—becomes an inward bodily gaze of absolute flesh, full and alive with depth, abominable depth. This calling-in-the-deep is directed to both sides of the body, to the unconscious side and the conscious side. By the quality of poetic calling, the opening of the world through words will implode to reveal a depth that rests inside us. The sense of this unconscious world is made by the word, captured and taken by the language of the world. It is a language familiar to us, made to look and reflect on our present. But between the word and the image, the poet's voice begins to crack and suspend our reality, for a moment, as it calls and mourns the present of our immediate reality while, at the same time, directing itself inwards to the gap-between-man, a vortex in the soul.

In *The Book of the Black Star* (Wendt, 2002), Wendt adds to this turn and intimates that this inward gaze is "a fathomless pool of black light that had witnessed our beginnings in Tagaloa-a-lagi's amazing eyes".[2] Wendt seems to suggest that The Black Star, or *Fetu uliuli*, is an ancestral impulse that clots the veins from the inside like a swollen vessel—a 'spaceship'—that pushes from the gap-between-man. On the surface, The Black Star hovers in the darkness.[3] The poet says that The Black Star was born from its birth-sac before the first dawn, in an offering of pain and wonder to the universe: "born before Tangaloa-a-lagi invented the Alphabet of Omens".[4]

In his attempt to draw this poetics out, Wendt literally draws by tucking and pulling with lines that scribble, weave and tie up words. In trying to write with lines and vectors, he draws like a partially blinded man. Words are world-forming in their geometrical certainty, whereas lines only describe an intention located elsewhere. The poet's blindness lies between lines and words and, in his uncertainty of sight, he relegates the words to Braille-like marks on the page, embossed in the darkness between lines and vectors.

This unsighted quest proposes two visions for The Black Star: firstly, as a continuous outward force that moves and cuts across space—across the page and across the soul; and secondly, as inward migrating lines that interweave to make the birth-sac, which returns life to its origin in threads that inwardly entangle the soul. The Black Star's dual movements, outward and inward, are two moments in an oscillation between capture/release, between cradling/escaping, and residing/roaming. These qualities mark the differences between the two poets whose works I am theorizing here: one resides and calls to the depth of man, the other is a nomadic prophet who butchers the surface of man. Albert Wendt is of the first kind, and John Pule of the other.

Surfacing, Wendt cradles and secures the gene-archaeological matter.[5] He draws for us the inward movements that weave us to the abominable depth of textile-like surfaces—made from bounded and tangled threads, in scribbles of soft lines woven within and without, which confuse orientation in space. His materiality of animate space is absolute flesh, at the point of bursting.

2. See Figure 2 (Wendt, 2002).

3. "Last night before dawn while the cold foraged thru' our backyard, the Black Star hovered above Ponsonby right over our house. Yeah, it was like Close Encounters of the Third Kind and I opened my window to it, Sam said. Yeah, and opened my pores to its converting light and deep scent of space-travel, oceans without end, and God. But you don't believe in God, I said. Now I do, he smiled." See Figure 8 in Wendt (2002).

4. See Figure 1 (Wendt, 2002). Tangaloa-a-lagi is widely accepted as being the first God of Samoa and Polynesia.

5. In Polynesia and the Pacific, genealogical ties with family/village/community/ancestors are the foundation of the individual; thus, a person is made from gene-archaeological matter. This involves the understanding that you—your body and being—represent a line of ancestors/land/community/family, which are part of you. Your body and your make-up belongs to the ancestors, to your *fanua* (the place of birth), and to the community that shaped and cared for you. Consequently your 'being there' allows these ancient bodies to be present, too. This gives meaning to *va* relationships—*va* spaces, that which is in-between us that is more than you and me, what in you that is more than you. See Wendt (1999: 399-412).

Figure 2: Albert Wendt, Ua fanau mai le Fetu Uliuli. 2001, ink on paper

Wendt intimates that Tagaloa-a-lagi's *will* is woven within this very depth *between*-man. Man's beginning follows an impulse that forces the Black Star across the surface of being, in a movement outwards to the world. Tagaloa-a-lagi is the original point of reference: the word *loa* (Pratt, 1984) in the name means 'longing' or 'to be long since'. It also refers to a family tomb built over with stones, and means 'of time and measure' when use in the plural *loaloa*. Depth of time is accumulated in and on the body, which is often dismissed when life passes. Wendt suggests that dying is not the passing of life, nor the nullity of being, but the accumulation of layers fortifying the ancient body within. Death is an inward-turning thread, weaving another layer in the abominable depth between-man which closes further the surface of the world, like a healing that leaves a scar. Therefore, the place of the dead—the tomb—is not the end of man but merely one point in the continual re-housing of man's ancestors; in the accumulation of stones upon stones, of layers upon layers.

Another way to think of this house of the ancestors is as a textile-like dwelling, a *taga* (or sac), a woven textile vessel. The poet's drawing of the intertwining lines describing the blood-clot-like birth-sac of The Black Star is an example. *Taga* (Pratt, 1984) refers to the idea of continuity, as in the expression *tagafa*, which means 'to have numerous offspring from many wives', or widely spread family connections. The ancestral sac that weaves life outwards creates people: *taga* + *ta*, which is the Polynesian word for people. It literally means 'a sac made in time'; *ta* is to strike time and to make time, thus *tagata* has the literal meaning of 'woven time'.

We've arrived at the surface of things, on the wave of time. According to the poet's logic, the human is woven in time and from the threads/lines of the ancestors, which reach deep into the abyss of time. The impulses are gigantic layers of presence, a gene-archaeological matter, a force that swells from the inside and through us. There is something in us that is more than you and I. My body/this body/our body is a fortuitous thing, a timely reorganization of the gene-archaeological matter. This way of thinking bears close affinity with Friedrich Nietzsche's thought; Nietzsche held that the question of man is, in the long run, irrelevant since *man* is to be overcome (see Klossowski, 2000: 34). In this overcoming we may present ourselves to the world with an understanding of truth-in-total: that our bodies, our beings, are woven flesh whose strands are ancestors, land, community, family. Because we are woven from the flesh of the others, our body belongs to the ancestors; we are a locus of an ancestral impulsive being.

Calling

> woven into my flesh like the music
> of bone flutes

Implicit in this silent world of the dead is a critical reflection of our present—the now. Wendt's call suggests that the music of bone flutes is not a fanciful one, but rather mournful, gathering, remaining. Bone flutes make an eerie sound not quite of this world—there is always a reverberating echo that draws away from the present. A guttural sound, it will not resonate with our immediate surrounding because, as the poet suggests, our world is a vacant one, a bony hollow shell. The ancestral is but an eerie sound, an echo bouncing between the recesses of our hollowness, and the music of bone flutes mourns us in our forgetfulness. In the music's lamenting tenor we are drawn inward, reminded that we are dead to this unconscious world of the ancestors. We are not conscious that we are a passage of the dead, destined to make a way for them.

By making us listen to the music of bone flutes, the poet's critical voice reminds us of our forgetfulness. We forget mortality and the fate of our bodies and we are oblivious, many times over, of the dead that we are. In our contemporary lives this interior world is muted and we are deaf to its call. We do not apprehend ourselves in our totality and refuse to hear the call that is spoken in the open.

A radical proposal would be that our body is *pulotu*. In Polynesia, *pulotu* is both an abyssal corridor and the abode of the dead (Pratt, 1984). As *pulotu*, we become the living-dead that straddles/houses/bridges the two sides of the truth-in-total—the inside/outside, unconscious/conscious. We stand between two sides, our selves but porous boundaries made in the present. We allow things to form through our being as thresholds, which house the dead on one side and the living on the other. As the birth of the The Black Star suggests, the dead has been a resident in our bodies since the beginning.

In Polynesian mythology, *pulotu* is always located to the west, towards the setting sun. *Pulotu* is a temporal space that relies on the setting sun for certainty of place—it follows the setting sun, always; its temporal dimension is that of the day's shadow and of the end of the day. As *Pulotuans*, we are creatures of the shadow resonating in the present. The word *pu* means a crevice or a crack in the ground, and is also the word to describe the deep hollow sound made by the conch shell; *lotu* is the word for religion and prayer. If we are the location of *pulotu*, this threshold between past and present, then we are also the prayer-wish made in the deep hollow by the ancestors, an echo shaped in the recesses of our hollowness. Therefore, we are opened up to the present by an ancestor's call "like the music of bone flutes".

Lemi Ponifasio has suggested that the fate of the body is bound by a particular constitution: *Mau a le Tino* (Mau Dance Theatre, 2000). Mau is the sense of holding or clasping something between.[6] In context of the motto *Mau a le tino*, there is also a reading which suggests the 'holding of the self in-between'. *Tino* (Pratt, 1984) is the word for flesh, or the body, which bonds the self to the surface of the world. This 'holding of the self in-between' refers to the space-between of the *va*: the temporal space that opens up the world and tends to the relational activities of Polyne-

sian culture (Refiti, 2002: 209).[7] If, as the locus of *pulotu*, we are a threshold for the dead, then our body is the ultimate *va*—a porous boundary between the ancestor and the world. Our bodies, both as *va* (space-between) and *pulotu* (abode of the dead), allow the past and future to arrive in the present.

Residing

A very different quality is heard in the poetic call of the Niuean artist/poet John Pule. If one hears the gentle rolling surface of the ocean in Albert Wendt's voice, then Pule speaks with a cyclonic voice that wants to force the world. Wendt's call is to the depth residing in man, a depth that remains captivated by the woven flesh-upon-flesh, which binds man to the gene-archaeological matter. With Pule, the poetic call arrives in a dazzle of multiple realities that strike the surface of man—breaking up his habitual cloak and making him scream. A passage from *The shark that ate the sun* bears witness to this:

> The Black god tore my chest open like lovers do, and the first thing he grabbed hold of was the state house he tore from the earth, and blew the windows out, opened the door and sucked out the sad mothers of Polynesia, the sad men, the sad children. (Pule, 1992: 9)

In these multiple attacks on the body, Pule attempts to pierce the flesh and unfurl the abominable monsters in man's depth to collide with our world. Pule's poetics is a 'forcing apart' that creates openings in the ancestral flesh, allowing us to pry into these hidden interior worlds. They are littered with creatures half animal and half human, devouring each other in a continual spiral that returns to itself. Animals roam and lodge themselves in our flesh while defecating on shoulders of other animals (see Plate 1).

Echoing the fictional world of his writing, Pule's paintings and drawings also show the savagery dealt to the body: its surface is sliced open and the canvas-like flesh of ancestral depth is hung on the gallery walls for inspection. This is the art of the savage cut, of the fresh kill hung from hooks arranged in a butcher's display window. It is visceral stuff, without niceties about the outside world or respect for the internal depth of man. What a contrast to the poetics of Wendt, which mourns and calls to man's forgetfulness of the ancestral flesh that is woven through us!

In the drawing suite titled 'Death of a God' (in the exhibition *People Get Ready*, held at the Auckland Art Gallery in 2000), Pule subjects our eyes to the kerfuffle and noisy montage of woven flesh between man/God/animal/plant, and in our fascination we are riveted to its unseemly sight which solicits our own monstrous depth to break forth and feast on the living. We are drawn to the fanfare of Pule's world as carnival of the dead. The entrails that lie flailing on the surface bear the truth of man—his overcoming. This overcoming, according to Deleuze, is only possible in Nietzsche's Dionysian *Superman*. The superman's qualities, "impersonal individuations" and "pre-individual singularity" (Deleuze, 2004: 139), are rendered discernible on Pule's slaughter table.[8]

6. Thus, when one is constipated there is a holding in place between inside and outside and the body becomes conflicted, because it is caught in-between.

7. It gives everyday life the continuity of affects that are inherent in each individual of the community. The va is the law that does not sit still in one place, but is rather a law continually activated when bodies are gathered in a particular space, such as the space of rituals. Each body's va becomes activated by the ritual in a collective willing that rules the community.

8. It is worth noting that Pule, in laying bare the flesh of the dead on the operating table of consumption (the white-washed gallery walls), tries to literally prop up the scenario for us to see. It is not enough to rip open the body and lay it on the table for inspection. The poet wants to present it to us on scaffolding, a carefully constructed architecture that props up woven flesh.

Pule constructs image-fragments in sequences that are sometimes held within *tapa*-like frames; sometimes they resemble pictographic scenarios ruled by lines and drawn from *tapa*.[9] In the works of 2001-2003, especially the drawings of the poem "Death of a God" (Pule, 2000), the lines constructing the images are literally drawn-out, pulled and tugged away from the written words and lyrics of the poem—no longer illustrations of the narrative but creatures fleeing from it, littering the pages, and either containing dead bodies or having been butchered themselves.

In more recent work, Pule suspends image-fragments inside clouds that are buried deep inside the earth, or inside a body. The clouds are smeared with blood: not at all the elevated clouds of heaven. They are shown to us in a sectional cut taken through the ground as body of the ancestors, revealing frenzied and dazzling worlds in archaeological layers twined together by vines and roots. Almost cinematic, this architecture of poetic images consists of montages that collapse the space of the narrative and image-words onto a single surface. In this architectural making, the plan of the building and the actual object are allowed to exist together in the same space.

In his essay "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1975), Heidegger suggested that since man has lost the ability to dwell, architecture and other attempts at the housing of man are futile endeavours.[10] Perhaps only in poetry can man begin to reside again in a meaningful relationship with the world. Pule's attempt at architecture is certainly not a project to recover this quality in a poetic calling. Far from it, his architecture is an apparatus that is absolutely destructive to the condition of 'saving' or 'of letting be'. He attempts to murder any attempt at reaching redemption in our depth, and wants to overcome man and all his efforts to place himself at the pinnacle of thought. Thus, Pule pins man to the surface of our desires and invites us to feast on him, to become animal.


Figure 3: John Pule, Niniko Lalolagi - Dazzling World (Detail), 2004, oil and ink on canvas.

Lodgings

In John Pule's pictographic/poetic world, all types of animals are lodgers inside bodies. *There is the shark*, from whose skeletal frame our flesh is made to hang in The Shark That Ate the Sun. And there are birds that lodge themselves inside the throat of poets and prophets. For the most part in this book, the poet wanders the street and alleys of the modern world, on a journey to reconcile his restless ancestral being of family/land/community in Niue with the modern world of migration and poverty in the streets of Auckland. The poet is planted with seeds in his throat so as to lure birds to feed and lodge themselves there.

> My family could plant a seed in the bird's beak, spreading my words, because I am a giant in a small world and I have to be heard. (Pule, 1992: 14)[11]

The animal that lodges in the throat of the poet gives him the power to speak with the voice of a cyclone. The gift tempers the body and opens up a space from which visions can grow. The event transforms the poet and, at first, he is confused and stunned by the visions:

> What does the poet save from the thousand glimmering stars up there in the heavens, every single fire a god's eye or animals migrating into the dark? Desperately I try to hold the golden grain, the seed, iridescent mineral, deep-sea fish, dolphins, looking for answers … I open the area that is temporarily closed by a dream, and inside a festival of dancers throw laughter at me, covering my eyes …
> I, the one stepping into the dark, my days full of the world, go out of the one to find the voice … Afraid to dwell, as subconscious hope has lost reason, so we cling to violent energy which takes on the appearances of beautiful haloes. (Pule, 1998: 27)

As spectators of Pule's journey as an uprooted prophet, we may have difficulties in fixing exactly where the voice and visions of the poet originate from and to whom the text is addressed. Double-edged words and images run amok in this vision; tension and suspense run in opposite directions *and* parallel to each other at the same time, and overload the senses. The poet's tongue twists, overwhelms and breaks words. Something is always let loose, drawn out, pulled apart and frayed at the edges.

In Pule's work, the animals that inhabit our bodies remain within us as temporary lodgers—when the body passes away from the world they will depart from us in trails. When poets and prophets are about to die, little critters literally pull the threads of life from their bodies as they unravel being from the depth. The poets' woven flesh is scattered to the earth: they do not return to an abominable depth. Because poets and prophets possess the gift of vision they are only allowed to live in myths. Pule intimates that the animal escapes us when the dead is no longer living, while it will become our lodger when the dead is within us. He also suggests that the poetic voice emerges only when the dead is made to speak through the animal that lodges itself in the throat.

11. Or, elsewhere: "My great grandfather Pa … saw the *kulukulu* leave my mouth, which was an omen of song. Salona and Pa talked incessantly through the first night of my cries, interpreting movement of certain birds that coincided with my sighs and pauses." (Pule, 1998: 9)

Prologue (Wendt, 1976)

Inside us the dead, | like sweet-honeyed tamarind pods | That will burst in tomorrow's sun, | or plankton fossils in coral | alive at full moon dragging virile tides over coy reefs | into yesterday's lagoons. | 1. Polynesians | Inside me the dead | woven into my flesh like the music | of bone flutes:

my polynesian fathers | who escaped the sun's wars, seeking | these islands by prophetic stars, emerged | from the sea's eye like turtles | scuttling to beach their eggs

in fecund sand, smelling | of the seas—the stench of dead | anemone and starfish,

eyes | bare of the original vision, burnt | out by storm and paddles slapping

the hurricane waves on, blisters | bursting blood hibiscus | to gangrened wounds salt-stung.

These islands rising at wave's edge— | blue myth brooding in orchid, | fern, and banyan; fearful gods | awaiting birth from blood clot | into stone image and chant—

to bind their wounds, bury | their journey's dead, as I | watching from shadow root, ready | for birth generations after they | dug the first house-posts

and to forget, beside complacent fires | the wild yam harvest safe in store houses— | the reason why they pierced the muscle | of the hurricane into reef's retina, | beyond it the sky's impregnable shell; | and slept, sleep waking to nightmare | of spear and club, their own young— | warriors long-haired with blood | cursed, the shrill cry | of children unborn, sacrificed.

No sanctuary | from the sun-black seed | inside the self's cell— | coral lacerating the promise, | self-inflicted wounds at the altar | of power will not heal.

References

Agamben, G. (2004). *The open: Man and animal*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Deleuze, G. (2004). *Desert island and other texts*. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).

Heidegger, M. (1975). *Poetry, language, thought*. London: Perennial Library.

Klossowski, P. (2000). *Nietzsche and the vicious circle*. London: Athlone Press.

Mau Dance (2000). *Boneflute iviivi*. Maidment Theatre Performance Catalogue.

Pratt, Rev. G. (1984). *A grammar dictionary of the Samoan language*. Papakura: R. McMillan Publisher. (Original work published in 1893.)

Pule, J. (1998). *Burn my head in Heaven*. Auckland: Penguin Books.

Pule, J. (2000). *People get ready* (exhibition catalogue). Auckland Art Gallery, October 2000-February 2001

Refiti, A. (2002). Making spaces: Polynesian architecture in Aotearoa New Zealand. In S. & P.F. Mallon (Eds.), *Pacific art Niu Sila: The Pacific dimension of contemporary New Zealand arts*. Wellington NZ: Te Papa Press.

Wendt, A. (1976). *Inside us the dead*. Auckland: Longman Paul.

Wendt, A. (1999). Afterword: Tatauing the postcolonial body. In V. Hereniko & R. Wilson (Eds.), *Inside out: Literature, cultural politics and identity in the new Pacific*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wendt, A. (2002). *The book of the Black Star*. Auckland: Auckland University Press.

Frontiers of Shame and Repulsion

A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul

Introduction: Sydney 2004, Anaura Bay 1769

At the 2004 Sydney Biennale a "traditional wooden dunny" (Bond, 2004),[1] imported from New Zealand, featured centrally in Daniel Malone's *A Long Drop to Nationhood*. Set at the end of a long corridor and flanked by a mural inspired by Aboriginal artist Albert Namatjira, it is intentionally reminiscent of a scene in Tracy Moffatt's short film *Night Cries*, where an adopted Aboriginal daughter wheels her white mother to the outhouse. The outhouse, an "essential common denominator of two closely linked cultures" (Wei, 2004), according to Malone represents the pioneering spirit of the 'colonial adventure' in both Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand. Engaging "with questions of belonging and place", he also plays on the contrast between the outhouse as "fundamentally associated with waste" and the museum as a place concerned with "high eternal values" (*Daniel Malone*, 2004). To interrogate such a body/mind split, alongside the cliché of the South as body and emotion, as opposed to to the North as mind and reason, was the concern of the Sydney Biennale *On Reason and Emotion*.[2]

Figure 1: Daniel Malone, A Long Drop To Nationhood, 2004, Readymade Kauri wood outhouse, wall mural, video with sound, export/import documentation, Dimensions variable. Photo Jenni Carter.

1. According to Tony Bond (2004), Malone talked in the catalogue "about the need for us, in Australia, to recoup our Aboriginality if you like. To acknowledge, in fact, that this is an indigenous country and not a colony." Malone, in fact, used excerpts from Germaine Greer's "Whitefella Jump Up: The Shortest Way to Nationhood" in the text of his catalogue entry rather than making his own artist's statement.

2. Thus, curator Isabel Carlos (2004) wrote in the catalogue: "The 'emotional' in Western societies has been connoted, almost to the point of cliché, with the south" (24). "In a conventional dichotomy we would say that the south is the body and the north the mind but, believing this to be a false dichotomy, one of my aims was to bring together artworks that create a total physical and psychological experience" (25).

3. Interpreting the installation as an equation of colonisation with defecation, Nova Paul commented: "Malone identifies the long drop as belonging to both an Australian and Aotearoa/NZ architectural vernacular … ingrained as part of our cultural identity; backward, funny and awkwardly displaced. It is this figure of the long drop that is activated in Malone's installation that addresses colonisation and sovereignty" (Paul, 2004).

4. Anaura Bay is located in Poverty Bay: http://southseas.nla. gov.au/journals/maps/17691029. html.

5. Similarly, a delegation protested in the seventeenth century at Troyes, when the mayor tried to close the rue de Bois, a public latrine: "Messieurs, our fathers have shit there, we shit there, and our children will shit there" (in Guerrand, 1997: 17). In 1894, a law concerning hygienic improvement in Paris "met with strong hostility from landlords, for once united in opposition to this collectivist and tyrannical infringement of their rights" (Perrot, 1990: 372).

6. Elias emphasised that, while the civilising process in Europe had no zero point, new codes became visible in these texts. They were a response to an increased population at the courts, and later in the cities. Not only did this new situation require different hygienic conditions, people were also bound together by what Elias calls "lengthening chains of dependence".

7. See Freud (1930: 296), Nietzsche (1884b: s.59, s.179) and Klossowski (2000: 26-30, 44-46, 257). Toilets are, from the beginning, tied up with the "traumatic excess" they cater for—"according to Lacan, one of the features which distinguishes man from animals is precisely that with humans the disposal of shit becomes a problem" (Žižek, 1997: 5).

In Malone's work mind and body, North and South, and settler culture and indigenous culture congeal "in the form of a dunny" (*Biennale of Sydney Volume 1: Cake*, 2004).[3] But how much are perceptions of the dunny as an icon for 'Down Under' based on facts, and how much are they an investment in conventional notions of top and bottom, centre and periphery? After all, the privy was a common feature in Europe at the time of colonisation, often paired with appalling hygienic conditions. In contrast, one of Cook's crew noted at Anaura Bay, in October 1769, that "every house, or every little cluster of three or four houses, was furnished with a privy, so that the ground was every where clean. The offals of their food, and other litter, were also piled up in regular dunghills …" (Hawkesworth, 1773: 312).[4] Hawkesworth compared this favourably with conditions in the capital of a European nation, Madrid, where privies were rare until 1760. Prior to that, it was "universal practice to throw the ordure out of the windows, during the night, into the street, where numbers of men were employed to remove it, with shovels" (313). This appeared to contemporaries so normal that a Royal proclamation ordering proprietors to "build a privy", and announcing the construction of "sinks, drains, and common-sewers … at the public expence [*sic*]" was seen "as an infringement of the common rights of mankind" and met with great resentment (313).[5] The situation in the British capital was hardly better: the River Thames served as the sewer for a population of two million in 1830. In Manchester's Parliament Street, "one single privy" served "three hundred and eighty persons" in 1851, and "in Parliament Passage … thirty thickly populated houses" (Engels, 1845).

So where do notions of the North as mind and South as body originate? How can they be so persistent, despite contrary facts, that Malone and others see the need to engage with them and meet resonance in the audience?

Civilisation: A long process of separation

Between the eighteenth and the twenty-first century, according to Norbert Elias, a process that had been underway in Europe for some time reached a new stage. In *The Process of Civilization* (1939), Elias traces in historical documents a long-term development in European courts and cities. Over the course of this development, however, people eventually came to think of their civilisation no longer as a process but as a universal standard. Long sections of Elias' investigations are concerned with sixteenth century humanist texts, in which an unprecedented plethora of rules and regulations concerning the "natural functions" emerges.[6] Much greater control of affects and impulses was called for, and this changed people's relationships with their own bodies and those of others.

Elias was theoretically informed by Sigmund Freud's ideas in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), in which civilisation appears as a burden that must be borne so as to avoid worse evils. Freud, in turn, owed much to Friedrich Nietzsche's thought, who once wrote that the difference between animals and humans depended on the latter's development of a plenitude of conflicting drives and impulses. Their synthesis, precisely, makes humans the masters of the earth. Nietzsche regarded the cerebral organ, just like the rest of the body, as the product of a confrontation of fortuitous impulses—each of which "would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate LORD over all the

other impulses" (Nietzsche, 1886: s. 6). The intellect as an apparatus for self-regulation (Nietzsche, 1884a: s. 179), however, strives to sustain its position at the 'highest' extremity: high and low come to mean more than spatial positions (Klossowski, 2000: 26). Hierarchies of top and bottom secure the mastery of conflicting impulses.[7]

If Nietzsche prefigured some of Freud's insights into the relationship between impulses (or drives) and intellect (or *ego*), Elias historicized them by tracing the construction of selfhood since the fifteenth century in European courts.[8]   He observed how "pleasure-promising drives and … socially generated feelings of shame and repugnance, come to battle within the self" (Elias, 1939: 160). Analogous to Freud's *superego*, "the social code of conduct so imprints itself … on human beings that it becomes a constituent element of their selves". This leads to a "pronounced division in the 'ego' or consciousness" as a "characteristic of people in our phase of civilization" that "corresponds to the specific split in the behaviour which civilized society demands of its members" and "matches the degree of regulation and restraint imposed on the expression of drives and impulses" (160).

However, whereas Nietzsche still used metaphors of body and intellect almost interchangeably,[9] Elias already took their division almost for granted. Further, the *ego*, in his thinking, not only mediates between conflicting impulses but also between impulses and the social commands of an era:[10] changing social imperatives can advance the frontiers of shame and render previously inconsequential impulses intolerable.[11] Thus "Changes in Attitudes Towards the Natural Functions" become apparent in humanist books on manners from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. In 1530, Erasmus thought it necessary to point out that it "is impolite to greet someone who is urinating or defecating" (*De civilitate morum puerilium* in Elias, 1939: 110) and Della Casa repeated in 1558 that it "does not befit a modest, honourable man to prepare to relieve nature in the presence of other people" (110). Neither should one, "when coming across something disgusting in the sheet, as sometimes happens, … turn at once to one's companion and point it out to him. It is far less proper to hold out the stinking thing for the other to smell … when it would be better to say, 'Because it stinks do not smell it'" (Della Casa 1558 in Elias, 1939: 111).

These are new injunctions, which speak of a lowered shame threshold. On the other hand, details are still discussed in the texts that will soon be passed over in silence.[12] Interestingly, shame was associated not with guilt feelings, but with fear of exposure to those more powerful: certain things "are not done", as Della Casa observes elsewhere, "except among people before one is not ashamed" (117).[13] Superiors produced shame in their inferiors by imposing on them stricter controls of impulses and emotions. Conversely, the "sovereign holding court on his pierced chair" was a privileged sight in French absolutist society. His subjects "bow[ed] and kneel[ed] in pursuit of a royal turd" (Laporte, 2000: 12).[14] A little more than two centuries later, Freud and his contemporaries were "astonished to learn of the objectionable smell which emanated from the Roi Soleil" (Freud, 1930: 281). Dirtiness now seemed "incompatible with civilisation" (281). Would Freud have been aware of the relative standards of cleanliness in European metropoles and those, for example, at Anaura Bay in 1769?[15]

The association of civilisation and toilet hygiene as we know it in the West made the toilet "a critical link between order and disorder" (Pathak,

8. The ego is, in Elias' account, the result of a slow process dividing people's lives into public and private. In this process, social pressures to restrain impulses were reproduced in individuals as self-controls, so completely that they continue even when alone (Elias, 1939: 160).

9. Experiences, for instance, are digested—like meals. If one cannot get over an experience, "this kind of indigestion is just as much a physiological matter as the other one—and in many cases, in fact, only one of the consequences of that other one" (Nietzsche, 1887: s. 16). His awareness of bodily existence and his leaning to the irrational were (despite contradictory statements) out of step with the pace of the civilising processes of his time.

10. The latter change: in ancient Rome, for example, bronze or silver urine pots were part of the furnishings of dining rooms, brought out by slaves upon request during a dinner—presumably so that eating and conversation could continue (Guerrand, 1997: 14). And in Paris at the middle of the seventeenth century, it was still possible for a young gentleman to urinate while holding the hand of a noble lady and simply to apologise: "Excuse me Madam, if I have you kept waiting a little that is because I had so much urine in my body and it caused great inconvenience" (30).

11. See Freud (1919: 241).

12. Elias demonstrates this with a comparison of two editions of La Salle's Les Règles de la bienséance et de la civilité chretienne (1729 and 1774). The earlier edition already surpasses Erasmus' text in its demands that all natural functions should be removed from the view of others (indicating that people actually did not conform with these rules at the time). While pronouncing that it is impolite to talk about them, the text still

calls them by their names in detail. In the later edition, all these detailed references are dropped and they are 'passed over in silence'.

13. Some things that a "great lord" might do before "one of his servants or in the presence of a friend of lower rank" would not be a sign of arrogance "but rather a particular affection and friendship" (117).

14. Given the possibility that the baring of one's private parts in front of an inferior can be a friendly gesture, the "men…, women, girls, boys, abbeys, Swiss Guards" passing by the houses next to the forest at Fontainbleau in 1694 may have felt honoured to watch Madame la Duchesse d'Orleans doing her business. She herself felt inconvenienced and wrote to the Electress of Hanover: "You are indeed fortunate to shit whenever you may please and to do so to your heart's content! … We are not so lucky here. I have to hold on to my turd until evening: the houses next to the forest are not equipped with facilities. I have the misfortune … of having to shit outside, which gravely perturbs me because I like to shit at my ease with my ass fully bared" (quoted in Laporte, 2000: 4, 11).

15. Would it have been difficult for him to imagine that "savages" not so long ago were ahead of Madrid, Paris, or London in their separation of food and filth—without, for that matter, necessarily effecting the same psychological separations that accompanied European toilet training?

16. See Vigarello (1988: 146).

17. See note 5. In 1539, François, King of France, passed an edict that privatised his subjects' waste production. They were henceforth forbidden to toss out into the streets and squares "refuse, offals, or putrefactions, as well as all waters whatever their nature" and had

Figure 2: A boy being given soap to wash his hands after going to the toilet. Photo Auckland City Council, 1959-1960.

1995). The bathroom similarly featured, in a 1917 article "Bathrooms and Civilization", as "an index to civilization … And in no line of building has there been so great progress in recent years as in bathroom civilization" (February issue of *House and Garden*, quoted in Lahiji & Friedman, 1997: 81). It institutionalised the control of impulses and moulded individuals and groups further towards an ideal of civilisation.

Over the course of this development, demarcations between inside and outside were constantly reproduced: for example, the restraint of impulses was more and more exercised by European subjects themselves, rather than imposed from outside, as they adapted to the requirements of increasingly complex societies with lengthened chains of social interdependence. Similarly, the separation from excrement—initially managed through sheer distance—was re-integrated into the house once suitable hygienic technologies were developed. This shift meant simultaneously a further privatisation of bodily functions. Finally, the hygienist discourse accompanying those technical developments simultaneously applied to single bodies, groups and the larger social body.[16] Certain groups of people were constructed as unhealthy for the social body and removed from the centre just like excrement; and, in many cases, by the same means: water. Let's look at the last two aspects now, in turn.

The State and the Sewer

The history of European cities reflects a protracted struggle over waste management. For a long time, any number of enactments "could not prevent people from defecating in the open".[17] But in the nineteenth century, techniques based on the reticulation of water and excrement became a matter of concern for a healthy, albeit invisible public body in the care of the state. At an international congress of hygiene, held in Brussels in 1852, English hygienist F.O. Ward described a system based on the "constant circulation of water" in and out of the city (in Gille, 1986: 235). This system linked the city with the country through "a vast tubular structure that has two divisions; … each of these divisions is made up of two distinct subdivisions: an afferent, or arterial system: and an efferent, or venous system" (236). He concluded that "it is a matter of just pride for us that our country" should have conceived of "this purely analogous discovery—circulation in the social body" (237).

English hygienists were initially in the forefront of this development but, soon, other European nations entered the body works competition.[18] It is in the context of intensifying national rivalry in Europe that Adolf Loos' 1898 essay "Plumbers" makes sense:

> Increasing water usage is one of the most pressing tasks of a culture. May our Viennese plumbers therefore do their jobs as fully and completely as possible in order to lead us to this great goal—the attainment of a cultural level equal to the other countries of the civilized Western world. For otherwise something very unpleasant, something very shameful could take place. (Loos, 1898: 19)[19]

On the upper levels of London society, a "compulsory cleanliness" made itself felt towards the end of the nineteenth century and the "wash-out closet" (elsewhere known as the 'English basin') became popular (Laporte, 2000: 61, 59). A range of products catered for "new notions of cleanliness, order, and, by extension, beauty", at least for the upper classes, and an "architectural abandon" turned some 'public' conveniences into commemorative shrines, "chapels to waste" (60), where "civilized man deposited offerings and prayers to ward off the … awareness of his primordial origins" (61). To control matter in the combat of the impulses, architectural force of form was enlisted. Whereas matter "presses down and wants to spread out formlessly on the ground" (Wölfflin, 1886: 159), form can provide an upright condition resisting any residual forces of a primordial condition to be forgotten or overcome.[20]

Water closets and sewers were part of a characteristic process of segregation by which a whole range of body functions was removed from social life and displaced behind the scenes. With the availability of a technical apparatus allowing for the quick separation of body and excrement, excretion could once again take place within the house or apartment.[21] Since the end of the sixteenth century, the prevailing attitude in architectural treatises had been to remove 'the place' as far as possible from the actual places of dwelling.[22] When Julien Guadet, influential teacher of architects at the École des Beaux-Arts wrote in 1901 that "as far as the toilets are concerned, we place them without any fear … into the midst of the apartment" (1901:

"to delay and retain any and all stagnant and sullied waters and urins [sic] inside the confines of [their] homes" (quoted in Laporte, 2000: 4, 11). In keeping with rules that applied different standards to superiors and inferiors, however, waste in the King's castles continued to be disposed of outside.

18. Haussmann regarded the Parisian sewers in 1854 as "the organs of the metropolis" which "function like those of the human body" (quoted in Gandy, 1998). See also Gille (1986: 228).

19. The "shameful" and "unpleasant" was the possibility that Japan could "attain Germanic culture before Austria" (19).

20. As Ross Jenner outlines in his contribution to this issue, several architectural theorists have seen parallels between the flow of forces of bodily impulses and those in the built environment. Heinrich Wölfflin considered the "opposition between matter and force of form" the "principal theme of architecture". "We assume that in everything there is a will that struggles to become form and has to overcome the resistance of a formless matter" (Wölfflin, 1886: 159). Will, or the force of form, is what "holds us upright and prevents a formless collapse" (159). There is more than a faint overlap with Nietzsche's thought here. Henry Staten (1990: 166) writes of Nietzsche's concern with the conflict between force and form that the "endless dispersal of the substance of humanity can only be brought to a halt by and aim upward, an aim at a goal". Staten goes on to remark that "wherever there is the desire for meaning and the search for something more durable than the pointless pouring-fourth of life, there will usually also be the distinction between the human and the animal, fear of the female who disperses one's substance, and loathing of the corruption of the body" (167).

21. While this apparatus does not explain the "advance in the frontiers of shame and the threshold of repugnance", once in place, it consolidates and constantly reproduces the new standards and their dissemination (Elias, 1939: 99, 118-9).

22. See Guerrand (1997: 26, 39). In 1883, it was still common in Parisian apartment blocks or tenements to find one privy for twenty five persons, placed somewhere in the entrance area or courtyard (137). Only legislation passed in 1894 made it compulsory for new buildings to allow for internal toilets. This did not necessarily mean their placement in the apartments themselves, and—if so—they were usually tucked away bordering onto the kitchen and the servants' realm.

23. There is a structural parallel between the segregation of 'the place' from normal life and Elias' notion of the dampening of affects, on the one hand, and, on the other, the integration of the WC into the middle of the house and a relaxation of the control of affects, following a sufficient moulding of individual psyches. See "Decivilizing and informalization processes" in van Krieken (n.d.). An interesting extreme case of moulding of affects is that of prisoners in Jeremy Bentham's panopticon cells: "A slight screen, which the prisoner might occasionally interpose, may perhaps not be thought superfluous. This, while it answers the purpose of decency, might be so adjusted as to prevent his concealing from the eye of the inspector any forbidden enterprise" (http://cartome.org/panopticon1.htm).

24. Slavoj Žižek finds an analogy between German, French, or American toilet constructions and national political characteristics: "German reflective thoroughness, French revolutionary hastiness, English moderate utilitarian pragmatism" are reflect-

62), he clearly announced a new trend in architectural design that set itself in opposition to common practice. Much of the discussion at the time was concerned with health and hygiene—but these were not the only factors.[23]

Thomas Crapper's flush toilet, according to a 1993 *Chicago Tribune* article, changed

> the course of history by allowing society to live with itself. It is more than valves and arms and floats that hiss and gurgle; the flush toilet is the very symbol of modern civilization. … Life without the water closet is, for most of us, a horror beyond imagination, so unspeakable and unacceptable that we cannot conjure up the prospect. (Ecenbarger, 1993)[24]

According to another non-academic source, Queen Victoria's "porcelain throne" represented an attitude that may well have "seemed more 'dignified'—more suited to aristocrats than the method used by the natives in the colonies" (*Health Benefits of the Natural Squatting Position*, 2001). Is it not surprising how civilisation, since the nineteenth century, has become a maxim for dominant European views of national achievements? Does it not stand, even today, for stable and consummate standards, which place 'civilised' nations far ahead of those who have supposedly not yet reached their level of progress?[25]

Imperial reticulations

Nineteenth century fears of social division and the contagion of poverty-related diseases eventually led to a wholesale purging of dangerous elements—be they matter or humans. Points of intensive crowding, such as hospitals, barracks, prisons and workers' housing, were to be "moved to the edge of the city, where conditions of isolation and ventilation would guarantee both their security and that of the city" (Fonssagrives quoted in Gille, 1986: 229). With that, the hygienists' programme spilled over—or returned to—issues not only of architecture, but also of politics.


Figure 3: Peter Bromhead, French Prime Minister's statement. 29 August 1985.

Waste management in the context of colonisation became the imperial reticulation of a poor or criminal population beyond national borders. Following the American colonies' embargo on convicts, the colonisation of Botany Bay was to ensure the ongoing flushing away of criminals (and the poor). However, ex-convicts—or escaped convicts—perhaps unexpectedly also ended up in the New Zealand colony, which, in Edward Gibbon Wakefield's scheme, served as another, different and more wistful variation of a 'safety-valve' for overpopulation, endemic unemployment and poverty in England.

Already Elias observes, it was "not a little characteristic of the structure of Western society that the watchword of its colonizing movement is 'civilization'" (1939: 509), and Robert van Krieken (1997) argues that any "*self-conscious* attempts to *bring about* 'civilization', have revolved around essentially violent policies and practices". Barbarism and civilization are thus "part of the same analytical problem" rather than successive stages of development (1997).

In the colonies, according to Laporte, civilisation is "the purview of the conqueror. The barbarian craps where he pleases; the conqueror emblazons his trails with a primordial prohibition: 'No shitting allowed'" (2000: 57). The coloniser, according to Professor McHugh in *Ulysses*, brings with him to new shores "only his cloacal obsession": "It is meet to be here. Let us construct a water closet" (Joyce, 1922). Cloacal obsession in the nineteenth century was articulated through progressivist vocabularies of hygiene and toilet technologies.[26]

The water closet might have represented an achievement in nineteenth century Europe, with its particular problems of over-crowding. But a peculiar myopia excluded from perception historical and geographical particularities such as the vast difference between the metropoles and the hinterland in Europe, or earlier observations of barbarians and civilised such as Hawkesworth's notes about hygienic conditions in Anaura Bay in 1769. These lapses of historical and geographical awareness supported a particular ideological system by which one type of toilet comes to mean something different from another, in peculiar ways. The perception of the

Figure 4: Daniel Malone, In Situ, Opouteke, Northland, Aotearoa/New Zealand, (Partially Covered Outhouse), 2004, Black and white photograph.

ed in "ambiguous contemplative fascination; the hasty attempt to get rid of the unpleasant excess as fast as possible; pragmatic approach to treat the excess as an ordinary object to be disposed of in an appropriate way" (1997: 5).

25. For long periods, civilization in Europe had been an ideal rather than a reality, but by the second half of the nineteenth century it had become a maxim for dominant European views. As a goal, it shaped the process of interior restructuring that accompanied industrialisation, the rivalry of nation states, and expansionary and imperialist politics. The reference to nationhood in Malone's installation is interesting in this context.

25. Such progressivist vocabularies may have even taken in Norbert Elias, who at times—despite his continuous discomfort with the notion of civilisation as achievement or standard—lapsed into his own brand of progressivism. See Elias (1995).

26. The compulsive need to eradicate traces of the 'olfactory animal' by immersing shit in floods of water, the spite civilisation has for odour, and the ferocity with which it will oust it—"this ferocity reaches its peak when imperialism punishes color" (Laporte, 2000: 83). Brantlinger observed that the Victorian middle classes not only displaced "their own 'savage' impulses onto Africans". They suffered from a fear of "backsliding" which was activated both by the protelarian mob and the colonial barbarians (1985: 196). If the mob uses a floor torn open as a privy, and if the natives shit on the ground, then white civilization must be identified with hygienist ideals of flushing toilets and well circulating sewers.

long-drop as an icon of the New Zealand or Australian vernacular, or of the lavatory as one of civilizing achievement, is based on imaginary investment rather than facts. The long-drop's appearance in the Sydney Biennale, revisiting the 'forgotten' world of dunnies and night carts, may be read as a return of what was repressed or eliminated in the process of civilisation. Alternatively, it may index an intrinsic part of a European barbarism that was always folded into civilisation.

Separations of the metropolis from its excess population, of settlers and natives, and between body and excrement may have been parallel and interconnecting processes. They are all concerned with literal or metaphorical top/bottom relationships. When Malone calls his installation *A Long Drop to Nationhood*, the title implies not only the physical movement of matter (down, as opposed to mind: up) but also an implied loss of status, from centre to colon-y. Implicit is still an unspoken assumption that people at


Figure 5: Daniel Malone, In Situ, Opouteke, Northland, Aotearoa/New Zealand, (Toilet Seat), 2004, Black and white photograph.

the *centre* have not only decided the combat of the impulses, but also have a right by virtue of their (our?) higher standard of civilisation to make others do as they (we?) do.[27]

What Malone's metaphor implies is that Australia and New Zealand share a colonial history, and that a long-drop is the makeshift, unsophisticated convenience attached to that condition. Once accepted, the metaphor extends and gets mixed with the brutality and arrogance of colonial politics in both countries.

Much of what happened at Okahu Bay (Orakei) in the 1950s,[28] for example, was justified by references to hygiene and health: Ngati Whatua, in their struggle to maintain their rights of occupancy at Okahu Bay, found their efforts over decades of court procedures blighted by health concerns. Thus, a 1935 sanitary report held "swampy conditions and inadequate drainage" against the continued existence of the Okahu Bay *papakainga* (habitation).

Figure 6: Frederick G. Radcliffe, Looking north east from Mount Hobson towards Orakei showing a real estate sign in foreground, "Sections Finest View Winstone Ltd".

27. Okahu Bay is situated in what is now a central Auckland region. About its history, see Waitangi Tribunal report (1986), particularly in this context: Chapter 7: "Cleaning Up 1930-1952".

28. In 1952 "those left had to be burnt out and physically carried from their homes. It seemed necessary that that should not be delayed. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II was to visit Auckland in the coming summer 1952-1953." Her route of arrival was at the time expected to pass the "unsightly Orakei shacks"—a prospect the council could not countenance.

29. The outfall was located at the head of Okahu Bay. From 1914 "Auckland's crude sewage was discharged to the shellfish beds of Ngati Whatua, opposite their ancestral village. There could have been no greater insult to a Maori tribe even if one were intended" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986).

Figure 7: James D Richardson, 12 Feb 1921, Looking south west from Takaparawha point across Okahu Bay showing Orakei Pa and the sewer running along the foreshore.

Ngati Whatua's objections that the "insanitary conditions" were not of their making were ignored. The mayor of the time failed to move the issue from housing and hygiene to broader issues of good faith and the rights of *tangata whenua* (people of the land, indigenous people). Okahu Bay, situated "at the front door of what must become a thickly populated European settlement", was not considered to be the appropriate place "for a Native settlement".

In a striking parallel to nineteenth century European politics, the *papakainga* was termed a "health hazard", "a disease centre", to be removed to make room for a new "garden suburb".[29] And yet a 1954 film (*Auckland's Drainage Problem*) shows how "night carts collect sewerage from suburban Auckland homes. Aerial views indicate the pollution of Manukau Harbour from the sewerage outfall at Orakei" (*1954: Looking Back 50 Years*, 2004)[30]

What, then, do we make of the perceived opposition between the North as mind and the South as body, as articulated by the curator of the Sydney Biennale? Surely it is still based on the same conflict of the impulses observed by Nietzsche, Freud and Elias. However, this combat is no longer supposed to occur in an individual body, or between members of the social body. Rather, the frontier now delimits vast antipodean regions whose populations, indigenes and settlers alike, are supposedly ruled by emotions rather than intellect. That cliché is not new regarding the colonised … but, by a strange twist, it now suggests that the colonisers, too, have to decide whether they want to complete the march towards civilisation.

It is in this context that the juxtaposition of long-drop and lavatory—but also of the present day Portaloo, the Exceloo or the Megaloos of more recent suburban developments—reworks (part of) reality into anxious oppositions.

References

1954: Looking back 50 years. (2004). Retrieved 13 March, 2005, from http://events.filmarchive.org.nz/event.php?eventInstanceID=454&eventID=124

Biennale of Sydney volume 1: Cake. (2004). Retrieved 13 February, 2005, from http://artlife.blogspot.com/2004_06_01_artlife_archive.html

Bond, T. (2004). *DANIEL MALONE : A long drop to nationhood - 2004. Friday, 19 November 2004 - Visit the Biennale at the Art Gallery of New South Wales*. Retrieved 15 January, 2005, from http://abcasiapacific.com/nexus/gallery/s1234056.htm

Brantlinger, P. (1985). Victorians and Africans. *Critical Inquiry, 12* (Autumn), 166-203.

Carlos, I. (2004). On reason and emotion. In *On reason and emotion: Biennale of Sydney 2004* (24-27). Sydney: Biennale of Sydney.

Daniel Malone. (2004). Retrieved 12 September, 2004, from http://www.biennaleofsydney.com.au/Biennale2004/2004/artists/Daniel%20Malone.html

Ecenbarger, W. (1993). *Flushed with success: Never have so many owed so much to one almost-forgotten inventor*. Retrieved 12 August, 2004, from http://ce.ecn.purdue.edu/~piwc/w3-history/crapper/crapper-ecenbarger.html

Elias, N. (1939). *The civilizing process: Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations* (E. Jephcott, Trans. Revised Edition, Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom and Stephen Menell Eds.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Elias, N. (1995). Technization and civilization. *Theory, culture and society, 12* (3), 7-42.

Engels, F. (1845). *The condition of the working class in England*. Retrieved 4 Sept, 2004, from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/condition-working-class/index.htm

Freud, S. (1919). The uncanny (J. Strachey, Trans.). In J. Strachey (Ed.), *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 17, 219-256). London: The Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its discontents. In A. Dickson (Ed.), *Civilization, society and religion* (Vol. 12, 251-340). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Gandy, M. (1998). *The Paris sewers and the rationalization of urban space*. Retrieved 12 September, 2004, from http://www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/gs/pdf/Gandy.pdf

Gille, D. (1986). Maceration and purification. *Zone, 1/2*, 227-281.

Guadet, J. (1901). *Éléments et théorie de l'architecture: Cours professé a L'École nationale et spéciale des beaux-arts*. Paris: Librarie de la construction moderne.

Guerrand, R.-H. (1997). *Les lieux: Histoire des commodités*. Paris: Editions La Découverte.

Hawkesworth, J. (1773). *CHAP. II. A description of Poverty Bay, and the face of the adjacent country. The range from thence to Cape Turnagain, and back to Tolaga; with some account of the people and the country, and several incidents that happened on that part of the coast*. Retrieved 12 January, 2005, from http://nla.gov.au/nla.cs-ss-jrnl-hv23-title

Health benefits of the natural squatting position. (2001). Retrieved 14 July, 2004, from http://www.naturesplatform.com/health_benefits

Žižek, S. (1997). *The plague of fantasies*. London: Verso.

Joyce, J. (1922). *Ulysses*. Retrieved 15 May, 2005, from http://www.web-books.com/Classics/Fiction/Other/Joyce_Ulysses/Ulysses_07_4.htm

Klossowski, P. (2000). *Nietzsche and the vicious circle* (D. W. Smith, Trans.). London: Athlone.

Lahiji, N., & Friedman, D. S. (Eds.). (1997). *Plumbing: Sounding modern architecture*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Laporte, D. (2000). *History of shit* (N. Benabid & R. el-Khoury, Trans.). Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.

Loos, A. (1898). Plumbers. In N. Lahiji & D. S. Friedman (Eds.), *Plumbing: Sounding modern architecture* (15-19). New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Nietzsche, F. (1884a). *Nachlass, 25. Die ewige Wiederkunft. Eine Wahrsagung. Spring 1884*. Retrieved 21 January, 2005, from http://thenietzschechannel.fws1.com/nachd25a.htm

Nietzsche, F. (1884b). *Nachlass, 27. Zarathustrasheft, Summer-Autumn 1884*. Retrieved 1 February, 2005, from http://www.friedrichnietzsche.de/index.php?REM_sessid=a647735ab27349514ec4b8c59809238d

Nietzsche, F. (1886, 2003). *Beyond good and evil*. Retrieved 6 June, 2004, from http://ftp.it.net.au/gutenberg/etext03/bygdv10.txt

Nietzsche, F. (1887). *On the genealogy of morals*. Retrieved 5 September, 2004, from http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/

Pathak, B. (1995). *International history of toilets*. Retrieved 15 November, 2004, from http://www.sulabhtoiletmuseum.org/pg02.htm

Paul, N. (2004). *Dumping ground*. Paper presented at the Interstices lecture series "Animal/Impulse", Auckland, The University of Auckland/Auckland University of Technology.

Perrot, M. (Ed.). (1990). *A history of private life IV: From the fires of revolution to the Great War*. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.

Staten, H. (1990). *Nietzsche's voice*. Ithaka: Cornell University Press.

van Krieken, R. (1997). *The barbarism of civilization: Cultural genocide and the 'stolen generations' or Elias in the Antipodes*. Paper presented at the Elias Centenary Conference, Amsterdam, 18-20 December, 1997. Retrieved 15 January, 2005, from http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/social/elias/confpap/genocid2.html

van Krieken, R. (n.d.). *Norbert Elias and process sociology*. Retrieved 12 January, 2005, from http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/social/robert/papers/ritzer.htm

Vigarello, G. (1988). *Concepts of cleanliness: Changing attitudes in France since the Middle Ages* (J. Birell, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Waitangi Tribunal. (1986). *Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei claim (Wai 9)*. Retrieved 10 February, 2005, from http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/reports/northislandnorth/wai9/toc.asp

Wei, L. (2004). *South by southeast: The 14th Sydney Biennale avoided many of the excesses typical of international art festivals by showing fewer artists and newer, often specially commissioned works*. Retrieved 18 September, 2004, from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1248/is_11_92/ai_n7637905/pg_2

Wölfflin, H. (1886). Prolegomena to a psychology of architecture. In H.F. Malgrave (Ed.), *Empathy, form and space: Problems in German aesthetics, 1873-1893* (149-192). Santa Monica: The Getty Center of the History of Art and the Humanities.

What Goes Up Must Come Down:

The Combat of Impulses in Italian Futurism and Rationalism

Ross Jenner

Figure 1: Persico, Nizzoli and Fontana, Hall of the Gold Medals, 1934.

The Impulses: Lightness and Gravity

The conflicting impulses of lightness and gravity are more often taken for granted than theorised. They are experienced as the will to ascend from the earth or to merge with it. In modernity, the propensity to launch buildings into the air is usually taken to refer to the will to rise above and remake the world in a new mould, to break with the weight of traditional materials and contexts. So, recent critiques of modernist lightness, such as Adolf Max Vogt's concept of the 'suspension-syndrome' (1989) and John Rajchman's of 'immateriality' (1994b; 1994c) have focused on the elements of 'demateri-alisation' and 'transparency'.[1] Building in the air manifests a will to reject earthly and bodily matter.[2] The earth shows traces, gets worn, accumulates history. The air does not; it offers least resistance to being filled with new projects.[3] But Rajchman argues, referring to Nietzsche and Calvino, that the lightness of today's architecture is more a question of how to displace boundary stones, how to lighten the earth itself.

[1.] See also Fossati (1971) and Lynn (1994).

[2.] See Vogt (1989) and Rajchman (1994a).

[3.] Research into the question of the 'spatial revolution' brought about by aviation confirms such a view. See Ingold (1978); Wohl (1994); Boatto (1992); and Asendorf (1997).

Could something of this other lightness, which is one of 'thinking otherwise', not be found already in the rationalism of Edoardo Persico in the 1930s and of Franco Albini from the 1930s to the '50s? Moreover, there would seem to be other forms of lightness, even within modernism, where the conflicting impulses come to a temporary halt. This lightness is not simply concerned with transcendence, nor the actualisation of force and will, but rather with the suspension of these very factors. It appears in some modernist work as a figure of potentiality. In the hands of Persico and Albini, displacement into the air also indicates an instability, risk and balance which entails suspension of judgement, of self in irony, and of necessity in grace, achieving an elusive and paradoxical lightness.

Weight/Will as a Field of Conflict

That buildings must resist the force of gravity seems a constant—but is it a coincidence that the expression of gravitational force came to be theorised with the advent of a voluntarist philosophy? In Schopenhauer's account, architecture brings to clearer perception some of the ideas that are the lowest grade of the will's objectivity:

> The conflict between gravity and rigidity is the sole aesthetic material of architecture ... It solves this problem by depriving these indestructible forces of the shortest path to their satisfaction, and keeps them in suspense through a circuitous path; the conflict is thus prolonged, and the inexhaustible efforts of the two forces become visible in many different ways. (Schopenhauer, 1958: 214)

Heinrich Wölfflin's *Grundthema der Architektur* (1994) started from a similar point but emphasized a living, upward striving side rather than the delay of gravitational forces. The effects of gravity are deduced from physical experience and always associated with a decrease in vital energy. It is the will that counter-acts this decrease and, through the "liberation from material gravity", realises and releases potential (161). Wölfflin proposed an empathy between building and body:

> Matter is heavy; it presses down and wants to spread out formlessly on the ground. We know the force of gravity from our own body. What holds us upright and prevents a formless collapse? It is the opposing force that we may call will, life, or whatever. I call it force of form (*Formkraft*). *The opposition between matter and force of form*, which sets the entire organic world in motion, is the principal theme of architecture. (159)

In Italy, this will was expressed in Futurism through figures of flight and speed as the means of overcoming gravity and rising above the ruins of the past, from at least as early as its official foundation in 1909. Together with the dissolution of matter into energy, aerial figures of thought became variations on the theme of transcendence.

The Double Face of Lightness

Filippo Tommaso Marinetti's Futurism is bent on simultaneously fleeing, rising above, and overcoming the earth. With a note of pathos echoing Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, the *Founding Manifesto of Futurism* ends with the refrain: "Lift up your heads! … Erect on the summit of the world, once again we hurl our defiance to the stars! …" (1909/1968: 13). But Marinetti's eulogy of flight and speed, his frenetic activity, turns out to be a means of exorcising the anxieties of technology and warding off the abyss of nothingness. His combat with subjectivity and interiority is intimately bound up with the association of flight with escape from closure. Flight exteriorises the will and unites desire with the exterior world of machines, the sky, and the universe. Marinetti's modernity harbours a rejection of matter or, at least, an intent to transform it into a new higher, more energetic form through the 'metalisation' of the flesh, electricity, the penetration of electromagnetic waves, and dissolution into particles.

Umberto Boccioni shares with Marinetti an enthusiasm for verticality, and a voluntarism that is most stridently expressed in the concluding words of his 1914 *Transcendentalismo fisico e stati d'animo plastici* (1977: 145):

> Have we perhaps begun to understand man's aspiration to travel at 300 kilometres an hour? Do we know why he is prepared to risk his life climbing to 5,000, 10,000, 20,000 metres—to infinity? There is only one necessity, only one will: to ASCEND.

Movement and light dissolve the materiality of bodies. Matter becomes permeable without fixed surface and co-extensive with universal space. The distance between things is composed not of empty space but "continuities of matter of different intensity" (Boccioni, 1971: 42). Material is redeemed from its inertia by means of a spiritualising bath that gives precedence to the idea of transcendence before that of immanence. The process is double: matter is spiritualised, the spirit is incarnate in matter, the state of mind becomes plastic. Since, for Boccioni, objects are never completed, matter, work, action, becoming, and future are all associated. The manifesto envisages ever-increasing possibilities not only in depth—but, above all, in height. He pioneers fusion, simultaneity, and space as an all-embracing field of intensities, open, scattered, multiple, energised, aerated, and lightened. Fragments are not arbitrarily dispersed, however, but aligned to vectors of possibilities.[4] In Enrico Prampolini's manifesto (1984: 88), Futurist architecture will have "an atmospheric genesis" in the "atmospheric style", creating "a unique *abstract entity*", "abstract consequence of energies" amalgamating "air", "light" ("natural energies") and "force" ("artificial energy").

This is one side to the freedom that lightness can offer: lightness as freedom *from* the weight of earthly matter. There is another side, which is not always easily distinguished: lightness as freedom *within*, no longer set in opposition to matter. Italo Calvino (1988) conceived of a lightness that is flighty and inexplicable; it will not let itself be constrained to fall into any definite place.[5] This inexplicable lightness is capable of dissolving the opacity of the world. Unpredictable deviations and combinations of atoms and letters, graceful minutiae, infinite unexpected possibilities, the invisible, and even nothingness elude the crushing weight of matter. Recomposed,

4. "All types of lines should be used at any point in whatever means. This autonomy of the component parts of the edifice will break up the uniformity and create an architectural Impressionism, and from this new possibilities can flow." (Boccioni, 1997: 185) In the continuity and reciprocity of subject and world, object and object, environment and figure, there is a coming and going of energy, following Henry Van de Velde's energist principle of force-lines and Albert Einstein's lightening equation, mass = energy. See also note 10.

5. Calvino's first lecture in *Lezioni americane* has become a celebrated starting point for current discussions on lightness. Regarding its reception, see, for example, Gregotti (1988), Rajchman (1994c), and Frascari (2000).

lightness is brought back to the mobility of mental processes. Knowledge of the world then tends to break up its solidity through the play of subtle and imperceptible elements—or, at least, a high degree of abstraction. Lightness is thus a way of looking at the world from a different perspective, obliquely. It is a reminder not to sink into heaviness and inertia; not to ignore, and hence suffocate, the slightest brush of thought or feeling. Lightness engenders the flowering of a consciousness that evades the predictable and opens up to the possible.

Simultaneously, Calvino highlights the paradoxes of lightness: definitions cancel lightness out of existence, yet it can be nourished by science and philosophy as a flight of thought. And it is cancelled out of existence by attempts to grasp it: it reverses into its opposite the moment it is seized. Lightness is "the unattainable object of an endless *quête*"; if one says one has gained it, one has lost it (Calvino, 1996: 7). He concludes with Kafka's enigmatic story "*Der Kübelreiter*". In the midst of winter the narrator goes out for coal with a bucket which, along the way, he comes to ride. But it floats too high in the air to come down and get coal from the merchant. Hovering, he begs for a shovelful but the merchant's wife unties her apron and shoos him away as if he were a fly. The bucket knight and bucket fly off, blown about like a feather in the wind, to vanish beyond the Ice Mountains. The reason for the quest—and thus lightness—is a need and a lack, which their satisfaction would annul. A full bucket would cancel lightness. In attaining the object, "everything we chose and value in life for its lightness soon reveals its true unbearable weight" (7). Kafka's bucket is a reminder of another paradox: that emptiness "is just as concrete as solid bodies" (8); that the bucket's void is infinitely greater than the thin rim that encloses it. The bucket flies because it is empty, like molecules that flit around because they are only motes in a void. Fundamentally part of their opposites, lack, absence, and emptiness also signify potentiality.

Giorgio Agamben adds to Kafka's story an urgently condensed sequel of a teacher of gravity who, having "brought proof after proof to bear", to which nobody listened, "launched himself into the air and, hovering, continued to teach that law—now they believed him" without being surprised that he did not come back from the air.[6] There is no better proof of gravity than flight. Agamben finds another instance of the paradoxical nature of lightness in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, where the problem of ascension and gravity is, however, symmetrically inverted. In the episode "Of the Vision and the Riddle", the prophet is mounted by the "spirit of gravity" (half dwarf, half mole), who whispers to him, "You stone of wisdom! You have thrown yourself high, but every stone that is thrown must—fall!" In the episode "Of the Spirit of Gravity", man is likened to a beast of burden: "Only man is hard to bear! That is because he bears too many foreign things upon his shoulders" and "lets himself be well laden" (Nietzsche, 1961: 211). Agamben notes that Zarathustra "accepts in substance the judgment of the dwarf ('every stone that is thrown must—fall'), but astutely flips it into its opposite: the stone that falls back again *eternally* is the lightest thing of all" (Agamben, 1986: 42). Burdened with the greatest weight, Zarathustra wants to turn it into the lightest wings, convert weight into the most elevated flight. Supreme lightness is at one with "the greatest weight": the eternal return of the same.

6. Recounted by Paul Celan in Agamben (1986: 41).

7. The ecstatic uplift and wildly exuberant flows, the futurist impulse to an exultant ascension, to upward projection, had come already in the Futurism of Fillia's paintings and Alberto Sartoris' drawings to an end, arrested in suspension.

The bucket knight, on the other hand, deprived as he is of all weight, wants instead to come down to earth to find gravity but is carried off forever. In Agamben's reading, he seems to say that "true lightness … is not the eternal return, but never to return. So desolate, in appearance, is his lesson. We can believe him, precisely because he will never come back again to repeat it" (42). Levity and desolation often belong together. Freedom from weight brings with it a potential loss. The bucket knight's wish for freedom from want and lack sets him adrift in the act of overcoming them—into a realm of improbability, uncertainty and fantasy. Here, to be in the air is to have lost, or not yet attained, the status of actuality. This might also be said about Persico and Albini's Rationalism. Excluded from monumental works by the machinations of a powerful minority of traditionalists, they found their outlet only in the all-too-light world of small projects, exhibition design and displays.

In the architecture of the 1920s, the figures of movement and aerial pressures pioneered by Futurism had been arrested. Ascension and flight changed into the motif of hovering. The free-flowing air of Impressionism and Futurism now flipped into the opposite pole of the paradox: a space of emptiness, alienation, detachment.[7] Perhaps a distinction is viable between a lightness of *ascension*, an initial rebellious flight away from earth, and a lightness of *suspension*, a levelling off in both later Futurism and in Rationalism.

Suspension: Between Lightness and Gravity

Given Italian Rationalist architecture's orientation towards transcendence, there would appear to be little hope of finding in it forms of a lightness that are understood as freedom *within* earthly matter. But they are indeed to be found the works of Persico and Albini with their different concepts of lightness, of 'thinking otherwise'.

The Withholding of Impulses in Potentiality

In 1934-5, Persico designed two Parker shops in Milan.[8] Shortly afterwards, Raffaello Giolli commented: "… everything is reduced to purpose. But in undressing architecture thus to the point of making it only a vibration of lines, Persico went beyond that point" (1937: 30). Beyond the reduction to purpose, beyond divesting, the issue is not simply an emptying out. Nor is it just hygiene, the application of a coat of white paint as a whitening out of psycho-sexual desires, *Existenz Minimum*, essentialism. Nor is it 'less is more', whose silence negatively states the limits of the art of building. What is presented in the 'vibration of lines' against the blank walls of these shops is an image of pure potentiality.

The image of the *tabula rasa* in relation to modernism has more recently come to be understood as a form of erasure and repression, rather than of receptivity, with the potentiality of blankness itself erased.[9] But the metaphor of the *tabula rasa*, the writing tablet on which nothing exists, had previously expressed the existence of a genuine potentiality. Agamben notes "all potential to be or do something is … always also potential not to be or not to do"; otherwise potentiality would always already have passed

Figure 2: Persico and Nizzoli, Parker Shop in Largo Santa Margherita, Milan 1934.

8. The first was demolished in 1964, the second bombed in 1943.

9. The image derives ultimately from that of the nous, thought or mind, in Aristotle's De Anima (430 a 1) where the mind "has no other nature other than being potential, and before thinking it is absolutely nothing". Thus, he writes, "the nous is like a writing tablet on which nothing is actually written".

into actuality and would be indistinguishable from it (1999: 215). The blank tablet is an image of the pure potentiality of thought itself. The mind is not an intelligible object; it has no other nature than that of being potential. Before thinking it is nothing. But, comments Agamben, it "allows for the act of thinking to happen, just as the film of impressionable wax is suddenly grazed by the scribe's stylus" (245). Because potential to be or to do is also potential not to be or do, "thought exists as a potential to think and not to think as a wax writing tablet on which nothing is written …" (245). In this sense, blankness in Persico's shops is the space where quivering lines trace thought and unexhausted potentiality.[10] The works keep open the possibility of non-actualisation, of not fully being.

The notion that a drawing or model of something unrealised is itself a form of potential architecture is not unfamiliar. Here, the contrasts between black and white, vertical and horizontal, so fundamental to Suprematism and Neo-plasticism,[11] take on a graphic note that Giulia Veronesi's caption to the first Parker shop did not fail to detect:

> a weave of infinite lines traced by thin straight poles in square section, black and white extended the exquisitely graphic structure of the elevation into the dynamic of the third dimension, creating volumes of transparency alone, perspectives lyrically excited by varying the viewpoint and by the very nature of the materials, but rigorously 'held' … (Veronesi in Persico, 1964: s.p.)

In both shops, in fact, it is as if the space had supremely attained the third dimension but, at the same time, had preserved something of the two dimensions of graphics. It is not just because it is difficult physically to locate a thin line before the eyes in space, nor because the fittings are for the most part in a-tectonic suspension, nor even because they refer to the weightless co-ordinates of Suprematism and Neo-Plasticism. The lightness hints at something unactualised, the pure capacity of architecture to become a matter only of a vibration of lines against blankness.[12] The perceptual play between black and white, their rhythmic interplay suggesting co-possibilities, is paralleled by that between the optically vibrating lines and their background. Veronesi wrote, "Nothing other than moments of pure rhythm was intended in the infinite of a Metaphysical atmosphere created by diffuse white light" (in Persico, 1964: s.p.).

The mountings and cases compose an architecture of 'construction lines', the scaffolding of an image—austerely intellectual like early Renaissance wire-frame perspectives, but without the intention to define a three-dimensional object. The presentation of "only a vibration of lines", the "volumes of transparency alone" (Giolli, 1937: 30); the wavering of asymmetric balance; the flickering between three dimensions and layers on paper; the refusal to come to ground (as the elements graphically hover in "moments of pure rhythm" between black and white, between line and blank ground; Veronesi in Persico, 1964: s.p.) … all intimate a suspension that conserves and exercises in the realised work a potential not actualised. Between the presentation of nothing, in blankness, and the presentation of something, in lines, lies the event of materialisation—manifest as *typos*, as trace. Persico maintains a reserve in the finished work that, keeping actuality in suspension, reveals the traces of a process of thought.[13]

10. For a resonance with Boccioni, cf. note 4. The potential of the blank surface plane had, of course, already become apparent in Suprematism and the anti-perspectival space of parallel projection, when, in El Lissitzky's words, Suprematism "shifted the vertex of the optical pyramid to infinity" (1925: 107). Before him, Malevich had written in 1919: "I have ripped through the blue lampshade of colour. I have come out into the white. Follow me, comrade aviators, sail on into the depths—I have established the semaphores of Suprematism." (1969: 122) Malevich's white abyss/plenitude plays with the perceptual possibilities of black and white, negating them, to create an optically ambivalent space where their rhythmic interplay suggests an infinite world of co-possibilities.

11. Both Suprematism and Neo-plasticism were derived from the right angle and emphasised directionless space. The vertical axis determining the familiar horizontal view "from which man looked about the earth" was changed when the aeroplane, opening a new sphere of spatial experience, as Benjamin stated, "broke the monopoly of the vertical" (Benjamin, 1972: 538). See also Asendorf (1997).

12. In this era, a line or mark, or word on paper, came to be conceived no longer as contained on a surface but related to a ground of indefinite depth. So, in the Parker shops, nothing quite touches the walls; and yet, seemingly indefinite, the thin steel sections pass through the walls, ceiling, and floor, running off the edge of the paper.

In the Parker shops, design begins with and returns to the graphic, to the black of ink and the white of paper—the possibilities in graphic space. They exhibit the space of communication as an experience of possibility. The black does not touch the white but is held back from it as if in an act of creation according to the model of thought thinking itself. "In the Arab tradition", Agamben notes, "agent intellect has the form of an angel whose name is 'Pen' (*Qualam*), and its place is unfathomable potentiality" (Agamben, 2003: 36-7).[14] Tectonic suspension is joined here by a sceptical suspension. They mark the point at which architecture retreats from rhetoric to a silence of pure potentiality, capable of expression precisely by virtue of saying nothing. What matters is not so much speaking or functioning but a return to the grounds on which anything may be communicated: that there exists a medium in which communication takes place, and that what is communicated in this medium is not one thing or another but, first of all, communicability. Suspension is a breath-taking path to virtual non-existence, indetermination, potentiality.

The achievements of the first Parker shop were developed further in June 1934 in the *Sala delle Medaglie d'Oro*, widely regarded as the foremost exhibit at the Milan *Exhibition of Aviation* and celebrated as Persico's finest architectural work. The hall commemorated the exploits of Italian aviators in the First World War who received the prestigious Gold Medal. Concealed light was diffused over the white walls by a luminous strip running right around them and evoking sky in the glowing shadowless space between two planes of darkness. The void of the sky and the void of the ground become the same. An explosion of documents remains suspended between them and at the threshold between oblivion and consciousness. Photographic panels, artefacts, and texts are mounted on a series of slender white scaffolds. Above head-height, a single continuous frame runs lengthwise through the hall, like a fuselage in translucent scrim. Carrying the floating relics of heroic aviators, they evoke loss, flight, and the suspension of time. The frames offer an idealized realisation of the grid as pure abstraction that, nevertheless, elides with a recurring figurative element: the box frame structure of the first bi-planes. As in Futurism, there is no return to earth. However, flight is here not represented as willed ascent and mastery but as suspension, loss of ground, force spent, diffused and vanished.

Similarly, in Persico's last project of 1936, the *Salone d'Onore* at the Milan Triennale, narrow white walls played a rapid and urgent beat, suggesting ascents and "improbable climbs" (Giolli, 1936: 19). And again, the image of feathers and wings appears in Giolli's description: the thin pilasters of the exhibition are "like a fluttering of wings" and seem to "detach themselves from the wall to vibrate alone"—the effect is dizziness. A precisely determined installation, it nevertheless had the capacity of producing the perception of something indeterminate, something out of grasp. Potentiality is, after all, "not simply non-Being, simple privation, but rather the existence of non-Being, the presence of an absence" (Agamben, 1999: 179).

Irony: Suspension of Self

In both Persico and Albini's work the doubt and instability a displacement into the air can produce found an expression in irony. Albini, in particular, explored notions of risk and balance. Purely tectonic suspension

13. The very idea of space, as something that can never be fully realised, is a form of potentiality. Only because architecture is capable of building nothing, that is, the non-material which is space, can it build anything; otherwise, it remains only an art of the imposing mass, shelter, functioning mechanism, or advertisement. What is frequently termed modernist 'dematerialisation' must, rather, be understood as materialisation. Beyond reduction to purpose lies a potentiality not exhausted in the passage to actuality.

14. In the second Parker shop, the figure of an angel even materialises. After the exorcism of all figuration, the messenger appears, solidly actualised in this graphic space as a prop or support to its suspended abstraction. The pinioned aggelos bearing pens is a redundant and ironic doubling: the medium of communication bearing the medium of communication. And the angelic announcement/creation is, anyway, already there as the space itself, in black and white. The low little angel signifies a fall; it brings us down to earth.

Figure 3: Albini, Lead and Zinc Pavilion for Montecatini, Rome 1938.

is in his work often accompanied by hints of the acrobatic: for example, the Sailing Ship bookcase (1938-40); the project for the *Bombini-Parodi-Delfino Stand* at the Milan Trade Fair (1947), structured as a highly improbable series of scales balanced from scales; or the extraordinary stand for the sculptural group of Marguerita of Brabant in the Palazzo Bianco (1945-51). All allude to the element of grace as the acceptance, but deflection, of the weight of necessity and the element of irony.

Despite the fact that gravity, as Jankélévitch observes, "in the double meaning of serious and geotropism, is … our natural tendency" (1964: 31), consciousness can detach itself from life and things. As *epochē*, this does not simply lead to indifference but to an experience of possibility (20). "Irony", Jankélévitch notes, "is the disaggregation of every '*res*' or dereification" (183). In posing questions, thought chops up the apparent solidity of what is taken for granted, making fissures. Thus, it is able to suspend the self, "able to look left and right and strip off at last the heavy mantle of necessity" (22).

In his *Room for a Man*, the task was to give form to rationality, specifically to exhibit the rationality of standardisation. Albini represented this by the abstraction of a three dimensional grid. But housing even the barest essentials unavoidably leads to a situation where material things, such as coats, undercut the abstraction as a reminder of man's bodily relationship to the world. Similarly, the universal aspirations of the grid are undercut by the singular fantasy of the bed (reached, acrobatically, via ladder and the top of the bookcase). The ironic note in Albini's work does not come as a sudden addition, but is present from his earliest projects—an ashtray that intimates a propeller fan and a floating hammock for an aviator.

The *Lead and Zinc Pavilion* for Montecatini, at the exhibition *Autarchy of the Italian Mineral* (Rome 1938), was planned as a display of the phases of national production: from the excavation of the raw minerals from the bowels of the earth, through their extraction and processing, to their use as products. The exhibition's itinerary proceeded from an 'underground' area, representing a mine with mineral deposits, up a ramp that continued on as a raised gallery in a double-height space from which the heavy machinery exhibited below could be viewed. The narrative was thus developed from subterranean confinement, through various transformations, to an aerial release in the form of sheets of metal hoisted like sails. Throughout the exhibition, thread-like uprights and horizontals contrasted with *sachlich* elements such as the raw materials, rocks, ores, alloys, and the machinery used to wrest them from the earth in mining and metallurgy. A rough-

hewn slab overhung the entrance to threaten the arriving visitors, who were also greeted by realist sculptures of heroic workers suspended in the air. The sail-like sheets exhibited as the end product of the process were skewered on the uprights like the accompanying photographic placards of machinery, which tilted menacingly overhead, confronting the visitor descending the stair to exit. This not only added a touch that perhaps reflected the boring and drilling required in excavation, but also Albini's views on the politics of autarchy as excavation of the home ground. Irony here is the expression of a split between one part of the designer that exists in a state or situation of inauthenticity, and another part that exists only in the form of questioning, and that asserts the knowledge of this inauthenticity.

Twenty-three years later, at the height of Italy's economic miracle, the exhibition *Organisation, Productivity, Market* at the International Exposition of Labour (part of *Italia '61*) provided another opportunity for a comment on the state of technology. Panels illustrating the evolution of machines and industrial production circulated on industrial conveyor systems, rising and descending like materials of assembly in a factory ("Italia '61: La Ricerca Scientifica, L'organizazzione Industriale, La Produttività, Il Mercato," 1961: 241).

Necessity, embodied in functionalist theory or the assembly line, may appear to offer little chance for humour, but "the comic is an effect of contingency: monkeys make us laugh because they could be men". Therefore, "what is funny, according to Bergson, is not the mechanism, as such, nor the vital as such, but the automatic, that is to say, the machine that breathes, or the man who looks like a machine" (Jankélévitch, 1964:155). So, when images circulate like mechanised sandwich-board men bearing allusions to the cycle of serial production and its inevitable discarded leftovers, reality becomes too light.[15] When knowledge of inauthenticity combines with an inability to overcome it, irony gains momentum. When the assembly line doubles as a tool for exhibiting *and* an object-symbol of the industrial cycle exhibited, reality becomes a disposable image of itself. In a reflective

15. Tentori notes that the panels, "far from being only neutral supports of the didactic history—metamorphose, in my imagination, into a slow Indian file of sandwich men, as in photos of a marching protest in an American strike of the '30s" (1965:).

Figure 4: Albini and Helg, International Work Exhibition, Italia '61.

Figure 5: Albini and Helg, Museum of the Treasury of St Lorenzo, Genoa 1952-6.

disjuncture, the meaning of mechanical reproduction is made evident, and the viewers watch it circulating like skiers on a chairlift from below in the comfort of armchairs. Representation thus affords the disaggregation necessary to strip off the heavy mantle of necessity and the possibility to think and laugh.

Gravity is at the core of this play of forces, and the fact that objects are, of necessity, physically hung or propped to counter their weight creates in his works at times an incongruency Albini seems to have deliberately set in scene. What goes up, must come down … But, *must* it? There is a long, drawn-out moment of hesitation in his suspension.[16] The difference between Nietzsche's eternally falling stone and the bucket knight is that one achieves freedom by accepting necessity, whereas the other drifts away never to return. While Albini's designs have the lightness of the one-off and the exhibition, the ephemerality of the bucket knight, they also have an acceptance of the necessities of programme and tectonics (Nietzsche's stone). Grace, the show of good will, will later lead Albini to moments of serenity and a curious weightlessness when, without force or anxiety, he accepts the pull of multiple gravities operating in the *Treasury of San Lorenzo*, both of the suspended objects and that of the building floating in the ground.

The heavy necessities imposed by instrumental rationality seem, paradoxically, to have brought about a lightness in the work of Persico and Albini that unpredictably surpassed necessity in meeting and fulfilling it. Modes of design thinking arose that did not leap instantly to a *vertical* transcendence but tended to defer and withhold it. Spreading out *horizontally*, they achieved a tectonic suspense, returning lightness to the everyday and to the materiality of air itself.

16. And this is perhaps the moment where, in Schopenhauer's observation (1958: 405), grace is the denial of will.

References

Agamben, G. (1986). Quattro glosse a Kafka. *Rivista di estetica* (22, anno 26), 37-44.

Agamben, G. (1999). *Potentialities: Collected essays in philosophy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Agamben, G. (2003). *The coming community*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Asendorf, C. (1997). *Super constellation. Flugzeug und Raumrevolution*. Vienna: Springer Verlag.

Benjamin, W. (1972). *Gesammelte Schriften* (Vol. 3). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

Boatto, A. (1992). *Della guerra e dell'aria*. Genua: Costa e Nolan.

Boccioni, U. (1971). *Gli scritti editi e inediti* (Zeno Birolli, Ed.). Milan: Feltrinelli.

Boccioni, U. (1977). *Pittura scultura futuriste: Dinamismo plastico*. Florence, Vallecchi.

Boccioni, U. (1997). Architettura futurista: Manifesto. In E. Godoli (Ed.), *Il Futurismo* (3rd ed., 185-187). Rome-Bari: Laterza.

Calvino, I. (1988). *Lezioni americane. Sei proposte per il prossimo millennio*. Milan: Garzanti.

Calvino, I. (1996). *Six memos for the next millenium*. London: Vintage.

Fermi, L. (1961). *Mussolini*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fossati, P. (1971). *L'immagine sospesa. Pittura e scultura astratta in Italia, 1934-40*. Turin: Einaudi.

Frascari, M. (2000). A Light, Six-Sided, Paradoxical Fight. *Nexus Network Journal, 4* (2 Spring http://www.nexusjournal.com/Frascari_v4n2.html).

Giolli, R. (1936). VI Triennale di Milano: 'La Sala della Vittoria'. *Casabella* (102-103 June-July), 14-21.

Giolli, R. (1937). Negozi a Milano. *Casabella* (109, January), 30-31.

Gregotti, V. (1988). Six memos per l'architettura. *Casabella* (October), 2-3.

Ingold, F.P. (1978). *Literatur und Aviatik: europäische Flugdichtung 1909-1927. Mit einem Exkurs über die Flugidee in der modernen Malerei und Architektur*. Basel: Birkhäuser.

Italia '61: La Ricerca Scientifica, L'organizazzione Industriale, La Produttività, Il Mercato. (1961). *L'architettura. Cronache e storia* (70 August).

Jankélévitch, V. (1964). *L'Ironie*. Paris: Flammarion.

Lebel, R. (1959). *Marcel Duchamp*. New York: Paragraphic Books.

Lissitzky, E. (1925). K. und Pangeometry. In *Europa Almanach* (103-113). Potsdam.

Lynn, G. (1994). Differential gravities. *Architecture New York* (March/April), 20-23.

Malevich, K.S. (1969). *Essays on art, 1915-1935* (X. G.-P. & A. McMillin, Trans.). London: Rapp & Whiting.

Manifesti del futurismo lanciati da Marinetti Boccioni. (1914). Firenze: Lacerba.

Marinetti, F.T. (1909/1968). Manifeste initial du Futurisme. In *Teoria E Invenzione Futurista*. Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori.

Nietzsche, F. (1961). *Thus spoke Zarathustra* (R.J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Persico, E. (1964). *Edoardo Persico Tutte le Opere*. Milan: Edizioni di Communità.

Prampolini, E. (1984). L'Atmosferastruttura. In E. Crispolti (Ed.), *Architettura Futurista* (pp. 88). Modena: Fonte D'Abisso.

Rajchman, J. (1994a). *Constructions*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Rajchman, J. (1994b). The Earth is Called Light. *Architecture New York, 1, N.5* (March/April), 12-13.

Rajchman, J. (1994c). Lightness: A concept in architecture. *Architecture New York, 1, N.5* (March/April), 5-7.

Schopenhauer, A. (1958). *The world as will and representation* (Vols. 1 & 2). New York: Dover.

Tentori, F. (1965). Opere ricenti dello studio Albini-Helg. *Zodiac* (14), 94-127.

Vogt, A.M. (1989). Das Schwebe-Syndrom in der Architektur der zwanziger Jahre. In *Das architektonische Urteil. Annäherungen und Interpretationen von Architektur und Kunst* (201-233). Basel: Birkhäuser.

Wohl, R. (1994). *A passion for wings: Aviation and the Western imagination 1908-1918*. London and New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wölfflin, H. (1994). Prolegomena to a Psychology of Architecture. In H.F. Mulgrave (Ed.), *Empathy, form, and space: Problems in German aesthetics 1873-1893* (149-190). Santa Monica, CA: The Getty Centre for the History of Art and Humanities.

ROMA QVANTA FVIT IPSA RVINA DOCET

Gee Wiz[1]

Marco Frascari

It is the minute detail that blocks the infinite invasion.
  —Bataille, *Manet*

The following 'totaling of minute of details' is an attempt to use Aby Warburg's *science without a name* to uncover a cosmopoietic dimension of architectural criticism buried deep in the closet of architectural culture.[2] Architectural discernment has become a negative theology that has made an idol of absence itself. Thinking about architecture has turned into self-contained and tautological scholasticism, clogged by the perspectives of the physical sciences, by questions of interdisciplinarity, and an ostrich attitude to the realities of judgment. At present, most architectural judgment works by a refusal of the power of recognition that properly belongs to animal experience and, being uncritically open to memory-less scientific or artistic fashions, forgets the links between the arts of building, living and thinking well.

Recognition is neither a rhetorical nor rational procedure; it is motivated by fear or longing. Animals are the quickest to recognize the bodies and movement of both their predators and their own kind. In the *science without a name*, recognition works through overlapping mnemotechnical atlases and initiatory charts of cultures, by which the viewer would become deeply conscious of the problematic nature of cultural traditions. The *science without a name* developed by Aby Warburg tends to spurt through the precincts of diverse epochs and cultures, from one to another, in an anagogic manner. An a-temporal perception generated by supratemporal corporeal themes nonetheless allows for the recognition of forms 'temporally' disintegrated by technologies of historical depictions.

In architectural criticism, this approach can assist in recovering a recognition of a cosmospoietic dimension through the reactivation of an original pathos of architecture, liberating it from its paralyzing aesthetic and professional conventions. The cognitive imagination of architecture is an

expression of the power of human beings to act and think in a pure mediality.[3] To think imagination as mediality is a challenge to which Warburg had already risen, and one which architects should begin to grasp again. The effective presence of tectonic condensation and the poignancy of building details and constructs result from what Warburg has identified as the "pathos formula" (*Pathosformel*). Through tectonic pathos, the energy embodied in artifacts can be reactivated beyond the threshold of rational understanding.

The victual, for example, can activate diegetic aspects of a constellation: seven thousand years before Christ, in the Fertile Crescent, the land between the Euphrates and the Tigris, humans discovered how to turn milk into a solid mass of foodstuff that retained the qualities of milk, but could last for a long time and was easy to transport and store. Cheese was an instant success and the art of cheese-making spread all over the ancient world: the Bible records that when David escaped across the River Jordan he was eating "cheese of kine (cows)";[4] it is also said that he presented ten cheeses to the captain of the army drawn up to do battle with Saul.[5] Homer gives a detailed description of small cheese pieces maturing in the cave of Polyphemus, a one-eyed shepherd with personality problems, but also a skillful cheese-maker.[6] The Etruscans and then the Romans used thistle flowers and green fig juice as rennet to curdle milk, the first action of cheese-making. In many medieval abbeys, the monks, who were mystics as well as cooks, perfected the Munster cheese (from *monasterium*, monastery). The French and Italian words for cheese, *formaggio* and *fromage,* derive from the Greek *formos* and Latin *formaticum,* meaning form or mold. Slowly, this ordinary victual acquired a powerful cognitive presence, since it could metaphorically stand for any forming or molding to open up the diegesis of cognitive imagination, as may be indicated by the following line stating a traditional belief: "They woulde make men beleue ... that ye Moone is made of grene chese" (Roy, 1895: 1529).

Cheese then becomes a formative and diegetic cosmic block or, better, a cosmic wedge that can be used to model and build an understanding of the universe. In the realm of quantum physics, quarks are the building blocks of protons and neutrons, which are in turn the building blocks of atoms, but in the German language, 'quark' is a soft white cheese. With its natural, air-formed holes, a slice of Swiss cheese is a particularly efficient analogical model for the large-scale structure of our universe. During the 1980s the astronomers Margaret Geller and John Huchra, among others, showed that clusters of galaxies tend to form in sheet or wall-like patterns that enclose empty regions (holes), hundreds of millions of parsecs in size. This Gruyère-like structure in the arrangement of clusters is too 'common' to be mere chance, and any model of cosmology will have to account for such a Swiss cheese layout of space.

However, the power of cognitive imagination integral to the mediality of cheese is most evident in its use as an anagogical model elaborated by a sixteenth-century Italian miller, a verbose and stubborn individual by the name of Domenico Scandella—better known as Menocchio. The opinionated miller had expressed too often in public his odd belief about the nature of creation and the cosmos. Accused of heresy, he was brought to trial in front of the Inquisition. His account of the origin of the world was that "All was chaos, earth, air, water and fire were mixed together; and out of

1. A shorter version of this article was delivered at the VT 2004 CAUS Symposium, in Blacksburg VA.

2. The name Warburg, although now much better known in intellectual circles than even few years ago, is still more associated with the bank that bears its name or the Institute for the study of art history located in London. Aby Warburg, born in 1866, was the heir to that banking fortune and the founder of the Institute, originally in Hamburg, the entire contents of which were surreptitiously moved, four years after its founder's death in 1929, to London, on the eve of the Second World War. For a discussion of Warburg's science without a name see Agamben (1999: 89-103).

3. Warburg defined the gesture as an "exhibition of mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as such. It allows the emergence of the being-in-a-medium of human beings ... The gesture is, in this sense, communication of a communicability. It has precisely nothing to say because what it shows is the being-in-language of human beings as pure mediality" (quoted in Schaber, 2004). Schaber comments that to "think imagination as mediality, as being in technology, then, is the cahllenge [sic] to which Warburg had already risen, and one which we are only beginning to grasp" (Schaber, 2004).

4. 2 Samuel 17: 29.

5. 1 Samuel 17: 18.

6. *Odyssey* (Book 9: 278-79).

7. Anagogy is a process of interpretation by which a material sense is lifted to a higher plane of understanding.

8. Cheese as a substance materializes, in a hypothetical identity, a style of construction labeled "early debased."

9. "*The New Belfry of Christ Church, Oxford, A Monograph by D.C.L*" and "*The Vision of the Three T's, A Threnody*," written respectively in 1872 and 1873. See Carroll (1988).

10. This "middle earth" is a medieval peasants' *utopia*, where well-dressed and well-fed citizens pass their time eating, sleeping, playing games and making love. It has survived into the 20th century as the hoboes' legend in *The Big Rock Candy Mountain Song*, with only few changes: the geological tectonic originates in crystallized sugar and the wine rivers are converted into "little streams of alkyhol" (attr. to Harry "Haywire Mac" McClintock and sung by Burl Ives: http://www.marysvale.org/brcm/song.htm).

that bulk a mass formed—and just as cheese is made out of milk, worms appearing in it, these were the angels" (Ginzburg, 1980). This uneducated man's explanation of the world's cosmogony through such a perfect anagogic model cost him his life: he was tortured and burned at the stake.[7] The Inquisition judges knew very well the power of anagogic models; in their theological studies, they had learned that anagogy could afford references to future revelations of things through metaphor of hypothetical identity. In plain words, once a person sees in cheese something that transcends the cheese, the process of freethinking cannot be stopped.

Understanding architecture as a mirror of the cosmos, and the cosmos as a mirror of architecture, architects have long used cheese in their tectonic quests. According to Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, a lecturer in mathematics better known as Lewis Carroll, Stilton cheese was the "imaginal material" used by the architect for the New Belfry of Christ Church in Oxford.[8] In two pamphlets, written in the 1870s,[9] Dodgson—a lactose-intolerant individual—vents his anger at the "lunatic" architect of the Belfry. His devious implication is that the architect made a model of the Belfry in "ancient stilton" with the cavities of the tunnel and windows carved with a cheese scoop (Carroll, 1988: 1032). Furthermore, to satirically discredit the design, Reverend Dodgson proposes "to present each guest with a portable model of the Belfry, tastefully executed in cheese" at the end of the banquet to be held to celebrate the Belfry construction (Carroll, 1988: 1030).

Sebastiano Serlio (1475-1554), on the other hand, was an architect who knew the cognitive power of the imagination clustering around food. The doors and gates presented in his puzzling architectural tome, entitled *Extrardinario Libro* (1551), are clearly recognizable in a Cockaigne Arch erected to honor the Duke Antonio Alvarez of Toledo, Viceroy of Naples, during the Feast of St. John the Baptist on June 23, 1629. The design drawing of the Arch shows its construction with bread, suckling pigs, and cheese. Cheese is the major material forming the landscape of the imaginal world of *Il Paese di Cuccagna* (The Land of Cockaigne). A twelfth century Roman illustration of this mythical land records the walls of its buildings made of aged cheese and plastered with white ricotta (Cocchiara, 1980: 184-86). According to folklore, Cockaigne was a mythical land of plenty. The land was abundant, flowing with milk, wines, and honey; hills were made of cakes and cheese; and candies fell from the sky like rain. The utopian structure of Cockaigne, in reaction to social and economic imbalances in the given world, is characterized by images of open and effortless access to Nature's abundance. Cockaigne is a world in which hard work is hindered and idleness is rewarded. It functions not only as an emblem of gastronomic desires, an imagined state of plenty, abundance and corporeal satisfactions, but also as a space in which social control and an alternative social order coexist.[10]

The medieval dreams of Cockaigne materialized in the *Pali o Alberi di Cuccagna* (Cockaigne poles or trees), which later evolved into elaborate monuments especially in festivals held in southern Italy. Constructed of wood scaffolding, papier-mâché, or stucco, they were decorated with real meat, cheese, bread, and pastry. They were usually built in the main square of the city or in front of the royal palace during festive events. Members of the court sat in balconies looking down on the street extravaganza, which frequently included fireworks and fountains flowing with water and wine.

When the prince gave the signal, the people climbed the monument in order to grab what they could and sometimes consumed the architecture on the spot.

As mentioned before, there are traces of Sebastiano Serlio's work in the drawing of the Neapolitan edible arch. Serlio's heavily illustrated treatise had been the most innovative and powerful visual source for the majority of European architects and patrons willing to emulate the magnificence of antiquity and of Italian courts. During his life, Serlio published the first five volumes of his planned seven book treatise, but the book of doors, not belonging to the planned series, was named *Il Extraordinario Libro* (*The book out of the order*). This unanticipated book is the most amazing piece of Serlio's theoretical work (Serlio, 1551).[11] It demonstrates a range of functional and not so functional gateways by which Serlio breaks the rules of ornamental design to signify various natural states, from elegance to its antonym, which Serlio names *"bestialità"* (bestiality). Serlio's heterodox innovations were not limited to the visual but included the verbal. His range of terminology to explain and judge the qualities of architecture is very peculiar and unique (Hall, 1942; Vitale, 1984; and Bembo, 1525). In book seven, Serlio sets out what he calls "discussion and definition of some architectural terms". This elaboration of architectural terminology belongs to an Italian cultural quest, the so called *'questione della lingua'* (question of language), a debate that took place, from the beginning of the 1500s, among erudites and scholars in order to define the official structure of Italian literary language.[12]

Architectural theoreticians of that time also had to cope with linguistic pressure: should they, in their treatises, coin new Italian terms to refer to building elements and materials, or use incomprehensible transliterations of Latin and Greek terminology?[13] A citizen of the prosperous and gluttonous Bologna, Serlio turned to the infra-ordinary of culinary terminology to elaborate his own language of architectural criticism, which appears surprisingly strict and coherent. Derived from a quotidian verbal communication, Serlio's metaphoric language keeps its precision and consistency in purpose. Through a gastro-poetic procedure, Serlio applies the infra-ordinary *sapience* of a cooking idiom to "judicious architecture", that is, an architecture where "taste" becomes the arbiter of the built world.[14]

In the *Extraordinario Libro,* Serlio adheres to the culinary rule of three: three components are always necessary to make a great dish. Serlio's three architectural components are Rustic, Gothic and Classical: a declaration of the significance and magnitude of these three components in his theoretical work is the well-known presentation of the three scenographies in Book II. In the *Extraordinario Libro,* Serlio's rustically Satiric, wholesomely Comic and eruditely Tragic tripartite conception promotes a science of hybrids, of mixed bodies, a comparative knowledge and a compound *sapience*, in which any practice of purification becomes suspicious.[15] In Book IV, Serlio declares that he is all in favor of mixing orders.

> Therefore, it will not be faulty to have a mixture of Rustic with one other style (*ordine*), symbolizing by this partly the work by nature and partly the work of human skill. … This mixture is, in my opinion, very pleasing to the eye. (1551: IV, XI, v; or 270)[16]

11. See also Serlio, S. ['Extraordinario libro'], MS of ca. 1544-47 in Argan (1932); Argan (1970); and Erichsen (1989).

12. It was never settled and the linguistic debate is still on the tables and the grills of Italian scholars. The most important event regarding the *questione della lingua* took place in the Venetian hinterland. In 1525, the Venetian Pietro Bembo (1470-1547) set out his proposals (*Prose della volgar lingua—1525*) for a standardized language and style: the poet Petrarca and the writer Boccaccio, both Tuscans, were his models and the literary Italian language was fashioned after the one spoken in Florence during the 15th century. Palladio's patron Trissino, the Mantuan Castiglione and Colli argued for an eclectic language, based on that of the Tuscan courts but admitting elements from other dialects, even other languages such as Provençal, "aventi qualche grazia nella pronuncia" (Castiglione).

13. For his Italian translation of Vitruvius (1556), Daniele Barbaro went to the Venetian Arsenal to borrow the real life expressions used by the artisans working there to make the architectural language descriptive and qualitative: for example, "ho voluto intendere da quelli che lavorono nell'Arzana" (25); and "per usare i nomi del nostro Arsenale" (256).

14. Onians is the first noting the peculiarity of Serlio's language but he does not trace it to its beginning in the realm of the gastropoiesis. "I wish to explain as my weak intellect is able to tell the difference between an architecture that is solid (*soda*), simple (*semplice*) unadulterated (*schietta*), sweet (*dolce*) and soft (*morbida*) and that which is weak (*debole*), frail (*gracile*), delicate (*delicata*), artificial (*affettata*) and crude (*cruda*), in other words obscure and confused." (Serlio, Book VII, or 120; Onians 266, trs. 276.)

By looking to the lemmas of Serlio carefully selected terminology in the dictionary of the *Accademia della Crusca* (1612), the critical and evaluative judgement demonstrates clearly the origin in the daily critical language of culinary evaluation and procedures. *Sodo*: "something hard that does not give up to touch and it is not yielding" refers typically to hard boiled edibles such as eggs: '*uova sode*'. The word '*sodo*' comes from the Latin *so(li)dus*: firm, fundamental. *Schietto*, a common Tuscan term, 'pure, not mixed', refers to wholesome substances, to absence of additions, modifications and sophistications such as undiluted wine: '*vin schietto*'. *Dolce*, *morbido*, *gracile* and *delicato* as quotidian terms do not require much explanation to how they connect to culinary language. *Affettato* is the artificial procedure of slicing food, as cold cuts, mainly for a visual gourmet effect rather than improving their edibility, and the term *crudo* simply means uncooked.

15. The ideas of *tertium comparationis* and the law of three are at the foundation of any real culinary understanding. Lino Turrini, a renowned and exceptional chef, states that the culinary law of three means combining two main contrasting ingredients—to which is added a third to stimulate taste. He illustrates this with the combination of three ingredients in *pasta al pomodoro* (pasta with

Serlio calls for a new, hybrid form of architectural knowledge, which is well demonstrated by the gateway listed as number four in the sequence of designs proposed in the book. This gateway results from a whimsically tripartite mix:

> The gateway here is entirely Doric but mixed with Rustic and "gentleness" … the "gentleness" is the cushion above the capitals, which was done as a capriccio. (1551: IV, XII, v; or 264)

The cushion is the clue, making evident the connection between the Neapolitan Cockaigne Arch and Serlio's extraordinary gateways. *Pulvinus* (meaning both the architectural element and cushion) is connected in the *Vocabolario della Crusca* with the metonymic word *guanciale* (meaning a cushion where we rest our cheek: *guancia*, cheek). But *guanciale* is also a special cut of pork that in many dishes can be a good substitute where the meat of suckling pigs (*lattonzoli*) is required.

The power of the Alvarez's Cockaigne Arch consists not in being a product of a *mimesis*, a visual imitation derived from a gate of the *Extraordinario Libro*, but of being the result of an act of *diegesis*: it is an architectural summary of an entirely created world, the Land of Cockaigne. A structural display of bread and cheese decorated with suckling pigs and arranged within the classically proportioned framework of an architectural order, the arch tells us the story of the country of Cockaigne: a peaceful landscape, a dreamland on earth with little hints of classical overtones that allows an escape from the harsh reality of mundane existence. An imaginal land where roasted pigs wander about with knives stuck in their backs to make carving easy, where roasted geese fly directly into one's mouth, where cooked fish jump out of the water and land at one's feet, the weather is always mild, enjoyable sex is readily available, and people do not age. This land, a human reverie, is a powerful expression of a sempiternal dream that can be summarized by the Italian assertion *"a tavola non si invecchia"* (at the [dining] table one does not get old), combined with a Veronese metaphoric allegation, *"la boca non l'e' straca se non la sa de vaca"* (the mouth is not tired if has not tasted cow-cheese), which I would like to rephrase for the land of architecture: at the drawing table one never gets old, and the design is not over if material has not been 'experienced' by becoming a doubled sign of loss and presence, of the past living in the present.

In other words, let me state that the cognitive aspect of imagination provides the foundation for a rigorous analogical knowledge allowing architects to evade the dilemma of a rationalism that gives us only a banal choice between 'matter' and 'mind'—or, 'material' or 'form'.[17] Forging links between past and present, then and now, it can demonstrate the transhistorical permanence of the products of the art of living well and art the art of building well in tectonic expressions. This is why the question of imagination in architecture cannot be reduced to a technology or to a humanity (a disjunctive conjunction), or to the use of technology by the humanities (a deceptive depiction). Culinary alchemic and architectural inventions take place in *imaginal worlds*. The *mundus imaginalis* is a peculiar landscape with its own reality, beginnings, and judgments, like the "middle earth" of *The Lord of the Rings* or that of Cockaigne. The stance of immediate mediating embodied in Cockaigne, or the *mundus imaginalis*, is closely linked to the theory of imaginative cognition.

We need to think of the acts of recognition as taking place in an inextricable relationship of fear or longing, memory and estimation, record and implementing, *modus operandi* and temporality, elegance and *bestialità*. These relationships have yet to be fully thought, and experienced in the mode of animalistic recognition, but they are the present challenge of an

References

Agamben, G. (1999). Aby Warburg and the Nameless Science. *Potentialities: Collected essays in philosophy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Argan, G. C. (1932). Sebastiano Serlio. *L'Arte* (vol. 35, III), 183-99. Argan, G. C. (1970). Il "Libro Extraordinario" di Sebastiano Serlio. *Studi e note da Bramante a Canova* (Rome), 60-70.

Bembo, P. (1525). *Prose nelle quali si ragiona della volgar lingua*. Venezia: Giovanni Tacuino. Carroll, L. (1988). *The complete works of Lewis Carroll*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Cocchiara, G. (1980). *Il paese di Cuccagna e altri studi di folklore*. Turin: Boringhieri. Erichsen, J. (1989). L'Extraordinario Libro di Architettura: Note su un manoscritto inedito. In Thoenes, C. (Ed.), *Sebastiano Serlio* (190-95). Milano: Electa.

Ginzburg, C. (1980). *The cheese and the worms: The cosmos of a sixteenth-century miller*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Roy, W. (1895). *Rede me and be not wrothe, for I saye no thinge but trothe*. Westminster: A. Constable & Co.

Hall, Jr., R.A. (1942). *The Italian questione della lingua*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and Literatures.

Meneghetti, C. (2002). Da Cuoco a Cuoco. In B. Stefani, *La cucina ai tempi dei Gonzaga*. Ginevra/Milano: Rizzoli/Skira.

Schaber, B. (2004). *Bodies without words, words without bodies. From Agamben's classroom to ours*. Paper presented at the Technology in the Humanities Conference, Ithaca College, New York, 24-26 May, 2004. Retrieved 10 July 2005, from http://bigjacket.com/sasha/texty/bennet.pdf.

Serlio, S. (1551). *Extraordinario libro di Sebastiano Serlio architetto del re christianissimo nel quale si dimostrano trenta porte di opera rustica mista con diversi ordini et venti di opera dilicata di diverse specie con la scrittura davanti che narra il tutto*. Lyons: Jean de Tournes.

Vitale, M. (1984). *La questione della lingua*. Palermo: Palumbo. Vitruvius (1556). *I dieci libri dell'architettura di M. Vitruvio tradutti at commentati da Monsignor Barbaro eletto patriarca d'Aquileggia*. Venice: Francesco Marcolini.

tomato sauce), which must always be served with grated aged Parmesan cheese. To prove his point, he suggests trying *pasta al pomodoro* without the cheese … (Meneghetti, 2002: 93). The power of cheese as a *tertium comparationis* is also evident in a Italian vernacular locution denoting perfection, "*come il cacio sui maccheroni*" (as the cheese on the macaroni).

In architecture, Carlo Scarpa's work illustrates the great power of the law of three. In his designs, Viennese Jugendstil (the tomato sauce) amalgamates with contrasting Italian Rationalism (drained pasta), tossed together with his personal interpretations of Venetian building technology (the cheese on the macaroni) to stimulate 'architectural taste'. Mixing and re-mixing robust, vulgar and magnificent traditions or avant-gardes, he unleashes a broad range of processes of signification.

The third, in architecture and cooking, is an alchemical catalyst, a hybrid being that both separates and fuses—that both disturbs and mediates—thus being, as it were, both excluded by *and* included within the established order.

16. Later on, in the same book describing a Doric door and rejecting the Vitruvian rule of discrete building elements, Serlio utters: "It seems to me suitable that not only one sort but also diverse styles should be used to enrich a building and satisfy different needs" (1551: Book IV, XII, v; or 294).

17. The imaginal world of architecture can be understood

Instinctive Systems
Two Projects by Deane Simpson

Figure 1: Thomas Gruenfeld, Misfits I-VII, 1991.
Taxidermy. Courtesy Jousse Entreprise, Paris.

> In a Darwinian sense, the architectural species can only survive if it exhibits a biodiversity of forms and a constant supply of mutations that provide an agility in the face of changing environmental conditions.
> —Mark Wigley (2005: 39)

The last three quarters of the twentieth century produced certain types of urban planning (such as the master-minded hygienist neuroses of CIAM and the nostalgic delusions of New Urbanism) which, more often than not, failed due to an excess of will and intention. In the following collaborative projects in Detroit and Copenhagen the mode of willed 'master' planning with its formal preoccupations was suspended in favour of experiments with open and auto-reactive systems.[1]

These 'instinctive systems' challenge the genetic identity of particular 'species' through the generation of urban mutations. They have an affinity with the 'Misfits', a series of mutant creatures in the work of German artist Thomas Grünfeld, produced primarily through techniques of hybridisation. Additional techniques of mutation were deployed in the projects, promoting a diversity of chimeric outcomes.

Chimera[2]

Techniques of 'Code Modification', for example, were applied to the Detroit project and suggested alternate geo-political and time-space arrangements, perhaps best understood as intensifications of emerging space-time mutations.[3] The 'Mixing Panel' strategy applied to the Copenhagen X project led to the production of mutations at different scales. They included the block scale, in which patio house and closed block typologies were cross-bred, and small scale zones of anarchy, which operated as highly fertile mutation grounds.

[1.]This opposition is analogous to the distinction in the cognitive sciences between the behaviour of humans (characterized by self-conscious 'will') and animals (ruled by unconscious 'instinct' or 'impulse'). In The Monumental Impulse (1999: 183), George Hersey briefly mentions this opposition and questions its soundness (it is certainly an oversimplification but, in the present context, it offers a useful analogy). The bulk of Hersey's book is devoted to the description of two main concepts connecting the animal to architecture: first, a bio-architectural analogy (mostly operational at a formal level) and, secondly, concepts of buildings as extended phenotypes of species.

Detroit: Global City State[4], 2004 (Deane Simpson + John Lin with Niels Albertsen)[5]

The city of Detroit has undergone massive changes in the last century as it grew rapidly into the centre of the US automobile industry. By the 1930s, Detroit was the fourth largest city in the US and by the 1950s its population had grown to 1.8 million people. From that point on, however, an uninterrupted process of sub-urbanisation occurred alongside the decentralisation of the automobile industry. By the year 2000, the city's population had dropped to 950,000 residents, while that of the surrounding suburban areas, known as 'Metropolitan Detroit', had grown to almost four million people. This left a high proportion of the city's predominantly 1920s building stock either demolished, or vacant, producing vast empty areas in the city.

Rather than interpreting the phenomenon of Detroit's 'shrinkage' as a situation to be reversed, the project suggested two strategies. Firstly, it proposed tools to support elasticity, accommodating both shrinkage and growth, which were no longer evaluated with reference to moral or intentional structures. Secondly, it viewed the existing condition of Detroit as an opportunity to test modifications to presupposed 'genetic codes' (e.g. geopolitical) that define the performance of the city.

Figure 2: Detroit City-State plan. Areas of urban void, urban densification, in-between, new infrastructure, and proposed downtown airport location. Bottom left: existing land vacancy. Bottom middle: Gaussian blur filter applied. Bottom right: Threshold filter applied, determining extent of urban agricultural and urban recreational voids.

Perhaps the two projects discussed here could be framed as forms of 'instinctive systems', within which the act of design focuses on the identification of inbuilt codes of performance, rather than on singular pre-determined forms. They could be interpreted as *genotypes* rather than *phenotypes*. Genotypes describe the genome, which is the set of physical DNA molecules inherited from an organism's parents (code). Phenotypes describe the *phenome*, the manifest properties of an organism: its physiology, morphology and behaviour form.

2. A Chimera is an organism, or part of one, with at least two genetically different tissues resulting from mutation, the grafting of plants, or the insertion of foreign cells into an embryo.

3. Previously identified by urban geographer David Harvey in the contemporary city (Harvey, 1989: 284-307).

4. Submitted for the Shrinking Cities Ideas Competition in 2004

5. Niels Albertsen is an urban theorist, sociologist and political scientist. He is currently the Head of Department for Urban and Landscape Development (Institute 2) at the Aarhus School of Architecture in Denmark, where he has taught since 1975. John Lin is an architect working and living in Hong Kong. He was educated at the Cooper Union in New York City and is currently teaching at the Department of Architecture of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His current research involves a collaboration with the Kowloon-Canton Regional Railway concerning processes of urbanization through rail infrastructure.

6. A Gaussian Blur is an Adobe Photoshop image manipulation filter.

7. Historically, the concept of citizenship has its origin in cities, beginning with the autonomous city-state. In recent times, nation-states have become weakened through the process of globalization, whereas urban regions have become increasingly independent. Some cities, such as Detroit, have been left behind in this process. This project proposed redefining the global positioning of Detroit by transforming it into an independent City-State.

8. CEBRA is a young Danish architectural firm based in Aarhus, Denmark. The studio has its focus on architectural design and urban planning and charges these with innovative pragmatism. Their design process is often fuelled by transdisciplinary collaborators, anchoring their projects both to contemporary architectural discourse and themes of wider relevance.

9. "Copenhagen X is a creative forum for innovation in dwellings, urban spaces and urban development in Copenhagen. We aim to open people's eyes to the changes in the city, and promote quality in urban development." http://www.copenhagenx.dk/template/t12.php?menuId=92

(a) Elasticity

Coherent areas of existing land use (or vacancy) were identified from the cluster-map data, using simple graphic imaging techniques. Gaussian blurs were applied to areas of existing land vacancy (extracted from the cluster-map).[6] A threshold filter was then applied to these areas, which produced contour edges indicative of the boundaries of proposed recreational and agricultural concentration. The latter also accommodated new infrastructure in the project, enhancing the connection between various dense areas. A similar, but block-pixellated technique was applied to areas of existing land-use, generating possible boundaries for residential and commercial concentration. Existing commercial strips were intensified to serve as bridges between different parts of the urban fabric. The remaining areas of the city, between those most used and those most vacant, were to operate as elastic zones accommodating both expansion and contraction. In the case of continued shrinkage, the consolidated agricultural zones would expand into the 'elastic' zone. If the population was to grow, consolidated residential and commercial areas would expand into the 'elastic' zone. In this aspect of the project, the city was not 'planned' in a top-down manner, but organized from the ground up, by the changes that occur in the city's data over time.

(b) Code Modifications

Some interventions were made into the existing genetic codes of the city, which significantly changed the regulatory apparatus to support mutations:

Geopolitics. The City of Detroit became an independent city-state, self-governing and independent from the United States.[7]
Immigration. All forms of immigration control into the city were eliminated, allowing Global Citizenship, Rights and Duties.
Transport Hub. The airport was relocated from what was formerly known as the periphery of the city to what was formerly known as the centre of the city. Abandoned inner-city skyscrapers too expensive to demolish were re-programmed as airline terminals, hotels etc.

Figure 3: Airport view looking toward Downtown Detroit. Eastern Local evening-Time.

Figure 4: International time-zones (left) and artificial day-time lighting effects (right) at downtown airport location.

Time-Space. The downtown area adjacent to the relocated airport runway was redefined according to the 24 time zones of the world, in parallel with the operation of artificial daylighting. Visitors were thus able to arrive at their destination in the same time zone from which they left.

Copenhagen X: Orestad, Denmark. 2004-2005 (CEBRA + Deane Simpson)[8]

This Urban Design Proposal commissioned by Copenhagen X, a creative initiative interested in innovation in urban development,[9] in collaboration with the City of Copenhagen and Orestad,[10] proposed a 'supplementary' urban study to address the perceived shortcomings of a previous, unbuilt urban proposal and suggested a new 'Local Plan' for the area.[11]

The partially state-funded assignment requested a proposal for approximately one million square meters of mixed-use space (residential, commercial and public), with a projected population of 10,000 people, on a 50 hectare site in Copenhagen, Denmark. The site is located approximately six kilometres south of the historical centre of the city. It belongs to a strip of land, 500 metres wide, extending from the city centre along a new metro rail line that is currently under development. Importantly, the site is located at the junction of road and rail infrastructures that link Denmark to Sweden (29 minutes by rail to Malmo, Sweden), as well as connecting the airport of Copenhagen (six minutes by rail) to the historical centre (seven minutes by rail).

The original unbuilt urban plan's focus was on defining a controlled formal outcome for the area. Its major urban design gesture involved three wide, curved 'boulevards' functioning as the area's primary public spaces. Each boulevard incorporated a different landscape concept, such as 'canal', 'park', and 'forest'. The proposal for the site's built fabric was characterized by a homogeneous, traditional closed-block urban structure of almost uniform height across the whole of the development.

Rather than producing a single and fixed alternative to the unbuilt plan, an open set of variables was defined that could generate multiple possible solutions. They could be adjusted, as on the sliding scales of a music mixing panel, according to the requirements of the various parties involved. Variables included the level of concentration and programming of public space; the extent of programmatic mixing; the orientation of the circulation system towards car or metro traffic; the variation in maximum height of building envelopes; the modulation of roofscape (incorporating landmarks), etc.

This system of open variables operated in three ways: first, as an internal tool for the design team; second, as a tool in negotiations toward a 'Local Plan' between the City, developers, community groups and the architects; and thirdly, as a way of producing an elastic 'Local Plan' that moved beyond the fixity and content of the conventional 'Local Plan'. This would allow for change over time, as well as greater flexibility in specific planning decisions. Five plan variations were described, one of which was 'frozen' and further developed in order to demonstrate the potential of the system. It also offered a clear critique of the existing proposal. The 'frozen plan' proposed a shift toward more concentrated and differentiated public space; a clearly articulated roofscape supporting a differentiation of neigh-


Figure 5: Multiple plan scenarios for Copenhagen urban design proposal.

10. The Orestad is a new municipal entity which will incorporate six towns. Four interdisciplinary teams were commissioned to make proposals within a 'Parallel Assignment' structure. This interdisciplinary team also included Peter Hesseldal (journalist and researcher) and Designit Bluesky (graphic and concept designers). Development of the alternate urban proposal occurred through a series of workshops in collaboration with the City of Copenhagen, the developer of the site 'Orestad' and external advisors including Adrian Geuze of West 8. The existing proposal to be addressed was a 1996 competition-winning scheme from the Finnish Architects Arkki.

11. A 'Local Plan' is the legal document that defines possible building activity at the local scale. It typically

Figure 6: Aerial view looking toward Downtown Copenhagen of one proposed development scenario with differentiated and concentrated public space and articulated roofscape.

bourhood areas within the overall plan; an increased level of programmatic mixing; a reorientation of the street system toward the main metro-rail entry points; and the introduction of areas free of any planning constraints: proposed areas of anarchy.

In addition to working at the scale of the overall urban plan, the project addressed the scales of buildings as well as individual residential units. At the building scale, for example, smooth transitions were proposed between the normally distinct typologies of the patio house and closed block structure—transitions that were based on, amongst other factors, the maintenance of natural light.

References

Harvey, D. (1989). *The post-modern condition.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Hersey, G. L. (1999). *The monumental impulse: Architecture's biological roots.* Cambridge, (Mass.): MIT Press.

Wigley, M. (2005). Towards the perforated school. *Archis*, 20 (1), 39.

Figure 7: Mixing panel as elastic Local Plan, and design and negotiation tool.

Bovine Buildings

Interview with Anthony Hoete

After graduating in 1990 from the Auckland School of Architecture, Anthony Hoete left first for Italy, and later moved to London, where he has been for the last 14 years. This interview took place with A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul, Albert Refiti and Ross Jenner during one of his occasional visits to New Zealand in February 2005.

Figure 1: Sketch for house on Motiti Island. All photos by Anthony Hoete.

You have just arrived here for ten days from London, perhaps to build another house in Clarence Street, Ponsonby.

Yes, what a blast of fresh air compared to what you can do in London, both in terms of economics and heritage restrictions!

You work in London at WHAT_architecture, how many partners are there?

Three now, but we were originally four. We've lost the W of our acronym—she went back to Germany. I guess that would make us HAT_architecture!

When did you leave New Zealand, and what have you been doing since?

In January 1991, days after the aerial assaults in the Gulf War, I left for Italy. I visited Nigel Ryan, my undergraduate thesis tutor at Auckland, in Rome and ended up working in Turin. From October 1991, I worked in London for Nigel Coates, Stefano de Martino and Sauerbruch Hutton Architects, who had all taught at the AA. However, there wasn't much work around in the early nineties so I decided to do a Masters at the Bartlett. My education at Auckland University had given me little idea of the prevailing architectural lineages influencing European architectural education. At Auckland, references were commonly to Italians like Tafuri, Cacciari, Dal Co ... So when I accidentally found myself interviewed for a course at the Bartlett (in the elevator ride between ground and second floors), I unsurprisingly confused Peter Cook with Peter Wilson.

The experience was liberating: values of metaphor and lyricism acquired at Auckland were swapped for functionality and space programming. At the Bartlett, I met Chiara, a lost six-year-old, and a few hours later her distraught mother Isabelle (whom I later married). In 1995, my father retired and received a golden handshake. After working on fit-outs and planning applications in London for three years, the opportunity to design and build a house appealed …

Did you design the house here or in London?

It's designed in London, made in New Zealand. The Bartlett Masters course was very autodidactic and didn't really prescribe lines of enquiry. I wanted to experiment, and the design became a 'live experiment', of which actual building was a vital part. Peter Cook agreed and so we designed

Figures 3-5: Ground plan, model South elevation, model components.

it over there (London) and built it over here (Motiti). The site existed then only in memory.

You were back for two years?

Yeah. I grew a 'kiwifruit' (hair and beard of the same length).

Seeing the model, Albert Refiti once said that the house was severely organised, which left me somewhat puzzled. But, in hindsight, yes, the internal planning is severe: two doors, one room. No concessions to western domesticity: bedrooms, parlours, verandahs …

Was that your father's requirement?

No. The architectural plan coincides with the severity of an island existence. Lost at sea, immune to technological advances, culturally remote.

To get to the island you fly or take a boat. These two arrival points on opposite sides of the island establish the axis upon which the house is founded. One door is oriented towards the jetty; the other to the airstrip. There are no rooms in the traditional sense—only a *whare* space, which is a modern open space.

Also, there are only two objects in the *whare*: one is a five meter long piece of cedar—the table. The wood was shipped from the Bartlett—Peter Cook used to stand on it at the end-of-year shows—and is hung from the ceiling. We used the table to test the structural stiffness of the house—a Robinson 800 helicopter landed on the roof and, by putting glasses of water filled to the brim on the table below, we watched for spillage … The other object is the concrete water store: the bathroom holds 1,000 litres of rain water in its ceiling to feed the shower, toilet, sinks etc. To get good water pressure from the gravity feed, we needed tall floor to ceiling heights.

What were the planning and design parameters?

Upon arriving on Motiti, we were confronted immediately with land issues: the right to occupy was contested amongst my *hapu*, *Patuwai*, which I interpret as 'troubled waters'. To avoid this problem, which is omnipresent with Māori land today (multiple shareholder interests leading to land locks), we looked for a site on the other side of the island. It is even more intensive: a desolate, fragrant fennel-scape midway between jetty and airstrip.

Given that the island, as tribal land, does not come under the Resource Management Act, planning or building consents were not required. For that, you get limited infrastructure: no electricity, no sewerage, no sealed roads, no vehicles. When we told the engineer that we didn't need a building consent, he asked, "Why are you using an engineer, then?" I said, "Because I don't really want to kill anyone." That was quite funny.

The political state of the island is interesting. My father's generation have an obligation to look after the island, which is riddled with problems. For example, the plane is owned by a Pākehā private operator, who ordinarily would pay landing fees to the Māori shareholders with an interest in the airstrip. However, lack of organisational consensus amongst Māori shareholders means no permission has or is likely to be granted to the plane operator. Thus the plane lands literally a few yards away on the other side

Figure 6: Table at the Bartlett.

Figure 7: Helicopter approaching building.

of the fence onto European title. A not inconsiderable amount of potential *marae* revenue is lost. This creates economic tension, as the islanders cannot generate income on Motiti. What, practically, are we supposed to do? We are supposed to earn money, have a life, then go back there and what? Die? Without economic sustainability, Motiti is in grave danger of becoming a cultural cemetery. So there's a whole sadness associated with the island. Already now its demography is polarised—either very young or retired. The in-between generations have departed to the main land, chasing contemporary trappings: our PlayStation generation. The house sits within a cultural maelstrom.

One thing about the island is its extremely transience. The whole island is transient … and yet, even though time is moving, nothing seems to have moved. People coming and going all the time, particularly for *tangi* … against those who effectively live there knowing that they are there to die. There is a smaller island off the big island, which used to be the cemetery and is *tapu*. The relationship between the two islands, one for the living, one for the dead, is surreal: a natural sea bridge which you can only get through at certain tides. You feel as if you're walking on the water.

How many people are living on Motiti now?

Around twenty-five, though the population gets up to a hundred during a *tangi* when there are five to six flights a day (!). Even funerals become embroiled in the economic tension of landing fees: death as revenue.

The geographic size of Motiti is about that of Venice (80,000 people). But architecture is, really, the preserve of the city rather than the country. Given the shed vernacular heritage and *tangata whenua* issues, maybe a Rural Institute of NZ Architects would have a plausible basis.

Is there a hint of Dutch influence in the house?

Accepting the pre-eminence of Dutch architecture at the end of the twentieth century, and its media presence, it would be difficult for *any* architect not to be influenced. That was, of course, compounded by my involvement as an associate at Mecanoo, by teaching at the Technical University of Delft, plus, by being registered as an architect in the Netherlands and a member of the curatorial board for *ab1*—the first Architecture Biennale of the Netherlands.[1]

How far did your father's intentions materialise?

My father wanted to build something different. I guess he got that.

The house seems branded with markings from the other side of the world …

It has a certain foreignness or indifference to its surroundings. In the same way as the transient island population comes and goes, the house also doesn't totally belong to the island. Motiti is a signifier though: an identification point for the *whanau*, *hapu*, and *iwi*.

The skin of the building almost looks like fur on the brick parts—like the wooden shingles on farm houses in Switzerland.

1. The thematic was automobility and was triggered by my research into spatial mobility at the Technical University of Delft, later published in Hoete, A. (2003). *ROAM. A Reader on the Aesthetic of Mobility.* London: BDP.

Figure 8: Sketches

We often talk about the life of the building, but not its death. Imagine hundred years of decay—what would be left? On the island, there are the carcasses of houses which have rotted away until all that remains is a concrete fireplace and chimney in the middle of a cornfield. This house, during its so-called building life, sits a bit awkwardly with the rest, not really integrated. But in a hundred years time, it will be dead like the rest of them, and the only thing left will probably be the concrete bathroom. I quite like that.

What in your design do you trace back to influences of your father, and what did the experience mean to you?

Solitude and severity. And the idea of 'Land's Cape': where the passing of the *korowai* (a cloak made of natural fibres such as flax and feathers) between generations reasserts territorial notions of the skin of the earth.

I realised the value of participating in the building process: seeing the drawing 'translate' into building. A house is a difficult project because of the personality cults involved: experimental, yet emotionally charged. One can objectify a commercial space but domestic design can get extremely neurotic … the design incest of tap fittings and trendy appliances.

How do you see your project for your father's house today?

In retrospect I think the house bears the predictable anxieties of an architect's first house: it possibly contains too many (urban) details.

What have you done since?

In 1997, when the house was complete, I went to live in Brussels and ended up working at Mecanoo in Rotterdam for five years. It's two hours by train from Brussels. I'd leave on Monday morning, come home on Wednesday or Thursday night. On Friday morning, I'd take the *Eurostar* to the Bartlett in London and be back in Brussels on Saturday morning. This movement, characteristic of Northern Europe with its dense fluid commuter landscapes, awakened an interest in spatial mobility, which resulted in the book, *ROAM*. Eventually, I returned to London and set up WHAT_archi-

tecture.[2] It was a slow process but we are gradually establishing ourselves with our first public building, due for completion this year. In it, there's a wink to the House on Motiti as it bears the same 'furry' block detail.

What about your teaching experiences?

The Bartlett was academically interesting but extremely intense. Teaching posts (lowly paid) are as competitive as student admissions (high fees). It is difficult in Britain both to teach and run a practice. On the back of my work at the Bartlett, I was offered a post as Associate Professor at the Technical University of Delft. It's a huge school with 4,000 architecture students with better teaching conditions: there is a fifty percent research allocation which, being Holland, means publication. Teaching is very much about communication and information. I sometimes consider it like managing a football team: a delicate balance of emotional intelligence, strategy, organisation and technique.

Last year, I was Visiting Professor at the American University of Beirut, running a design course called "Urban Surgery" (small project remedies for urban reconstruction). I learnt a lot about the Middle East; I also saw *Once Were Warriors* in Arabic, which was weird. It's a bit frustrating teaching there, as the students are intelligent without diligence—lazy intellectuals, in other words. I suspect that is because the design courses are organised in two stages: read theory, then apply to design—thus students often over-conceptualise their projects. One cannot expect a reading of a sizeable text to manifest itself legibly within the architectural project. Such demands often yield stage fright in studio. I prefer an iterative process of small steps that loop back: read a paragraph, undertake initial design gestures; feed-back into research, produce a design, et cetera. Labelling courses either 'theory' or 'design' also sends the wrong message: theory can be design and vice versa—more designers should write, more critics should draw.

How do your Dutch, or European, experiences relate to New Zealand bi- and multi-cultural issues?

As I state in *ROAM*, identity, like nationality, is increasingly fluid and mobile. I consider myself an Anglo-Māori *(te hapu Patuwai O Motiti)* married to a French-speaking Flemlander who was born in the US. Our son Maui's middle name is *PehiamuOPatuwai* (the Belgian of the tribe). The absence of a homogenous Belgian identity (three national languages) sits comfortably with my own cultural schizophrenia.

What this means for New Zealand's biculturalism I have no idea, but in the *North and South* magazine's issue on "White Māori",[3] I suggest that both Māori and Pākehā need to consider a cultural context beyond the polarity of each other. With the increasing numbers of Asians in New Zealand, Chinese-Māori (or '*Chow-ri*') will further expand and accelerate indigenous concepts.

Having said that, it is probably also worth saying that I found it much more secure being Māori outside. In London, it's much easier than here, for sure … it's not like life and death or heavy, just less easy. Being outside, you start to realise that indigenous thing. You don't have to hide from it.

How do you feel about your recognition in New Zealand?

The recent NZIA conference *Taking Stock* and *ROAM* had similar thematics: mobility, identity, perception. I guess I found it surprising that the British Arts Council asked me to speak at the British Museum on these same issues—yet the NZIA expressed no interest.

What similarities and differences do you see between work in New Zealand and work overseas?

Contemporary New Zealand architecture is formulated around the private house. The downside is that it means, socially, 'architecture as privilege'. More high density, low-cost housing schemes need to be encouraged, as well as an indigenous architecture that moves beyond metaphor and iconic Māori symbolism. Working on the house for my father gave me a chance to engage intensively with the user, that was of great value, and to work intensively on concepts, rather than labour over details.

Would you say that you have an explicit design philosophy?

Everything is discourse, just add 'what'! Without wanting to sound pretentious, what informs the office is culture in its widest sense and architecture ought to be a function of this. An architecture without walls may not just be possible but preferable, an architecture founded on social event and use. Perhaps a notorious question needs to be re-phrased: not "What is architecture?" but "When is architecture?"

What are your current projects, and where do you see them leading?

Last year we were invited to propose an Olympic Landmark project for Paris. Based upon the story of the red balloon by Lamorisse, we fitted two thousand, two metre diameter helium balloons with an LED that would allow citizens of Paris to text urban SMS, visible from seven kilometres: "I love you Marie", "Paris 4 Nantes 2" … everyday communication elevated to national statement. Now that London has won the bid, we need to change channels.

Last year, we were short-listed for another urban project, the New Zealand Memorial on Hyde Park Corner, London. The site has a huge Wellington Arch in the middle, which sets up an axis between Buckingham Palace and Marble Arch. I don't know who negotiated the project on behalf of the New Zealand Government, but it seems that nobody raised any questions, in death as in life, about what is basically a complete subjugation of all the colonies under the Master Image. The rules said that the design could not go over three meters, which effectively preserved the sightlines of the Wellington Arch. Therefore, a colonial vision was preserved in the memorial, which was actually not about war but about sacrifice. I found that a bit grating.

Naturally(!) I thought we had the right strategy—a memorial that accentuated absence not presence—but we may have had the wrong landscape morphology. Thus, the spatial physicality of the monument was for-

saken for the temporality of the '*nu* moment'. A void inside an existing hill was created, accentuating the existing topography. Inside, the walls were of polished greenstone. The passage inside the hill terminated in an open room from which one could reflect upon the colonial landscape.

Otherwise, current projects include: a public nursery featuring fifty reconfigurable floor plans—one for each child; a house in New Zealand featuring a mega-sky window so that you can watch the stars at night; a collaborative project with AKK Architectes of Beirut that is a house with a movable kitchen (sliding plumbing connections!) and perspex staircase; a house in London with a home cinema formed wholly from bent plywood and 100% leather … more cows and building, that kind of thing.

What is the future for you in terms of this place and over there and … ?

I would like to work in NZ more often. We have two current projects here. I'd like to think WHAT_architecture can add value through its dislocation!

The Tectonic of the *Fale*

Semisi Fetokai Potauaine[1]

Figure 1: Inside the Falehau, Tonga, in 'A new, authentic and complete collection of voyages round the world …' London 1784. The image shows the tectonics with lavalava connecting the structure.

1. Semisi Fetokai Potauaine is a fourth year student in architecture at The University of Auckland.

2. The fale is in some sense treated like an upturned boat-hull. In fact, the technology used for its construction is based on replaceability of its components or parts, just as parts are replaced when boats are serviced. With the use of lalava, the joints or members are not weakened by cutting, drilling or nailing. The fale could even be portable: in his book Tongan Society (1929), Gifford mentions early voyagers' accounts of portable houses set up at convenient places near anchorages for the reception of visitors.

Figure 3: Lalava, fata section of the Fale Pasifika, The University of Auckland, 2004. All photos by Semisi Fetokai Potauaine.

Lalava: The 'lashing' of the *fale*

As part of Pacific and, more specifically, Polynesian building culture, Tongan architecture is essentially derived from notions of ocean, sea faring and navigation, and cosmology (Refiti, 2002). As discussed by Tomui Kaloni, in his paper "The Evolution of Tongan Architecture" (2005), Tongan culture resulted from a process of differentiation by adaptation, and developed within a unique environment. Kaloni advocates that this uniqueness should not be mistakenly generalized.

Tongan aesthetics are based on *heliaki*—to say one thing, but mean another (Wood-Ellem, 2004). As context and meaning change, this use of allusion and metaphor allows for the passing on of cultural knowledge. Therefore, some insight into the poetics and politics of Tongan verbal and visual modes of expression is necessary to understand Tongan aesthetics, which are not just "an artistic penchant; … [but] a philosophy; a way of life"… (Stevenson, 2002: 18).

As a way of analysing Tongan architecture, I propose exploring the tectonics of the *fale* in terms of lashing, or *lalava*. The essence and form of *lalava* reflect not just a general Pacific 'tectonic tool', but a specifically Tongan one. Applications of *lalava* are not restricted to the *fale*, but can be extended to other uses: for instance, to boat building, tool making, and traditional clothing.[2] Thus, *lalava* not only integrates the *fale* and its components but reflects every other aspect of Tongan culture, society, and way of life.

Tectonics: Ontology and Representation

In general, Tongan arts are divided into *faiva*, performance art, and *tufunga*,[3] material arts. Both art forms are governed by time and space: *faiva* translates as 'time and space', and *tufunga* as a temporal production of 'form in space' (Mahina, 2002: 5). The Tongan conception and praxis of *ta* and *va*, 'time' and 'space', critically govern the arts of lineal and spatial intersection from which *lalava* comes. In an anthropological dimension, *tufunga lalava* can be related to aesthetic concepts and practices of particular and universal significance.

While *ta* may generally be less significant than *va* in Tonga, they are of equal currency in formal social and aesthetic contexts. This is critical in the performance of reciprocal social obligations and creations to do with beauty and harmony.

> Like the world over, both *ta* and *va* underpin the overall Tongan conception of the practice of art. Not only are the ontological entities, time and space, the medium in which all things are, in a single level of reality, spatio-temporality or four-sided dimensionality, they are epistemologically intensified and reorganized, thereby giving rise to art. Art can, thus, be defined as the rhythmic and symmetrical reorganisation of time and space that produces harmony and beauty. A type of *ta-va*, time-space, transformation, art is formally investigative and functionally therapeutic … (Mahina, 2002: 5)

As social obligation, hereditary profession or way of life, *tufunga* were the obligation of *ha'a tufunga* and *faiva* that of *ha'a punake*. The *ha'a tufunga* class was divided into several subclasses,[4] but all *ha'a tufunga* use intertwining line and space, and all *tufunga* professions use the *lalava* as their main tool.[5] In fact, all *tufunga* masters will get involved in the construction


Figure 4: The construction of the Fale Pasifika involved tufunga tamaka (stone), tufunga tongi'akau (wood) and tufunga langafale (architecture).

3. Tufunga can be juxtaposed with the Greek tekton, but tufunga governs all aspect of creating. It is a way of living, a profession important in society. Even the gods are referred to as Tangaloa Tufunga.

4. Tufunga fo'uvaka, tufunga langafale and tufunga tātongitongi, tufunga tongi'akau and tufunga tāmaka which to deal with 'akau (wood) and maka (stone). Both tufunga fo'uvaka and tufunga langafale have more direct connections with tufunga lalava.

5. "Working with kohi or tohi, by way of ta or beating of time, makes lalava an abstract art form. By extension, tufunga lalava is akin to tufunga tātatau, body art or tattooing. Although they are differ in subject matter, or space, the former is a work with houses and boats and the latter with sino or the body. Both arts utilise line and space, with kafa sinnet made from coconut fibres and black ink or vaitohi'uli as respective means of interlacing kohi and va …" (Mahina, 2002: 5)

of a *fale*, along with the whole of society (reciprocal duties). In this highly strung society, the professions are shared and collective: *tufunga tāmaka* are responsible for the elevated platform or the *'esi*; *tufunga tātongitongi* and *tufunga tongi'akau* for the wood preparation; and women, usually, are responsible for *lālanga* of coconut leaves and woven mats for wall and roof coverings.

Tufunga masters, as non-academic professionals, are empirically oriented. They draw their inspirations—like their predecessors—from their experiences with their physical and social environment. With ancient *lalava*, masters ingeniously created abstractions of real life and everyday in many *kupesi* or *lalava* patterns with direct connections to the lashing of boat and house construction.

In "Rappel a l'ordre: The Case of Tectonic" (1990), Frampton discusses Semper's "theory of formal beauty", which viewed architecture as an "ontological world-making art" despite its "static representational form" (5). This applies not just to symbolic form, but also to the urge to strike a beat, string a necklace and, in this case, perform the *lalava*. Semper also regarded architecture, together with dance and music, as cosmic arts, in contrast to painting and sculpture. This concept has a parallel in the conception of Tongan art, where *tufunga* (material art) and *faiva* (performance art) stand side by side: the making of -cloth (*koka'anga*) is always accompanied by singing and chanting. This explains the unity and execution of reciprocal duties among the social groups taking part in the *tapa*-cloth making, where *ta* and *va* are both practiced. Performance by singing creates the *ta*, and *tapa*-cloth making brings about the social *va* between the participants.

From an anthropological perspective, the Tongan concepts of "such things as the sky, the human body, and social practices such as *lālanga* (weaving) and *koka'anga* or *ngatu*-making" are all "associated with the lineal and the spatial" (Mahina, 2002: 5).[6] *Lalava* is a term made up of two words, *lala* and *va*. This two-word scenario is a common occurrence, especially in the language of art, crafts and society. *Lala* means to intersect, as in the

6. "The celestial bodies in the sky or outer space, or vavā, were treated as kohi 'a velenga, where the points of spatial intersection of imaginary lines form the actual stars and galaxies, of value to navigation and voyaging. In fact, kohi is the older form of tohi, hence tohitohi or kohikohi. The word tohi applies to lālanga and koka'anga, especially when making dried pandanus leaves into fe'unu or fine threads or fibres for weaving, and painting over printed kupesi using koka and tongo 'black-dye' made from treated sap of koka and tongo trees, which are known as tohi lālanga or tohi ngatu respectively." (5) There are parallel analogies.


Figure7: Lalava pattern, Fale Pasifika.

Figure 8: Section of a typical Fale. Drawing by Semisi Fetokai Potauaine based on Tomui Kaloni, 2005.

intersecting of two or multiple lines (*kohikohi*). Thus *kohikohi* is a multiple intersecting of woven cords (coconut sinnet) in lashing, black-dyed *koka* and *tongo* in *tapa* making, lining threads of leaves (*fe'unu*) in weaving and line productions with black ink in tattooing.

Mahina (2002: 6) states that, "in its 'pure' form, the word *lala* evokes a pristine state"—harmony; and that "the notion *lala* lies in close proximity to the concept *noa*, meaning a zero point, which depicts a state of nothingness, emptiness or formlessness" (6). A number of contradictory yet intersecting tendencies are counter-poised, giving "rise to unity, harmony and beauty" (6).

In "Rappel a l'ordre" Frampton also refers to *The Tectonic of the Hellenes*, by Karl Boetticher (1843). Boetticher regarded construction as an appropriate interlocking of two constructional elements. These conjunctions are seen as body forms, simultaneously articulated and integrated. This not only guaranteed the finish of the building material, but also enabled form to acquire symbolic meaning. Boetticher then distinguished between "structural nucleus" and "decorative cladding", in which "decorative cladding" somehow symbolised the status of the "structural nucleus". In the *lalava* of the *fale*, the interlocking of the constructional elements can be easily fitted into Boetticher's position.[7] The *lalava* reiterates the symbolic, and aesthetic, of the *fale*'s tectonics by further intersecting the intersected constructional element. According to the *lalava* master of the *Fale Pasifika*, University of Auckland (2004), Filipe Tohi,

> the *kafa* sinnet used is normally in *kula* or red and *'uli* or black, the spatio-temporal intersection of which eternally reproduces four-sided dimensionality, the colours symbolise men and women, who are physically united and genealogically related in time and space, and connected through procreation … (cited in Mahina, 2002: 5)

In fact, the old Tongan term for copulation and sex is *lala*, and symbolises the physical 'intersection' between male and female, in all animals—but particularly between women and men. Referring to Pierre Bourdieu's analysis of the Berber house (published in 1969), Frampton points out that the Berber house itself constitutes a cosmos in the way in which its tectonic order unites language and the collective beyond the house itself. It is possible to explain certain aspects of the *fale*, the *lalava* and their relationship with the wider society in this way. On the other hand, Semper's "Conception of Style" points at ancient monuments and constructions, emphasising that "they are the free creations of men, who employed understanding,

Firstly, the term kālava refers to both types of the blood vessels, that is, arteries and veins. Kālava then translates into arteries and veins intersecting to form the human body. Secondly, the human brain, which is referred to as the 'uto, is believed to be a collection of (various intersecting) thread-like or fibrous substances (a reference to coconut sinnet). Thirdly, various types and forms of thinking such as vavalo, vavanga, havala, and so forth all refers to their spatio-temporal ta-va, kohi-va or lalava origin. The term Tauhivā literally translates as 'the beating of space' or in a more formal sense means 'nurture the space'. These are all to do with maintaining exchange relationship between so.

7. Similarly, Marco Frascari's essay on the "The Tell-Tale Detail" (in Frampton, 1990: 13) seems to summarise every aspect of the architecture of the fale: it is an art not only for the basic need for shelter, but puts together materials in more than just a meaningful manner. This occurs through 'formal' and 'actual' joints, and it is here that the 'construction' and 'construing' of architecture takes place.

observation of nature, genius, will, knowledge and power" (in Rykwert, 1982: 129).

Following Semper, one could say that *fale* are microcosmic and mirror the law of nature—while not necessarily following natural law. Rather, they are the products of the collective, of society, exactly in the same way as language.

Conclusion

Like other Tongan or Polynesian art, within a system of cultural knowledge the tectonic of the *fale* as a whole remains highly aesthetic. Its construction, from the elevated platform to the roof, involves the whole community. What is created in the *fale's* tectonics reflects people's ways of living, their culture—not just within the confines of the *fale*, but within society as a whole.

As an analogy, the *fale* could be put alongside the Berber house, with the Berber house being stereotomic and the *fale* very 'monolithic' and uniform. However, with all due respect to Frampton and other followers of tectonic theories, the *fale* requires special treatment and special analytical tools. Its ethnic domain must be approached, and *heliaki* must be considered, in order for this architecture to be understood. For example, the fact that the *tufunga lalava* intersected *tufunga fo'uvaka* and *tufunga langafale* might not only confirm that the tectonic of the *fale* is based on the *vaka*, or boat, construction. It may also explain the role of an up-turned boat hull as current metaphor for the *fale* concept.

Lalava, then, is not only a structural necessity for the tectonics of the *fale*, but also an abstraction of society. *Lalava* can, indeed, be put alongside the *knot* as a primordial mode of the tectonic, as Semper conceived it. It is a variety of the knot, a record to hand down cultural knowledge.

The *lalava* of the *Fale Pasifika*, although not structural (due to Building Code requirements), still echo the main essence of *lalava*. Here, the functionality of the *lalava* is far removed (non-structural), but its recording mode and ideas are still present, its messages still as a powerful as in ancient lashing. The patterns created in the *Fale Pasifika* depict, according to Filipe Tohi, the *Lalava* master responsible for the lashing, abstractions not just of academic relationships between Polynesian communities. The work knows no 'geo-political boundaries' and it relates to everything in Oceania. The *Fale Pasifika* is a modern *fale*, highly contemporised to fit modern requirements, intended not just for Polynesian students but for all of New Zealand and for a wider global audience.

Lalava in context is a philosophy, a way of life, which is vulnerable to changes, which are of course part of modern society and technology. But these changes can, as seen in the *Fale Pasifika*, also provide sustenance to Pacific cultures.

Glossary of Tongan terms (Mahina, 2002)

faiva	*Lit*. to do time and space; performance art.
fale	*Lit*. Tongan house.
fe'unu	Noun: fine threads; 'line' made from dried leaves for weaving; verb:sliding along, or readjusting of more than two things; refers to ladies taking position in weaving large mats.

ha'a	Professional class, usually hereditary professional class.
ha'a punake	Class of performance artists.
ha'a tufunga	Class of material artists.
heliaki	To say one thing and mean another; Tongan proverbs; *punake's* profession.
kafa	Sinnet made from coconut fibres; 'lines' for lineal-spatial intersecting.
kohi	Line; writing; older form of *tohi*.
kohikohi	Multiple lines; writing; older form of *tohitohi*.
koka	Black dye made from treated sap of *koka* trees.
koka'anga	Bark-cloth; *tapa*-cloth making; *ngatu*-making.
kula	Red, brownish colour.
kupesi	A design, a blue print, a pattern.
lala	Older term for sex, copulation. Also used as pristine, or nothingness place.
lālanga	Intersecting of line and space; mat weaving.
lalava	Intersecting of line and space; *kafa* lashing.
noa	State of purity, harmony and beauty.
ta	Time; tempo; beat; rhythm.
tongo	See *koka*; black dye made from treated sap of *tongo* trees.
tufunga	*Lit.* 'to do time and space'; material art or artist.
tufunga fo'uvaka	Art of boat building, boat builder.
tufunga lalava	Art of intersecting line and space; lineal spatial sculpture; lashing master; *lalava* master.
tufunga langafale	Art of house-building or architecture; house-builder; master builder.
tufunga tāmaka	Art of stone cutting; stone sculpture.
tufunga tātatau	Art of symmetry-beating (of body); tattooing; body sculpture.
tufunga tātongitongi	art of wood carving; wood sculpture.
tufunga tongi'akau	See *tufunga tātongitongi*.
'uli	Black.
va	Space; social relation.

References

Frampton, K. (1990). Rappel a l'ordre: The case of tectonic. *Architectural design, 60* (3/4), 19-25.

Gifford, E. W. (1929). *Tongan society*. Honolulu (Hawai'i): Bernice P. Bishop Museum.

Kaloni, T. (2005). The architecture of Tonga. *Cross section: NZIA news* (March), 11-15.

Mahina, O. (2002). *Tufunga lalava, genealogy of lines, Filipe Tohi*. New Plymouth: Govett-Brewster Art Gallery.

Refiti, A. (2002). Making spaces: Polynesian architecture in Aotearoa New Zealand. In S. Mallon & P. F. Pereira (Eds.), *Pacific art niu sila* (209-225). Wellington: Te Papa Press.

Rykwert, J. (1982). Semper and the conception of style. In *The necessity of artifice: Ideas in architecture*. New York: Rizzoli.

Stevenson, K. (2002). Lalava-ology: A Pacific aesthetic. In O. Mahina (Ed.), *Tufunga lalava, genealogy of lines, Filipe Tohi* (17-19). New Plymouth: Govett-Brewster Art Gallery.

Wood-Ellem, E. (Ed.). (2004). *Songs and poems of Queen Salote*. Nuku'alofa (Tonga): Vava'u Press.

Chains of Negotiations:

Navigating between Modernity and Tradition[1]

Jeremy Treadwell

Figure 1: Construction and Representation in conflict

1. This discussion is based on my prior experience of the complexity and dilemmas involved in the design and construction of a small traditional faletele at the School of Architecture at Unitec Institute of Technology.

2. Buck's anatomising description of *fale* construction may be seen as an attempt to describe and fix a contemporary tradition as a condition, against which all future *fale* may be judged.

There is no denying the impressive interior space of the University of Auckland *Fale Pasifika*, with its soaring shadowy volume rising above the low band of light at its base. The size of the building has necessitated timbers of impressive dimensions to carry the roof structure. This is indeed a substantial building, a tangible commitment by the University to Pacific culture. This paper discusses some of the intricate dilemmas of its historical and contextual background.

Te Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck) wrote in the introduction to *Samoan Material Culture* that "persistence of custom has led to the retention of much native material culture in Samoa … The need for guest houses kept up the guild of carpenters who … perpetuated the native form of architecture and technique" (1930: 6). Linking custom and material cultural production, Buck emphasised their widespread continuity, concluding that "the [recording of] technique may be useful to the Samoans in days to come when the broadening of the horizon will inevitably lead to the decay of their native arts and crafts"(7).[2]

Woven into Buck's description of the construction of a Samoan guest house—a *fale tele*—are accounts of ceremonies that structured the process. The making of a *fale* is inextricably bound into the social world of politics and economies it was destined to shape. The *fale* simply *was*: it existed in its own time and space, congruent with its social milieu, rather than symbolising something separate from itself. In that sense, the *fale* may be equivalent to Romanesque or Gothic cathedrals in which Peter Eisenman (1984: 155) perceives a lack of signification: "Things were; truth and meaning were self evident … it [the building] was de facto." By contrast, he argues, all buildings from the Renaissance onward "pretended to be 'architecture'"—and "received their value by representing an already valued architecture".

Eisenman's proposition provokes consideration of a parallel condition in the Pacific as a consequence of European colonisation. Pacific and indigenous architecture generally was frequently appropriated by its colonisers (Morton, 2000). An example is the exhibition of Maori houses at interna-

Figure 2: Aligned with the street

tional and British expositions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Samoan *fale* were also variously exhibited in Britain and New Zealand during the 1920s and 1930s. Colonial interest in re-representation led to their excision from their spatial and temporal contexts; they became colonial representations of *fale*. In the wake of these disjunctive interventions, *fale* building is no longer inextricably bound by traditional context. It has become a self-conscious act of the present, in which values of the past are relativised and represented.

Tradition is never a static order which excludes innovation: innovation was highly valued in Samoan tradition. We know of two-storey *fale*, and one *Tufuga-fai-fale* (architect/master builder), Mulitalo, was described as having specialised in a "*fale afolau* (long house) with two smaller rounded ends added in the middle of the long section" (Unesco Office for the Pacific States, 1992: 73). Innovations in the twentieth century have included the use of corrugated steel for the roof, concrete floors, the widespread use of nails, milled timber, and a reduction in the use of lashing. In 1985, when Roger Neich surveyed houses in thirteen villages in Upolu and Savaii, only twenty-two of 887 houses were fully lashed, thatched and framed: "The percentage of traditional thatched, sennit lashed houses in all villages is now minimal" (1985: 21).

These considerations form part of the background of the University of Auckland project to construct a large *fale afolau* as focal point of the new *Centre for Pacific Studies*. If Buck's 1930 textual *fale* is taken as an exemplar of Samoan tradition, what might the huge dislocation in space and time mean for the designers and users of such a building?

Displaced from traditional context, the design of a *fale* becomes, in part, the design of representations. A chain of negotiations arises between elements signifying tradition and requirements arising from the new context. Without binding traditions, things can get complicated, for everything is now at stake: form, structure, function, ornament, and of course spatial context. On what basis are architectural decisions about such things now

made? In an account of the design process, Ivan Mercep of Jasmax was reported as saying

> This system of construction would not meet New Zealand structural standards, particularly since at 26 metres long and 15 metres wide it is much bigger than a traditional Pacific Fale. So the timber poles are connected with unobtrusive bolted steel gussets that are set into the framework. These will be covered with traditional lashings. (*University Fale begins to take shape*, 2004)

This was a decision of considerable significance because it separated architecture from construction. Traditionally, the *fale's* powerful aesthetics were indistinguishable from its structure. Samoan traditional *fale* architecture was enviably 'modern': the experience of the interior's visual complexity and beauty is that of its explicit structure and construction. For Samoan *Tufuga-fai-fale* there was no need to devise the negative detail as shadowy representation—what could be a more explicit statement of function than the lashed joint? The union of elements can be traced with every turn of the *afa* (sennit cord). While Western architecture relinquished the fiction of the modern in the 1980s, unease about covering structure with ornament is still widespread. Within a modern tradition, lashing without structural role becomes ornamental; in a post-modern paradigm, the *fale* acquires an explicitly representational condition.

Figure 3: The lashed joint as an occasional feature

Much appears to have been given away with the decision not take Samoan structural systems seriously. New Zealand's environmental conditions are frequently mentioned to explain architectural decisions. Many environmental risks, however, are related to the country's general seismic conditions, which Auckland does not equally share. However, Auckland occasionally experiences significant storms that endanger buildings. *Fale* were developed within this environment of annual storms, and archaeological records suggest that *fale* have been built in the tropical Pacific region for many hundreds of years. Contemporary observations of the *fale's* general resistance to cyclones suggest that its structural system is worth considering. The large scale of the *Fale Pasifika* was another explanation why traditional principles of construction were abandoned. However, there are photographs of nineteenth century *fale* measuring around twelve metres in height and breadth—dimensions roughly equivalent to the scale of the *Fale Pasifika*. Were the structural operations of the traditional *fale* investigated from an engineering point of view? Such research would be of great value, not only to Pacific studies, but also to the discipline of engineering.

Entering the *Fale Pasifika* is a memorable experience. When crossing the threshold at the top step of the *paepae* (platform) and passing under the low soffit of the roof, the building opens up its soaring interior volume. This experience confirms the understanding of the *fale* as an interior building. It is on the inside surfaces that they reveal themselves. But maybe as a consequence of this building's size, its interior space—in contrast to traditional buildings with their proliferation of timbered complexity—seems strangely empty and mutely incoherent. It is as if Pacific tradition has baffled the West. Standing in the main space and looking up, one notices that the fine traditional thatching astles have been replaced with grooved plywood. On the straight sides of the building, the grooves run vertically (traditionally), and at right angles to the *laau matua* (under purlins), echoing the warp and weft of the Pacific structure. But, astonishingly, the grooved plywood in the round end of the *tala* is run not at right angles with the great curved beams—*fau*, but in parallel, denying all sense of their constructional role.[3]

The building seems to embody the dilemmas faced by the architects in their quest to represent the traditional with the modern. What elements are needed to be present to signify tradition, once traditional construction and structure has been jettisoned? In the selection of familiar elements of a *fale* interior, questions arise as to which ones to use, and how much is enough? While in the tradition of the West 'less is more', in Samoan architecture less is not enough. Consequently, the building lacks the visual complexity of major and minor elements, interwoven in the wonderful texture of Pacific architecture. While some elements were reinstated to operate symbolically, the omission of others such as the *auau* (ridge pole), an element fundamental to wider Pacific architecture, leaves the building incoherent in its representational claims.

Auckland can feel like a subtropical city in summer but, for most of the year, the cold south-westerly winds banish such fantasies. *Fale* were not built for such climates. Their openness is architecturally foreign, even alarming, in a New Zealand context. For a *fale* to be habitable throughout the year, it has to be capable of being enclosed. The designers' response was to deploy a perimeter of glazed aluminium joinery, a mixture of bi-folding doors and louvres, to admit flows of people and breeze. Visually, however,

3. The equivalent in Western architecture would be to run nogs parallel with studs, or the ceiling battens parallel with the rafters.

Figure 4: The interior poutu (posts) structure the space

the glass in dark painted frames hermetically seals the house. Taken seriously, the radical openness of the *fale* tradition offers Western architecture a chance to rethink its strategies of achieving openness in buildings, beyond the ubiquities of aluminium joinery.[4] The 'glazing line' of the *fale* also excludes from the building's interior the important perimeter posts, crucial for setting out social and political hierarchies in the important *kava* ceremony. Here, the architects' judgement was in line with Buck's assessment of the disadvantages of *fale afolau* or long houses (the *Fale Pasifika* is a long house), where the main interior posts obstruct sightlines and where "guests therefore have to sit to the inner side of the supporting posts while the attendants sit between the main posts and the wall posts" (Te Rangi Hiroa, w930: 21). Adroitly, the architects left the perimeter posts visually to structure the exterior of the *fale* without compromising its social utility.

To design a *fale* based on the Samoan *fale afolau*, not just for Samoans but for all Pacific people, seems like an impossibly complex task. Over-generalisation had to be avoided and materials and elements employed that could take the *fale* towards a new, hybrid complexity. Filipe Tohi's lashings might do just that, and provide a beginning for the house to become both an instance of Pacific architecture and a repository of wider Pacific cultural production. Perplexingly, however, they appear to have been abandoned before completion. At the level of the first tie beams, black and russet coloured *afa* are wound into complex geometries, unmistakeable statements of Pacific craft. Above this level though, the lashings are small and occasional, and the rest of the structure is revealed as a composition in *pinus radiata* and galvanised steel—meagre by comparison. The restriction of lashing to just a few locations seems as incongruous as the re-direction of the plywood grooves, and their location suggests that their purpose was indeed to conceal the steel fittings whilst simultaneously evoking tradition, at least at the major structural junctions. This creates a double emptiness. Not only is Pacific construction set aside, but its aesthetic and signifying properties seem also undermined.

The *Fale Pasifika* reveals how difficult it is to build across cultures, but it also seems to offer clues about what may become a new Pacific architec-

4. Failure to rethink rote strategies has, during the period of New Zealand's control of Samoa, similarly led to a misrecognition of openness: in model villages, *fale* were built in straight lines to one side of the *malae* or open ceremonial ground, which had taken on the 'openness' of a parade ground. The "almost ethereal loveliness" of Samoan villages was lost in the view of a contemporary trader (in Austin, 1996: 3). The issue is the extent to which Western planning uncritically defaults to a Cartesian spatial organisation. A *fale* that had swivelled to the openness of Mechanics Bay and unfurled an asymmetrical *malae* space, instead of aligning itself to the street, might have suggested a design concept critically open to Pacific ways of thinking.

Figure 5: Frigate birds in the South Pacific sky

ture: hybrid, contemporary, vigorous and enriching. It will be an architecture based on the recognition of traditional strengths and their adaptation, rather than on unquestioning acceptance of orthodoxies, or their representation as tradition. Tohi's sculptural work offers insights into possible transformations: working from projections of traditional Tongan lashing, Tohi has created a public sculpture already recognised for its architectural qualities.[5]

The *Fale Pasifika* is of great significance to Auckland, which already has a number of *fale* buildings. Its designers took a risk that others avoided: they navigated along a line running between modernity and tradition. In doing so, they stretched across great voids to connect two worlds. That the architecture was sometimes out of reach can only indicate the great difficulty of the project.

5. Tohi's *Halomoana* sculpture, gifted to New Plymouth by Terry Boon, was praised for its architectural implications. The piece outside the Onehunga Public Library is equally complex and three-dimensional.

References

Austin, M. (1996). *The Mau movement and the model villages in Samoa*, Paper presented at 'Loyalty and Disloyalty in the Architecture of the British Empire'. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference of the Society of Architectural Historians of Australian and New Zealand, pp. 1-7.

Eisenman, P. (1984). The End of the Classical. *Perspecta* (21), 154-173.

Morton, P. A. (2000). *Hybrid modernities: Architecture & representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition*. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.

Neich, R. (1985). Material Culture of Western Samoa: Persistence and Change. *National Museum of New Zealand Bulletin 23* , pp. 1-66.

Te Rangi Hiroa. (1930). *Samoan material culture* (Vol. Bulletin 75). Honululu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum.

Unesco Office for the Pacific States. (1992). *The Samoan Fale*. Bangkok: Unesco Regional Office for the Pacific.

University Fale begins to take shape. (2004, March). Retrieved 10 July, 2005, from http://www alumni.auckland.ac.nz/2527.html

The Open: Man and Animal[1]

Review by Maria O'Connor

1. Agamben, G. (2004). *The open: Man and animal* (K. Attell, Trans.). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

2. Bartoloni, P. (2004). The Stanza of the self: On Agamben's potentiality. *Contretemps* (5, December).
To contextualise this description that traces Agamben's thinking on the spatial-temporal condition of the open, Bartoloni seeks to excavate Agamben's interstitial moment between literature and philosophy: the dispute between literature and philosophy that culminates as two different positions of the genres of a self, i.e., we exist either in (poetic) language, or through (philosophically enquiring) language. The writer's attention to a more radical position on subjectivity is thought of with respect to Agamben's project of language and the self, whereby the potentiality (the openness of a radical other presence) for being is characterized by "the zone of presence that is determined to play its own potentiality, including inpotentiality, to the full, that is prepared to let

The open is nothing but a grasping of the animal not-open. Man suspends his animality and, in this way, opens a 'free and empty' zone in which life is captured and a-bandoned [*ab-bandonata*] in a zone of exception.
   —Agamben (2004: 79)

They all inhabit the *interim*, the interzone of the 'meanwhile' where action and process are rejected for what I like to call the 'waiting'; that is the interstitial time in which, and this is essential, the notion of what-one-is-waiting-for is all of a sudden unimportant and irrelevant. The 'waiting' is that zone inbetween concrete and tangible 'homes' in which [language] investigates the meaning of an absence, of that which should have come, or should come or will come but is not here yet.
   —Bartoloni (2004: 13)[2]

Caesura: Standing Still in an Opening

Perhaps Agamben's central motif in *The Open* is that of the *caesura*—the stand-still—that holds our thinking, across any thinking of regions between man and animal; for in this book these regions are, in some way, always intimately linked—not only serving philosophical enquiry, but all enquiry that has questioned this relationship (theology, ecology, medicine, biology etc.)—and, for Agamben, a radical re-entry, ethical in its impetus, into a genealogical analysis for an outside to humanism and all its problematic implications. Let us enter *The Open* in the middle that demarcates a shift in the book's intonation; a tonal register that has implicitly shifted from retroactivity to potentiality. Here Agamben concludes the section on the *Anthropological Machine*, a machinic characteristic of instrumental humanist thinking that we associate with the epoch of modernity (and linking this work to his earlier concern with bare life, from the Aristotelian distinction between *bios* and *zoe* to Foucault's concerns with the advent of the biopolitical).[3]

Like every space of exception, this zone is, in truth, perfectly empty, and the truly human being who should occur there is only the place of a ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae

and their rearticulation are always dislocated and displaced anew. What would thus be obtained, however, is neither an animal life nor a human life, but only a life that is separated and excluded from itself—only a bare life. (Agamben, 2004: 38)

Osmotic Languages of Agamben's Waiting

We hover in a reading-understanding of questions of style that asks for another time; another paradigm of thinking, neither wholly constantive nor wholly performative: rather a thinking between both moments, oscillating without the desire for a claim on either position. This thinking of style, style of thinking marks Agamben's *The Open*—a writing style that produces in its brevity something of an interstitial difference—a *waiting*—that allows the reader to gauge what is *really* at stake. *Really?* We wait whilst something surprising reveals itself through this playful performing, whereby each section accounts for a slice of thinking (Foucault suggests knowledge is not for understanding but for cutting) that has radically placed itself into some official doxa on the relations between man and animal. Agamben's *open* lies waiting between each section insomuch as it reveals the linkages which build upon modernity's (humanist) prioritizing of (man's) mastery over things (animals-*himself*) in the world, thereby closing down (or forgetting) the contingent nature of our being.

Indebted to Heidegger, Agamben's *open* is a revealing of a shift in thinking that holds open the wonder of thinking; the *as such* that opposes, as it reveals, the dominance of instrumental logic wherein a culture of technology has become our central way of relating to the world. Here animals are ex-*positions*, revealed as things (not beings) that we relate to insofar as how we can use them; and in using them (as in the way of technicity), our own enslavement is produced—a reference to Heidegger's warning in his essay "The Question Concerning Technology", for instance, that the forgetting of being is paradoxically dangerous, for in the essence of technology (which is nothing technological) humanity can be saved, as what is acutely recognizable is the way in which we have forgotten being. And in *The Open* Agamben does something akin to Heidegger, whereby the essence of man is revealed through our relation (a kind of non-relation) to animals. And more so here, in the open—interstitial *waiting*—style of this small book, where between the brevity of each section we find a larger field opens up around the middle of the book. This larger moment of openness structures the book into two marked parts. The first is marked by a kind of wisdom that revisits dominions of thinking (philosophy, theology, politics, medicine, biology etc.), exposing through their singular question the secured borders between human and animal: an exposure of thinking of difference both culminating in, and producing constantive accounts of man's placing himself over and above all other beings in the world. In short, this is an effect of Western thought that has produced *the* humanist condition, which Agamben names efficiently as the *anthropological machine.*

The title for Agamben's book is ultimately taken with respect to Heidegger's reciprocal gesturing for a revealing of being through positions of openness and closedness, or unconcealedness and concealedness. In Heidegger's thinking of animal as 'poor-in-world', within its poverty the animal possesses openness through captivation. Man is not poor-in-world as *he* is able to recognize other beings in the world (that is not environment).

the 'in language' free to roam within the 'through language'". To quote Agamben (on such radical presence): "Only when we succeed in […] experiencing our own impotentiality do we become capable of creating, truly becoming poets. And the hardest thing in this experience is not the Nothing or its darkness, in which many nevertheless remain imprisoned; the hardest thing is being capable of annihilating this Nothing and letting something, from nothing, be" (Agamben, 1999: 253). So, in writing a 'review' (some kind of intepretation through and in reading), on Agamben's *The open: Man and animal*, it is important to sense in what language we dwell in order to move through, not so that some kind of progression as an account of man's dysfunctional relation to animal is confirmed as producing some kind of nihilistic cultural condition (marked in particular by the epoch of modernity), but rather to become productive in experiencing our own impotentiality as a not remaining in the darkness of the Nothing but a coming into an open relationship with it such that letting something, from nothing, be.

This presence is not the presence associated with metaphysics but rather is the promotion of a crossing of communities (for example, those of philosophy and literature) that dislocates knowing through the attempt at possessing (language and its object of) or keeping it (object of language/language of object) at a distance in order for possession to take place. Rather, Agamben's openness brings the near and the far together in a rearticulation of singularity and subjectivity into a domain in which 'suchness' (Agamben's such as it is, or, being-such) acquires its own possible actuality; an actuality which is obviously incommensurable with the universalizing concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity. Agamben's such as it is or being-such is characterized by a community of self. This condition or state is not calculable (i.e. we think

again of a turn—not towards something but a turn/move simply in itself); it is incomplete, in the sense that it is something unstructured by the universal. "Suchness", according to Agamben, is that which "presents itself as such, that shows its singularity. … The antinomy of the individual and the universal has its origin in language". *The Open* collects many singular recountings of discursive practices, of disciplinary genres, of relations between men and animals, and in multiplying the as such of brief interstitial accounts we (readers) arrive in and at the same time through Agamben's language: "an extra-temporal … the time of pleasurable plenitude … a time not, in other words, the eternal" (Bartoloni, 2004: 12). We read Agamben's language as an attempt at the coming community of a pure 'now', the interim—not dependent upon a projected future point at which it will be come whole. And so, we may read *The Open* as Agamben's performative genre, whereby the question of community is bound to his ethics of a taking-place that celebrates the pleasure of difference; each insight into man and animal offers something intelligent and stupid, authentic and inauthentic, potential and impotential.

3. See Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life* (D. Heller-Roazen, Trans.). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Although, as Agamben states, Heidegger's ontological paradigm of truth is the conflict between concealedness and unconcealedness, it is a paradigm of thinking that has its originary thinking in a paradigm of politics. Agamben wants to point to two things here that ultimately address his *Open*.

First, Heidegger is still ensnared by the oppositional thinking that he seeks to overturn. Even though animal is poor-in-world (occupying some small place in man's 'world'), animal is truly outside the zone of the *polis* (the essential place of man) with its discordant dialectics between concealedness and unconcealedness. For example, "in our culture, the decisive political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the animality and the humanity of man. That is to say, in its origin Western politics is also biopolitics" (80). And second, since animal is only capable of (non)recognizing the being of man through being closed in/to *his* world, then it is truly through the (thinking of the humanist) *anthropological machine* that animal is allowed to be: "If humanity has been obtained only through a suspension of animality, and must thus keep itself open to the closedness of animality, in what sense does Heidegger's attempt to grasp the 'existing essence of man' escape the metaphysical primacy of *animalitas*?" (73)

Idling

Locating the thetic moment of *The Open* in the middle of the book with Heidegger's paradoxical *holding* pattern that keeps *humanitas* and *animalitas* (of man) quite separate, we sense how Agamben is indebted to Heidegger's thinking with respect to a closure to metaphysical thinking. For a post-historical enquiry, this has meant a turn that allows for a Foucaudian engagement with respect to genealogical questioning. This, in turn, takes us back to the book's beginning: the engagement with an image of the Last Judgment, where humans are given animal heads, an image that starts with the end of history (a world after end of the world-post-judgement) and culminates in the metamorphosis of man and animal. And so Heidegger acts as the central hinge, as that moment that (re-)turns thinking from the very ground of Western thought and opens up a new ground. A suspended spike is placed into the wheels of a dominant (perhaps now idling) *anthropological machine*, which has claimed much of the ground for thinking the question of being human, separate from animal. Its rise and history had made possible the most 'logical' outcome of a thinking that permits the stripping of humanity from human beings: "From the beginning, metaphysics is taken up in this strategy: it concerns precisely that *meta* that completes and preserves the overcoming of animal *physis* in the direction of human history" (79).

In its concluding moments the book opens onto another kind of relation, outside dialectical and humanist thinking, another caesura, another hiatus of the decidability of man or animal—something truly unnameable (via Walter Benjamin, whose dialectics were always idling, at a standstill): "The machine is, so to speak, stopped; it is 'at a standstill', and, in the reciprocal suspension of the two terms, something for which we perhaps have no name and which is neither animal nor man settles in between nature and humanity and holds itself in the mastered relation, in the saved night" (83). For Agamben, as for Benjamin before him, the *anthropological machine* is out of play.

Félix Guattari

Architectural Enunciation[1]

Translation by Tim Adams

For thousands of years, perhaps by imitating crustaceans or termites, human beings have been encasing themselves in all kinds of shells. We are ceaselessly secreting buildings, clothes, cars, images and messages that cling to the flesh of our existence like flesh clings to the bones of our skeletons. Nevertheless, there is one major difference between men, crustaceans and termites, which is that the last two species haven't for the moment been found to include any corporations of architects, artisans and media "pros". Be that as it may, for a very long time, the delineation of social assemblages has been largely due to ecolithic expressions such as the building of ziggurats, the demolition of the Bastille, or the capture of the Winter Palace. Only now, besides stone having been replaced by concrete, steel and glass, the cleavages of power occur above all in terms of the speed of communication and the control of information. Under these conditions architects don't even know which hero to turn to! What use would Le Corbusier be today in a place like Mexico City, that grows uncontrollably towards 40 million inhabitants! Even someone like Haussmann would be useless here because the politicians, technocrats and engineers now manage this sort of thing with the least possible contribution from the men of that art that Hegel once placed on the bottom rank among all other arts. Admittedly architects do maintain a minimal window of control[2] in the domain of extravagant buildings. But positions in this area come at a high price, and unless they consent to become postmodern dandies, which the politico-financial schemes always imply, the lucky few are subjected to a deceitful degradation of their creative talents. They channel their energies into pure theory, utopia, or a nostalgic return to the past.[3] Alternatively, although the times hardly seem to lend themselves to this, there is the possibility for critical contestation.

The architectural object flies to pieces. It is useless to cling to what it has been or should be. Situated at the intersection of political stakes of the utmost importance, of demographic and ethnic tensions, of economic, social and regional antagonisms that are by no means nearing resolution, spurred on by constant technological and industrial mutations, the architectural object is irreversibly condemned to being tugged and torn in all directions. Nothing infers, however, that we should take an eclectic course of action in such a state of affairs, which on the contrary demands an exacerbation of the ethico-political choices that have always underlain the practice of this profession. From now on it will be impossible to take ref-

uge behind art for art's sake or pure science with a clear conscience.[4] To reinvent architecture can no longer be taken to mean the revival of a style, a school, or a theory with hegemonic tendencies, but rather to recompose the *architectural enunciation,* and in a sense, the *métier* of the architect under today's conditions.

When architects stop trying simply to be plasticians of built form and begin to offer their services as revealers of the virtual desires of space, place, journeys and territory, then they will have to analyse the relations between individual and collective corporeities by constantly singularising their approach. And furthermore they will have to become intercessors between those desires revealed to themselves and those interests they oppose; in other words, they will have to be artists and craftsmen of perceptual and relational lived-experience [*vécu*]. Obviously, I have no particular desire for them to lie down on the psychoanalyst's couch so they can come to terms with such a decentring of their role. On the contrary, I believe they are in the position of having to analyse for themselves certain specific functions of subjectivation.[5] For this reason they will be able to constitute, along with many other social and cultural operators, an essential relay within the multi-headed assemblages of enunciation that can deal with the contemporary productions of subjectivity, both pragmatically and analytically. Consequently, this is far from placing the architect in the role of simply being a critical observer.

The emphasis having thus shifted from object to project, an architectural work, whatever the characteristics of its semiotic expression and its semantic content may be, will now require a specific elaboration of its enunciative "material": how should one practice architecture today? What part of themselves do architects need to mobilize? What kind of commitment should they be making and which operators should they use? What relative importance should they give to the developers, the engineers, the town planners, and the users, both actual and potential? Up to what point will they be justified in making compromises with the various parties involved? It's a matter of a highly elaborate transferential economy, and one that I will now examine from the point of view of the two forms of consistency of the enunciation of an architectural *concept*:

—The first one polyphonic, of the *perceptual* order, inherent to the deployment of the components concurrent with its discursive coming into existence; and
—The second one ethico-aesthetic, of the *affective* order, inherent to its non-discursive "coming into being".

The Polyphonic Component*s*

Under the category of scale, Philippe Boudon has listed twenty ways of conceptualising the architectural object, all essentially based on the category of space. He then proposes to regroup these into four categories:

—Scales that refer real space to itself (geographical, optical visibility, proximity and apportional scales);
—Scales that refer architectural space to an exterior referent (formal, symbolic, technical, functional, extensional, dimension-

ally symbolic, socio-cultural, modelling and economic scales);
—Scales that refer architectural space to its representation (geometric, cartographical, and representational scales); and
—Lastly, scales of architectural thought processes that involve a constant to-ing and fro-ing between different spaces (to "put into scale", "give scale" etc.).[6]

One could no doubt list other components of this type, but from the point of view of enunciation rather than a simple taxonomic enumeration of modes of spatialisation, it is evident that their number is potentially infinite. In fact, all of the virtual enunciations can drift into the vicinity of the architectural object. As Henri von Lier writes, "a significant work of architecture always has the ability to be other than what it is. A dwelling is not dwelling *per se*, but refers to dwelling: it is one of its possibilities appearing as such."[7] Nevertheless, I have selected eight kinds of assemblages from this continuous spectrum of virtual enunciations to reflect those "voices" that seem to me to be active in contemporary architecture.

1. A geopolitical enunciation taking into account not only the orientation of cardinal points but also the contours of the land and the climatic and demographic givens, which evolve over long periods like Fernand Braudel's secular trends causing the centre of gravity within "an archipelago of towns" to drift according to the fluctuations of the world-economy.[8]

2. An urbanistic enunciation relative to the laws, regulations, habits and customs, concerning the size of parcels of land, the arrangement and volumes of buildings, as well as the mechanisms for contamination between various models and images (referring to what Philippe Boudon calls the scale of proximity). The interlocutors here can take the hard form of local authorities and state bodies or the "fuzzy" form of a collective state of mind, opinions more or less controlled by the media.

3. An economic enunciation, the capitalistic expression of relations of force between the different systems of individual and collective valorisation: the use of a relative evaluation of costs and demand in terms of projected profits, prestige, political impact and social usefulness to fix the exchange value of real-estate property and to "drive" the choices and scales of investment in the domain of construction.

4. *A functional enunciation* or function of equipment that considers built spaces according to their specific uses. Collective equipment as well as equipment for private use becomes integrated into a double network of:

a) "horizontal" complementary relations positioning each constructed segment in the set of urban structures now interconnected within world capitalism,[9] and
b) "vertical" relations of integration ranging from the micro-equipment (lighting, ventilation, communication, etc.) up to the infrastructural macro-equipment.

6. See Boudon (1971; 1972; and 1975).

7. See van Lier (1985: 554).

8. See Braudel (1992: 76-82). The world economy is the largest zone of consistency in any given period and in any global field, a sum of individualised economic and non-economic spaces that usually transgresses the limits of other large groupings of history. François Fourquet, under the term *écomonde*, has undertaken a systematic theorisation of the conceptions of Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein in *La richesse et la puissance. Publication provisoire: Commissariat général du Plan, Convention d'étude* (1987).

9. Cf. my study in collaboration with Eric Alliez (1984: 273-287).

As Paul Virilio writes:

Today ... the essence of what we insist on calling urbanism is composed/decomposed by these transfer, transit and transmission systems, these transport and transmigration networks whose immaterial configuration reiterates the cadastral organisation and the building of monuments. If there are any monuments today, they are certainly not of the visible order, despite the twists and turns of architectural excess. No longer part of the order of perceptible appearances nor of the aesthetic of the apparition of volumes assembled under the sun, this monumental disproportion now resides within the obscure luminescence of terminals, consoles and other electronic night-stands.[10]

10. See Virilio (1991: 21-22).

Consequently, the collective enunciators here will be:

—The social stratifications according to resources, age group, regional characteristics, ethnic divisions, etc.
—The social bodies sectored according to their specialised activities of an economic, cultural nature or by a state of assistance (internment, incarceration, etc.).
—The programmers, experts, and technicians of all sorts, having the position of stating the constraints and norms of architectural writing.

11. See Boudon (1972: 17).

5. A technical enunciation implying that the equipment and, more generally, the construction materials "speak" in terms of fixed standards, stating, for example, "the slope of a roof according to the relative permeability of the material employed, the thickness of a wall according to its load, the dimensions of a material according to its ease of handling, transportability or implementation."[11]

The relay of interlocutors here no longer only includes building engineers but also chemists, who every month invent new materials, electrical and communication engineers, and eventually all the technical and scientific disciplines.

6. A signifying enunciation whose aim, independent of functional semantemes, is to allocate a significant content to a built form, which is shared by a more or less extensive human community, but which is always delineated by all the other communities not sharing the same type of content. We rediscover several of Philippe Boudon's scales here. At one scale a building comes to embody a symbolic form independent of its size (for example, the cross plan of Christian churches). At another scale, the plan of an ideologically explicit model is transferred to a construction (the ideal city of Vitruvius; the rural, industrial and commercial cities of Le Corbusier). At yet another scale, a more or less unconscious socio-cultural scheme intervenes (such as the central courtyard that Arab builders probably inherited from Roman antiquity). Or at another even more vague scale, a global style is conferred onto an urban settlement (such as the self-enclosed character of a small Tuscan town, being the opposite extreme of North American ag-

glomerations that open onto a transfinite spatium and cling, as best they can, to the flow of motorway traffic).

7. An enunciation of existential territorialisation that is as much of an ethological order as of a perspective one, in which I will locate the three types of spaces distinguished by Vittorio Ugo.[12]

12. See Ugo (1987a and 1987b).

—Euclidean spaces under the ægis of Apollo, univocally positioning an object identity within the framework of an axiomatico-deductive logic in which is inscribed a "primary and elementary architecture in all the clarity of its crystalline perfection, always identical to itself and devoid of any ambiguity or internal contradiction". — Projective spaces under the ægis of Morpheus, positioning forms of a modulated identity within metamorphic perspectives, affirming the primacy of "the imaginary above the real, vision above speech, extension above usefulness, the plan above perception". — Labyrinthine topological spaces under the ægis of Dionysus, functioning as existential space[13] according to a geometry of the envelopment of the tactile body that already refers us to the register of affects.

13. In the sense that Martin Heidegger gives this term in "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1975: 143-161).

Architectural space is one concrete operator among others in the metabolism between objects on the outside and intensities on the inside. But even if the interplay of correspondences between the human body and its habitat has been explored continuously, from Vitruvius to Leonardo da Vinci and Le Corbusier, perhaps it is henceforth less a question of considering these correspondences from a formal point of view than from one that could be described as organic. As Massimo Cacciari writes, "Any authentic organism is labyrinthine".[14] And let's not forget that the labyrinthine (or rhizomatic) characteristics of existential territorialisation can have multiple fractal dimensions.

14. See Cacciari (1980).

8. A scriptural enunciation that articulates all the other enunciative components. Because of the diagrammatic distance that it introduces between expression and content, and through the coefficients of creativity that it generates, architectural projection promotes new potentialities, new constellations of universes of reference, starting with those which preside over the deployment of ethico-aesthetic aspects of the built object.

The Ethico-Aesthetic Ordinates

Architectural enunciation is not limited to these diachronic discursive components: it is just as much a matter of the capture of consistency within synchronic existential dimensions, or ordinates on a level. Following Bakhtin[15] I will distinguish three types:

15. I refer here to the three categories of enunciation (cognitive, ethical, aesthetic) proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin (1990: 257-325).

—Cognitive ordinates, namely the energetico-spatio-temporal coordinates that pertain to the logic of everything discursive. It is in this register that the scriptural enunciation of architecture concatenates the first five types of assemblages of enunciation listed above. —Axiological ordinates, including all the systems of anthropo-

16. [See Guattari (1996: 110), where Guattari compares painting, which for the ruling classes has never been more than a "supplement of the spirit", a currency of prestige, to architecture that has always had a major role in forming territories of power, fixing its emblems and proclaiming its durability.—Trans.]

17. See Klein (1950).

18. See Winnicott (1958).

19. [The key text for Sartre's concept of commitment is his short book, What is Literature?, where he writes, "the 'committed' writer knows that words are action. He knows that to reveal is to change and that one can reveal only by planning to change. He has given up the impossible dream of giving an impartial picture of Society and the human condition." (13)—Trans.]

centric valorisation of aesthetic, economic and political orders. —Aesthetic ordinates determining the thresholds of completion of entities, objects or structural groups, inasmuch as they are able to transmit meaning and form on their own account. It is up to these ethico-aesthetic ordinates to intertwine the components of signifying enunciations and existential deterritorialization with the other components. Thus the built object, lived reality [*le vécu*] and the incorporeal find themselves rearticulating each other, despite the fact that capitalist corporations are ceaselessly trying to eliminate any trace of subjective singularisation from their architecture and urbanism in an effort to achieve a rigorously functional, informational and communicational transparency.

It should be clear that the singularisation at issue here is not a simple matter of a "supplement of the spirit",[16] a "personalisation" filed away under "after-sales services". It concerns procedures that operate at the heart of the architectural object and grant it its most intrinsic consistency. Under its exterior discursive aspect this object establishes itself at the intersection of a thousand tensions that pull it in every direction, but under its ethico-aesthetic enunciative aspects it reassembles itself in a non-discursive mode, whose phenomenological approach is given to us through the particular experience of spatialised affects. Below the threshold of cognitive consistency the architectural object collapses into the imaginary, the dream or delirium, while below a threshold of axiological consistency the dimensions of alterity and desire are exhausted—like those cinematic images that fail to interest the aborigines of Australia—and below the threshold of aesthetic consistency it ceases to capture the form's existence and the intensities destined to inhabit it.

What therefore defines the art of the architect, in the final analysis, is the capacity to apprehend these affects of spatialised enunciation. But it must be admitted that it concerns paradoxical objects that cannot be delineated by the coordinates of ordinary rationality; they can only be approached indirectly by meta-modelisation, by an aesthetic detour, and by mythical or ideological narratives. Like the part-objects of Melanie Klein,[17] or the transitional objects of Winnicott,[18] this kind of affect establishes itself transversally on the most heterogeneous levels; therefore we must not homogenise them but, on the contrary, engage them further in the fractal process of heterogenesis. Architectural form is not destined to function as a gestalt closed in on itself, but as a catalytic operator setting off chain reactions among the modes of semiotisation, which draw us out of ourselves and expose us to new fields of possibility. The feeling of intimacy and existential singularity contiguous with the aura given off by a familiar situation, an old dwelling or a landscape inhabited by our memories, establishes itself in the rupture of the redundancies emptied of their substance, and can be the generator of a proliferation and lines of flight in all the registers of the desire to live, of the refusal to give in to the dominant inertia. It is the same movement of existential territorialisation and capture of synchronic consistency, for example, that will make things "work" together, things as different as a treasure chest and a shoe box under the bed of a child hospitalised in a psychiatric home, the refrain-password that he perhaps shares with some comrades, the space within the particular constellation that he occupies in the refectory, a totem tree in the playground or a part of the sky

known only to him. The architect's aim, if not to compose a harmonic out of all these fragmentary components of subjectivation, must be at the very least, to allow for all these virtualities and not to mutilate them!

The architect, in order to undertake the recomposition of existential territories in the context of our societies devastated by capitalistic flows, must be able to detect and processually exploit all the points of catalytic singularity likely to establish themselves, not only in the perceptible dimensions of the architectural apparatus, but also in its formal composition and in the most complex institutional problematics as well. All the cartographic methods that can help achieve this will be valid since their *commitment*[19]—let's not shrink from this old Sartrean concept that has been taboo for too long—will find its own regime of ethico-aesthetic automisation. The only criterion of truth confronting the architect will then be the effect of an existential completeness and an overabundance of being, which will never be absent so long as he has the good fortune to be caught up in a process of becoming-an-event, that is to say, the historical enrichment and re-singularisation of desire and values.

References

Bakhtin, M. (1990). The problem of content, material, and form in verbal art. In M. Holquist & V. Liapunov (Eds.), *Art and answerability: Early philosophical essays by M. M. Bakhtin*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Boudon, P. (1971). *Sur l'espace architectural: Essai d'épistémologie de l'architecture*. Paris: Dunod.

Boudon, P. (1972). *La ville de Richelieu*. Paris: AREA.

Boudon, P. (1975). *Architecture et architecturologie*. Paris: AREA.

Braudel, F. (1992). *Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, Vol. III: The Pperspective of the world* (S. Reynolds, Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cacciari, M. (1980). Eupalinos or architecture. *Oppositions* 21 (Summer 1980).

Fourquet, F. (1987). *La richesse et la puissance. Publication provisoire: Commissariat général du Plan, Convention d'étude 984*. Paris.

Gaudin, H. (1984). *La cabane et le labyrinth*. Brussels: Pierre Mardaga.

Girard, C. (1986). *Architecture et concepts nomades: Traité d'indiscipline*. Brussels: Pierre Mardaga.

Guattari, F. (1989). L'énonciation architecturale (291- 301). In *Cartographies schizoanalytiques*. Paris: Galilée.

Guattari, F. (1996). The Postmodern Impasse. In G. Genosko (Ed.), *The Guattari reader*. Cambridge, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Guattari, F. with Alliez, E. (1984). Capitalistic systems, structures and processes. In *Molecular revolution: Psychiatry and politics* (R. Sheed, Trans.). London: Penguin Books.

Heidegger, M. (1975). Building dwelling thinking. In *Poetry, language, thought* (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row.

Klein, M. (1950). *Contributions: Contributions to psycho-analysis*. London: Hogarth Press.

Programmation, architecture et psychiatrie. *Recherches* (June, 1967).

Sartre, J.-P. (1970). *What is literature?* (B. Frechtman, Trans.). London: Methuen & Co.

Ugo, V. (1987a). *L'objet architecture*. Paris: Minuit.

Ugo, V. (1987b). Une hutte, une clairiere. *Critique* 476/477.

van Lier, H. (1985). *Encyclopaedia universalis*. Vol. II, Section 1. Paris.

Virilio, P. (1991). *The lost dimension* (D. Moshenberg, Trans.). New York: Semiotext(e).

Winnicott, D.W. (1958). *Collected papers: Through paediatrics to psychoanalysis*. London: Tavistock.

Models for Living: 1905 – 2005

A survey of 100 years of New Zealand Residential Architecture.
An exhibition presented at the Auckland War Memorial Museum
8 April – 19 June 2005

Review 1 by Peter Bartlett

The exhibition, in celebration of the centenary of the NZIA, comprised fifty scale-model houses designed by architects and delicately crafted by students—all pure white in paper and card. They represented a selection of New Zealand domestic architectural designs whose scope ranged from 1905 to 2005. The exhibition was supported by video projections of David Mitchell's "The Elegant Shed" and the Hamish Keith/Bill Saunders documentary "The City and the Suburbs".

Not surprisingly, since model making is daunting, the representative house selection is a thin one. Presumably, the range of models will be augmented for future exhibition elsewhere. Modeling of this precision is irresistible both to gaze and hand, captivatingly tantalizing, and more so here when protected from grasp. Yet while each model on its abrupt white pedestal exalts and focuses, it is also deprived of any evidence of external elements important to the design's genesis. The visual triggering available, and the perception that follows, are derived from a finite architectural object without context, rather than from any interaction with an environment. Our own mental stock of notional environments may compensate a bit, but only roughly so.

What these exquisitely detached models of detached houses preclude is our perceptual grasp of the often specific and crucial design influences and living experiences that lie beyond these mostly suburban dwelling exteriors in the wider spaces of site and landscape. Nor can we convincingly comprehend interiors as indicators of designed ways-of-life, or as influences on exterior form. Though one can revel in the often voluminous living spaces, one can hardly do so at all in the variety of plan arrangements, which remain unrevealed in the models. Thus, one design seriously

Figures 1 and 2: The model display in the 'concrete gallery'.
Photos Tim Adams.

misrepresented is Mike Austin's Chapple house—one struggles to recognize the house without its pohutukawa pivot and its black lava brink. More satisfying, however, is the exception: Andrew Patterson's Summer Street courtyard house, where site-is-house-is-model. Plans and site plans would have enabled this fuller comprehension in other cases, as too might have the alternative medium of digital and photographic modeling, with the added advantages of permitting a much increased range of house samples, as well as a means of readily reproducing them all.

The similarities and differences of external form are most discernible across the range, being uncomplicated by pronounced material or colour cues. The stuttering evolution of suburban dwelling form and composition—its elaborations and reductions—is superbly highlighted for scrutiny.

The suburb has clearly scored as the main testing ground for creativity, even though, as the models demonstrate , at the end of the century architectural intrigue and merit are irresistibly wedded to wealth. Wealth-driven residential work that excels in keeping abreast or ahead of this testing tumult defies canonisers, mostly because of its inherent freedoms and non-conformity—at least until that work chooses to embrace the pangs of negative reinforcement which sustainability imperatives now confront it with.

Canon seeking amidst this turbulence is history's privilege and, increasingly, one which must compound and mediate international as well as local acts and readings of architecture. While canons to the (new) right seem illusory, canons to the left of us might have a chance. Low to middle income levels equate with conservative, slower-changing habits and more

normalized tastes. Moreover, a prospect arises of eventually looking back on residential minor canons, about to be created under the stimuli and constraints of two intensifying challenges: sustainability, and the intensification of suburban nodes and arteries, the latter tending to an anti-suburban typology.

What this house show is about is the fixation of the creative edge and the resources of designers and their times. The ignition of engagement in any matrix of ideas, opportunities and constraints, by which an architect is motivated, is inevitably ephemeral. Thus, on reflection, two impressions suggest themselves: first, the fate of award-winning buildings is to become familiarized, type-cast, and diluted by commodification. Secondly, an inevitable benefit of this fate is to register, through their durability, memorials to their times. Domestic architecture leaves rich, tell-tale traces of swings in design and life aspirations. For future cultural epidemiologists, celebrated house designs, together with their 'trickle-down' hybrids in the community, will afford good litmus tests of wider social trends.

Whilst the worlds of the café, the restaurant, retail and recreation have known well how to draw upon stage settings and practices for their theatricality, their humanity, and certainly their farce, most urban office and institutional environments have evolved into places of comparative abstraction. These places bear little resemblance either to the former, or to the creative vitality of home places. Is this adequate, or not? Will it persist, or is likely that prolonged familiarity with such workplace minimalism, with abstraction a relentless conditioning basis, presumes a confident shift towards greater abstraction in future dwelling environments?

Figures 3 and 4: Thompson House (Auckland). Architect Rewi Thompson, 1985. Photos Vincent Kar

What's the collective noun for a gathering of architects? How about a 'muttering'? As the opening night of Auckland Museum's *The New Zealand House* proceeded, initial murmurings in the reception area gave way to more audible grumblings. Some homonymic confusion at the drinks table? ("More whine, sir?") No; the cause of the discontent lay elsewhere—upstairs, in two first-floor exhibition galleries. There, displayed in three vitrines, were the *Models for Living*: forty-eight, 1:50-scale, card models of New Zealand houses, all in white, seemingly innocent, and perversely provocative.

Some criticism was predictable. In any exhibition, curatorial decisions—what's in, what's out—invite dissent. But the particular issue that vexed some viewers of *Models for Living* was the question of context, or rather, the lack of it. The gist of the slightly slurred complaints was that the exhibition reduced architecture to object, an impression strengthened by the austerity of the 'concrete galleries', the paucity of information about the displayed models, the lack of supporting material, and captions that were either confusingly placed or non-existent. (One vitrine had thirteen models, but only nine captions.)

The shortcomings of the captions suggested fumbles under deadline pressure, but the curators could plead mitigating circumstances to some of the other charges. Originally, curator Charles Walker had intended to augment a larger exhibition (one hundred models for one hundred years!) with architectural drawings and photographs, but a budget cut meant a scaled-down show. So: half the number of models, no plans or photos, and collateral material reduced to a few text boards and looped screenings of two episodes of David Mitchell's 1984 television series "The Elegant Shed" and one undated Televison New Zealand documentary on state housing.

Thus truncated, did *Models for Living* get a compensatory boost from the other displays gathered under the rubric of *The New Zealand House*? Not really; this was one show in which the whole was not greater than the sum of its parts. Immediately outside both concrete galleries was a case occupied by Stephen Brookbanks' models of Rangitoto Island baches. Coloured models of *ad hoc* structures placed outside rooms with white models of

Figures 4-6: Chapple House (North Shore, Auckland). Architect Michael Austin. 1969. Photos Krzysztof Pfeiffer

architect-designed houses: whatever the motivation for the juxtaposition, it was a graphic expression of design apartheid. Around the corner was *Houseworks*, Monique Redmond's series of small portraits of houses picked out in computer-programmed embroidery. As with those scale-model ocean-liners assembled from match-sticks, one can appreciate the effort, while wonder at the point. And one floor up, reached via the militaria department and so far removed from the rest of *The New Zealand House* that it should have been given refugee status, was an abbreviated version of Wellington City Gallery's Ernst Plischke exhibition. Rather strange to be ushered into the presence of an émigré from Nazism with "*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*" ringing in one's ears …

Models for Living, then, did not get much in the way of contextual assistance from its exhibition mates. Visitors had to make what sense they could of the displays, and the rewards offered by a 'reading' of the models were probably a function of design literacy. In this respect at least, the exhibition visitors' books were interesting documents. Some visitors were enthusiastic ("Models are excellent—showing the structure explains it all", wrote one), some were dismissive ("Flat-roofed houses are impractical"), and the odd one clearly was odd ("Life is difficult—but we are here to live peacefully"). A few visitors lamented the exclusion of certain architects ("Athfield? Walker?"), and some regretted the absence of topography ("The models are well done—but what about the site? Is lack of context a typical NZ response?").

"It would be great if the models were on turntables, as you needed to see the work as whole," wrote another visitor. An intelligent point, if rather naïve: without sturdy protection the white models would have been tagged or bagged before one could say Vladimir Cacala. (An exaggeration? In one

visitors' book the message "Yo fuk yo, Black Power" was exceptional not for its obnoxiousness but its legibility.) What may have been in the back of some visitors' minds was the exhibition of architectural models of contemporary Japanese houses presented by Auckland's Objectspace gallery last June. At that small exhibition, also curated by Charles Walker, viewers could practically poke their noses into the standalone white card models.

At the Objectspace exhibition there were some misgivings about 'object architecture' but also a more relaxed appreciation. What made Auckland Museum's model show more contentious is that it was closer to home. *Models for Living* mated objectification with canonisation—an alliance sure to alienate those who know too little (much of the public) and those who know too much (all the architectural Nick Hornbys with their lists of top Kiwi houses).

Apart from anything else, *Models for Living* prompted a stimulating consideration of the issue of how architecture can be displayed. We all know there's no substitute for being there, and we all realise being there is often impossible. Having witnessed the effort that went into the preparation of *Models for Living*, I prefer to take the glass-is-half-full approach. Perhaps the exhibition was oversold (canny marketers always under-promise and over-deliver) but attendance was a reasonably happy experience—if not a haptic one.

PARADISE
Looking For Exits

John Pule

June 2005: MAU performs PARADISE at Theater Der Welt, Germany, and Holland Festival, Netherlands

I have glimpsed Paradise in the North, West, South, East. So where is it? Lemi Ponifasio, the choreographer of PARADISE, a theatre piece with generic aspects of surrealism and Polynesian realism, familiarizes us with the notion that reality is not what we anticipate.

The Kunstmuseum in Basel, Switzerland, is home to two Gauguin paintings: one of a market, with Tahitian women carrying fruits to the market; and *Nafea Faa Ipoipo*, young girls available for marriage. In the background of both works is a scene Western viewers associate with Paradise: lush forests, green, healthy fruits, colour, and the sense that the land is still virgin emerges. Next door is Holbein's *The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb*.

In the Stuttgart Staatsgalerie, another Gauguin painting, *E haere eo I hia*, is separated by a hallway from Holbein's gloomy *Stations of the Cross*. Holbein's Western Paradise has Jesus as its doorway. Gauguin's setting is in the Pacific.

The West is inundated with brochure information and advice on how to get there. The idea of that doorway to Paradise has been sold to Pacific Islanders: the weekly Sunday donations to the church are a lifelong lay-by for entry tickets for the family. Getting there is not so easy. But the painting *Tahiti Revisited*, by William Hodges, which he brought back from his journey with Captain Cook to Tahiti, shows a tropical lagoon where salubrious smiling girls cavort carefree through luxuriant foliage—images that have provoked wonder, lust and longing since first exhibited at the Royal Academy in London 1776.

At the Theaterhaus Stuttgart, MAU perform PARADISE, a sequence of narratives that voices the boundaries of orientation. Its imagery relates to how the nations in Moananui a Kiwa are treated by individuals, communities, Hollywood, and militarily and economically advanced countries. America and France use Pacific soil and air to store, commercialize, parody, bully, and test nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The meaning of Paradise has been packaged by Westerners as a deal that includes eternal sun, endless golden sandy beaches and ocean. Unfortunately, this package also included the nations and people of Polynesia.

Characteristic of Lemi Ponifasio's visual universe is the manifestation and presence of an imagined, cognitive world. In PARADISE, that world is damaged. Paradise is treated as a unique species, a sickly animal conjured up from the past and reinterpreted for theatre. There are only two

colours, black and white. At the same time, it encompasses the mystery of this world of ideas. Ponifasio resuscitates and uses metaphors to reveal, through audio, film, oratory and dance, the impact of colonialism, the invasion of diseases, the debasement of images of Pacific peoples—but also the triumphant memories of past histories.

Motifs of transition, birth of humankind along with monstrous creatures, migration, protest, reconciliation, thresholds and borderlines emerge. These include the use of Maori and Samoan orators and Tongan dance, drawing the eye from an organized interior to the outside world and vice versa: lizards, light, mountains, birth, horror, dance, water, and the forever present use of darkness. Light is an intriguing device and is used vehemently by MAU lighting designer Helen Todd to instigate growth (in this case, creating an exterior reminiscent of Polynesian Pulotu and architecture).

For me, it is the structure of one word that lines much of Lemi Ponifasio's ideas: Va. Inside this word, transparent materials are created out of the desire to articulate the truths, the joys and the fears of living in Moananui a Kiwa; Va is home to Polynesian ancestors, our heroes, dark kings and queens, our poets, singers and writers of prose.

Albert Wendt in his epic poem describes poetically this Va: *Inside us the dead,/ Woven into my flesh/ Like the music of bone flutes.*

Restless spirits, original footage of Bikini Atoll, and forebodings are the haunting qualities of PARADISE: images disconnected from the world of dreams, in settings that usually embody memories of Polynesian mythologies and the advancement of televised horrific pictures of war, famine, and the invasions of countries by America and its allies.

The performance attracted considerable attention, and generated an immense reaction from the audiences in Stuttgart and Amsterdam. We were taken on a rich and powerful journey through various plateaus of Maori procedures of the Powhiri. This foundation and obligation having been established, the performance began. Powerful. Enigmatic.

MAU is composed of musicians, orators and artists from different Pacific nations. This plays an important part in how we perceive and experience reality, in itself a huge uncompromising force of strengthening ties and obligations to each other. Some of the most defining imagery for me was the performers' voices, which gave shape to the mountains that we all must climb so as to see, understand and feel the distance we must travel … in order to achieve jurisdiction over our own stories and destinies.

Contributors to this issue

Dr. Mark Jackson is currently a Senior Lecturer in Spatial Design at Auckland University of Technology. Prior to this he has held lecturing positions at the Faculty of Architecture, University of Adelaide and at the Sydney College of the Arts, the University of Sydney. He gained his Ph.D. in Architecture at the University of Sydney in 1994. Jackson was a Visiting Scholar in the Faculty of Architecture at MIT in Boston in 1996, and a *Gastdozent* in the Faculty of Architecture, University of Karlsruhe, Germany in 2003-04. He has published in the fields of design history and theory, the visual arts, film and media as well as architecture and landscape architecture. He has had a number of film and video works exhibited internationally. His current research focus is on ethics and design cultures. mark.jackson@aut.ac.nz

Dr. Laurence Simmons is Associate Professor in the Department of Film, Television and Media Studies at The University of Auckland. His recent publications include *Freud's Italian Journey* (Rodopi) and a co-edited volume From *Z to A: Žižek at the Antipodes* (Dunmore). l.simmons@auckland.ac.nz

Dr. Sarah Treadwell is a registered architect and a Senior Lecturer at the School of Architecture, National Institute of Creative Arts & Industries, The University of Auckland. She teaches architectural design and lectures on issues of architectural representation. Her research areas include analyses of images of architecture in the South Pacific and New Zealand, and the architecture of volcanic landscapes and unstable ground. She also writes on contemporary fine art practices that reference architecture. s.treadwell@auckland.ac.nz

Paul Veart is a postgraduate student in the Master of Creative and Performing Arts—Film and Television, Department of Film, Television and Media Studies, The University of Auckland. His interests lie in writing and directing short films and anime. He has worked in local and international film productions in a variety of roles.

Dr. Peter Wood holds a Ph.D. in architectural theory from The University of Auckland and is currently a Senior Lecturer in Architecture at Victoria University, Wellington. He has an ongoing research interest in the relationship between the environmental responsiveness of the human animal and architectural experience. peter.wood@vuw.ac.nz

Albert Refiti born and brought up in Samoa, is an architectural designer, historian and theorist; currently lecturing at the Auckland University of Technology School of Art and Design. He has worked in architecture in Auckland and London, and written extensively on indigenous knowledge and identity formation in architecture and art of the Asia Pacific region. His current research explores the rethinking of Pacific concepts in light of temporal technologies and digital/virtual design. albert.refiti@aut.ac.nz

Dr. A.-Chr. (Tina) Engels-Schwarzpaul is Associate Professor in Spatial Design, School of Art and Design, Auckland University of Technology. Recent publications include "Ways of Appropriating—Culture as resource and standing reserve" and "Internationalism, Education and Governmentality: Critical perspectives" (with Elizabeth Grierson). She is currently working on a book *Trading Images: Culture as Resource and Practice.*

Dr. Ross Jenner teaches architecture at The University of Auckland and occasionally practices. He has worked in New Zealand, Britain, Finland and Switzerland and has taught at several universities in Australia and the United States. He has a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He has exhibited and published in the US, Italy and Australasia. With students and other members of faculty, he designed and built the Auckland School of Architecture's winning entry to the 1991 Biennale di Venezia: "43 Schools from around the World", recipient of the Venice Prize. He was Commissioner for the New Zealand Section of the XIX Triennale di Milano, 1996. He is currently writing a book on Italian Rationalism. r.jenner@auckland.ac.nz

Dr. Marco Frascari took up his post as Director of Carleton University's School of Architecture this summer, after teaching at the Architectural Association, Columbia University, Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Georgia Tech, and the Instituto Universitario di Architettura di Venezia. He has won several awards and honours for his projects and is a prolific writer on architectural representation and tectonics. Marco_Frascari@carleton.ca

Deane Simpson is an architect currently based in Zürich. He was educated in New Zealand and at Columbia University in New York City. He collaborated as a project architect with Diller + Scofidio in New York City from 1997 until 2003. He is currently carrying out his own research practice and consultancy while teaching at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zürich. simpson@arch.ethz.ch

Anthony Hoete is a graduate of the Auckland School of Architecture (BArch) and the Bartlett School of Architecture (MArch). He has worked for Nigel Coates, Stefano de Martino, Sauerbruch Hutton Architects, Mecanoo architecten, and is a founding partner of WHAT_Architecture, London. He taught at the Barlett and at the Technical University of Delft, and is currently teaching at the American University of Beirut. He is a registered architect in the Netherlands and in the UK and has, amongst others, published *ROAM: A Reader on the Aesthetic of Mobility* (London: BDP).

Tim Adams currently teaches an Introduction to Architectural Theory course at The University of Auckland. He has been researching and writing about the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari for many years, participating in the 1996 Deleuze Symposium at The University of Western Australia and the 1997 Morphe conference at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. One of his essays on Deleuze and architecture has been translated into German and published in the Cologne magazine *Der Architekt* (December, 2000). He has previously contributed to *Interstices* and is currently writing a large work on the architectural implications of the work of the French philosopher Alain Badiou entitled "Singularity and Event". tada001@ec.auckland.ac.nz

Maria O'Connor lectures in theoretical studies within the disciplines of Spatial Design and Graphic Design, and provides supervision to post-graduate candidates on the Masters and Honours programmes, in the School of Art and Design, Auckland University of Technology. She is currently undertaking Ph.D. research which focuses on an ontological questioning of sexual difference with respect to the genres (and laws) of literature and philosophy. This research topic has an underpinning concern for ethics in the realm of the performative (deconstruction). In respect to the domain of the ethical (and its question to, and of, performativity in language) the research has gained ground(ing) from the philosophical writings of Emmanuel Levinas, Georgio Agamben, Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, and the literary-philosophical writings of Maurice Blanchot and Hélène Cixous. maria.oconnor@aut.ac.nz

Semisi Fetokai Potauaine is fourth year student at the School of Architecture, The University of Auckland. After attending primary and secondary education in Tonga, he studied at Unitec Institute of Technology and graduated with a draughting diploma. During an employment period of several years in New Zealand he visited Tonga several times and came to the realization that the younger generation of people of Tonga had become far removed from understanding its philosophy of life, especially in regard to architecture. Since then, he has been involved in a humble investigation of the architectural identity of Tonga. The idea is not to dig out the past, but to somehow shed some light on the enormity of Tongan culture in terms of its people and architecture. From there followed an interest in the ways in which the architecture of Oceania (in a Tongan context) survived in to the modern era and in the role it has to play in architectural discourses of the 21st century. potty@ihug.co.nz

Jeremy Treadwell teaches Design and History at the School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture, at Unitec. He is currently researching and writing about colonial and indigenous architecture in Samoa and the Cook Islands. In 2003 a traditional Fale Samoa was built under his direction at the School of Architecture. jtreadwell@unitec.ac.nz

Dr. Peter Bartlett is Emeritus Professor from The University of Auckland. He is a practising architect and an expert in theatre design.

John Walsh is editor of *Architecture New Zealand*, which is a bi-monthly magazine which is the official journal of the New Zealand Institute of Architects. Its primary audience comprises practising architects, and its principal focus is the built work of those architects. johnw@agm.co.nz

John Pule is a Niuean poet/artist, who has published two novels and books of poetry.

Notes for contributors

Submission

The manuscript should be submitted in the form in which the author wishes the paper to appear. Preliminary consultation with the editors about the suitability of the article does not guarantee its publication. Authors are strongly encouraged to seek comments from colleagues before submitting a paper for publication.

To facilitate 'blind' reviewing, no references to the author/s, the institution, department or firm or any other form of identification may be included in the paper itself. Papers that include identification will not be reviewed. Author name and details must be supplied on a cover sheet (name of paper, contact details in full, and word length of paper). Three copies of manuscripts should be sent to the editors for consideration, as well as an emailed version in Word. Authors should retain a copy for their own reference. Copies submitted will not normally be returned.

Referee Process: All papers are read first by the editors, then sent to two referees ('blind' reviewers) who will return a referee report and make suggestions regarding suitability for publication, editing, reworking or development of the paper. The recommendations will be forwarded to the writers for reworking before the paper is accepted and edited for publication.

Final submission: When a paper is accepted for publication, the author(s) will be asked to forward it electronically with the following file name: interstices(issue number)_author name_final.doc. The editors reserve the right to make amendments, alterations or deletions to articles without consulting the author(s) so long as such changes do not affect the substance of the article. Usually, the authors will be consulted about such changes. Authors are responsible for obtaining permission to publish images or illustrations that are copyrighted with their papers and will be asked to sign a declaration to that effect.

Abstract Paper must be accompanied by a short abstract (100-150 words) on a separate sheet of paper.

Length Refereed papers should not exceed 5000 words (including title, main text and endnotes). Non-refereed full papers should not exceed 2500 and reviews should not exceed 1000 words. Longer papers are only accepted in special circumstances.

Biographical Note Include a short bio-note of the author(s) on a separate page (50-100 words).

Format

Manuscripts should be typed in double-space throughout, one side of paper only, A4, with 2.5 cm margins all around. Use standard fonts such as *Times* or *Arial* and format the text in 12pt. Do not separate paragraphs by extra paragraph marks. Use only one empty space between sentences. Do not use more than one consecutive tab for formatting and use hanging indents for consecutive lines. All titles and subtitles must be in Title Case (lower case, with Caps. for first word). Justify all text.

With few exceptions, the *Interstices* format follows APA conventions as stipulated in the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (5th edition, 2001). For reference see http://www.apastyle.org.

Unlike APA, however, in-text citations should be formatted as follows: (Author, year: page number(s), i.e. (Rykwert 2000: 78-9). See further details below.

Layout tables on a separate page, with as few lines as possible, and indicate the placing of the table in the text with a note [Insert Table 1 here]. Tables should be numbered in arabic figures with a clear identifying legend.

Use **endnotes,** not footnotes, in all manuscripts.

Graphics or images Should be provided on good quality white paper and on separate sheets. Also send digital file, saved as JPG, in anticipated size and publishable quality (300dpi).

Quotations Double quote marks around a quoted word, phrase, or sentence, as follows:

Heidegger would make this point very clear in later two essays, in which he introduces the "*primal* oneness" of the fourfold where "to be 'on earth' already means 'under the sky'" as a counter to a world in a process of planetary dissolution, in which "everything is washed together into the uniform distancelessness" (1954: 149), and "airplanes and radio sets are … among the things closest to us" (1975: 21). Note that a quote within a quote uses single quotation marks.

If the quotation is 40 words or more it must be indented (left indent only) and does not have quotation marks around the whole quote. Quoted words inside the body of the 40 words are indicated in single quotation marks. e.g.

> The axonometric drawings of Sartoris can be considered ... the locus of a cognitive transcendence: in the finished perfection of the design, where geometry discloses its suprahistorical authority, the architect-theologian catches the 'philosophical and poetic matrix' of the new architecture in the mirror of the 'dreamt image', and anticipating the ends by the mastery of the means, prefigures a reality to come … (Reichlin 1978: 91) Note that if a word or group of words is omitted from the quotation then three stops are used with a space before and after (see above).

References Type the sub-heading *References* at the top of a new page. References should be formatted as 'hanging indent' style. Do not use tabs. Set up 'hanging indent' by selecting 'Paragraph' in Format menu in Word. Be sure to reference every author and text cited in the body of the paper. Incomplete references will not be accepted. Authors are encouraged to use Endnote software (Version 6 or higher). Examples:

Book:
Leatherbarrow, D. (2000). *Uncommon ground: Architecture and topography*. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.

Translated book:
Agamben, G. (2004). *The open: Man and animal* (K. Attell, Trans.). Stanford (Ca): Stanford UP.

Edited book:
Hawkins, G., & Muecke, S. (Eds.). (2003). *Culture and waste: The creation and destruction of value*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

Corporate author:
Ministry of Education, Te Tahuhu o te Matauranga (2000). *The arts in the New Zealand curriculum*. Wellington: Learning Media.

Chapter in book:
Parry, B. (2002). Directions and Dead Ends in Postcolonial Studies. In D. T. Goldberg & A. Quayson (Eds.), *Relocating postcolonialism* (66-82). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Article in journal:
Leeuwen, T. A. P. v. (2001). Columns of Fire: The Undoing of Architecture. *Hunch* (4, Winter), 63-81.

Unpublished paper:
Jackson, M. (2001). Radical Gestures. Auckland: Auckland University of Technology. Unpublished Paper.

Newspaper article:
Hattersley, R. (2002, Friday August 30). The Silly Season. *The Guardian*, 18.

Thesis:
Jenner, R. G. (2005). *Building in the air: Aspects of the aerial imagination in modern Italian architecture.* Unpublished Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

On-line references:
Humanities Society of New Zealand/Te Whainga Aronui (HUMANZ) (2000b). *Knowledge, Innovation, and Creativity: Designing a knowledge society for a small, democratic country*. Wellington: Ministry of Research Science and Technology. Retrieved November 23, 2001, from http://www.morst.govt.nz/publications/humanz/Humanz.htm

Frascari, M. (2000). A Light, Six-Sided, Paradoxical Fight. *Nexus Network Journal, 4*(2 Spring). Retrieved 22 February, 2001, from http://www.nexusjournal.com/Frascari_v4n2.html.

For further examples of electronic sources, please consult the APA website at http://www.apastyle.org/elecsource.html.

Brendan O'Brien

"Without an architecture of our own we have no soul of our civilisation"

Architecture New Zealand

To contribute, contact johnw@agm.co.nz
To subscribe, visit www.agm.co.nz